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Owning Adaptation
Country-level governance
of climate adaptation finance
146 Oxfam Briefing Paper
13 June 2011
2.
3. 146 Oxfam Briefing Paper 13 June 2011
Owning adaptation
Country-level governance of climate adaptation finance
www.oxfam.org
The safe water and sanitation for communities in south-west Bangladesh project.
Golam Rabban/Oxfam.
As financing for climate change adaptation in developing
countries begins to flow, it is essential that the governance of
funding at the global and country level be shaped so that the
needs of the most vulnerable can be met. The core issue is
country-level ownership of adaptation finance. Providers of
adaptation finance must put developing countries in the driver’s
seat, while the countries themselves must exercise leadership and
respond to the needs of those most affected by climate change.
Most importantly, civil society and vulnerable communities must
be able to steer and hold accountable the way in which adaptation
finance is used.
4. 2
Summary
Vulnerable communities across the world are already feeling the effects
of a changing climate. These communities are urgently in need of
assistance aimed at building resilience and at undertaking climate
change adaptation efforts as a matter of survival and in order to
maintain livelihoods.
However, even as financing for climate change adaptation begins to
flow to developing countries, it is not yet clear if the funding will
respond to those immediate and pressing needs; and whether these
funds can succeed in reaching the most vulnerable remains a critical
unanswered question.
This represents a new and different challenge from past development
issues; climate change adaptation finance should not be considered aid
in the traditional sense. However, many lessons learned regarding
development and aid effectiveness are relevant.
In order for adaptation funding to be effective and reach those who
need it most, developing countries themselves need to own and be
invested in the process, with a focus on developing country-led
adaptation strategies.
Country ownership in the context of climate change adaptation finance
entails a strong role for governments in developing countries.
However, governments also have an obligation to create the necessary
national governance structures and ensure accountability to civil
society and to its citizens, especially the most vulnerable.
Climate change adaptation finance is still at a formative stage and can
be shaped such that developing countries and, above all, vulnerable
communities, can guide the ways in which it is used. This represents a
significant window of opportunity.
There are currently a number of channels of adaptation finance for
which this is critical, while the new global Green Climate Fund, in
particular, has the potential to build a new approach for managing
climate finance at the global and national levels.
This is not a simple or easy task. Oxfam has looked at the ways in
which adaptation finance has begun to be implemented in a number of
countries. It is clear that both international providers of finance and
national governments will need to undertake significant course
corrections.
• Adaptation finance is often channelled around governments,
through multiple and uncoordinated channels, and without
alignment with national adaptation or development plans or
investment aimed at enhancing national capacity;
• At the national level, while governments are beginning to put in
place structures and initial strategies to handle adaptation finance,
5. 3
there is often still a lack of clearly identified leadership or adequate
coordination and coherence across governments. Added to this, the
lack of capacity in many developing countries hampers these efforts;
• Most importantly, the participation and accountability of civil
society and vulnerable communities, particularly of women, have
yet to be achieved in most countries.
Despite these initial shortcomings, there is an opportunity to create an
approach to adaptation finance that is genuinely owned by developing
countries.
What is needed is for providers of adaptation finance, particularly
within the framework of the Green Climate Fund, to make countries the
drivers for the use of funding. Country governments must then step up
to lead and create national processes that are responsive to the needs of
their most vulnerable communities.
Providers of adaptation finance must put developing countries in
the driver's seat
• Adaptation finance should be channeled through a national entity
chosen by the government and on the basis of a national adaptation
strategy designed through a participatory, country-driven process;
• Adaptation finance should be harmonized and provided through a
coherent channel; the major part of international adaptation
resources should come through the new global Green Climate Fund;
• Countries must be provided with the necessary resources and
capacity in order both to develop and to implement national
adaptation strategies.
Developing countries should exercise leadership
• Effective government leadership should be established for
adaptation planning and use of finance, and led by a clearly
identified ministry or agency;
• An effective multi-ministerial and agency coordination process must
be created to develop and oversee a national adaptation strategy that
is coherent with the country’s development strategy.
Adaptation plans and funds must be accountable to the most
vulnerable
• Adaptation strategies and the use of funding must be developed and
implemented by countries with the full participation of vulnerable
communities and civil society, and be transparent and accountable
to them;
• Providers of finance, particularly through the Green Climate Fund,
should help to ensure that country strategies are participatory and
accountable, including providing the resources needed to fulfill that
goal;
• Gender equality and women's leadership should be central to the
development and implementation of national strategies.
6. 4
1 Governing adaptation
finance – seizing the
opportunity now
A changing climate is a reality for sixty-three year old Nasima Begum of
Azgar Munshir Khandi under Shariatpur District in Bangladesh. Flooding
is a worsening annual phenomenon in her area, and the Meghna River has
twice devoured her land. As a result, the land has become sandy and the crop
it produces inadequate to provide for her six-member family. Cyclones add to
the stress she faces. Yet Nasima’s region does not yet have a governance
structure in place for the planning and implementation of climate adaptation
programs to address the impacts she faces.1
Nasima’s experience is not unique. Across the world communities that
are vulnerable to the impacts of climate change look to their
governments to provide support. They may wonder if funding for
climate change adaptation will be delivered in a way that meets their
needs.
Adaptation – and adaptation finance – represents a different challenge
from those faced in the past. Climate change is a new and growing
reality facing developing countries, adding to other, already existing,
development challenges. Moreover, the impacts of climate change are
felt across a range of arenas from agriculture to infrastructure and
health, thereby requiring a wide-ranging and multi-sectoral response.
Climate change adaptation demands a unique set of tools to address the
impact of a global driver on highly-local contexts. Developing countries
must understand the risk factors and potential responses across
multiple locations, communities, and populations. That is why there is
a more urgent need than ever before to involve communities and civil
society.
All of this presents an opportunity for providers of finance and
developing countries alike to create systems for governing adaptation
funds that are both innovative and responsive to those on the frontlines
of climate change. For those people, it is imperative that both providers
of finance and developing countries fulfil their responsibilities.
The ghosts of development finance
At its heart, climate change adaptation finance should not be
considered traditional development aid. The motivation for financing
climate change adaptation stems from the obligations of industrialized
countries that are responsible for the large majority of greenhouse
emissions.
7. 5
Adaptation finance addresses climate change impacts that did not yet
exist when commitments to development assistance were made in
earlier decades. However, experiences with development finance can
provide important lessons for adaptation finance, including, first and
foremost, that countries themselves must own and be invested in the
process of governing and funding climate change adaptation. Other
relevant experiences from development finance include:
• Donor-imposed priorities are often not aligned with a country’s
circumstances and could undermine national ownership and
implementation;
• Complex and diverse funding processes, along with a lack of
transparency and information sharing, are serious burdens for
under-resourced and under-staffed governments in developing
countries;2
• There are constraints to meaningful participation by and
accountability to civil society and vulnerable groups.3
Against this background, the vital importance of a country-led
approach to development assistance has become widely acknowledged
and has been enshrined by the international community in the
principles of the Accra Agenda for Action and its precursor, the Paris
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. In 2005, the Paris Declaration
committed more than 100 governments and agencies to allowing
developing countries to set their own strategies and improve their own
institutions, and to ensuring that donor countries aligned their
approaches with local systems.
The Accra meeting enhanced this platform in 2008 with an
acknowledgement that active participation of civil-society
organizations was necessary for strengthening country ownership, and
that citizen engagement was a central component of government
accountability.4
Experience has demonstrated the value of putting developing countries
in a lead role. While doing so may not be workable in some contexts, as
in fragile states, country leadership has proven to be highly effective in
many cases. A 2005 independent review commissioned by the OECD
showed that in seven developing countries where financing was
provided as support through countries’ national budgets, the countries
had stepped-up pro-poor spending and scaled-up social service
delivery.5
Experience has also shown the importance of pairing leadership by
country governments with accountability to civil society and vulnerable
groups. A key finding of consultations on the Hyogo Framework for
Action, the international agreement on building resilience to disasters,
was that disaster strategies needed to be reoriented in order to support
a ‘proactive and systematic deepening of engagement with at-risk
communities, including participation of most vulnerable groups.’6
The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria embodies a
similar view. It has gone further than most other global funding bodies
8. 6
in recognizing that ‘only through a country-driven, coordinated, and
multi-sector approach involving all relevant partners will additional
resources have a significant impact’.7 (See Box 4.)
Emerging questions
As the basis for this briefing paper, Oxfam examined how a number of
developing countries were grappling with the governance of
adaptation finance.8 Oxfam conducted research and interviews in
Bangladesh, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Nepal, the Philippines, Tajikistan,
and Viet Nam, supplemented by analysis in additional African and
Latin American countries.
While the provision of adaptation finance is still at an early stage, key
questions have already surfaced with regard to country ownership. In
many countries, adaptation planning and finance is linked
institutionally with climate change mitigation, but adaptation efforts –
and hence the emerging issues involving country ownership and
adaptation – must stand on their own.
Country ownership in the context of climate change adaptation
involves several interconnected elements, namely: the role of
governments in channelling finance; the role of effective governments
in developing and implementing successful strategies for the use of
adaptation finance; and the role of civil society and communities in
holding governments accountable for whether the most pressing
climate change adaptation needs are met.
These key questions emerge:
• Are providers of finance putting developing countries in the
driver’s seat?
• Are developing countries prepared to lead?
• Is adaptation funding accountable to those most in need?
These elements of adaptation finance are inherently linked; and the
ultimate goal must be to enable those who are most vulnerable to
climate change, together with their governments, to drive the way in
which adaptation finance is used, and to ensure it meets their needs.
9. 7
2 Enabling country ownership
Are providers of finance putting developing
countries in the driver’s seat?
If adaptation finance is channelled in a way that circumvents, rather
than strengthens, existing government structures and strategies, it can
impede the development of government capacity and the critical task of
building stronger engagement between citizens and their governments.
Effective and participatory governance of adaptation finance depends
in part on whether international finance promotes or impedes the
development and implementation of country-led strategies.
Providers of finance often hesitate to cede too much control to country-
led processes. This may be due to a lack of confidence in a
government’s capability to administer funds efficiently or to address
key accountability issues, and may be especially so in fragile states.
However, in most countries, failing to take steps to build country
ownership will only maintain the status quo and fail to build the
capacity needed.
The evidence from a number of countries suggests that finance
providers will only succeed in shifting this dynamic by developing new
ways of funding and engaging with countries.
Box 1: The capacity-ownership trade-off
The question of country ownership, including government leadership, goes
back to the age-old question of the chicken and the egg. Which comes first:
ensuring government leadership or having a capable government?
Frequently, governments are not yet fully equipped to handle the task of
developing national strategies, coordinating funding streams, and delivering
finance where climate change adaptation is most needed. In many cases,
ministries of environment are charged with playing the central leadership
role on climate change adaptation. However, these ministries are often
under-resourced and politically weak. As a result, many bilateral and
multilateral providers of finance seek to provide funding in ways that work
around these weak government institutions or ministries.
In some cases, there may need to be support that doesn’t flow through
governments, for example in fragile states. However, in most cases,
channelling funds around government structures will mean missing an
opportunity to build the capacity of line ministries and effectively develop the
government’s engagement with communities and civil society. The
challenge is to avoid side-stepping the capacity and governance constraints
of developing countries and, rather, to tackle them head-on.
10. 8
Channelling adaptation finance through national governments
and aligning with country priorities
Country ownership is closely tied to the level of government control in
how funds are spent. At one end of the spectrum, adaptation finance
providers may earmark the funds according to their own priorities or
bypass existing government structures altogether. At the other end, the
allocation of incoming funds are given as budget support for a country
and spent according to its priorities.
In a number of cases, adaptation funding has bypassed government
structures or strategies.
• In Cambodia, many providers of finance have chosen to bypass the
government completely, instead providing funding for climate
change adaptation initiatives directly to international and national
NGOs;9
• In Ethiopia, while none of the projects as originally conceived in the
National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA) (see Appendix)
were implemented, the Global Environment Facility along with
Japan, Spain, Denmark, and the European Union stepped in to
support specific climate change adaptation projects outside of those
in the NAPA;10
• In Nepal, in order to improve coordination and alignment with the
government, 14 international providers of finance signed a compact
in 2009 with the Ministry of Environment. Despite this step, a lack of
faith in the public financial management system resulted in a large
proportion of funding being provided in the form of bilateral
projects outside of the central budget.11
The role of international financial institutions, especially development
banks, in providing climate finance has also frequently been at issue.
These institutions have often operated in ways that were inconsistent
with country-led leadership.
• In Nepal, the World Bank, within the framework of the Pilot
Programme for Climate Resilience (PPCR) (see Appendix), rejected a
request to channel PPCR funds through a trust fund that civil society
believed could be an accessible and transparent arrangement. The
PPCR initiated a process with little government input or alignment
with Nepal’s NAPA, though it may end up funding some of the
activities it spelled out;12
• In Bangladesh, the United Kingdom’s Department for International
Development (DFID) and the World Bank worked to create a multi-
donor trust fund led by the World Bank rather than by the national
government. Public pressure ultimately led to a shift in the structure
with the Government of Bangladesh taking over control of the fund
(see Box 2).13
In some cases, the way in which climate funding is provided may
undermine a country’s ability to assert its leadership and priorities.
• In Ethiopia, international deadlines for developing the country’s
forestry mitigation programme initially drew away limited human
resources from completion of the country’s adaptation plan;14
11. 9
• In Nepal, the PPCR has offered loans for adaptation programmes,
which has led to strong opposition from civil society. Civil society
groups expressed concern that vulnerable countries affected by
climate change should not be put in a position of having to repay
adaptation costs that should be borne by developed countries.15
Box 2: The Bangladesh Climate Change Resilience Fund
When, in 2008, DFID pledged to fund for adaptation efforts in Bangladesh, it
also played a central role in efforts to create a multi-donor trust fund for the
country. Plans for the fund originally provided a central role for the World
Bank, which would have served as co-chair of the management committee,
facilitated daily operations of the fund, and monitored implementation.
Bangladesh’s civil society was deeply concerned about the World Bank’s
role, which many groups saw as inappropriately interfering with country-led
control of finances. In 2010, the government announced that the new
Bangladesh Climate Change Resilience Fund would be managed by the
government and would also include civil society representation. The World
Bank would serve mainly as a technical advisor to the Fund.
The Resilience Fund is intended to carry out the country’s Climate Change
Strategy and Action Plan, which was revised and adopted in 2009. However,
the Resilience Fund, with its international financing, will not be consolidated
with Bangladesh’s own Climate Change Trust Fund, which is funded entirely
with domestic Bangladesh financing. It remains to be seen if coherence can
be achieved in this parallel structure.
16
Enhancing capacity
A country’s progress in ensuring ownership and delivery of adaptation
programmes to vulnerable groups can depend on the capacity of its
government, its civil-society groups, and its communities to engage
effectively with adaptation finance processes. In addition to the
technical and financial knowledge of climate finance, governments are
most in need of institutional and leadership development.
In many cases, however, adaptation finance processes have been
carried out with external technical support arranged by providers of
finance, rather than by national governments themselves. While these
decisions by finance providers often reflect their own concerns about
existing local capacity, this represents a missed opportunity to create
greater capacity within country governments.
• In Tajikistan, representatives of the World Bank and the Asian
Development Bank indicated that their international staff had to lead
the national PPCR process, owing to the limited capacity of
government institutions and to the fact that the country’s climate
change lead post remained vacant for several months at a critical
time in the PPCR process;17
• In Nepal, the Ministry of Environment is mandated to serve as the
lead agency and to channel funds, which could translate into an
opportunity for building the capacity and enhancing the role of the
staff at the Ministry in terms of handling such processes. However,
DFID opted instead to support external consultants and to pilot the
12. 10
Local Adaptation Programme of Action outside central government
structures by using a private consultancy firm and seven NGO
partners.18
Box 3: Direct access to the Adaptation Fund
When the Adaptation Fund was created under the Kyoto Protocol, developing
countries insisted that it needed to provide ‘direct access’ for developing
countries, given the concerns about the lack of country-led approaches as
well as the proliferation of multiple funding streams and intermediary financial
institutions in existing structures. Direct access has been viewed by
developing countries as an extremely important shift in the way in which
adaptation finance has been provided. To date, however, only three national
implementing entities (NIEs) have been accredited by the Adaptation Fund
Board as having the fiduciary and adaptation programming capacity to
channel financing directly at the country level. While the Adaptation Fund
model has been a critical step forward, the limited progress with NIEs points
to the need to bolster the capacity of governments and institutions in
developing countries.
19
Harmonizing the priorities and processes of finance providers
In many developing countries, the array of funding streams can
increase the burden on governments in terms of accessing and
managing adaptation finance. Moreover, it can impede efforts aimed at
coordinating national strategies and at implementing plans. This raises
important questions about the ways in which multilateral and bilateral
providers of finance organise themselves.
At times, bilateral and multilateral providers of finance set up and lead
coordination processes in developing countries. This can facilitate
exchanges of information on the priorities and approaches of various
finance providers and, in the long term, can improve the coordination
of funding streams and minimize the burden on governments in
developing countries.
For example, in a move to increase coordination among providers of
finance in Bangladesh, the Bangladesh Climate Change Resilience Fund
was created to bring bilateral and multilateral finance providers
together with the national government and civil society (see Box 2).
Importantly, the Resilience Fund will be led by the national
government after a protracted debate over its management. However, it
remains separate nonetheless from that country’s own Climate Change
Trust Fund, which is funded with domestic resources.20
While coordination efforts among finance providers can be helpful,
they also have clear limitations. It is essential that such coordination
does not replace efforts to put countries in the driver’s seat and to
establish coordination mechanisms that are country-led.
13. 11
3 Building country leadership
Are developing countries ready to lead?
In order to ensure that adaptation finance actually responds to the
needs of those most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change,
developing countries must act assertively and establish ways to channel
resources effectively.
This requires having a clear national strategy and implementation plan
in place for climate change adaptation and resilience-building activities,
as well as systems that can undertake adaptation programmes and
handle financial procedures. Moreover, developing countries need to
put in place processes that ensure full accountability to civil society and
vulnerable communities.
Tackling the challenges of adaptation planning and implementation is
an essential task for country governments to undertake in order to be
responsive to those in their countries who are hit hardest by climate
change. This will require a high degree of country-driven engagement
on adaptation that overlaps with, but is not identical to, a country’s
process for handling adaptation finance.
While developed countries must provide the resources to help make
these efforts possible, developing country governments need to be
ready to translate potential into reality.
Leadership
Identifying and bolstering leadership at the national level constitutes a
critical task for governments. Success in this can improve their ability to
engage with providers of finance and to develop and oversee an
effective adaptation strategy.
The specific institutions and structures within the government that play
a leadership role vary according to each country’s circumstances (see
Table 1). In many countries, including Bangladesh, Cambodia, Nepal,
and Viet Nam, environment ministries have inherited significant
responsibility for climate change adaptation planning and
implementation of finance.21
However, there are other ministries and agencies that can play
leadership roles. For example, in Colombia, the lead candidate for
managing climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction is the
Risk Management Directorate under the Ministry of Interior and
Justice, rather than the Ministry of Environment.22
14. 12
Table 1: Government institutions leading on climate change
Bangladesh The Ministry of Environment and Forests leads
implementation of the Bangladesh Climate Change
Strategy and Action Plan
23
Cambodia The Ministry of Environment is in charge of climate
change
24
Ethiopia The Environmental Protection Authority (EPA) is an
independent regulatory and monitoring body charged with
coordinating the Ethiopian government activities on
climate change and reporting directly to the Prime
Minister
25
Nepal The Ministry of Environment serves as the Secretary of
the Climate Change Council (CCC) formed under the
chairmanship of the Prime Minister
26
The Philippines The Climate Change Commission is charged with effecting
policy integration and coordination across agencies
27
Tajikistan The Deputy Prime Minister is the lead for the Pilot
Programme for Climate Resilience (PPCR). The PPCR
focal point is the Deputy Head of the Environment
Department under the Office of the President
28
Viet Nam The Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment is the
lead agency of the National Target Programme to
Respond to Climate Change
29
Choosing an institution to act as the lead agency can raise important
issues of political profile and capacity. At times, the lack of institutional
capacity within a country’s lead climate change agency, often an
environment ministry, may stem from the central government’s lack of
political will to delegate decision making authority effectively.
For example, in Ethiopia, the Environmental Protection Authority
(EPA) was only assigned to coordinate implementation of the country’s
NAPA after the plan was already developed.30 The EPA was concerned
that the NAPA’s project-focused approach was not the most
appropriate way to strengthen resilience in the country and has since
started development of a new National Adaptation Programme, which
is meant to incorporate plans by ministries and regional states.
In many countries, the environment ministry is not ready to handle the
tremendous task of managing adaptation finance processes without
considerable capacity-building support and institutional development.
This is the case in Viet Nam, where the Ministry of Natural Resources
and Environment (MONRE) has limited coordination powers across the
government;31 and in Nepal, where the National Capacity Self-
Assessment, which was prepared for the UN Framework Convention
on Climate Change, indicated that the Ministry of Environment lacked
adequate technical and operational capacity.32
When ministries and agencies other than the environment ministry
play a leading fiduciary, planning, or coordination role within
government, the ministry of environment may often be best placed to
handle monitoring and evaluation activities, or other complementary
functions.
15. 13
However, allowing funds to circumvent existing government structures
or default to coordination by powerful, ministries, such as the ministry
of finance or planning, could skew the ways in which funds are spent.
Even with a robust coordination process across the government, there
is a risk that funds could subsequently be diverted by the distinct
priorities of individual agencies.
Coordination
Climate change adaptation is a complex multi-sectoral challenge that
requires the attention of several arms of the government working on
issues from poverty to agriculture and health. While clear leadership is
important, a range of agencies are needed to fully develop and then
implement a comprehensive adaptation strategy.
As a result, governments face coordination challenges in terms of
developing and approving national strategies, budget allocation among
implementing ministries, and linking decision-making with the needs
of local government.
In order to address these coordination challenges, some countries have
established national coordination bodies, each tailored to the particular
government structure. However, these efforts have not always solved
the coordination quandary.
• In Bangladesh, the Climate Change Trust Fund oversees
domestically-generated resources for adaptation and other climate
programmes. The Trust Fund brings together the President’s office
with key elements of the Ministry of Environment and Forests, other
ministries, and civil society;33
• In Viet Nam, the National Target Programme to Respond to Climate
Change, led by MONRE, has worked to establish effective
coordination. However, the national coordination process provides
few opportunities for lower levels of government to provide input.
In contrast, the country’s national development plans are more
decentralized than the climate planning process;34
• The coordination challenge is often evident when multiple agencies
do not adequately act. In both Cambodia and Tajikistan, ministries
outside of the lead agency were required to establish climate change
units or focal points in order to implement a national process;
however, their failure to do so created bottlenecks.35
16. 14
Box 4: Lessons from the Global Fund to Fight AIDS,
Tuberculosis, and Malaria
The model for designing and overseeing finance at the country level was
developed by the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, and
provides some key lessons for climate adaptation finance. While they are far
from perfect, the Country Coordinating Mechanisms (CCMs) are
nonetheless an important model for carrying out country-led coordination
with participation from civil society and affected communities.36
CCMs act as the primary in-country decision-making bodies for the Fund,
identifying national priorities and coordinating the submission of a single
‘Coordinated Country Proposal’. CCMs include representatives from a broad
range of stakeholders, taken from government, multilateral and bilateral
funds, NGOs and community-based organizations, people living with the
diseases covered by the Fund, and the private sector.
The inclusion of civil society, both within and outside of CCMs, has played
an important role in increasing the capacity and effectiveness of the
coordinating mechanisms.37
A recent review by the Global Fund itself found
that average civil society representation was just over 40 per cent, which is
the representation target set by the Global Fund.
38
However, there are still key weaknesses with CCMs in many countries. Only
half of the CCMs that were reviewed by the Global Fund met the target of 40
per cent for civil society representation. Representation ranged from as low
as 17 per cent in Tajikistan, and was below 40 per cent in countries such as
Cambodia and Ethiopia.39
Disparities within civil society have also been noted. In some countries, civil
society participation has been dominated by networks and umbrella
organizations headquartered in the capital.40
Participation by people living
with HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria has historically been weak, though
it has now reached 8 per cent of representatives. While a third of
participants in CCMs are women,
41
only 22 per cent of CCM chairs are
women.
Other challenges have also risen to the surface, including the potential for
conflicts of interest, with lead implementing government ministries often
chairing CCMs, and civil society representatives often dependent on
government funding.
The Global Fund and the CCMs themselves have attempted to address
some of these shortcomings in the following ways:
– Expanding capacity through the creation of full-time, dedicated secretariats
in government ministries to support the work of CCMs, thereby improving
their effectiveness;
42
– Improving links between government and civil society by developing a
system of ‘dual track financing’ through which at least one government and
one non-government principal recipient are nominated to lead programme
implementation;
43
– Engaging affected populations, especially women. The Global Fund has
adopted strategies aimed at promoting gender equality in its programmes.
44
A Global Fund committee has also proposed new CCM guidelines that
would explicitly require a transparent and documented process for review of
funding applications, including engagement of key affected population
groups and a transparent and documented process for the selection of non-
government members through their own constituencies.
17. 15
Coherence
The ideal coordination tool used by governments is a national policy or
strategy that articulates adaptation priorities and projects in response to
the particular climate change impacts in that country. While a number
of developing countries have built strategies, most continue to face
difficulties in updating and implementing them, owing to a lack of
capacity and coordination, and other constraints.
The effectiveness of a national climate change adaptation policy or
strategy can often be measured by how well it is integrated with
national development planning. When they are a central part of a
country’s development plans, climate change issues are less likely to be
sidelined by the country’s broader goals. Unfortunately, it is common
for national disaster risk reduction strategies to be out of sync with
national development plans.
Coherence between climate change and development planning has
moved forward moderately in Bangladesh. The government requested
that the Ministry of Planning integrate a chapter on climate change into
its sixth Five-Year Plan, though adaptation is not mainstreamed
throughout the plan.45
Viet Nam and Nepal have made progress in integrating adaptation into
their national development strategies. While Viet Nam’s draft
development plans include a focus on climate change adaptation, it is
largely characterized as an environmental challenge.46 Nepal has
integrated climate change and development planning through the
government’s Three Year Plan, which also provides the mandate for the
Ministry of Environment to coordinate all climate change activities.47
Some countries struggle to implement integration between climate
change and development activities. Ethiopia’s government has
articulated a clear vision that climate finance should align with its
national strategy, the Five Year Plan, which is managed by the Ministry
of Finance and Economic Development, and which represents
Ethiopia’s preferred framework for development assistance. However,
previous commitments by line ministries to implement work in their
sectors and the lack of a clear monitoring framework for the ways in
which climate finance is used for adaptation could lead to missed
opportunities to integrate adaptation with the development plan.48
Other countries have yet to develop a national strategy. For example,
Cambodia does not have a national climate change policy beyond its
NAPA, thereby making it difficult to achieve coherence with the
country’s National Strategic Development Plan.49
18. 16
4 Ensuring accountability
Is adaptation funding accountable to those who are
most in need?
In order to achieve a truly country-led strategy, decision-making on
adaptation finance must ultimately be accountable to those populations
that are in greatest need of support. Indeed, those who are most
affected by a changing climate have the right to be centrally involved in
directing the use of adaptation funding.
If highly vulnerable communities and the broader civil society are not
included as full participants in the development and implementation of
national adaptation plans, there is a genuine risk that funds will be
spent in ways that are misaligned with realities on the ground.
Governments must play a central role in ensuring that processes are
participatory and accountable, while international providers of finance
must support this and not impede it.
Meaningful participation
Participation by vulnerable communities and civil society can be
designed to enhance and deepen a country-led adaptation strategy, or it
can occur as an afterthought or token gesture. Truly meaningful
participation will result in inputs that are visible in the final outcome.
Civil society and community-level participation in national climate
finance decisions varies greatly from country to country. In a number
of countries, civil society engagement has remained quite limited.
• In Cambodia, civil society groups that were consulted on the
development of Cambodia’s NAPA were asked to react to a nearly-
finalized project document, rather than invited to offer their input in
at an earlier stage;50
• In Tajikistan, civil society participants were only invited to late
consultation stages on the country’s NAPA and did not have
advance access to relevant documentation;51
• In Bangladesh, the Ministry of Environment and Forests issued a
request for project proposals without identifying or disclosing
project criteria, which resulted in 3,700 projects being submitted.
Subsequently, the media reported that 20 projects had been selected
for implementation by the Climate Change Trust Fund, but this
information was not made public by the government.52
In some cases, important steps have been taken towards meaningful
participation, including the creation of formalized processes. What
remains to be seen is how these efforts to promote civil society
participation will fare, and how well they will incorporate the needs of
vulnerable populations into adaptation planning and implementation.
• In Nepal, the NAPA process included wide consultations with
vulnerable communities. Thematic working groups were led by
19. 17
government ministries and included a wide range of civil society
representation, including NGOs and academics. These thematic
working groups met with vulnerable communities throughout the
country and incorporated their perspectives;53
• Civil society in Bangladesh holds two out of 17 membership seats on
the board of the Climate Change Trust Fund. However, these two
civil society representatives have a three-year term limit, while other
members do not have a set term;54
• In Bangladesh, civil society organizations actively lobbied the
government to revise the first draft of the Bangladesh Climate
Change Strategy and Action Plan (BCCSAP). The first plan was
subsequently rejected by a high-level government panel and
replaced with a new strategy that incorporated some civil society
perspectives;55
• In Ethiopia, a climate change forum outside the government has
brought together representatives from government ministries with
those from civil society (see Box 5). Although this is not a formal
national planning or implementing body, it can help increase
coordination and participation among different actors.56
Box 5: Climate Change Forum-Ethiopia (CCF-E)
The Climate Change Forum-Ethiopia (CCF-E) is a gathering of
representatives acting in their individual capacity from government, civil
society organizations, UN agencies, embassies, bilalateral and multilateral
finance agencies, research and academic institutions, and the business
community, which meets regularly to discuss national responses to climate
change. When it was established, CCF-E was chaired by a state minister
from the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development and hosted by
Oxfam America. Currently an independent organization with a secretariat,
CCF-E intends to support policy coordination among all stakeholders with
national consultation, policy development, and as a clearing-house of
climate change information and data.
57
While not a formal body for national
planning and implementation, the CCF-E may serve as a model for bringing
together stakeholders to help steer adaptation efforts.
Reaching vulnerable communities
A critical question in engaging civil society is who exactly the
participants are. Civil society in developing countries —such as
international and national NGOs, community-based organizations, the
private sector, trade unions, women’s organizations, and academia—
are by no means homogenous in their perspectives.
Moreover, while many civil-society organizations can provide a
connection to and perspective on vulnerable groups, as well as links
between governments and local communities, those based in capitals
do not always adequately represent the interests of vulnerable local
communities, especially those in rural areas, such as smallholder
farmers. Indeed, the engagement of vulnerable communities and
groups such as these has often been limited.
20. 18
• In Bangladesh, while women and men who work in fisheries are
among the most vulnerable groups, they have not been included in
the national climate change adaptation policy or in the country’s
PPCR;58
• Official project documents for climate change adaptation plans in
Cambodia have noted that there is a need to communicate with rural
communities in order to gather information on their perceptions of
the potential impacts and their suggestions on how to respond.
However, there is no evidence of this level of consultation in
practice.59
• By contrast, in Nepal, the NAPA process has been carried out in
ways that incorporated local community viewpoints through a
number of thematic working groups. The Local Adaptation Plan of
Action initiative in Nepal may also provide important opportunities
for vulnerable communities to shape adaptation plans in the
country. However, it has not been linked so far to national
processes.60
Participation models in other sectors, including for disaster risk
reduction and AIDS, can provide important lessons for adaptation
finance (see Box 6).
Box 6: A model for participation in El Salvador
In El Salvador, hands-on disaster reduction practices are combined with
advocacy training to ensure that communities can raise their concerns with
decision makers. This approach has allowed for more rapid and effective
evacuations during emergencies; successful advocacy to local government
for the construction of mitigation projects; as well as raised awareness at the
local, municipal and national levels about the vulnerability of marginalized
rural and urban communities.
More than 100 community civil protection committees have been formed that
work at the local and municipal levels for disaster risk reduction. Each
community has an emergency plan and risk map. Meanwhile, municipal
committees, headed by the Mayor and with the participation of government
bodies, NGOs, and community leaders, receive training and support.
Community civil protection committees are linked with the municipal
committee, thereby providing a mechanism for NGO partners and
community leaders to work together with local government and also to
advocate to these leaders. In turn, the municipal process is connected to the
national civil protection system.
61
Gender equality and women’s leadership
Vulnerability is determined not only by the physical impacts of a
changing climate, but also by underlying social, economic, ethnic, and
other circumstances that shape climate-related risks.62 Among the
groups that are most vulnerable to climate change impacts, women
have largely been ignored by climate finance processes, though they are
often best placed to contribute to community resilience-building and
climate change adaptation.63
21. 19
In all of the countries studied, climate change impacts were found to
fall disproportionately on women and girls. In responding to this, some
governments have identified women as a vulnerable group, while
others have taken this one step further by recognizing the important
leadership role played by women. However, this initial recognition has
not yet translated into concrete gains for women.
• While Ethiopia’s NAPA notes that a gender approach needs to be
integrated into all development activities, there are no specific
recommendations in the plan;64
• In Bangladesh, BCCSAP includes women and children as the most
vulnerable group in terms of food security, social protection, and
health. However, the plan fails to address the root causes of these
challenges through specifically gender-responsive measures;65
• The first joint PPCR mission to Tajikistan considered the needs and
participation of vulnerable groups, including women. However,
there was insufficient gender analysis in the resulting climate change
adaptation planning, and the projects selected were not based on
gender-differentiated needs.66
While gender-specific objectives, indicators, and data can be used to
measure and ensure the delivery of finance to women and men, these
are largely missing from national climate change strategies.
Ministries that handle women’s or gender affairs are often missing from
the climate change decision-making process for various reasons,
including a failure to invite them, limited operational scope and
capacity, or a mandate that does not incorporate climate change. These
institutions require support aimed at building their capacity to engage
in climate change decision-making.
• In Nepal, the Women’s Ministry and the Women’s Commission
have recently joined the multi-stakeholder framework that was
formed as part of the development of Nepal’s NAPA, known as the
Multi-stakeholder Climate Change Initiatives Coordination
Committee;67
• While the Ministry of Women’s Affairs in Ethiopia plays a limited
role on climate change, owing to their lack of capacity, the EPA has
now started to include the Ministry in national climate change
discussions; and it could play an important role in bringing forward
climate change adaptation practices that are spearheaded by
women.68
22. 20
5 Recommendations
As international mechanisms for climate change adaptation funding,
particularly the Green Climate Fund, gather pace, the flow of funds to
developing countries poses both a real challenge and a significant
opportunity. If seized, this can be the moment when adaptation finance
is directed to countries in ways that respond to the needs of those who
are hardest hit by a changing climate.
In order to leverage this opportunity, however, it is clear that important
course corrections must be made both by providers of finance and by
national governments.
• Adaptation finance often bypasses governments through multiple
and uncoordinated channels, and without alignment with national
adaptation or development plans, or investment in enhancing
national capacity;
• At the national level, while governments are beginning to put in
place structures and initial strategies to handle adaptation finance,
there remains a lack of clearly identified leadership or adequate
coordination and coherence across governments. The lack of
capacity in many developing country contexts often undermines
their efforts;
• Most importantly, real participation and accountability, involving
civil society and vulnerable communities, has yet to be achieved in
many developing countries. This is especially true for women.
The situation faced by those who are hardest hit by a changing climate
demands a better course. A key milestone on that new course that must
be reached urgently is the development and implementation of
country-driven adaptation strategies, with plans that respond to the
needs of those who are most vulnerable. Providers of adaptation
finance and national governments can act now to make that a reality by
taking action on the recommendations set forth below.
International providers of adaptation finance must
put developing countries in the driver’s seat
Adaptation finance should be provided predictably, in line with a
country-driven adaptation strategy or plan
In order to enable country leadership, international finance for climate
change adaptation needs to be provided to fund a country’s priorities
on the basis of a country-driven adaptation strategy or plan.
The development and implementation of a national adaptation strategy
or plan must be led by the national government and must be based on a
participatory and accountable process that ensures the needs of women
are met.
Financing should be provided on a predictable, consistent basis to
countries in order to enable effective planning and budgeting for the
implementation of the adaptation strategy or plan. Specific details for
all funding provided should be made transparent and public.
23. 21
In order to minimize transaction costs and ensure coherence with a
country’s adaptation strategy, finance should be harmonized and
should come through a coherent, consolidated channel, with the Green
Climate Fund providing the majority of adaptation finance.
International adaptation finance should be provided to a national
entity
Funding should be provided to a national-level entity formed or led by
the national government, such as a lead ministry or other institution
chosen by the government. The Green Climate Fund should provide
direct access to finance for such a national-level entity.
Whenever possible, adaptation funding should be provided as budget
support to implement the national adaptation strategy.69
In some cases, there may need to be project-based or programme
support until governments are able to channel funding through budget
support, for example in fragile states or countries with inadequate
mechanisms to tackle corruption.
Dedicated resources for capacity-building must be provided so
countries can both develop and implement a national adaptation
strategy or plan
In order to help ensure country ownership, providers of finance,
particularly the Green Climate Fund, must deliver substantial resources
aimed at building the capacity of both the government and civil society
of developing countries.
Capacity-building will need to span technical and scientific
competencies; ‘softer’ capacities, such as civil society and community
engagement; and relevant infrastructure, including weather-monitoring
capability.
Resources for capacity-building need to be provided in a rapid, up-
front, and sustained manner, with a minimum level of support
provided for developing and updating national strategies.
A separate pool of funds should be made available for civil society and
community capacity-building. This support can be targeted at building
skills to engage in developing national adaptation strategies,
participating in program implementation, and undertaking monitoring
and evaluation.
Developing countries should exercise leadership
Effective government leadership should be established for
adaptation planning and use of finance, led by a clearly identified
national entity
While governments must have flexibility in designing their own
approaches, a lead national entity, such as a ministry, should be
designated to coordinate adaptation finance.
24. 22
This agency should have the authority and functionality to act as the
primary channel of international finance for adaptation and oversee
implementation of the national strategic framework on adaptation.
While countries may decide to consolidate adaptation and mitigation
funding oversight in a single entity, a clearly designated level of
resources and capacity should be established for adaptation finance.
An effective coordination process must be created to develop and
oversee a national adaptation strategy
The lead entity for adaptation finance should form a consortium with
all other relevant ministries and agencies to develop the national
strategic framework, with citizen and stakeholder participation.
The national climate change adaptation strategy should be integrated
with national development and poverty strategies; and the priorities
need to be put forward by local government, civil society, local
communities, and marginalized groups.
The strategy should be developed and overseen through a fully
participatory and accountable process involving civil society and
vulnerable communities. National parliaments should also be fully
consulted and have a clear role in the development of a national
adaptation strategy.
Adaptation plans and funds must be accountable to
the most vulnerable
Strategies for adaptation and the use of funding must be
developed and implemented by countries with the full
participation of vulnerable communities and civil society, and
must be transparent and accountable to them
Climate funding should prioritize and clearly provide resource
allocations for those areas and populations most affected by climate-
related risks and with the greatest need for building adaptive capacity
due to vulnerability.
From the initial planning to the final evaluation, participation by civil
society and vulnerable communities in the national adaptation strategy
and in the use of funding should be transformative, rather than
cosmetic, thereby resulting in inputs that are visible in the final
outcome.
In order to help to achieve this, civil society and vulnerable
communities must be fully represented in the process of designing a
national adaptation strategy and in overseeing its implementation. This
should include a transparent, participatory, and inclusive process for
monitoring and evaluation.
Civil society organizations and direct representatives of local
communities and marginalized groups should be actively supported
such that they are able to hold their governments to account over
25. 23
adaptation planning and spending. This should include support to
establish – or assist, if such already exists - a national civil society
network or coalition that liaises with and facilitates full participation in
the government-led process.
Governments and finance providers should uphold the public right of
access to information, through disclosure all relevant documents and
the publication of regular and accessible public reports, which outline
how funds are allocated and any other pertinent information.
Providers of finance should ensure that country strategies are
developed with full participation and accountability, while also
providing resources to enable that process
Arrangements for participation by civil society and vulnerable
communities should be designed by governments and should reflect
national circumstances. However, international finance providers,
particularly the Green Climate Fund, should ensure that each country
can meet a global set of principles for participation and accountability.
These principles would require stakeholder views to be reflected in
strategy formulation and implementation. In order to make this
participation possible, finance providers must cultivate substantial
capacity in governments aimed at engaging stakeholders, through
sustained financial and technical support to build the capacity of local
and regional government offices leading on adaptation planning and
priorities.
Gender equality and women’s leadership should be central to the
development and implementation of national strategies
Women should be prioritized in climate funding, particularly given
their greater vulnerability to climate-related risks and untapped
potential in leading climate-related solutions. Gender-specific objectives
and indicators should be core components of the national climate
strategy. Women’s ministries and gender units within all ministries
need to play a more central role in climate funding processes, and
should establish climate change as a core element of their mandate. A
systematic capacity-building process should be available to these
departments and units, as well as to national women’s organizations
and gender experts.
26. 24
Appendix
National Adaptation Programmes of Action
Between 2004 and 2010, forty-five countries prepared and submitted
National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs) to the Least
Developed Country Fund (LDCF) managed by the Global Environment
Facility (GEF). In line with a 2001 decision made by the UN Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), NAPAs are meant to
identify priority activities that respond to a country’s urgent and
immediate needs to adapt to climate change – those for which further
delay would increase vulnerability and/or costs at a later stage. In
December 2010, parties to the UNFCCC agreed on a new Adaptation
Framework and a process to enable LDCs to formulate ’national
adaptation plans‘, building on the NAPA process.
http://unfccc.int/national_reports/napa/items/2719.php
The Pilot Programme for Climate Resilience
The World Bank’s Pilot Program for Climate Resilience (PPCR) is part
of the Strategic Climate Fund (SCF), a multi-donor trust fund within the
Climate Investment Funds (CIFs). The objective of the PPCR is to build
resilience to climate change by integrating adaptation into national
development planning and policy. The program has invited nine
countries and two regions (Caribbean and Pacific) to participate, and is
intended to build on the NAPAs. The first design phase of funding
supports capacity building, awareness raising, coordination and
planning, and the second implementation phase provides technical
assistance and a combination of grants and highly concessional loans to
support investments in priority sectors.
http://www.climateinvestmentfunds.org/cif/ppcr
27. 25
Notes
1
Abed, S.I. (2011) Wither Happiness'. Kaisar Jahan Kony (with support from Oxfam), Dhaka, Bangladesh.
2
Oxfam (2010) ‘21st Century Aid: Recognising Success and Tackling Failure’, Briefing Paper 137, Oxfam.
3
Advisory Group on Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness (2008) ‘Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness: An Exploration
of Experience and Good Practice’. See also the World Bank (2005) ‘Issues and Options for Improving
Engagement Between the World Bank and Civil Society Organizations’, the World Bank, p. 26; and Christian
Aid (2001) ‘Ignoring the Experts: Poor People’s Exclusion from Poverty Reduction Strategies’, Christian Aid.
4
The World Bank (2008) ‘Accra Agenda for Action’,
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ACCRAEXT/Resources/4700790-1217425866038/AAA-4-SEPTEMBER-
FINAL-16h00.pdf (last accessed 20 April 2011).
5
IDD and Associates (2006) ‘Evaluation of General Budget Support: Synthesis Report’, OECD/DAC, Birmingham,
UK.
6
Global Network of Civil Society Organizations for Disaster Risk Reduction (2009) ‘Views from the Frontline: A
Local Perspective of Progress Towards Implementation of the Hyogo Framework for Action’,
http://www.globalnetwork-dr.org/images/reports/vflfullreport0609.pdf (last accessed 20 April 2011).
7
The Global Fund (2005) ‘Revised Guidelines on the Purpose, Structure, Composition and Funding of Country
Coordinating Mechanisms and Requirements for Grant Eligibility’, para. 3.
8
Oxfam conducted preliminary research in Cambodia, Ethiopia, Nepal, Bangladesh, Viet Nam, Tajikistan, and the
Philippines; global research on the UNFCCC National Adaptation Programmes of Action and the World
Bank's Pilot Programme on Climate Resilience that included additional countries; and global research on the
Country Coordinating Mechanisms of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria.
9
A.M. Kleymeyer (2011a) ‘Cambodia Country Brief’, internal research report.
10
A.M. Kleymeyer (2011b) ‘Ethiopia Country Brief’, internal research report.
11
K. Wiseman and R. Pandit Chhetri (2011) ‘Governance of Climate Change Adaptation Finance: Nepal’, Oxfam
Research Report.
12
Ibid.
13
M Iqbal Ahmed (2010a) ‘Governance of Climate Change Financing: A Case Study on Policy and Practices in
Bangladesh’, Oxfam Research Report.
14
Kleymeyer 2011b, op. cit.
15
Wiseman and Pandit Chhetri 2011, op. cit.
16
Ibid.
17
Oxfam (2011) ‘Climate Change Investment Through the Pilot Programme for Climate Resilience in Tajikistan’,
Oxfam Research Report.
18
Wiseman and Pandit Chhetri 2011, op. cit.
19
Adaptation Fund (2010) ‘Report of the Twelfth Meeting of the Adaptation Fund Board’, http://www.adaptation-
fund.org/system/files/AFB_12-Report.pdf (last accessed 20 April 2011).
20
Oxfam 2010a, op. cit.
21
See Oxfam 2010a, op. cit., for Bangladesh; Kleymeyer 2011a, op. cit., for Cambodia; Wiseman and Pandit
Chhetri 2011, op. cit., for Nepal; and Oxfam (2010b), Adaptation, Finance, and Viet Nam Climate Policy,
Oxfam Research Report, November 2010.
22
The Risk Management Directorate (or DGR, the acronym used to refer to it in Colombia) is responsible for
leading and coordinating the National System of Disaster Prevention and Response (SNPAD), for proposing
national policies and strategies relating to risk management, for dissemination and monitoring of the related
National Plan, for supporting relevant agencies that are part of the National System, for raising national and
international resources for the National Calamities Fund as well as management of the same, among other
responsibilities (see http://www.sigpad.gov.co/sigpad/paginas_detalle.aspx?idp=100). As part of its
recommendations to help Colombia avoid another disaster caused by climate-related hazards like the one the
country suffered in 2010-11, Oxfam is calling for the DGR to take a stronger role in developing and
implementing the country's national adaptation policy and strategy (see:
http://www.oxfam.org/es/policy/colombia-inundaciones-como-evitar-otro-desastre).
23
Oxfam 2010a, op. cit.
24
Kleymeyer 2011a, op. cit.
25
Kleymeyer 2011b, op. cit.
26
Wiseman and Pandit Chhetri 2011, op. cit.
28. 26
27
E. Santoalla (2010) ‘Climate Financing in the Philippines: A Scan of Governance Mechanisms, Practices and
Initiatives’, Oxfam Research Report.
28
Oxfam 2011, op. cit.
29
Oxfam 2010b, op. cit.
30
Ibid.
31
Ibid.
32
Wiseman and Pandit Chhetri 2011, op. cit.
33
Oxfam 2010a, op. cit.
34
See Oxfam (2010b).
35
Kleymeyer 2011a, op. cit., for Cambodia; and Oxfam 2011, op. cit., for Tajikistan.
36
The Global Fund (undated) ‘Framework Document of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS Tuberculosis and Malaria’,
http://www.theglobalfund.org/documents/TGF_Framework.pdf (last accessed 20 April 2011).
37
The Global Fund (2008) ‘Country Coordinating Mechanisms: Oversight Practice’.
38
The Global Fund (2005) ‘Revised Guidelines on the Purpose, Structure, Composition and Funding of Country
Coordinating Mechanisms and Requirements for Grant Eligibility’, para. 13.
39
The Global Fund (2008a) ‘Country Coordinating Mechanisms: Governance and Civil Society Participation’.
40
K. Nichols, African Services Committee, telephone interview with the authors.
41
The Global Fund (2010) ‘CCM Gender Balance for QTR 2, 2010 - Global and Regional Perspectives’,
http://www.theglobalfund.org/documents/ccm/CCMgraphs/CCM%202010%20QTR%202%20Gender%20Bal
ance%20Global%20and%20Regional.pdf (last accessed 20 April 2011).
42
The Global Fund 2008, op. cit.
43
The Global Fund (2010a) ‘Dual Track Financing Information Note’.
44
The Global Fund (2008b) ‘The Global Fund’s Strategy for Ensuring Gender Equality in the Response to
HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (The Gender Equality Strategy)’.
45
Oxfam 2010a, op. cit.
46
Oxfam 2010b, op. cit.
47
Wiseman and Pandit Chhetri 2011, op. cit.
48
Kleymeyer 2011b, op. cit.
49
Kleymeyer 2011a, op. cit.
50
Ibid.
51
Oxfam 2011, op. cit.
52
Oxfam 2010a, op. cit.
53
Wiseman and Pandit Chhetri 2011, op. cit.
54
Oxfam 2010a, op. cit.
55
Ibid.
56
Kleymeyer 2011b, op. cit.
57
Ibid.
58
Oxfam 2010a, op. cit.
59
Kleymeyer 2011a, op. cit.
60
Wiseman and Pandit Chhetri 2011, op. cit.
61
Oxfam (2011b) ‘Successful Capacity-Building Approaches: Climate Change Adaptation and Disaster Risk
Reduction’, unpublished report.
62
M.L. Parry et al.( 2007) ‘Summary for Policymakers’, in Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation, and
Vulnerability, Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change, ed. M. L. Parry et. al., Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.
63
L. Schalatek (2009) ‘Gender and Climate Finance: Double Mainstreaming for Sustainable Development’,
Heinrich Böll Stiftung North America.
64
Kleymeyer 2011b, op. cit.
29. 27
65
Oxfam (2010a, op. cit.
66
See Oxfam 2011, op. cit.
67
Wiseman and Pandit Chhetri 2011, op. cit.
68
Kleymeyer 2011b, op. cit.
69
Providing budget support to fulfil a national plan that involves a particular area of work is often characterized as
‘sectoral budget support’. It can also be ‘general budget support’, with an agreement to achieve certain
benchmarks or objectives.
31. Owning Adaptation
Factsheet: Bangladesh
India
Democratic
Republic
of Congo
Ethiopia
Pakistan
Nigeria
Tanzania
Sudan
Niger
Angola
Thailand
Myanmar
Bhutan
Yemen
Zambia
South
Africa
Afghanistan
Chad
Malawi
Eritrea
Uganda
Kenya
Mozambique
Zimbabwe
Israel
Palestine
Georgia
Azerbaijan
Armenia
Tajikistan
Nepal
V
Bangladesh
Sri Lanka
Somaliland
Somalia
ChinaAlbania
Rwanda
Cambod
Introduction
Forty per cent of Bangladesh’s population of 150 million live below the
poverty line, and millions struggle with malnourishment and hunger. The
Fourth Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and other scientific
studies list the country as among those most vulnerable to climate
change.
In the last 30 years, Bangladesh has experienced nearly 200 disasters
related to drought, extreme temperature, floods, and storms, which killed
181,307 people, caused damages costing $16.4 billion, and destroyed
the homes and livelihoods of more than 30 million. In November 2007,
more than 4,000 people were killed and six million displaced or made
homeless by Cyclone Sidr. When Cyclone Aila hit Bangladesh and
India on 25 May 2009, it forced 400,000 people to leave their homes
and communities. The reconstruction of the embankment took almost
two years to make the area liveable again. As of 2011, Oxfam and other
national and international organizations, as well as the government,
continue to facilitate rehabilitation programmes in the area.
Sudden and unforeseen climate change-related hazards practically
nullify development investments in poverty eradication before these can
take root. The government has had to divert development financing to
disaster relief, rehabilitation and safety net programmes.
Loss of livelihood and outward migration due to climate
change1
Related Event Loss of
Livelihood
(no. per year)
External
Migration
(no. per year)
Frequency
Coastal and
River Erosion
50,000–
200,000
60,000 annual
Salinity 120,000 10,000–15,000 annual
Tidal Surge and
Rough Sea
300,000–
400,000
100,000–
120,000
every three
years
Water Logging 350,000 30,000 annual
1 A.U. Ahmed and S. Neelormi (2008), ‘Climate change, loss of livelihoods, and forced displacements in
Bangladesh’, http://www.csrlbd.org/pressrelease-/doc_download/22-climate-change-loss-of-livelihoods-
and-forced-displacement-in-bangladesh
Climate change in
Bangladesh
The impact of climate change on the
environment and people of Bangladesh
includes increased:
• intensity and frequency of cyclones and
tidal surges due to temperature rise;
• altitude and intensity of tidal surges,
frequency of coastal floods and water
logging, and increased salinity in the
coastal region due to sea-level rise;
• magnitude of floods, flash-floods, and
river erosion;
• drought due to lack of rain and erratic
rainfall;
• uncertainty in seasonal changes.
32. Policy Instruments and Implementing Tools
Mainstreaming adaptation into overall development planning and
strategies is imperative, not only to make the country resilient to climate
change-related hazards but also to accelerate achieving the poverty-
reduction targets of the Millennium Development Goals and long-term
sustainable economic development.
Bangladesh is one of the few countries that have successfully developed
participatory disaster management. Since 2003, the Comprehensive
Disaster Management Programme (CDMP) of the Ministry of Food and
Disaster Management (MoFDM) has advanced government-wide and
agency risk reduction efforts. The Ministry of Environment and Forests
(MoEF), guided by the National Environment Council, which is chaired by
the Prime Minister, tackles climate and environmental issues. Following
recent structural changes, the MoEF’s Climate Change Unit (CCU) now
coordinates other ministries to implement climate change-related projects
and programmes.
The draft version of the sixth five-year development plan (2011–15) set
16 core targets – for economic growth, employment, poverty reduction,
human resources development, gender balance and environmental
protection. Along with higher per capita income, the government’s Vision
2021 manifesto projects a development scenario where citizens will have
higher living standards, better education and social justice. It aims to
ensure a more equitable socio-economic environment and sustainable
development through better protection from climate change and natural
disasters.
The government has earmarked more than $10 billion in investments for
the period 2007 to 2015 to make Bangladesh less vulnerable to natural
disasters. Despite this effort, the direct annual cost of natural disasters
over the last 10 years is estimated to be between 0.5 and 1 per cent of
GDP.2
(The social safety net budget is 2.1 to 2.8 per cent of GDP.) The
first phase of the Comprehensive Disaster Management Programme
(CDMP), successfully implemented by the MoFDM, cost about $26
million.
National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA)
• Developed under the Least-Developed Country Fund (LDCF)/Global
Environment Facility (GEF) initiative with the participation of civil
society organisations (CSOs) as well as UN institutions.
• Focused on three particular effects of climate change: increasing sea-
level rise, changing rainfall patterns; and increases in the frequency
and intensity of extreme events.
• Identified 15 immediate and urgent projects that will address the
country’s vulnerability to climate change in the original plan and 18
specific projects in the revised plan. So far, only one of the 15 projects
has been supported by LDCF/GEF.
Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan
(BCCSAP)
• Established Bangladesh as the first of the least developed countries to
finalise a national strategy and action plan on climate change.
• Aims to build a climate-resilient economy and society through
adaptation to climate change as well as mitigation for a low-carbon
development path.
2 World Bank (2010), Economics of Adaptation to Climate Change Study (EACC): Bangladesh.
33. • Recommends projects under six main pillars – food security,
social safety and health; comprehensive disaster management;
infrastructure, research and knowledge; management, mitigation and
low carbon development; and capacity building.
Both the government and CSOs have been active in international
conventions and organisations to increase pressure for more stringent and
legally binding agreements on climate change. CSOs are part of official
government delegations and take similar positions, including on higher
emission-reduction targets and stricter warming limitations to within 1.5°C.
On several occasions the prime minister has expressed her intension
to invest heavily in the re-excavation of rivers and canals (to reduce
vulnerability to floods and increase irrigation facility during dry season),
and in income opportunities in areas where crop failure is more likely to
occur. Between 2007 and 2010, the government invested significantly to
build more than 1,000 new shelters to save lives during cyclonic storm
surges.
Financing Mechanisms and Issues
Climate change adaptation financing has become a critical issue in
discussions about national development financing. Donor-supported
projects, often financed by loans from multilateral financing agencies
such as the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank, focus
mostly on infrastructure and lack community consultation, transparency,
accountability, and the appropriate monitoring and evaluation. These
loans are tied-in with numerous conditions, which, in most cases, reduce
a country’s policy space secured under different multilateral agreements.
Bangladesh Climate Change Trust Fund (BCCTF)
The controversial Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) proposed in 2008
was to be chaired by the World Bank and its secretariat based in the
World Bank office in Dhaka. However, criticism of the MDTF by the
Campaign for Sustainable Rural Livelihoods (CSRL) and a section
of the government, combined with uncertain and inadequate finance,
provoked the government to finance climate change adaptation initiatives
from internal resources. This led to the establishment of the BCCTF
to fund the BCCSAP. In mid-2010, the government allocated an initial
$110 million to the fund for 2009–10, and another $110 million for the
succeeding year.
As designed, two-thirds of BCCTF will be spent on projects and
programmes. The remaining one-third would be kept as a fixed deposit,
with the interest earned to be spent on projects recommended by a
technical committee and approved by a board of trustees.
In 2009–10, an open-ended call for applications for financing under
the BCCTF was issued where both government and non-government
organisations (NGOs) could apply for adaptation and mitigation projects
for a maximum period of two years. A maximum $3.57 million was
assigned for government projects, while the allocation for NGOs is yet to
be finalised.
Bangladesh Climate Change Resilience Fund (BCCRF)
As a result of strong opposition from the CSRL and a section of the
government, the MDTF evolved into the BCCRF in May 2010. The
government put in place an innovative mechanism to channel $110
million or more in grant funds to millions of Bangladeshis in order to build
their resilience to the effects of climate change. BCCRF was established
Other Policies, Programmes
and Mechanisms
• Vision 20021, Perspective Plan, and Sixth
Five-Year Plan
• Standing Order on Disaster Management
• National Water Management Plan
• Climate Change Unit (CCU) under the
Ministry of Environment and Forests,
which coordinates focal points in all
ministries
• Coastal Zone Policy and Coastal
Development Strategy
• National Disaster Management Plan
(2010–15)
34. with the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding between the
government and five development partners. The Fund will support the
implementation of the Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and Action
Plan (BCCSAP) 2009.
The Fund will be managed and implemented by the government, with
initial contributions from Denmark ($1.6 million), the European Union
($10.4 million), Sweden ($11.5 million) and the UK ($86.7 million). The
World Bank will provide technical support for a short period of time and
ensure that due diligence requirements are met.
The Fund will have a two-tiered governance structure, consisting of a
governing council and a management committee, both of which will
be chaired by the government, and include representatives from line
ministries, development partners and civil society.
Lessons Learned and Recommendations
1. Policy coherence
Although the government seems to have taken climate change seriously,
the BCCSAP needs to be coherent and consistent with other national
development policies and strategies. Mainstreaming climate change in
national development programmes will be critical to successful climate
change adaptation and mitigation.
To achieve Vision 2021, the government drafted a perspective plan and
is preparing the Sixth Five-Year Plan. A committee has been formed at
the Ministry of Planning to mainstream climate change into this national
planning document.
The government’s adoption of food security as a major investment plan
for the next five years is commendable. However, the existing agriculture
policy is not streamlined with the climate change strategies, particularly,
that of adaptation of agriculture to climate change. Moreover, the newly
finalised food security policy assigns inadequate attention to climate
change. Before making any investment on food security, agriculture and
climate change adaptation, a comprehensive strategy has to be in place
so that related investments and initiatives complement each other. This,
in turn, requires extensive research and consultation as well as policy
advocacy at the national level.
Although the Prime Minister has articulated a general policy direction that
Bangladesh will not receive loans, and only grants, for climate change
adaptation programmes, bureaucrats at the Ministry of Finance have
ignored this. Moreover, instead of focusing on adaptation, the MoEF is
investing its own resource for mitigation and low carbon development
path, contrary to the directions set forth by the BCCSAP.
2. Participatory processes
CSOs and NGOs expressed concern about the original BCCSAP
completed in 2008. Oxfam contributed significantly to redefining
a climate change action plan through the CSRL, which conducted
extensive advocacy at national and international levels for the revision of
the original BCCSAP. As a result, the 2008 BCCSAP was reviewed by
a committee convened by the newly-elected government and a revised
document was prepared and endorsed in 2009. The review process
addressed the strategic part of the document, while the programmes
remain to be finalised following a consultative process involving all
relevant stakeholders.
36. Owning Adaptation
Factsheet: Cambodia
India
Democratic
Republic
of Congo
Ethiopia
Pakistan
Tanzania
Sudan
ola
Thailand
Myanmar
Bhutan
Yemen
Zambia
South
Africa
Afghanistan
had
Malawi
Eritrea
Uganda
Kenya
Mozambique
Zimbabwe
Israel
Palestine
Nepal
Cambodia
Viet Nam
Bangladesh
Sri Lanka
I n d o
Somaliland
Somalia
Chinabania
Rwanda
Introduction
Cambodia is amongst the least developed countries in the world, and
following years of political and social upheaval, faces significant socio-
economic challenges. Nearly 70 per cent of the population survives
on less than $2 a day and 30 per cent live below the national poverty
threshold of $0.46–0.63 a day. Development needs are acute, affecting
all sectors and regions.
Cambodia has been identified as one of the countries most vulnerable
to climate change. In addition to the expected increase in frequency
of climate hazards like cyclones, droughts, floods, and landslides, the
country’s adaptive capacity was evaluated to be among the lowest of all
Southeast Asian countries.1
Policy Instruments and Implementing Tools
Cambodia began implementing climate activities in 1999 with the Climate
Change Enabling Activity Project, funded by the Global Environment
Facility (GEF) and the UN Development Programme (UNDP). As a least
developed country, it qualified for assistance from the GEF to complete
its First National Communication in 2002, and from the Least Developed
Countries Fund to produce its National Adaptation Programme of Action
(NAPA) in 2007. The Second National Communication is expected in
2011. The purpose of the National Communications and NAPA were to
assist with national policy development, awareness raising, and project
identification.
Budget and resource limitations have impinged on policy development
and project implementation. The Ministry of Environment (MoE) is the
official focal point for climate change at the national government level.
But, while the MoE has achieved a higher profile since it was put in
charge of climate change, no additional resources accompanied the
restructuring. Ministries are required to establish climate change units,
yet many have not. In principle, under the process of decentralisation
adopted by the government since 2002, policy from the national level
should be carried out at the local level, yet there are no formal climate
change focal points at the sub-national level or any relationship between
national and local government processes.
Cambodia has recognised the need for national policy development on
climate change, and discussions on a Climate Change Strategy and
Action Plan (CCSAP) are ongoing. The National Committee on Climate
Change (NCCC) is tasked with developing this national policy, as well
as integrating climate change into relevant policies, strategies, legal
instruments, plans, and programmes. The NCCC was also supposed to
establish a climate change technical team to provide technical advice;
however, due to delays in setting up the technical team, a climate change
department now plays this role.
1 This is based on a three-tiered evaluation of the country. For more information see the Climate Change
Vulnerability Mapping for Southeast Asia (2009), www.eepsea.org
The impact of climate change
in Cambodia
• More severe and frequent floods and
droughts will damage agriculture,
particularly rice production.
• Changes in rainfall patterns will affect the
availability of surface and ground water,
including drinking water and water for
irrigation.
• Unpredictable water flows – in terms of
seasonality, timing and duration will affect
sensitive wetland ecosystems as well as
the productivity of fisheries.
• Cambodia already has the highest fatality
rate from malaria in Asia, with an average
of 800 deaths per year. Changing
climatic conditions will further spread
vector-borne diseases such as malaria,
disproportionately affecting the health of
poor and marginalised communities.
37. The climate change department functions under the direct guidance of
the MoE and NCCC. It addresses four technical issues: the country’s
greenhouse gas inventory; mitigation; vulnerability and adaptation;
and implementation. The vulnerability and adaptation unit carries out
activities in co-ordination with international development partners.
The government has yet to convene a technical working group on climate
change. As a result, the topic of climate change has not been discussed
thoroughly and has been subsumed under the responsibilities of the
environment working group.
Cambodia has also developed a National Green Growth Roadmap,
which includes an array of climate-related strategies and programmes
to mainstream low-carbon and environmentally-sound development
practices into key sector activities. The Roadmap adopts a ‘holistic
approach to development [that] will help the country improve resilience
and decrease vulnerability to climate change’.2
The activities specified in the Roadmap include primarily those aimed at
mitigation, such as renewable energy, low-carbon investments, and green
industries. It also has a number of adaptation-related activities, such as
forest management, sustainable agriculture, water-resource management
and irrigation, and transportation and infrastructure management.
Cambodia has many other institutional mechanisms and processes to
enable co-ordinated governance and policy integration. The country’s
development objectives are outlined in the Rectangular Strategy for
Growth, Employment, Equity, and Efficiency adopted in July 2004,
as well as in the NSDP. Both documents stress the need to reduce
poverty and improve agricultural productivity through the expansion of
irrigation and the management of water resources to reduce vulnerability
to natural disasters. Yet, public expenditure in agriculture, water, and
rural development made up less than five per cent of the 2009 national
budget.3
The Cambodia Development Cooperation Forum is the highest level for
political dialogue and review of National Strategic Development Plan
(NSDP) and and implementation of the plan. As part of the Forum, the
Government-Development Partner Co-ordination Committee, chaired by
the government, meets two to three times a year for high-level political
and technical discussions. Climate change is a key priority in the NSDP
for 2010–13. All concerned ministries and agencies are required to
integrate the priority projects identified in the programme into their plans
and work.
Funding Mechanisms and Issues
The funding mechanisms available include budget support, basket funds,
multi-donor trust funds, sector-specific funds, international project funds,
bilateral funds, and a wide variety of loans. The question is how to best
approach climate adaptation financing. Some adaption needs require
large infrastructure investments, while others need community-based
approaches rolled-out across the country.
The NSDP is envisioned as a guide for resource allocation, including
Official Development Assistance (ODA). ODA, in theory, complements
government financing and provides critical infrastructure development
and services. It is a major vehicle for achieving Cambodia’s Millennium
Development Goals.
2 National Green Growth Road Map, Royal Government of Cambodia (2009)
3 Annual expenditure by MAFF and MoWRAM was about 4.8 percent per year during the period 2006-
2009’, NGO Forum (2010)
38. In 2008, Cambodia received ODA of $742.81 million – nearly 84.7 per
cent of government expenditure. However, a recent UNDP study found
that ODA to environment and conservation in Cambodia had decreased
between 2004 and 2008 from $19.6 million to $7.6 million. A stated
priority of the NSDP is to develop a National Strategy and Action Plan
for Climate Change. However, the procedure, timeline, and resources for
this are unclear.
The Council for the Development of Cambodia is a high-level institution
tasked with coordinating development partner assistance; its database
shows all partners, activities, sectors, funding levels, and other detailed
information. The database has recently integrated a climate change filter,
although this function is not yet fully applicable and therefore does not
provide a full picture.
Development partners have made pledges of $96 million for climate
change over the next five years. Most of the climate-change projects and
programmes in the country have been sourced by development partners
or international NGOs, rather than applied for directly by the government
or local organisations. This raises the issue of country ownership of
these initiatives, which is critical for effective project implementation and
requires close attention, as increasing levels of climate-change financing
begin to enter the country.
Commune councils have been identified by many as an entry point for
working with government at the local-level, as well as for partnerships
with civil society groups. Working at the community level is a challenge
for the government, and requires increased capacity building, awareness
raising, and information dissemination. A possible way of providing
sustainable local-level financing is through ‘commune investment plans’.
At present, communes receive around $5,000 base funding; the rest
comes from civil society groups and development partners. A strategy
to connect climate financing to these investment plans will help align
activities along national plans while strengthening government capacity.
Two Parallel Funds
Cambodian Climate Change Alliance (CCCA)
The CCCA is a UNDP trust fund for adaption and capacity building,
due to be handed over to the government in 2012. The intention is for
the CCCA to be country-driven, while project selection is government-
determined. Many civil society groups are concerned, however, that it will
simply use non-government parties as contractors depending on need.
Strategic Programme for Climate Resilience (SPCR) (developed
through the Pilot Project for Climate Resilience (PPCR))
The SPCR is a programme funded by the PPCR, which was managed
in Cambodia initially by the World Bank and, more recently, by the
Asian Development Bank (ADB). Phase one, ongoing but significantly
behind schedule, provided $1.5 million to facilitate the development of a
cross-sectoral approach to climate resilience. The program will last for
two years and has no clear provision for continuation or sustainability,
in this way it reflects the ‘fast-start financing’ dynamic that donors
concerned with climate change. Phase two, valued at nearly $105 million
(approximately 50 per cent as grant and 50 per cent as concessional
loan), includes some support for policy reform and institutional capacity-
building, but the majority of the funds will be used to ‘climate proof’
ADB projects. There is a concern that, in terms of effectiveness, these
funds should be directed towards the communities already recognized
as most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, rather than ADB
Suggested Climate Change
Financing Modals
• Civil Society and Pro-Poor Markets
(CSPPM) is a two-year, $7.5 million
programme which uses partnership
grants to boost citizens’ influence in
local decision-making regarding the
exploitation of natural resources. It helps
ensure that local communities are the
chief beneficiaries of local resources,
and that those resources are managed
sustainably.
• The WorldFish Center is working with
communities and government for ‘soft’
adaptation needs such as knowledge,
capacity, and information. But knowledge
and capacity building are long-term
results that demand time. The project’s
strategy is to broker links between
government and civil society. After this,
the next step is brokering coalitions of
partners to provide a broader and better
range of capacities.
39. priority projects, especially where, arguably, climate change action and
responses should already have been integrated into the ADB projects.
At an earlier stage of the PPCR/SPCR development, a World
Bank consultancy engaged with civil society groups to develop
recommendations for civil society participation whereby $3–5 million
would go to a separate fund to build capacity among civil society and
ensure their contribution to the success of the program. This intended
investment has since been reduced to a Technical Assistance allocation
of $2 million and there remains concern that this will be omitted in its
entirety from the final SPCR.
Lessons Learned and Recommendations
1. Consultation and participation
The NAPA claims to have followed a participatory consultation process,
with a focus on country-driven adaptation measures that affect the
lives of local people, especially the poorest. According to the NAPA,
information was gathered on 684 households in 17 provinces regarding
the following climatic hazards: flood, drought, windstorm, seawater
intrusion, and rising tide. The survey results identified which provinces
suffer which hazards. The responses of the villagers, when asked to
describe existing ways they adapt to these hazards, demonstrated little
access to information and little understanding of how to respond safely.
Most local communities are unprepared for extreme climate events and
have little adaptation capacity. Those which are resourceful when dealing
with climate hazards are usually settlements with higher social capital
and stronger local institutions. Even where communities are aware
of possible coping and adaptation mechanisms, the lack of financial
resources prevents them from implementing these projects.
2. Capacity
While many adaptation projects and programmes include a capacity-
building component, few provide capacity-building programmes that
also adapt to changing needs and capacity. Furthermore, few capitalise
on the existing knowledge of local communities or the broad networks
and capabilities of civil society groups. Instead, they veer towards one-
shot workshops with external trainers who provide information without
a careful assessment of needs or a consideration of cultural context.
All levels – from the most remote village to the highest political level –
require a better understanding of their roles and a greater capacity to
strategise, co-ordinate, respond to, and monitor climate change.
3. Co-ordination and planning
Cambodia is only just beginning to address climate concerns, and so far
has done so in an uncoordinated manner. There is limited understanding
of how to mainstream climate change in development planning and
budgeting, and little engagement with civil society or community-based
groups, despite their potential to support climate adaptation through
research, funding, know-how, monitoring, and evaluation. For example,
many civil society groups consulted on the NAPA were asked to react to
a close-to-final draft of the document. The NAPA has therefore focused
mainly on large-scale infrastructure projects rather than responding to
the needs of vulnerable communities. The involvement of the private
sector in adaptation, disaster risk management, and even mitigation
activities is non-existent. The integration of gender considerations in
climate change plans is limited.
