World Bank Governance, securities Regulation

1. 1 ResearchconductedbyArthurMboue
Laws relatedto voice reform at the WorldBank Group
A yearago, I knewalreadythe candidate Iwill support. Itwasaround12:30 PM thatThursday,my friend
whois a republicanbutnota Trump fan wasdrivingme fromVA to DC library,I toldhimthat onlyTrump
couldbeatthe Clintons withtheircombined80yearsof experience. AndI didadd that I diddecide tohelp
himso I will take aleave tohelp himonline while masteringthe World BankGroup.Why the WorldBank
Group? I have a great respectof that institutionandIhave beentryingtoscore a lot of friendsoverthere.
But, thingswere notgoodat that time,a least three of myfriendsandlong-time employeesof the ‘Bank’did
resigntojoinothersinstitutionsforthe same reason‘the WBG Presidentmanagerial style’andinadditionI
was informedaboutWorldBank employeesprotestsinside the Bank mainbuilding. Thatsaid,I letmyself
believeitwill be averyeasytransitionfrommy excellentcorporate andgovernance sectorcoupledwith
financial regulationasaSEC expert. But,inpractice, itrequiresalotof new knowledge,fromthe corporate
securitieswhichisamandatorydisclosure law, relatedtonew conceptsvotingpower,full timeboard,
constituenciesandmore. Asyoumay recall byreadingmypast posts,the WorldBank Group isimmuned
fromany lawsfromits members,all 189 countriesincludingUSA,maybe because of the welfare tiedtoits
founding. To speedforwardthe deliveryandacceptance of the IMF membership includesinthe Bretton
WoodsAgreementActsignedbyHarryTruman it statesthat onsection2 “ The Presidentishereby
authorizedtoacceptmembershipforthe UnitedStatesinthe international monetaryFund(hereinafter
referredtoas the ‘Fund’),andinthe international Bankfor Reconstruction andDevelopment (hereinafter
referredtoas the ‘Bank’),providedforbythe Articlesof Agreementsof the Fundandthe Articlesof
Agreementsof the Bankasset forthinthe Final Actof the UnitedNationsMonetaryandFinancial
Conference datedJuly22,1944, anddepositedinthe archivesof the Departmentof State.”
Thingsare worse whenitcomestothe review of the WorldBankGroup creation. Asyou know itis one of
the oldestandpowerful welfare ‘Bank’inthe World. PleasereadEdwardMason(G?) andRobert Ashes
(1973), the WorldBank since BrettonWoods,WashingtonDC,BrookingsInstitution,p.29“The United
NationsMonetaryandFinancial Conference,betterknownasthe BrettonWoodsConference,tookplace
overthree weeksinNewHampshire,USA,inJuly1940…..The governance of the International MonetaryFund
was consideredfirstandtookup mostof the initial week’sdiscussions. Forreasonsof time andconvenience,
the delegatesappliedtothe WorldBankthe same governance structure theyhaddesignedforthe IMF.”
SimilaritiesandDifferences:IMFand WorldBank
IMF WorldBank
Leadsby a Managing Director Leadsby a President
Can be its memberwithoutbeingaWorldbankmember Must be a IMF memberinorderto applyforits membership
189 membercountries 189 membercountries
2,300 employeesfrom182 membercountries 10,000 employeesfrom180 membercountries
Has $215 Billionof fullypaidinquotas Has authorizedcapital of $184 Billionof whichmemberspay
inabout 10 percent
Assistall members industrializedandDTC Has borrowingandnon-borrowermembercountries
 Overseesthe international monetarysystem
 Promotesexchange stabilityandorderlyexchange
relationsamongitsmembercountries
 Seektopromote the economicdevelopment
 Seektoend extreme poverty

2. 2 ResearchconductedbyArthurMboue
Are theyimmuned fromthe US rules,maybe? One of the oldestandpowerful regulatorybodyof most
financial affairs inthe world isthe SEC. It was createdonJune 6, 1933 witha missiontoprotectinvestors,
maintainfair,orderlyandefficientmarketsandfacilitate capitalformation. Itscommissionersare chosenby
the US PresidentanditreportstobothUS CongressandUS President. Itsdivisionsandoffices seektodetect
and addressviolationsandpotentialproblemsinthe securitiesmarket. InApril 2011, in response tothe SEC
requesttosubmitcommentletter,the WorldBankGroupand IMF corporate counselsstatedthatall
transactionsof the WBG were integratedtothe developmenteffectivenessof the MDB’s (Multilateral
DevelopmentBanks) andthatanyattemptsto regulate suchactivitieswouldviolate the WBGandother
MDBs privileges andimmunities.
Havingsaidall that I want you to imagine thatthe Ohio,aviationstate,mandidfire andchase out a lotof
staff at the bank. Andyou have beenhired fromthe corporate orothernon MDB sector to structure the
incomingvoice reform event.Whatisthe voice reformisthe firstquestiontoanswer?
VOTINGRIGHTSREALIGNMENT TARGET ANDFUNDING
Before Phase 1
(pct
point
increase)
target
Phase 2 (pct
point increase)
target
After
IBRD Developed
countries
57.40 -1.46 -3.13 52.81%
votingpower
Each member receives votes (one vote foreachshare ofthe bank’s capital stockheldby
the member country)plus basic votes (calculatedso that the sum of all basic votes is
equal to 5.55percent of the sum of basic votes andshares votes forall members
countries)
Developing
countries
42.60 1.46 3.13 47.19 %
votingpower
IDA Developed
countries
59.9 N.A -5.49 54.41%
votingpower
Each member receives thevotes it is allocatedunder IDA replenishment accordingtothe
rules establishedin each IDA replenishment resolution. Votes consist of subscription
votes andmembership
Developing
countries
40.1 N.A 5.49 54.59%
votingpower
IFC Developed
countries
66.59 N.A -6.07 60.52 voting
power
Each member receives votes consistingof sharevotes (onevoteforeach share ofIFC’s
capital stock heldby the membercountry)plus basic votes (calculatedso that thesum of
all basic votes is equal to 5.55percent of the sum of basic votes andsharervotes for all
members countries)
Developing
countries
33.41 N.A 6.07 39.48%
votingpower
MIGA Developed
countries
N.A Must maintain
votingpower
parity between
developed
countries and
DTC
(Developing
andtransition
countries)
50.03%
votingpower
Each member receives votes consistingof sharevotes (onevoteforeach share ofMIGA’s
capital stock heldby the membercountry)plus parityvotes, calculatedso that the
aggregate number of votes of category1 andcategory2 members is the same. Members
choose which category they want tojoinat the time of membership. Category1,
members were originally definedas developedcountries andcategory 2 members as
developingcountries
Developing
countries
N.A 49.97%
votingpower
Funding
strategy
 Exceptional
allocationof
7,117 shares
to 16 DTC
 Establishment
of Voice
Trust fund
 General
Capital and
Selected
Capital
increases of
725,876
shares
including
70,000
already
authorized
but
Funded IBRD with SelectedCapital Increase with
 75% of the total SCI andshare allocatedon the basis GDP (economic weight)
 20% on the basis of financial contributions (IDArecognition)
 5% on the basis of the development andprotectionof the smallest poorcountries
 Funded by selectedcapitalincrease of 230,374shares ($27.8 Billionwith paidin of $1.6Billion)
 Formula used: .75 shares forEW + .2 shares forfinancial contribution + .05 shares for development contribution
FoundedIDA subscription by the donorfinancingestablishedunder the name Voice Trust Fund(BTF)with $1.2Billion
FoundedIFC subscription with $200Million capital increase,that means 200,000shares (1 share= $1,000)(130,000
authorizedforthe event and70,000 shares already authorizedbut unallocated)

3. 3 ResearchconductedbyArthurMboue
unallocated
were
approved
In the corporate world,whenthe companyfacesangry majorinvestors,the VPforinvestorrelation
(communication)callsthemandputsthemonthe company investornewsalerts;he sendsthemanalysts’
reportsaboutthe investingonhiscompany,recentCEO/CFOanalystscalls,annual reportof the company
and more. He mayalso requestthe CEOto meetwiththemonscheduledlunchordinner meetingswhere
theywill talkaboutnewproducts,newpartners,strategytomaximizingshareholdervalue andneutralizing
competitors andmore. Atthe same token,the VPforcustomerservice will call,survey andmeetwithmajor
angry customerstotalkabout howthe companyis helpingthe customertosave intermof qualityof his
companyproductsversusitscompetitors’products,the convenience anddeliveryof service andthe like.
Trend in VotingPower of The Top 8 ShareholdersCountries
Countries World
Bank
Divisions
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
IBRD 16.39 16.36 16.09 15.63 15.19 15.02 16.16 16.63
USA IDA 12.16 11.24 11.09 10.86 10.76 10.70 10.47 10.33
IFC 23.63 23.59 23.59 22.70 23.69 21.52 20.99 20.99
MIGA 14.94 14.95 14.98 14.99 15.00 15.02 15.02 15.02
IBRD 4.30 4.30 4.22 4.13 4.01 4.06 3.93 3.94
UK IDA 5.37 5.25 5.46 5.56 5.61 5.92 6.04 6.17
IFC 5.11 5.02 5.11 4.85 5.04 4.60 4.48 4.48
MIGA 4.02 4.02 4.02 4.02 4.02 4.03 4.03 4.03
IBRD 7.85 7.88 9.62 9.24 8.48 8.13 7.49 7.19
JAPAN IDA 9.53 8.83 8.74 8.61 8.59 8.59 8.45 8.44
IFC 5.96 5.86 5.86 5.65 5.87 6.16 6.01 6.01
MIGA 4.20 4.21 4.21 4.21 4.21 4.22 4.22 4.22
IBRD 4.30 4.30 4.22 4.13 4.01 4.06 3.98 3.94
FRANCE IDA 4.04 3.82 3.86 3.81 3.82 3.82 3.82 3.79
IFC 5.11 4.57 5.11 4.85 5.04 4.60 4.48 4.48
MIGA 4.02 4.02 4.02 4.02 4.02 4.03 4.03 4.03
IBRD 4.48 4.48 4.41 4.62 4.50 4.56 4.38 4.21
GERMANY IDA 6.30 5.84 5.68 5.56 5.55 5.54 5.46 5.42
IFC 5.44 4.36 5.44 5.16 5.36 4.90 4.77 4.77
MIGA 4.18 4.19 4.19 4.19 4.19 4.20 4.20 4.20
IBRD 2.78 2.78 2.73 3.31 5.47 5.25 4.63 4.64
CHINA IDA 1.88 2.06 2.06 2.06 2.07 2.08 2.12 2.20
IFC 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.01 1.01 1.72 2.36 2.30
MIGA 2.63 2.64 2.64 2.69 2.64 2.64 2.64 2.64
IBRD 2.78 2.78 2.73 2.52 2.37 2.27 3.03 2.91
SAUDI ARABIA IDA 3.30 3.17 3.19 3.19 3.21 3.24 3.24 3.24
IFC 1.26 1.26 1.26 1.23 1.21 1.16 1.91 1.91
MIGA 2.63 2.63 2.63 2.63 2.63 2.64 2.64 2.64

4. 4 ResearchconductedbyArthurMboue
IBRD 2.78 2.78 2.73 2.52 2.37 2.27 2.83 2.91
RUSSIA IDA 0.31 0.29 0.30 0.32 0.31 0.31 0.37 0.33
IFC 3.43 3.38 3.43 3.27 3.38 3.91 3.82 3.82
MIGA 2.63 2.63 2.63 2.63 2.63 2.64 2.64 2.64
IBRD 45.66 45.66 46.75 46.1 46.4 45.62 46.43 46.37
TOTALS IDA 42.89 40.5 40.38 40.09 39.92 40.2 39.97 39.92
IFC 50.96 49.06 50.82 48.72 51.31 49.21 48.76 48.76
MIGA 39.25 39.29 39.32 39.38 39.34 39.42 39.42 39.42
Here what didhappenatthe WorldBank Group isthat underthe pressure of countriesmemberswiththe
belief thattheyhave toolittle voiceandtoofew opportunitiesforparticipationatthe WorldBankGroup,
regardlessof itsexcellentvital global contributions,global humanwelfare scorecard itwasa call for change
by the MonterreyConsensus. In2002, the MonterreyConsensus [UN Conference onFinancingfor
Development,March2002] encouragedthe WorldBankGroup to enhance the participationof all developing
countriesandcountrieswitheconomicsintransition(DTC) byanymeanspossible. The so-calledvoice
reformwassupposedtofocuson voice powerandshareholdingincluding:
 Increasingvotingpower
 Establishingunique IBRDshareholding
 HoldingregularIBRDand IFCshareholdingreview
 EnhancingDTC voice onthe WorldBank boards
SHAREHOLDER VALUE SHIFTED (CONTROL) BY Top 8 Preferred shareholders of the World Bank Group
IBRD (Founded on 12/27/1945) IFC (Founded on 7/20/1956) IDA (founded on 2/01/1960) MIGA founded on 4/12/1988)
Capital Stock Voting
power
%
variance Capital Stock Voting
Power
% total
variance Capital Stock Voting
Power
%
variance Capital Stock Voting
Power
% Total
variance Total
Shareholder
Value Shifted
(control)
Amount
paid
($Million)
%
Total
Amount
paid ($
thousands)
%
Total
Amount
paid ($
Million)
%
Total
Amount
paid ($
Million)
%
Total
United
States
2,670 17.07 16.16 0.91 569,379 22.19 20.99 1.20 51,045 18.28 10.33 7.95 67,406 18.36 15.02 3.34 34,635.03
United
Kingdom
644.0 4.13 3.93 0.20 121,015 4.72 4.48 0.24 31,117 11.15 6.17 4.98 17,593 4.83 4.03 0.8 16,791.15
France 644.8 4.13 3.98 0.15 121,015 4.72 4.48 0.24 17,745 6.36 3.79 2.57 17,593 4.83 4.03 0.8 10,114.13
Germany 717.9 4.61 4.38 0.23 128,908 5.02 4.77 0.25 25,612 9.17 5.42 3.75 18,355 5.04 4.20 0.84 11,719.53
China 774.6 5.09 4.63 0.46 61,756 2.41 2.30 0.11 495 0.18 2.13 -1.95 11,359 3.12 2.64 0.48 -3,542.14
Japan 1,222.2 7.89 7.49 0.40 162,534 6.33 6.01 0.32 39,590 14.18 8.39 5.79 18,443 5.06 4.22 0.84 19,297.30
Saudi
Arabia
484.6 3.17 3.03 0.14 51,038 1.99 1.91 0.08 2,709 0.97 3.24 -2.27 11,355 3.12 2.64 0.48 -4,569.23
Russia 452.0 2.97 2.83 0.14 102,853 4.01 3.82 0.19 764 0.27 0.33 -0.06 11,355 3.28 2.64 0.64 2,072
Total 7,630.1 49.06 46.43 2.63 1,155,945 51.39 48.76 2.63 169,077 60.56 39.8 20.76 173,459 47.64 39.42 8.22 86,517.771 (or
88,559.191)
6 yearsafteritsimplementation,the votingpowerisnotproducingthe targetresults. Bythe way,
JohnMaynard Keyesdidpull that alarmin 1943 “inactual workingvotingpowerisnotlikelytoprove
important. If the organizationbeginsvotingabouteverything,itwill notbe longbefore itbreaksdown”
(Giannaris1991:920). In addition,Ihave toadmitthat ‘one share one vote”formulausedinthe corporate
worldcannotproperlyworkat the World BankGroup because the ‘Bank’isan exceptionwithmembersbeing
at the same time shareownersandborrowersornon-borrowersbutitdoesnotchange the rule. At the same
token, borrowersrunWorldBank Groupwill neversurviveitdoesnotmatterthat theyare gettingthisvoting

5. 5 ResearchconductedbyArthurMboue
powerforfree of charge. There isnot incentive forthemtorecognize thatthe bankneedstomake moneyin
orderto advance othermissionsof the banksincludingendingextremepovertyandgrantstothe poorest
membersof the WorldBank Group. Once the WorldBank Group will notbe able to advance othermissions
of the WorldBank Group includingdemocracy,humanrights,cybersecurityandthe like wealthyandnon-
borrowercountrieswill cuttheirdonationandcontributiontothe WorldBankGroup. Period. The price to
pay formaintainingthe newdecisionmakingof the bankbasedonthe new ‘voice reform’ ishuge and
experience. Itiswhy I believe thereisameritand urgencyto seriously[notHollywoodactingwhile fellow
humanbeingsare dying] considerthe introduction,testing(pilotprogram) andimplementationof double
majorityvote foralmostall Executive DirectorsBoardmeetings. Imeana combinationof consensusand
double majorityvote sothatwe have voice fromDTC. That said,we must reclassifyandcorrectcategoryA
and categoryB (China,Saudi Arabiaandotherwill be reclassifiedtoA withthe wealthycountries). Thus, the
true reasonfor the implementationof double majorityistocreate a forumfor an open,transparentand
meritocraticprocessbasedon Business JudgmentRules(BJR). Double majoritywill entitlevetopowerto
bothdonorsand borrowers(DTC) as a coalition. Asa group,donorswill start listeningtowhatborrowerssay
duringconsensustalksorface vetovote.At the same time,borrowersasminorityshareholderscannot
expecttochange the way the Bank isfundedunlesstheyhave agoodsubstitute. ItiswhyDTC cannot have
bothways. Do theyneedmoneyfordevelopment?Ordotheyneedpowerfordevelopment? Also,thereis
not secretandsuspicion whyUS choosesthe WorldBankPresident. There isanunwrittenlegal agreement
that reservesthe World Bank Presidencytothe U.S.citizenandthe IMF to Europeanand itis basedonBJR.
Whenit comesto restrictiononthe candidatestothe Executive Vice Presidencies(IFCandMIGA). It ismore
for the bestinterestof diversificationanddonors’satisfaction. The bottomline isthatwhatvoice reform
cannot fix double majoritycan.
Main Winners and Losers of the Voting Realignment
IBRD IDA IFC
winners points losers points winners points losers points winners points losers points
1 China 1.64 Japan 1.01 U.K. .55 US 1.47 China 1.28 US 2.57
2 South
Korea
0.58 France 0.55 Philippines .41 Japan 1.09 Brazil .62 Germany .58
3 Turkey 0.55 United
Kingdom
0.55 Zimbabwe .32 Germany .69 Saudi
Arabia
.56 France .54
4 Mexico 0.50 United
States
0.51 Algeria .26 France .29 Russia .43 UK .54
5 Singapore 0.24 Germany 0.48 Tajikistan .23 India .25 India .34 Italy .36
6 Greece 0.21 Canada 0.35 Moldova .22 Argentina .15 South
Korea
.40 Canada .35
7 Brazil 0.17 Netherlands 0.29 Uzbekistan .21 Mexico .14 Japan .16 Netherlands .23
8 India 0.13 Belgium 0.23 Azerbaijan .19 Pakistan .1 Kuwait .16 Belgium .21
9 Vietnam 0.12 Switzerland 0.20 Ukraine .18 Ghana .09 Romania .07 Australia .20
10 Spain 0.11 Australia 0.20 Kyrgyz .18 Switzerland .08 Zimbabwe .05 Spain .15
11 United
Arab
Emirates
0.09 Venezuela 0.16 Timor- Leste .15 Israel .08 Peru .04 Venezuela .11
12 Thailand 0.08 Italy 0.14 Guinea
Bissau
.15 Canada .07 Albania .02 Sweden .10
13 El
Salvador
0.05 Nigeria 0.10 Mozambique .14 Netherlands .07 Bahamas .02 Switzerland .08
14 Costa Rica 0.05 Denmark 0.09 Sri Lanka .14 Ireland .07 Guinea .02 Denmark .07

6. 6 ResearchconductedbyArthurMboue
15 Romania 0.05 South Africa 0.09 Djibouti .14 Ecuador .07 Iraq .02 Austria .07
*I did use 2009 and 2014 data for IDA
Atthistime,I am lookingfora partnerto re-make acase against2010 voice reformandvoting power
and make a pleafor the testingandadoptionfora combinationof double majorityvote andconsensus.
To conclude,thisbottomwill provide toyoua guide forrulestovisitforyour presentationandreportabout
incomingvotingreform(letsay,it is2009). GOOD LUCK
Corporate and world bank legal issues impacted votingrights realignments
Introduction:As youwill realize the World Bank Groupwas foundwith special laws andimmunityof its members’ regulation
and law. For instance, inthe corporate world, one share equalsto one vote, that means whenshareowner increases her/his
ownership, he/his ownership, he/she is increasing his/her control. At the World BankGroupthings are completelydifferent the
more developedcountries are increasingtheir contribution to the World Bank Group, the more theyare losing their control of
the WorldBankGroupcalled here votingpower
 Right for
refusal
Technicallythe WBG did exercise its right of 1st refusalbygrabbing(not freelyoffer)shares from
developedcountries and shifting themto DTC(developing andTransition Countries). In the corporate
world, the issuer companymust fail to exercise its 1st refusalright inorder for somebodyelse to buythe
available for sale issuedshares. It must be a free offer. Youmust remember that when the issuer
companyrefuses to exercise this right, for market analysts, these sharesare overvaluedbecause it will
make sense to hold undervaluedunallocatedshares
 Right for
FirstOffer
In the corporate world, commonshareholders have the right to purchase new shares issued bythe
corporation before others have the opportunityto purchase the remaining. As youare goingto findout,
the anti-dilutionprotectionwas not available to protect developedcountries shareholders, it is whythey
did lose their percentage ofownership during recapitalization byconsequent control votingrights
(squeeze out). It was not a free, fair andclear waiver of rights while their contribution were usedto buy
shares for others (developing countries)
 Derivative
suitrights
The WorldBank Grouphas its owntype of derivative lawsuit procedure with a difference that most cases
of complaints from countries or on behalfof the WBGcanbe onlyheardbythe Boardof Governors or in
very rare case bythe International Court of Justice. But inpractice, it is more internal WorldBank Group
matter, dealt throughnegotiation, consensus andBoard of Governors votes.
 Voting
rights
A common shareholder has the right to vote onanymatter during the annual meeting andspecial
meeting, this is the corporate standard. At the WorldBankGroup, the boardof governors where the
voting power always counts, the developed countries votes are becoming lessreliable regardless oftheir
contribution because ofthe enrollment of developingcountries withfree ofcharge basic votes and
several expensive realignment somethingclose to star shopping spree event.
 Termination
clause
My readingof this agreement is unclear, countriesincludingUS didrefuse to buymore shares, I do not
know why, but theywere given to developingcountries. Other struggledcountries, a least one didnot
subscribed to the newformula;protest strategyto endthe agreement, I donot know.
 Conflictof
interest
In the corporate setting, you must inform the investing public about allthe conflict of interest. Here, it
was reasonable to informmembers that a noncooperating wealthycountries to thisnew voice reform will
make themlooknon compassionate to the poor countriesincludingMICbut nothingto with Business
Judgment Rules (BJR) andfiduciaryduties. But a true parent andprovider has a responsibilityto control
children and dependents.
 Risk factors It is inthe best interest of the structurer andissuer to disclose riskfactors of this kind ofcomplex
recapitalizations andissuance. One of the risks is the transfer of control from the wealthyandmajority
owners to the minorityowners? What trigger thischange of control? Willit result into increase in
commitment anddonation(grants) to the poor countries andgraduationof MIC? I do not think so. If
wealthycountries object to this trend towardparityof control andfound competitors to the WorldBank,
weaker its influence or just decrease their donationandcontributionto the bankas theyare losing
controls, what will the Bankdo to preserve the institution?
 Market
Price
The disclosure of the market price is required. Inthis case, it was a pro rata offer andacceptance.
 Purpose
and Plans
Indeed, it was disclosed that the purpose of the reform was to increase control to poor countries called
voice reform. Does it increase loans and grants for development? True reason ofthe creation ofthis

7. 7 ResearchconductedbyArthurMboue
institution.
 Withdrawal
Rights
It is disclosedin some of the Article of Agreements
 Extension It will make sense to disclose the timeline to complyandifit will be anyextension to dealwith special
situations. (for instance, 15 days to payfor the shares)(
World BankGroup’s Article ofAgreements relatedto increaseof capitalstock ( General Capital Increase andSelected Capital
Increase)
 IBRD Article II, Section2(b)-the capital stock maybe increasedwhenthe Bank deems it advisable bya three
fourths majorityof totalvoting power
 IDA Article III,section(c)-whenanyadditionalsubscription is authorized, eachmember shallbe givenan
opportunityto subscribe under suchconditions as shall be reasonablydeterminedbythe association, an
amount whichwill enable it to maintainits relative voting power
 IFC Article II, section2 (c)(iii)-in anyother case, bya four-fifths majorityof the totalvoting power
 MIGA Chapter 1, article 3 (d)-a ‘special majority’ means anaffirmative vote of not less than twothirds of the
total voting power representingnot lessthan fifty-five-percent of the subscribedshares of the Agencyis
to be allocated.
Chapter II, Article 5 c-the council, byspecial majority, mayat anytime increase the capital stockof the
Agency
World BankGroup’s Article ofAgreements relatedto issuance of sharesof Capital (allocation ofauthorizedshares)
 IBRD Article V, section3 (b)-except as otherwise specificallyprovided, all matters before the Bankshall be
decided bya majorityof the votes cast.
 IFC Article II, section2(c)-the amount of capitalstock at anytime authorized maybe increasedbythe Boardof
Governors as follows
i. By a majorityof the votes cast, incase suchincrease is necessaryfor the purpose of issuing
shares ofcapitalstock oninitial subscriptionbymembers other than original members,
provided that the aggregate ofanyincreases authorizedpursuant to thissubparagraph
shallnot exceed10,000 shares
ii. In anyother case, bya four-fifths majorityof the total votingpower
 IDA It is silent
 MIGA It is silent
World BankGroup’s Article ofAgreement relatedto council vote
 IBRD Article V, section3, ii-the share votes of eachmember shall be the number of votes that results from the
allocationof one vote for eachshare ofstock’s held
 IFC Article IV, section3, the share votes ofeachmember shall be the number of votes that results from the
allocationof one vote for eachshare ofstock held
 IDA Article VI, section3,b,Except as otherwise speciallyprovided, all matters before the Associationshallbe
decided bya majorityof votes cast
 MIGA Chapter VI, Article 40, (a) and (b)
 (a)-each Governor shall be entitled to cast the votes of the member he represents. Except as
otherwise specifiedinthisConvention, decisions of the Council shall be takenbya majorityof the
votes cast
 (b)-A quorum for anymeeting of the Councilshallbe constitutedbya majorityof the Governors
exercising not less thantwo-thirds of the total voting power.