Based on the paper Sukuk and Their Contemporary Applications by Mufti Taqi Usmani.

1. IS THE SUKUK STRUCTURE
SHARIÁH COMPLIANT?
By: Camille Paldi, CEO of
FAAIF

2. INTRODUCTION
This presentation aims to break down and clarify Justice Taqi Usmani’s famous
paper on Sukuk and Their Contemporary Applications.
The objective of the presentation is to show how modern day sukuk are generally not
Shariáh compliant and replicate conventional bonds.

3. SUKUK V BONDS
Sukuk are Islamic capital raising instruments where the sakk (certificate) holder has
beneficial ownership in the underlying asset of the transaction, which generates a
return for the investor.
A bond is a sale of debt, where the investor gets a fixed or variable interest rate
(coupon payment) and where the principal is guaranteed.

4. ARE SUKUK REALLY DIFFERENT
FROM BONDS?
Modern day sukuk have been endowed with the same characteristics as
conventional bonds.

5. CHARACTERISTICS OF
CONVENTIONAL BONDS
Bonds do not represent ownership on the part of the bond holders in the commercial
or industrial enterprises for which the bonds were issued. Rather, they document the
interest-bearing debt owed to the holders of the bonds by the issuer, the ownership of
the enterprise.
Regular interest payments are made to the bond holders. The amount of interest is
determined as a percentage of capital and not as a percentage of actual profits.
Sometimes the interest is fixed, while often times in bonds with longer tenors the
rate of interest is allowed to float.
Bonds guarantee the return of principal when redeemed at maturity, regardless of
whether the enterprise was profitable or otherwise.

6. BOND HOLDER’S OWNERSHIP OF
ENTERPRISE ASSETS
Generally, sukuk represent ownership shares in assets that bring profits or revenues,
like leased assets, commercial enterprises, or investment vehicles that may include a
number of projects.
However, recently, there are many sukuk in which there is doubt regarding their
representation or ownership.
I.E. the assets in the sukuk may be shares of companies that do not confer true
ownership, but which merely offer sukuk holders a right to returns.

7. BOND HOLDERS OWNERSHIP OF
ENTERPRISE ASSETS
There has also been a proliferation of certain sukuk that are based on a mix of ijarah,
istisnaá, and murabahah contracts undertaken by Islamic banks or institutions such
that these are packaged and sold to sukuk holders who hope to obtain the returns
from these operations.
The inclusion of murabahah contracts into such sukuk brings into question the issue
of sale of debt, even if the percentage of the murabahah contracts may be
considerably less than that of the ijarah, musharakah and istisnaá contracts.

8. REGULAR DISTRIBUTIONS TO
SUKUK HOLDERS
Most of the modern day sukuk are identical to conventional bonds with regard to the
distribution of profits from their enterprises at fixed percentages based on interest
rates (LIBOR).
In order to justify this practice, the issuers include a paragraph in the contract, which
states that if the actual profits from the enterprise exceed the percentage based on
interest rates, then that amount of excess shall be paid in its entirety to the enterprise
manager as an incentive for the manager to manage effectively.

9. REGULAR DISTRIBUTIONS TO
SUKUK HOLDERS
Some sukuk state the holders of the sukuk will be entitled to a fixed percentage
based upon the rate of interest at the time of regular distributions as if the excess as
an incentive was established as an implied clause of the contract.

10. REGULAR DISTRIBUTION TO SUKUK
HOLDERS
If the actual profits are less than the prescribed percentage based on interest rates,
then the manager may take it upon himself to pay out the difference (between the
actual profits and the prescribed percentage) to the sukuk holders, as an interest free
loan to the sukuk holders.
Then, that loan will be recovered by the lending manager either from the amounts in
excess of the interest rate during subsequent periods, or from lowering or increasing
the cost of repurchasing assets at the time the Sukuk are redeemed.

11. GUARANTEEING THE RETURN OF
PRINCIPAL
Almost all modern day sukuk guarantee the return of principal to the sukuk holders
at maturity in the same way as conventional bonds.
This is done through use of a binding promise from either the issuer or the manager
to repurchase the assets represented by the Sukuk at the stated price at which these
were originally purchased by the Sukuk holders at the beginning of the process,
regardless of their true or market value at maturity.

12. GUARANTEEING THE RETURN OF
PRINCIPAL
Thus, sukuk replicate conventional bonds in that they return to investors a fixed
percentage of the principal, based on interest rates, while guaranteeing the return of
investors’ principal at maturity.

13. THREE SHARIÁH ISSUES IN SUKUK
1. Stipulating the amount in excess of the price of interest for the manager of the
enterprise under the pretense that this is an incentive for good management.
2. The manager’s commitment, if the actual profits are less than the yield from the
fixed rate of interest during any of the times for distribution, to lend the amount
of the shortfall to the holders of the Sukuk. Thereafter, the amount of such loans
will be recovered either through the actual profits of the enterprise at the times of
following distributions or through the sale of the enterprise’s assets at maturity.

14. THREE SHARI’AH ISSUES IN SUKUK
3. The binding promise by the manager that he will purchase the assets represented
by the sukuk at their face value and not at their market value on the day they are
redeemed.

15. STIPULATING AN INCENTIVE FOR
THE MANAGER
With regard to the stipulation of an incentive for the manager of an enterprise, its
justification may be found in what certain jurists have mentioned in regards to the
lawfulness of offering incentives in contracts of wakalah or brokerage.
Companion Ibn Abbas: There is no impediment to one’s saying, “Sell this cloth and
whatever is in excess of this or that will be yours.”

16. STIPULATING AN INCENTIVE FOR
THE MANAGER
The Hanbali School adopted this opinion. Ibn Qudama says: If someone says, “Sell
this for ten, and whatever you receive in excess will be yours,” then that excess will
be lawful for the seller because Ibn Abbas did not see any impediment in doing so.
This was, however, considered makruh (undesirable) by Ibrahim a-Nakhaí and
Hammad as related by Abd al-Razzaq and by al-Hasan al-Basri and Tawus ibn
Kayasan as related by Ibn Abi Shaybah.

17. STIPULATING INCENTIVE FOR THE
MANAGER
This is the opinion of the majority, other than the Hanbali scholars.
An unspecified fee for a broker over the original price of the sale is not allowed in
the Shariáh.
However, if there is a specified fee determined in advance, it is allowed.

18. BLOM BANK
In Blom Bank, the Investment Dar (TID) was an investment company
registered in Kuwait and the Blom Development Bank (BDB) was a bank
incorporated in Lebanon.
A wakalah investment agreement was entered into between the two parties
governed by English law (Asutay and Hasan, 2011: 57).
The agreement provided that Blom deposit a certain amount of money with
TID, appointing TID as its wakil (agent) to manage the money as an
investment (ISRA, 2012:758).

19. BLOM BANK
When TID defaulted on payments under the wakalah agreement, BDB sued
TID in the High Court of England and applied for summary judgment on the
grounds of default in payment (claim in contract) and the deposits held in trust
(claim in equity) (Asutay and Hasan, 2011: 57).
The master found that there was an arguable defense to the contractual claim,
but not to the trust claim due to a misunderstanding of Shari’ah and the
application of common law to an Islamic finance transaction.

20. BLOM BANK
The judge ignored the valid and binding contract and the original contractual
intent of the parties, applied western trust law to the wakalah arrangement and
unjustly ruled that TID was only liable to pay Blom the principle amount.
In the concerned wakalah arrangement, at the end of every wakalah period,
TID was obligated to pay 5% profit to Blom.
The issue arose when TID defaulted on payments of Blom’s principal and the
agreed profits. Blom claimed that TID should pay it the principal deposits
plus the contractually agreed 5% profit.
However, TID argued that the agreement was not Shari’ah compliant, being an
agreement for deposit taking with interest, and therefore null, being ultra vires
and beyond its legal capacity to conform.

21. BLOM BANK
TID raised the defense of ultra vires (Asutay and Hasan, 2011: 57).
TID argued that the wakalah agreement, which was approved by its own
Shari’ah board, did not comply with the Shari’ah and was therefore void and
against TID’s constitutional documents (Asutay and Hasan, 2011: 57 and
ISRA 2012:758).
Although within the wakalah arrangement some issues of Shari’ah non-
compliancy arose, since the contract was approved by the TID Shari’ah Board
and constituted a binding contract in both common and Islamic law with valid
offer and acceptance.
Thus, TID should have been held to the terms of the contract.

22. BLOM BANK AND WAKALAH
According to the AAOIFI Shari’ah Standard No. 5(2/2/2) on Guarantees, ‘it is not permissible
to combine agency and personal guarantees in one contract at the same time (i.e. the same
party acting as agent on the one hand and acting as guarantor on the other hand), because such
a combination conflicts with the nature of these contracts.
In addition, a guarantee given by a party acting as an agent in respect of an investment, turns
the transaction into an interest-based loan since the capital of the investment is guaranteed in
addition to the proceeds of the investment (i.e. as though the investment agent had taken a
loan and repaid it with an additional sum, which is tantamount to riba).’
In this case, TID, as agent, also guaranteed Blom a 5% return.

23. BLOM BANK AND WAKALAH
Jurists agree that an agent’s possession is one of trust, analogous to deposits and
similar to possessions (Zuhayli 2007: 675).
This ruling follows from the fact that the agent would possess goods as a legal
representative of the principal (who is the owner).
Thus, his possession is similar (but not the same) to that of a depository, following its
rules for trust and guarantee (Zuhayli 2007: 675).
Under Shari’ah, TID was holding the 5% profit on trust for Blom as agent for
principal even if the guarantee combined with agency is thought by some to have
turned the wakalah into a deposit taking with interest or to have simulated an interest-
bearing loan.

24. BLOM BANK AND WAKALAH
Although under Shari’ah, TID was technically only supposed to receive an agency
fee, in this wakalah arrangement, TID was contractually to receive an agency fee plus
all return above 5%, thus bearing risk of loss.
In a proper wakalah arrangement, the principal bears all risk of loss and profit, while
the agent only receives an agency fee.
According to the AAOIFI Shari’ah Standard No. 21(4/2/c), ‘…the amount payable as
remuneration for agency should be known, whether in lump sum or as a share of a
specific amount of income.
It may also be defined in terms of an amount of income to be known in the future, as
when remuneration is linked to an indicator that may be quoted at the beginnings of
different intervals of time.

25. BLOM BANK AND WAKALAH
However, it is not permissible to leave remuneration for agency undetermined and
allow the agent to take an unspecified share from the entitlements of principal’ (2004:
415).
In this arrangement, the agent was to take an unspecified share from the entitlements
of the principal, being any amount of return above 5%.

26. STANDARD FOR MUDARABAH
APPROVED BY THE SHARIA’H
COUNCIL
If one of the two parties should stipulate for itself a specific amount of profit, the
mudarabah will be void.
This prohibition, however, is not inclusive of an agreement by the two parties that if
the profits exceed a certain percentage then one of those two parties will receive the
excess exclusively such that the distribution will be according to what the two have
agreed.

27. STIPULATING AN INCENTIVE FEE
FOR THE MANAGER
The operations manager in a sukuk will manage on the basis either of its being a
wage-earning employee (ajir) or an investment agent (wakil), thus resembling a
broker, or on the basis of its being an investment manager (mudarib), or a working
partner (sharik amil).

28. STIPULATING AN INCENTIVE FEE
FOR THE MANAGER
However, when the jurists gave permission for this arrangement, they did not
consider that it would be used to carry out operations on the basis of interest rates or
to maintain the status quo of the conventional, riba-based market.
The right of the manager to an amount in excess of the prescribed percentage has
been called an incentive fee for better management of the assets.
Such an incentive, however, may only be understood as an incentive if it is linked to
that enterprise for which the sukuk were issued.

29. STIPULATING AN INCENTIVE FEE
FOR THE MANAGER
For example, if the minimum amount of expected profits is 15%, then it may be said
that the actual profits in excess of that percentage may be paid to the manager as an
incentive. This is because that excess amount may logically be ascribed to good
management.
The problem is that the prescribed percentage in these sukuk is not linked to the
expected profits from the enterprise, but to the costs of financing or to the prevalent
rates of interest in the market; rates that very every day, or every hour of the day.
Obviously, there is no connection between these and the profitability of the
commercial or industrial enterprise.

30. STIPULATING AN INCENTIVE FEE
FOR THE MANAGER
What is being called an incentive in these sukuk is not truly an incentive, but rather a
method of marketing these sukuk on the basis of interest rates.
This aspect is said to have karahah (legal repugnance) even if it is not declared
prohibited (haram).

31. INCENTIVES STUNT EQUITABLE
WEALTH DISTRIBUTION
Sukuk that are based on such incentives distribute profits to investors on the basis of
prevalent interest rates and not on the basis of actual returns from an enterprise.
Either sukuk should be free of all such incentives or these should be based on the
enterprise’s expected profits. These should certainly not be based on prevalent
interest rates.

32. STIPULATING LOANS WHEN PROFITS
FALL BELOW PRESCRIBED
PERCENTAGES
There is absolutely nothing in the Shariáh to justify a loan when actual profits are less
than the prescribed percentages.
The one undertaking the loan is the operations manager, and the manager is the one
that sells the assets to the sukuk holders at the beginning of operations.
If it is then stipulated that the manager will make loans to the sukuk holders at times
(for distribution) when actual returns fall below the (promised) rate of return, the
transaction will come under the heading of a sale with a credit.

33. STIPULATING LOANS WHEN PROFITS
FALL BELOW PRESCRIBED
PERCENTAGES
The Prophet (p.b.u.h.) prohibited sales linked to credits.
With regard to the mechanism used in sukuk, the manager is not willing to offer the
loan unless he receives more than his due share of the actual profits by means of the
incentive, which is stipulated for him when the percentage of actual profits exceeds
the percentage based on the prevalent rate of interest.
Therefore, such a loan, is all the more unlawful.

34. THE MANAGER’S PROMISE TO
REPURCHASE ASSETS AT FACE
VALUE
The return of investors’ capital cannot be guaranteed.
In Shariáh compliant dealings, reward always follows after risk.
The legal presumption with sukuk is that there can be no guarantee that capital will be
returned to investors.
Instead, they have a right to the true value of the sukuk assets, regardless of whether their
value exceeds that of their face value or not.
Modern day sukuk, however, guarantee by indirect means sukuk holders principal.

35. THE MANAGER’S PROMISE TO
REPURCHASE ASSETS AT FACE
VALUE
The sukuk manager pledges to the sukuk holders that he or she will purchase sukuk
assets at face value upon maturity, regardless of their true value on that day.
What this means is that the principal paid originally by the sukuk holders will be
returned to them at maturity.
If the enterprise is not profitable, the losses will be borne by the manager.
If it is profitable, however, the profits will accrue to the manager, regardless of how
great the amount.

36. THE MANAGER’S PROMISE TO
REPURCHASE ASSETS AT FACE
VALUE
It seems the sukuk holders have a right to return of their principal just as in a
conventional bond.
It is clearly prohibited for a mudarib to make a capital guarantee to the investors.
It is also unlawful for a partner (sharik) in a musharakah to guarantee the return of
capital for investors.
This is because to do so would interrupt the partnership in the event of losses.

37. THE STANDARD ON MUSHARAKAH
APPROVED BY THE SHARIÁH
COUNCIL
It is unlawful for the conditions of partnership or for the basis of profit distribution to
include any text or condition that leads to the possibility that the sharing of profits
will be interrupted. If this happens, the partnership will be void.

38. THE STANDARD ON MUSHARAKAH
APPROVED BY THE SHARIÁH
COUNCIL
It is lawful for one of the parties to the partnership to issue a binding promise to
purchase the assets of the partnership during the period of partnership or at the time
of dissolution at market value or at an agreed price at the time of purchase. A
promise to purchase the assets at face value, however, is unlawful.

39. BASIS FOR CONCLUSION FOR THE
STANDARD
The justification for the ruling of unlawful with regard to the binding promise by one
of the partners to purchase the assets of the partnership at face value is that this is the
same as a capital guarantee, which is unlawful. The justification for a ruling of
lawful for repurchase at market value comes from the fact that there is nothing in this
arrangement that guarantees anything to the partners.

40. THE MANAGER’S PROMISE TO
REPURCHASE ASSETS AT FACE
VALUE
If we are to continue on this path, then it is feasible that the managers of Islamic
banks might start to guarantee the capital of depositors by committing to purchase
shares in investment accounts at their face value.
This would negate the single difference between conventional and Islamic deposits
and Islamic Banking would be no more.

41. A COMMITMENT BY AN
INVESTMENT AGENT – WAKALAH
In some sukuk, the manager is neither a mudarib (managing partner) or sharik
(partner), however, acts as a wakil or agent.
Such a commitment by a wakil is also unlawful.
This is because agency, wakalah, is a contract of trust, amanah and there can be no
guarantees except as regards negligence or mala fides.
The aforementioned commitment is tantamount to a guarantee and is therefore
unlawful.

42. PARAGRAPH 1/2/2 OF THE STANDARD
FOR GUARANTEES, ISSUED BY THE
SHARIÁH COUNCIL
It is not lawful to stipulate a guarantee from a mudarib, or an investment agent, or a
partner among partners, regardless of whether the guarantee is for the principal or for
the profits. Likewise, an operation may not be marketed on the basis that investor
capital is guaranteed.
It is unlawful to combine agency with a guarantee in a single transaction because to
do so is contrary to the requirements of both. This is because to stipulate a guarantee
by an investment agent transforms the operation into a loan with interest,
guaranteeing the return of principal while offering returns from the investment.

43. BAI AL INAH
To add to the confusion, the manager is the seller and buyer of the assets to the sukuk
holders so that the commitment leads to a sale of Inah. This is because he or she
commits to buy what those to whom he has committed are selling; unless the Inah is
negated by means of the conditions, which are well-known in Islamic Jurisprudence.

44. CONTACT ME AT
CAMILLE@FAAIF.COM
THE END