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Security Intelligence
and Response Team
@maestretti
jobs.netflix.com/teams/security
SIRT
TECH & CULTURE
CULTURE
DETECTION
Technology
Culture
medium.com/netflix-techblog/
jobs.netflix.com/culture
CULTURE
FnR
Freedom and Responsibility
Our goal is to inspire people more than manage them. We
trust our teams to do what they think is best for Netflix
There are a few important exceptions to our anti-rules
pro-freedom philosophy. ... keeping our members’
payment information safe, have strict controls around
access. Transferring large amounts of cash from our
company bank accounts has strict controls. But these are
edge cases.
In general, freedom and rapid recovery is better than
trying to prevent error. We are in a creative business, not a
safety-critical business. Our big threat over time is lack of
innovation…
CULTURE
CONTEXT
Context Not Control
There are some minor exceptions to “context not control,” such as an urgent
situation…
FEMA Incident Command System - https://training.fema.gov/
CULTURE
FULL CYCLE DEVELOPERS
https://medium.com/netflix-techblog/full-cycle-developers-at-netflix-a08c31f83249
https://medium.com/netflix-techblog/how-we-build-code-at-netflix-c5d9bd727f15
PRODUCT
CI/CD TECH STACK
‘Baking’ Virtual Machine images, called Amazon Machine Images (AMIs),
from source (instead of configuring servers on the fly as you would with
Chef/Puppet) provides a strong baseline for forensics.
Any changes to be made to a server (instance), are made in code, checked
into source control, and built into a new AMI - then new servers (instances)
are deployed from this new AMI.
Containers deploy the same way.
https://www.spinnaker.io/
PRODUCT
MICROSERVICES
Deploying multiple copies of
the same AMI not only scales
load, but creates a peer
group to compare against,
allowing us to surface
suspicious differences in our
fleet.
https://github.com/Netflix-Skunkworks/diffy
CORPORATE
LISA
Our corporate model relies
heavily on SaaS and the
services we do run are
launched in our cloud the
same way as our product.
We isolate and devalue our
user endpoints, then seek to
protect our core assets in the
cloud.
No lateral network access
(LISA), no Active Directory, no
network shares (GDrive). https://www.slideshare.net/BryanZimmer/location-independent-security-approach-lisa
CORPORATE
SCOPE
Identity is our perimeter. We
seek to control access to our
cloud resources through Single
Sign On and User Behavior
Analytics.
We make access decisions
based on strong identity and
device health checks.
https://github.com/Netflix-Skunkworks/stethoscope-app
Technology and Culture are formative.
Our technology stack supports new approaches to security problems. We try to
solve the easy problem, instead of the hard one.
Our culture enables smart risk taking and aligns incentives to produce positive
outcomes.
SUMMARY
Trainman -
Learnings from a
detection platform
Security Data Science Colloquium - 06/11/2018
Siamac Mirzaie, Science & Analytics
Motivation
Corporate Apps
2-year Growth
40%
Corporate App Users
2-year Growth
460%
2018 Content Investment
$ 8B
Share learnings for better
collaboration
Stack
Visualization
There is more to it than just detection
Ingestion Detection Post-Processing
Learnings
“Can you folks do some machine learning
on my app’s data?”
Three components to a viable use case
Business
impact
Audit log
data
Analytically
tractable
“The thing is, we don’t have past examples of
malicious behavior”
Compensating for the lack of ground truth
Security
analyst
feedback
Red team testing
“Wait, why was this categorized as
abnormal?”
Making an output explainable
Data
enrichment
Algorithms
transparency
Decomposable
ranking of
anomalies
“Also, some people always use this resource,
others don’t”
Working around data sparsity
More complex
feature engineering
Uncovering
entity
personas
Picking the right
model
“This is a mathematical anomaly,
not a business one”
Curbing false positives
Ensemble
approach
Post-processing
of anomalies
“This used to be an anomaly…
but not anymore”
Keeping up with behavioral drift
Dynamic
models/thresholds
“That finally looks good. Can we make it
faster?”
Shrinking time-to-detection
Stream
processing
Combination of
simpler anomaly
detectors
“We have a new use case, can you build
another detector?”
Handling use case quantity and variety
Repeat
Identify
use case
categories
Pre-implemented
functionality
Thank You.
Backup Slides.
CULTURE
Netflix Culture Memo - jobs.netflix.com/culture
1. Encourage independent decision-making by employees
2. Share information openly, broadly and deliberately
3. Are extraordinarily candid with each other
4. Keep only our highly effective people
5. Avoid rules
Our core philosophy is people over process. More specifically, we have
great people working together as a dream team. With this approach, we
are a more flexible, fun, stimulating, creative, and successful organization.
Freedom and Responsibility
Our goal is to inspire people more than manage them. We trust
our teams to do what they think is best for Netflix
There are a few important exceptions to our anti-rules
pro-freedom philosophy. ... keeping our members’ payment
information safe, have strict controls around access. Transferring
large amounts of cash from our company bank accounts has
strict controls. But these are edge cases.
In general, freedom and rapid recovery is better than trying to
prevent error. We are in a creative business, not a safety-critical
business. Our big threat over time is lack of innovation…
Context Not Control
There are some minor exceptions to “context not control,” such
as an urgent situation...
Full Cycle
Developers
https://medium.com/netflix-techblog/full-cycle-developers-at-netflix-a08c31f83249
CULTURE
MEMO - 1
Netflix Culture Memo - jobs.netflix.com/culture
1. Encourage independent decision-making by employees
2. Share information openly, broadly and deliberately
3. Are extraordinarily candid with each other
4. Keep only our highly effective people
5. Avoid rules
Our core philosophy is people over process. More specifically, we have great people
working together as a dream team. With this approach, we are a more flexible, fun,
stimulating, creative, and successful organization.
SECURITY LEARNING
ORGANIZATION
Mary Landesman - Threat Intelligence
https://www.linkedin.com/in/marylandesman/
Forest Monsen - SIRT Security Engineer
https://www.linkedin.com/in/forestm/
Steve Zenone - SIRT Security Engineer
https://www.linkedin.com/in/zenone/
BROCADE
Alex Maestretti - SIRT Manager
https://www.linkedin.com/in/maestretti/
Swathi Joshi - TPM Response
https://www.linkedin.com/in/joshiswathi/
Kevin Glisson - SIRT Security Engineer
https://www.linkedin.com/in/joshiswathi/

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Netflix SIRT - Culture and Tech -Trainman

  • 1. Security Intelligence and Response Team @maestretti jobs.netflix.com/teams/security
  • 3. CULTURE FnR Freedom and Responsibility Our goal is to inspire people more than manage them. We trust our teams to do what they think is best for Netflix There are a few important exceptions to our anti-rules pro-freedom philosophy. ... keeping our members’ payment information safe, have strict controls around access. Transferring large amounts of cash from our company bank accounts has strict controls. But these are edge cases. In general, freedom and rapid recovery is better than trying to prevent error. We are in a creative business, not a safety-critical business. Our big threat over time is lack of innovation…
  • 4. CULTURE CONTEXT Context Not Control There are some minor exceptions to “context not control,” such as an urgent situation… FEMA Incident Command System - https://training.fema.gov/
  • 6. https://medium.com/netflix-techblog/how-we-build-code-at-netflix-c5d9bd727f15 PRODUCT CI/CD TECH STACK ‘Baking’ Virtual Machine images, called Amazon Machine Images (AMIs), from source (instead of configuring servers on the fly as you would with Chef/Puppet) provides a strong baseline for forensics. Any changes to be made to a server (instance), are made in code, checked into source control, and built into a new AMI - then new servers (instances) are deployed from this new AMI. Containers deploy the same way.
  • 7. https://www.spinnaker.io/ PRODUCT MICROSERVICES Deploying multiple copies of the same AMI not only scales load, but creates a peer group to compare against, allowing us to surface suspicious differences in our fleet. https://github.com/Netflix-Skunkworks/diffy
  • 8. CORPORATE LISA Our corporate model relies heavily on SaaS and the services we do run are launched in our cloud the same way as our product. We isolate and devalue our user endpoints, then seek to protect our core assets in the cloud. No lateral network access (LISA), no Active Directory, no network shares (GDrive). https://www.slideshare.net/BryanZimmer/location-independent-security-approach-lisa
  • 9. CORPORATE SCOPE Identity is our perimeter. We seek to control access to our cloud resources through Single Sign On and User Behavior Analytics. We make access decisions based on strong identity and device health checks. https://github.com/Netflix-Skunkworks/stethoscope-app
  • 10. Technology and Culture are formative. Our technology stack supports new approaches to security problems. We try to solve the easy problem, instead of the hard one. Our culture enables smart risk taking and aligns incentives to produce positive outcomes. SUMMARY
  • 11.
  • 12. Trainman - Learnings from a detection platform Security Data Science Colloquium - 06/11/2018 Siamac Mirzaie, Science & Analytics
  • 15. 40%
  • 17. 460%
  • 19. $ 8B
  • 20.
  • 21. Share learnings for better collaboration
  • 22.
  • 23. Stack
  • 24. Visualization There is more to it than just detection Ingestion Detection Post-Processing
  • 25.
  • 26.
  • 28. “Can you folks do some machine learning on my app’s data?”
  • 29. Three components to a viable use case Business impact Audit log data Analytically tractable
  • 30. “The thing is, we don’t have past examples of malicious behavior”
  • 31. Compensating for the lack of ground truth Security analyst feedback Red team testing
  • 32. “Wait, why was this categorized as abnormal?”
  • 33. Making an output explainable Data enrichment Algorithms transparency Decomposable ranking of anomalies
  • 34. “Also, some people always use this resource, others don’t”
  • 35. Working around data sparsity More complex feature engineering Uncovering entity personas Picking the right model
  • 36. “This is a mathematical anomaly, not a business one”
  • 38. “This used to be an anomaly… but not anymore”
  • 39. Keeping up with behavioral drift Dynamic models/thresholds
  • 40. “That finally looks good. Can we make it faster?”
  • 42. “We have a new use case, can you build another detector?”
  • 43. Handling use case quantity and variety Repeat Identify use case categories Pre-implemented functionality
  • 46. CULTURE Netflix Culture Memo - jobs.netflix.com/culture 1. Encourage independent decision-making by employees 2. Share information openly, broadly and deliberately 3. Are extraordinarily candid with each other 4. Keep only our highly effective people 5. Avoid rules Our core philosophy is people over process. More specifically, we have great people working together as a dream team. With this approach, we are a more flexible, fun, stimulating, creative, and successful organization. Freedom and Responsibility Our goal is to inspire people more than manage them. We trust our teams to do what they think is best for Netflix There are a few important exceptions to our anti-rules pro-freedom philosophy. ... keeping our members’ payment information safe, have strict controls around access. Transferring large amounts of cash from our company bank accounts has strict controls. But these are edge cases. In general, freedom and rapid recovery is better than trying to prevent error. We are in a creative business, not a safety-critical business. Our big threat over time is lack of innovation… Context Not Control There are some minor exceptions to “context not control,” such as an urgent situation... Full Cycle Developers https://medium.com/netflix-techblog/full-cycle-developers-at-netflix-a08c31f83249
  • 47. CULTURE MEMO - 1 Netflix Culture Memo - jobs.netflix.com/culture 1. Encourage independent decision-making by employees 2. Share information openly, broadly and deliberately 3. Are extraordinarily candid with each other 4. Keep only our highly effective people 5. Avoid rules Our core philosophy is people over process. More specifically, we have great people working together as a dream team. With this approach, we are a more flexible, fun, stimulating, creative, and successful organization.
  • 49. Mary Landesman - Threat Intelligence https://www.linkedin.com/in/marylandesman/ Forest Monsen - SIRT Security Engineer https://www.linkedin.com/in/forestm/ Steve Zenone - SIRT Security Engineer https://www.linkedin.com/in/zenone/ BROCADE Alex Maestretti - SIRT Manager https://www.linkedin.com/in/maestretti/ Swathi Joshi - TPM Response https://www.linkedin.com/in/joshiswathi/ Kevin Glisson - SIRT Security Engineer https://www.linkedin.com/in/joshiswathi/