Writing Sample

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“A Time of Ferment and Toil”: Dairy Farmer Strikes in the 1930s and the Success of the
Dairy Farmers Union
Casey Abribat
Technology, Capitalism, and the State

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On August 13th, 1933 a New York Times writer reported that violent dairy strikes
throughout the state had “possibly…brought New York State closer to martial law than at
any time since the Revolutionary War.”1 Though widely prevalent in New York, dairy
producers, as well as some cooperatives, were striking throughout the United States as a
response to drastically low milk prices. Although the Great Depression has often been
cited as the primary catalyst to the failing milk industry, market tensions between
independent farmers, dairy cooperatives, and distributors were the main source for the
economic unrest.2 Strikes had been a popular tool by farmers seeking agricultural reform
and legislation since the 1800’s.3 These different actors all had the same goals, despite
their contentions, and wished to see economic reform through the implementation of
price controls, in order to increase the profitability of their commodity.4
New York was not the only state that saw economic unrest in the form of violent
strikes by dairy producers. Across the country, states with large, metropolitan markets
faced turmoil created by these low dairy prices amidst the context of the Great
Depression. California, Michigan, and Wisconsin in particular witnessed desperate
farmers attempting to withhold their product from the market in an attempt to raise
prices.5 Much like the New York Times reporter, Herbert Jacobs wrote in 1951 that this
“was a time of ferment and turmoil. Looking back at it now, it seems almost as if we
1 Melanie E. Dupuis, Nature’s Perfect Food: How Milk Became America’s Drink (New
York: New York University Press, 2002), 169.
2 Dupuis, 169.
3 Leland Spencer and Charles J. Blanford, An Economic History of Milk Marketing and
Pricing: A Classified Bibliography with Reviews of Listed Publications, 1840-1970
(Columbus: GRID, Inc., 1973), 233.
4 Nancy Grey Osterud, Putting the Barn Before the House: Women and Family Farming
in Early Twentieth-Century New York (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2012), 233.
5 Herbert Jacobs, “The Wisconsin Milk Strikes,” Wisconsin Magazine of History, 1951,
30.

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were close to revolution, and perhaps we were.”6 Dairy producers throughout the country
were enraged by their poverty, which drove them to frantic measures such as “milk
strikes, dumping of milk, livestock embargos, [and] clashes between farmers and law
officers.”7
An important precursor to any discussion on the 1930s strikes by dairy producers
is an examination of the dairy industry and falling milk prices. In New York State, as in
the rest of the United States, “areas around cities that…provide a particular metropolitan
area with a significant proportion of its fluid milk” are known as a milkshed.8 Thus,
unlike other agricultural markets, such as wheat, rice, or tobacco, the milk industry was,
and remains, very connected in regards to its “freshness and local production.”9 In a
populated location such as New York City, it was of paramount importance to have a
milkshed that would provide transportation of its fluid milk to the metropolitan center.
However, an important factor that changed the shape of the dairy market in New
York State was the various technological advances that occurred throughout the course of
the early twentieth century. Before the advent of improved transportation techniques such
as the truck, the New York City dairy market was intrinsically tied to railways, which
extended into specific areas in upstate New York.10 Therefore, having a successful dairy
farm prior to the twentieth century was not only a matter of having healthy, milk-
producing cows; it was also a matter of proximity to a railroad station that had the means
of storing and transporting milk to a metropolitan location. Prior to the 1930s,
6 Jacobs, 30.
7 Jacobs, 30.
8 Dupuis, 9.
9 Dupuis, 9.
10 Dupuis, 170.

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“transportation limitations created a physical limit on the milkshed boundary,” thus
forcing dairy farms located outside of the milkshed to participate in markets other than
fluid milk, such as cheese. A farmer’s ability to be relevant in the milk market was
completely tied to his farm whereabouts, which therefore prevented a large portion of
rural farmers from entering the fluid milk industry in cities.
The arrival of truck transportation in the 1920s, which was greatly utilized by the
milk industry, erased some of the physical boundaries that once hindered upstate New
York dairy farmers from competing in the lucrative metropolitan market.11 With the
increased use of trucking, the milkshed of the New York City market was greatly
extended, as trucks could now transport dairy products from a rural location to a railway.
Trucks also helped to lower transportation costs as “bulk shipments” could now be
transported in an efficient manner to New York City.12 This technological triumph was
beneficial for farmers who were once located outside of the metropolitan milkshed.
However, the advent of the truck was a direct factor in the rising instability of the fluid
milk market and therefore tensions between producers, distributors, and dairy
cooperatives.
The truck was not the only technological invention that would have a lasting
impact on the dairy industry in the United States. By the 1930s, many technologies were
introduced, all with the aim of increasing the “perfection of milk.”13 Unlike the
nineteenth century, by the 1930s “the milk industry carried stronger imperatives for top
breeding stock, clean scientific methods, machinery, and year-round production,
11 R.E. Plimpton, “Distribution Advances with the Motor Truck,” The Journal for Land
& Public Utility Economics 7 (1931), 262.
12 Plimpton, 276.
13 Dupuis, 44.

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something that had been absent on most dairy farms in the 1880s.”14 For example, by the
late 1920s, mechanical milkers were utilized throughout rural areas of the state, reducing
the manual labor needed to operate a lucrative dairy farm.15 These machines would
transport the milk into a “bulk tank,” where it would be stored until transportation to a
railway via truck.16
A main reaction caused by truck transportation, in addition to improved milking
methods, was increased competition between dairy producers. Prior to the 1930s there
existed a “two dairy” market system in which milkshed farmers produced fluid milk,
while those located outside of the milkshed produced cheese and butter.17 However, with
the advent of these technologies, dairy farmers were no longer restricted by their location,
and could enter the fluid market without fears of spoiled product. Thus, many dairy
farmers who were previously in the cheese industry could now enter the fluid milk
market and sell their product in bulk at a price lower than the original competition.18
For example, Jim Fisher in Changing Works: Visions of a Lost Agriculture
provides an account of growing up in a rural farm in the North Country region of New
York State. Fisher states that in the 1930s, “we took the milk to Ogdensburg ourselves in
a three-quarter-ton truck…it was all worth it because it was a fluid market. We could
probably get a dollar a hundred more than the regular [cheese] market.”19 Increased
competition among dairy farmers flooding the market became a main source of price
14 Thomas Summerhill, Harvest of Dissent: Agrarianism in Nineteenth-Century New
York (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2005), 168.
15 Douglas Harper, Changing Works: Visions of a Lost Agriculture (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 2001), 236.
16 Harper, 237.
17 Dupuis, 171.
18 Dupuis, 171.
19 Harper, 39.

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instability in the dairy industry in 1930s New York State. Price instability, in addition to
increased supply and competition, led to tensions among independent farmers and
farmers aligned with dairy cooperatives.
The state of the 1930s dairy market in New York, as in the rest of the United
States, was exacerbated by contentions between independent dairy farmers, dairy
cooperatives, and distributors. To a large extent, the dairy industry was marked by
cutthroat competition between these actors. The New York City case is a particularly
interesting market to study, as its milkshed was actually the largest in the United States
during the 1930s.20 Therefore, prior to its collapse, producing and distributing fluid milk
to New York City was a profitable venture, and the vicious competition over its
domination is evidence of that.
In the 1930s, just three companies were responsible for about two-thirds of New
York City milk.21 Borden’s Condensed Milk Co., Sheffield Farms and the US Dairy
Company had been cutting their prices throughout the interwar era, each vying for the
New York City market. This ruthless competition led to the lowest fluid milk prices in
years.22 As shown by the Report of the Joint Legislative Committee to Investigate the
Milk Industry, “the price received for milk in January, 1933, was little more than half the
cost of production.”23 The competition between the ‘Big Three,’ as they were known,
also occurred at a time when there were more cows in New York State than at any other
20 Lowell K. Dyson, Farmers’ Organizations (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986), 67.
21 Thomas J. Kriger, “The 1939 Dairy Farmers Union Strike in Huevelton and Canton
New York: The Story in Words and Pictures,” Journal for Multimedia History 1 (1998).
22 Reuben A. Kessel, “Economic Effects of Federal Regulation of Milk Markets,”
Journal of Law and Economics 10 (1967), 52.
23 Report of the Joint Legislative Committee to Investigate the Milk Industry (Albany:
J.B. Lyon Company Printers, 1933), 14.

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given time, paired with a milk demand that was at an all time low.24 Dairy farmers were
experiencing poverty like never before, and the economic climate of the 1930s during the
Great Depression showed few signs of relenting.
As such, the state of the dairy farmer across the United States was exceedingly
poor. “Farm foreclosures, skinny ragged kids, [and] the realization that each year you
were farther behind financially than the year before,” defined the life of the dairy farmer
in the 1930s as the fluid milk market continued to collapse.25 Many farmers continued to
increase their production during the 1930s era as an attempt to earn their money back.26
However, this endeavor worked only to flood the market with unwanted milk and drove
the prices down further. To offset the economic turmoil created by the shifting dairy
industry and competition, it is important to note the rise of dairy cooperatives since the
turn of the century.27
The late nineteenth and early twentieth century experienced a plethora of changes
in economic markets, most notably the rise of “large-scale corporations and organizations
that reflected the specific and separate interests of business and labor.”28 The ‘Big Three’
capitalized on the New York City market at the turn of the century, purchasing fluid milk
from the surrounding milkshed. Organizations such as the Dairymen’s League
Cooperative Association (DCLA) and the Sheffield Producers Cooperative Association
were groups of farmers who collectively organized and often made agreements with the
24 State of New York Department of Agriculture and Markets, Milk Control Board
Minutes of: Hearing no. 2 (Albany, April 18, 1933).
25 Jacobs, 31.
26 Dyson, 67.
27 James E. Boyle, “The Battle of Milk,” Saturday Evening Post November 13, 1937.
28 Hal S. Barron, Mixed Harvest: The Second Great Transformation in the Rural North
1870-1930 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 81.

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‘Big Three’ companies. These independent deals between distributors and cooperatives
were mutually beneficial arrangements, typically where the distributor agreed to purchase
fluid milk from farms associated with the cooperative. In return, the cooperatives would
not sell their milk independently, therefore abstaining from entering the New York City
market entirely. To a great extent, this relationship between dairy cooperatives and
corporations serves as the underlying context for the strikes occurring in the 1930s.
During this time period, the DCLA contracted over 100,000 dairy farms in New
York State, and even established their own processing plants for the influx of fluid
milk.29 Meanwhile, the Sheffield Producers Cooperative Association had about 16,000
dairy farms contracted in 1934.30 Farmers who were contracted by dairy cooperatives had
ties to the industrial leaders in the New York City fluid milk market, which granted them
some security in an unstable market. However, farmers who aligned themselves with a
powerful entity such as Borden’s Dairy, through cooperative groups, “greatly undermined
the dairy farmer’s independence…[with] substantial control over its producers.”31 Dairy
farmers were veritably controlled by their dairy cooperative membership, as the
cooperatives bargained their milk prices for them.32
While many farmers aligned themselves with powerful entities such as the DCLA,
thousands of independent farmers remained in the New York milkshed, who sold their
29 Pamela J. Karg, “More than milk: Dairylea’s scope of farmer services moves beyond
milk marketing,” Rural Cooperative Magazine (September/October 2003), accessed May
1st, 2014, http://www.rurdev.usda.gov/rbs/pub/sep03/milk.html.
30 Belle Zeller, Pressure Politics in New York: A Study of Group Representation Before
the Legislature (London: Forgotten Books, 1937), 116.
31 Barron, 88.
32 Kriger, “The 1939 Dairy Farmers Union Strike.”

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fluid milk to smaller companies.33 Dairy farmers that remained independent feared that
joining an organization would take away their freedom of action, as they would have to
support the dairy cooperative in every aspect. For example, John J. Dillon wrote in the
Rural New Yorker that cooperatives “have the right under contract to make the price of
milk, to collect for it and take out whatever they please. They own and control millions of
dollars worth of plants and equipment purchased by the producer’s money.”34 Essentially,
“the dairymen are required to sign away their right to an accounting.”35 To a large degree
there was a suspicion among independent farmers that cooperatives were actually just
glorified unions dictated by big industry leaders, such as Borden’s Dairy, and that
associations such as the DCLA aided the destruction of small, family-run rural farms.
Evidence suggests that what initially formed as a grassroots movement seeking
collective action and protection in the dairy market eventually did become intrinsically
linked with corporations like Sheffield Farms. Through consolidation within leadership
and continued alliance with companies, most dairy cooperatives became a veritable
“business cooperative, many of whose directors were lawyers and accountants with
peripheral farming interests.”36 Farmers within the cooperatives, as well as independent
farmers, saw this controversial association, which contributed to underlying tensions
during the 1930s strikes.
Therefore, the shifting landscape of the dairy market created an atmosphere that
was ripe for social conflict between the different actors of independent dairy farmers,
dairy cooperatives, and distributors. During the 1930s, many farmers became
33 Zeller, 117.
34 Barron, 101.
35 Barron, 101.
36 Dyson, 75.

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disillusioned with their association with large cooperatives, which accounted for some of
the violence during this era. For example, in 1933 independent farmers in upstate New
York went on strike after they decided not to renew their contracts with the Dairymen’s
League.37 These farmers stopped several milk trucks near Pittsfield, New York, and
overturned their milk onto the highway, showing their discontent with dairy producers
who still planned on selling their milk at the extremely low prices.38 Throughout the state,
farmers’ actions were marked by “assaults, malicious mischief, property damage and
personal injuries.”39
Thus, the 1930s strikes in New York State and the greater United States was not a
simple act of farmers withholding their product in an attempt to raise prices and
demand.40 The nature of the dairy economy had shifted in the 1930s, as improved
technologies made it easier for farms to enter the competition, and as industrial leaders
attempted to control the market through extensive price-cutting. Independent farmers
experienced the worst consequences from these changes, and when cooperatives such as
the DCLA decided to collectively withhold their milk, these farmers continued to sell
their product at the low market prices.41 The Dairymen’s League historic researcher,
Irving Parmeter, explored the cause and actions of these strikes in 1952. Parmeter found
that the 1933 strike “was called by non-league members and individual producers…in an
37 Kriger, “1939 Dairy Farmers Union Strike.”
38 Kriger, “1939 Dairy Farmers Union Strike.”
39 Dairymen’s League Cooperative Association records, #2614, Division of Rare and
Manuscript Collections, Cornell University Library.
40 John D. Black, The Dairy Industry and the AAA (Washington: The Brookings
Institution, 1935), 127.
41 Dupuis, 169.

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effort to obtain higher prices; prices were extremely low.”42 His account supports the
assertion that the 1933 dairy strikes in New York State were caused by contentions
between cooperative farmers and independent farmers. While it is easy to portray a
narrative of independent farmers locked in a struggle against big business, as shown by
primary sources and recent scholars, “much of the struggle took place as regional
sectionalist politics between farmers.”43
Scholarship on the dairy strikes of the 1930s varies under two different assertions.
The first argument that many historians make is that the 1930s strikes occurred as a result
of economic conditions and frustrations that many independent and cooperative farmers
felt during these various market shifts.44 These historians cite evidence that the farmers
were acting violently and withholding their product in an effort to raise awareness to their
plight and to ensure that agricultural reform occurred. Ultimately, these historians find
that the strikes were efficient and eventually achieved their goals of price controls.45 The
second school of thought differs in the perception of the motives behind the strikes and
their ultimate conclusion. These historians convincingly utilize farmers’ accounts, as well
as historical context, to note that much of the violence actually occurred between
independent farmers and their cooperative adversaries.46 Although government
intervention was the goal behind the strikes, and price controls were established
throughout the 1930s, the overall aim of the strikes was not reached. Strikes were an
42 Dairymen’s League Cooperative Association records, #2614, Division of Rare and
Manuscript Collections, Cornell University Library.
43 Dupuis, 169.
44 Kessel, 52.
45 Ronald N. Johnson, “Retail Price Controls in the Dairy Industry: A Political Coalition
Argument,” Journal of Law and Economics 28 (1985), 58.
46 Dupuis, 169.

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inefficient means of stabilizing the dairy market, and it was only when separate collective
organizations without ties to industry leaders, like the Dairy Farmers Union, were created
that the strikes accomplished their goal of improved market conditions.
As shown, it eventually became evident to government officials that “federal
marketing legislation” was necessary to offset the vicious competition between
producers, cooperatives, and distributors, as well as to put an end to the disruptive strikes.
After a series of physical conflicts between farmers and New York State Troopers,
government intervention was imminent.47 In 1933, New York State Senator Pitcher called
a Milk Control Board to ascertain the cause of the milk market collapse, find out the
consequences, and prepare a solution that would benefit both the producers and
distributors, as well as keep prices low for the consumers.48
The task of the Milk Control Board was completely unprecedented, and therefore
was a very complex and delicate process. Presented in the Report of the Joint Legislative
Committee to Investigate the Milk Industry, the dairy industry was the “most important
branch of agriculture in the state,” as almost 40% of the land was designated for use by
dairy animals, making dairy farmers an essential leader of agricultural purchasing
power.49 It is important to note that the Milk Control Board also viewed the situation of
the dairy farmer as having far-reaching consequences for the rest of the state. “The
wholesale failure of an industry which touches as many people as the dairying industry of
New York State would be a disaster of the greatest consequence…to the consumer of
47 Boyle, 94.
48 Report of the Joint Legislative Committee to Investigate the Milk Industry, 13.

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milk and to the general public.”50 Therefore, the ultimate and positive resolution of this
conflict was viewed by the board as necessary to the wellbeing of the state and thus was
handled with extreme care.
Henry S. Manley, then the Counsel to the New York State Department of
Agriculture and Markets, was the main leader in the Milk Control Board and oversaw the
various hearings that occurred throughout the state as producers and distributors alike
voiced their concerns.51 Unsurprisingly, the Board found that one of the main reasons for
the state of the milk industry was the result of price-cutting by the Big Three who sought
to maintain control over the New York City milkshed and market.52 According to this
legislative document, “unsettled market conditions have led to price wars among
distributors which have caused reductions in retail and wholesale prices.”53The Milk
Board placed much of the blame on the big industry leaders for fostering such an
unhealthy economic climate, rather than on the striking farmers.
It was these “destructive trade practices” that made it necessary to enact economic
reform, as price controls were continually discussed and argued throughout the meetings.
Farmers’ frustrations with Borden’s Dairy, Sheffield Farms, and the US Dairy Company
can clearly be seen within the Special Report, as well as in the minutes of the Milk
Control Board hearings. Within these documents, independent farmers and cooperative
farmers alike contested the actions and intentions of the Milk Control Board. While the
Report of the Joint Legislative Committee to Investigate the Milk Industry claimed to be
most concerned with the poverty-stricken state of the dairy farmer, the following Milk

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Control Board would eventually be condemned as a supporter of the Big Three, and
therefore the industrial takeover of family-run farms.
The hearing minutes of the Milk Control Board are very telling in regards to the
concerns of farmers and distributors alike, and also highlight the necessity for legislative
action. On April 18th, 1933 a hearing was held to discuss a price minimum on dairy sales
in the metropolitan sector, and this source helps to exemplify how farmers, government
officials, and the public, saw the violent strikes. Assemblyman Irving D. Neustein of
New York City, for example, stated that in upstate New York, “there was very serious
fighting going on and that lives were being threatened…[and that] we would have to pass
immediately some form of legislation whereby the strikes would be eliminated.”54 This
statement highlights that producers, distributors as well as government officials, saw the
Milk Control Board legislation as having been rushed out of a necessity to quell the
violence occurring due to the low milk prices. The hearing minutes help to depict the
many different perspectives and aims of the separate actors involved in the dairy market.
Although the Control Board hearings were called to action to assist the farmers and
prevent further any further violence, Assemblyman Neustein’s statements exemplify that
consumers’ needs were also an interest.
What remains clear from these documents is the dispute many individuals had
with the dairy corporations and their domination of the New York City milkshed through
cooperative groups. Assemblyman Neustein continued to state his complaints with the
state of the market, the findings of the Report on the Milk Industry, and the regulations
set by the Milk Control Board, and noted that the Big Three seemed to be the main

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beneficiaries of this legislation. Neustein even went as far as to assert that the Dairymen’s
League should be considered one of the big firms, and that “eventually the only result
that will come from this bill will be the driving out of the little fellow; taking away his
living…and leaving the entire milk industry solely in the hands of two or three large,
well-established firms.”55 Thus, it was not only independent farmers who had animosity
towards the Big Three in the dairy market, but leaders in the New York State government
also had qualms with their part in the combative industry.
Senator B. Hendel, a representative of the third district in Queens County, also
concurred with Neustein during the April 18th Milk Control Board hearings. Hendel
stated to the Control Board that he initially believed that the legislation was intended to
support higher prices for dairy producers, while still ensuring acceptable prices for the
consumer. However, as legislation continued, Hendel believed, like Neustein, that the Big
Three were receiving the better part of the litigation. It is also interesting to note that
Hendel accused New York State Senator Pitcher for rushing the process of the Milk
Control Board in order to put a cursory end to the agitated strikes occurring throughout
the state. Prior to the Control Board, Pitcher apparently stated to Hendel that, “if you
don’t want their [farmer’s] blood on your hands, go along with us,” and assured that the
consumer would not be jilted out of the legislation.56
The Milk Control Board, in its expedited execution, was accused in another
hearing in April of having failed to address all locations of the state in their legislation, as

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well as undercutting the independent, small-time farmer in the process.57 In this particular
hearing on April 26th, the Milk Control Board had its first statewide meeting of
producers. Farmers from all over the state came to Albany to voice their concerns with
the Milk Control Board and its legislation. The purpose of the April 26th hearing was to
have a general discussion on price fixing by the Control Board, and its records indicate
the many debates that occurred over this contentious issue.
Albert Woodhead, representing the Western New York Milk Producer’s
Association, stated that the Milk Control Board initiated reform that benefitted only the
large-scale milk dealers, such as Borden’s Dairy.58 This accusation was widely supported
across those in attendance, as other dairy producers voiced their unease with the Milk
Control Board’s legislation. Many argued that farmers not associated with the ‘Big
Three’ and their cooperative counterparts would not reap the benefits from such
government intervention. C.H. MacVey, the Chairmen of the Dairymen’s Protective
Association, noted his concern for independent producers prior to the April 26th hearing,
and wrote in the St. Lawrence Plaindealer that this meeting was the first instance in
which the farmer could have his voice heard.59
MacVey took this discussion very seriously, as he stated to the Board and his
farming peers that he supported the country by fighting in two wars, and that reflects “the
sentiment of our farming constituency. They have been the backbone, they have been the
59 “Committee to Represent Dairymen at Hearing,” The St. Lawrence Plaindealer, April
25th, 1933.

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loyalty, they have been the very basis upon which we have [built] America.”60 This bold
statement was met with rigorous and thunderous applause, and it can be ascertained that
much of the farming audience supported MacVey’s proclamation. Dairy farmers
throughout the April 26th hearing not only stated their issues with the Big Three, but also
condemned the Board for not putting the producers at the forefront of their legislation.
The farmers who attended this hearing also made note of their present state as
poverty-stricken and ultimately ignored by the American government and population.
Their articulation of these sentiments supports the assertion that the strikes were caused
by the economic landscape created by market unrest and competition between producers,
distributors, and cooperatives. One farmer stated that they “cannot continue to produce
either milk or any other agricultural commodity under the present depleted prices or
under the present market conditions.”61 Citing the Great Depression of the 1930s, the
producers within the April 26th hearing stated that farms all across New York State were
going into foreclosure. And, even if producers could maintain their home and farm, they
were not earning enough to make a proper living, making dairy farming no longer a
viable agricultural pursuit.62
In effect, what is clear from the hearing minutes is that many of the farmers who
voiced their concerns defended their actions during the strikes that occurred prior to the
establishment of the Milk Control Board in 1933. One such producer went as far as to
argue that there is a different between a ‘strike’ and ‘withholding a commodity.’ He

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stated that a “depletion of that amount of goods [could] create a demand for it.”63 The
actions taken by independent farmers prior to the 1933 Milk Control Board were not a
strike, according to his account, because it was a farmer’s privilege to remove their
product from the market as a function of a capitalist economy.
It is also clear from the hearing minutes that farmers felt as though their place in
the American economy was undervalued, despite serving an important agricultural
function. Indeed, the interwar era was distinguished by attempts to make milk a practical
and important product for children and healthy families.64 Evidence of this practice can
be seen in Part II of the Report of the Joint Legislative Committee to Investigate the Milk
Industry, highlighting the necessity to solve the strike crisis due to the milk industry
having “a most important bearing upon the welfare of the people [and] the state.”65 Thus,
the producers’ concerns over their perception within the state, as well as the country,
were not entirely unfounded. What remains apparent from the Statewide Meeting of
Producers on April 26th, 1933, was that many dairy farmers craved recognition for their
labor and commodity.
The Milk Control Board eventually established fixed milk prices across the state,
which was seen as the primary goal of the strikes by historians and scholars within the
first school of thought. Official Order No. 5 of the Milk Control Board Orders established
the following system of price controls for milk producers, distributors, and consumers:66
64 Dupuis, 4.
66 New York State Department of Agriculture and Markets, “Official Order No. 5,” Milk
Control Orders, 1933-1938.

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Milk By Milk Dealers to
Consumers
By Milk Dealers to
Stores
By Stores to
Consumers
Quarts in bottles 10 cent 8 cent 9 cent
Pints in bottles 6 cent 5 cent 6 cent
½ Pints in bottles - 3 cent -
Although the strikes achieved economic reform through the Milk Control Board
and its legislation, many producers were displeased with the results when they were
actually put into practice throughout the state.67 Borden’s Dairy, Sheffield Farms, and the
US Dairy Company still controlled two-thirds of the New York City market, and prices
continued to fluctuate in April and May of 1933 when the law was supposed to be in
effect.68 Small, independent producers did not fare any better, as they were still shut off
from the New York City market, contributing to the prominent perception that the large
companies had the best outcome from the Milk Control Board.
Therefore, rather than solve many of the producer problems the Milk Control
Board originally planned to mitigate, farmers were more frustrated than ever. Their
strikes were not efficient in forcing real, tangible change in the dairy market. Price
controls were established, and yet the state of the independent farmer was hardly
improved.69 Instead, farmers and dairy cooperatives were more divided than ever, albeit
with an increased exasperation with the Big Three’s control of the industry and their
alliance with large dairy cooperatives. The overall ineffectiveness of the Milk Control
Board and the strikes prior to its establishment can be seen in the discord that occurred
almost immediately after the legislation went into practice.
67 Black, 335.
68 “A Real Showdown,” New York Food Museum, accessed March 31st, 2014,
http://www.nyfoodmuseum.org/milk/a_real_showdown.php
69 Black, 334.

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Resentment over the Milk Control Board, as well as cooperative groups connected
with powerful dairy distributors, was shown in August 1933.70 Only months after the
legislation by the Control Board, a considerable group of dairy farmers broke off from
the Dairymen’s League in the western part of New York State.71 Albert Woodhead of the
Western New York Milk Producer’s Association, who originally protested the Board in
the April 26th hearing, and an organized group of independent farmers led this movement.
It is important to note that this August strike was indeed “a protest against the Milk
Control Board.”72 The farmers did not accomplish their goals of higher prices and market
stability, and continued their actions intended to enact effective and lasting reform.
This August 1933 strike was in direct conflict with the Dairymen’s League and
other cooperative groups.73 Organized by independent producers such as Woodhead,
these farmers’ actions highlight that many producers were leaving collective groups such
as the Sheffield Farms cooperative.74 Middle and lower class farmers were among the
groups most likely to join the strikes following the Milk Control Board, as they were
continually “pushed out of the market,” by dairy cooperatives and the Big Three.75 This
fragmentation helped to somewhat weaken the control the Big Three had over the fluid
milk market, but also contributed to a lack of solidarity among dairy producers.76
Disunity among striking groups became a serious problem in the years following
the Milk Control Board. Although contentions between independent farmers, cooperative
70 Black, 333.
74 Dupuis, 178.
75 Dupuis, 178.

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groups, and milk dealers resulted in disintegration prior to the Milk Control Board, it is
really after its legislation that this became prevalent. Because the Dairymen’s League did
not call the August 1933 strike, farmers were torn between their contracts with the
cooperative, and the desire to join other frustrated, independent farmers. One
contemporary farmer wrote, “there were two groups, those that were for the strike and
those that were against. We didn’t go along with the strike, because we didn’t think we
could afford to throw our milk down the drain, but some of the people down the road who
were on strike tried to dump their milk.”77 This quote exemplifies how the strikes prior to
the Milk Control Board did not accomplish the greater goal of settling the dairy market,
and following this failure the dairy farmers increased the occurrence and violence of the
strikes from 1933 onwards.
Disunity among farmers contributed to the ineffective manner of the strikes
following the Milk Control Board. While the dairy strikes had always been of a violent
nature, these strikes “quickly spread beyond the control of the groups that organized
them, and, as with the farm strikes in the Midwest, acquired a reputation for more
violence and destruction than for constructive political accomplishments.”78 According to
New York State Troopers archives, nearly 400 striking farmers attempted to stop a
shipment of fluid milk with “axes and clubs.”79 Violence such as this continued
throughout August 1933 in New York State, and many New York State Troopers were
injured while protecting transports of fluid milk to cooperatives and dealers.
77 Grey Osterud, 234.
79 “Milk Holiday Synopsis,” New York State Troopers History, accessed April 13th,
2014, http://nytroopershistory.com/1933---Milk-Stikes236.php.

22
By the end of August, however, many of the striking farmers had been arrested,
and their actions began to stall because of this. In addition, in order to counteract the
withholding actions of these dairy farmers, dealers threatened to buy their fluid milk from
out-of-state producers at “less than board prices.”80 In purchasing fluid milk from areas
such as Pennsylvania and Vermont, the dealers reestablished their status as the
controlling force behind the market. 81 The independent farmers were unsuccessful in
enacting change in the dairy market, and were forced to submit for the time being.
Thus, from late1933 to 1936 there existed a relative calm among producers,
cooperatives, and dealers. The lack of strikes in this period is not indicative of stable
market conditions, however. Rather, actions by fluid milk dealers and government
officials to subdue producer unrest were successful. In addition to finding cheaper
alternatives to the New York milkshed, officials of the Dairymen’s League also utilized
“accusations of communism” to damage the striking movement and farmers.82 New York
State officials also took a firm stance against striking farmers, allowing State Troopers to
use tear gas and riot sticks to stop the unrest. The August 1933 strikes “pitted farmer
against farmer,” and this lack of solidarity among producer groups was not alleviated,
despite the two-year period of no strikes.83
In 1936 it became clear that the era of ‘peace’ in the dairy market was at an end.
In September of that year, farm milk prices fell to their lowest point in fifteen years, and
dairy farmers across New York State were angry and disgusted with their state in the
80 Black, 334.
81 Spencer Leland and Charles Blanford, An Economic History of Milk Marketing and
Pricing, 239.
82 Dyson, 67.
83 “Milk Holiday Synopsis,” New York State Troopers History

23
industry.84 About 500 producers in upstate New York called for a “committee to consider
the prospect of a new organization which would represent northern New York’s angry
independents.”85 Out of this committee came the establishment of the Dairy Farmers
Union (DFU), headed by Archie Wright, who was once an Industrial Workers of the
World (IWW) organizer. The establishment of the Dairy Farmers Union was a major
turning point for independent farmers and for the overall effectiveness of the strikes.
Archie Wright and the Dairy Farmers Union wanted to bring back the “family
farm” in the agricultural industry. Reminiscent of the April 26th, 1933 producer hearing
during the establishment of the Milk Control Board, Wright and the DFU saw small,
family-run farms as the foundation of the United States. This perception is evident in a
DFU pamphlet written by Wright:
Our government, reflecting small farm, small business ownership was set
up as a democracy that attracted worldwide attention and no small amount
of envy. [Yet] suppose this situation should change. Suppose all of our
rural counties were in one or two, or even ten farms. What would happen
to our town meetings and town government…[which] are the backbone of
our democratic form of government, both national and state. Fascism, [or]
business dictatorship, its not inevitable as long as these town and country
governments can be preserved.86
The beginnings of the Dairy Farmers Union were humble at best, as the
independent, rural farmers who initially joined had few economic resources, and even
less political manpower. The DFU agreed to bargain “with any organization that bought
from its members,” which included the Dairymen’s League, as the Union saw the DCLA
as a dealer much like Borden’s Dairy and Sheffield Farms.87 A major juncture for the
87 Dyson, 68.

24
Dairy Farmers Union occurred at the hands of Sheffield Farms, which cancelled over
2,000 upstate New York farm contracts.88 This action included the closing of twelve fluid
dairy plants across the North Country region of New York State. With the livelihood of
many upstate dairy farmers at stake, the DFU had a unanimous vote to strike the
Sheffield plants, and “from the outset, it was clear that this strike would be conducted
much differently.”89
Unlike the strikes of the early 1930s, the 1937 DFU strike was carefully organized
and monitored. Wright and the leaders of the Dairy Farmers Union were very aware of
the violence and subsequent failure of previous strikes by independent farmers, and their
conscious handling of the 1937 strike is evidence of that. For example, rather than
dumping milk onto highways, it would be “diverted to other processing facilities.”90 It
was this lack of violence and increased control and organization that led to the success of
dairy strikes by the DFU. Whereas strikes were once caused by a frustrated, divisive
group of producers, the Dairy Farmers Union’s solidarity and their methods allowed the
strikers to accomplish their goals.
The “passive resistance” method utilized by the Dairy Farmers Union resulted in
the closing of a Sheffield Farms plant for 108 days without any instances of violence or
destruction of property.91 It is important to note that newspapers around the North
Country indicated a positive reaction by the public towards the DFU’s actions at the
twelve Sheffield Farms plants. The Advance News on August 5th, 1937 noted the unity
existing between producers in the Dairy Farmers Union. “In this strike the dairy farmers
88 Dyson, 68.

25
of the north country have followed the union theory of united effort. They have decided
together; they have acted together; they have stuck together, and they have put on such a
demonstration as has never been seen before in this industry.”92 Eventually, Sheffield
Farms would raise the price of milk bought from producers, although without granting
any recognition to the DFU strike.93 Despite this, the efforts of Archie Wright and the
Dairy Farmers Union were recognized by the public and, more importantly, by other
producers.
As the Dairy Farmers Union’s collective action gained more publicity throughout
New York State, more independent farmers were drawn to their cause by their strategies
and values. To a large degree, the DFU’s goals and policies offered an “alternative
economic [vision] that challenged the industrial ideal of perfection.”94 The Dairy Farmers
Union was extremely different from previous organized collective farming groups.
Unlike the Dairymen’s League, the DFU did not maintain any affiliations with large,
industrial dealers. Rather, the Dairy Farmers Union sought to organize producers and
defend the nature of rural farms in the New York City milkshed and throughout the state.
Many producers, after seeing successful strike actions by the DFU, left dairy cooperatives
and joined the Union.95
In October 1937 the membership increase prompted Archie Wright and other
Union officials to expand their strike to the Big Three dealers in the New York City
milkshed. However, this strike was not successful in ending the dealers’ dominance over
92 “No Confusion As Milk Strike Enters Sixth Day, Pickets Are Still On Duty,” The
Advance News, August 5th, 1937.
94 Dupuis, 184.
95 “Robert Dudley Signed With Dairy Union: General Manager of Irona Creamer, Inc.,
Signed Contract in Utica,” Plattsburgh Daily Press, November 24th, 1937.

26
the metropolitan market, due in part to increased advertising efforts by dairy
distributors.96 For example, ‘Elsie the Cow,’ was a Borden’s Dairy mascot created in
1937 to symbolize “the trust, quality and freshness of Borden products.”97 Another reason
the strike efforts against the Big Three failed in 1937 was the perception by the public,
and by some dairy producers, that the DFU had gained a considerable victory against
Sheffield Farms, and should be careful not to “overshoot the mark…an early settlement
would benefit all.”98
While still not large enough to efficiently challenge the Big Three dealers, the
Dairy Farmers Union and its effective striking methods were becoming more powerful
throughout New York State in the late 1930s. The DFU’s striking methods were a direct
contrast to the elements that defined strikes earlier in the decade. Unlike the violent
demonstrations, which required tear gas and arrests at the hands of New York State
Troopers, the DFU exemplified the ways in which organized, peaceful, and carefully
executed protests could achieve real results, in the form of higher prices for farm milk. It
was only through challenges to dairy distributors and cooperative groups that
independent farmers could improve their economic standing in the New York dairy
market.
By 1939 the Dairy Farmers Union had acquired over 14,000 contracted members
in the New York milkshed, and this number was only increasing.99 Information on DFU
membership suggests that this organization attracted a certain kind of dairy farmer. Dairy
97 Kristina Peterson-Lohman, About Borden Dairy Company: About Elsie the Cow, PDF,
http://www.bordendairypresskit.com.
98 C.S Cantwell, “‘Round Town,” Ogdensburg Journal, November 12th, 1937.
99 Dyson, 70.

27
farmers closest to the metropolitan center often were not interested in membership, as
they enjoyed a “secure access to fluid milk markets,” unlike the fluctuating market
conditions further upstate.100 It was those farmers in places like St. Lawrence County and
Jefferson County that were “most radical in their fight for higher milk prices,” and were
attracted to the DFU’s successful striking techniques and unified organization.101 This
trend helps to exemplify the Dairy Farmers Union strike that occurred in 1939, at the
peak of the DFU’s influence.
The Dairy Farmers Union, by 1939, had honed their striking methods and was
prepared for action when Federal District Court Judge Frank Cooper removed price
regulations in the New York milkshed.102 This federal court decision led to immediate
price-cutting by milk dealers in New York State, and despite the reinstatement of market
controls later that summer, dairy farmers were extremely irate and frustrated with years
of discontent within the milk industry.103 Across the state in August 1939, thousands of
DFU members voted to strike the dairy dealers. Although membership to the Union was
concentrated in the North Country region of New York State, it is important to note that
DFU representatives from the Hudson River Valley, Mohawk River Valley, and even
from Pennsylvania and Vermont, were involved in the voting process.104
The organized, collective withholding by the Dairy Farmers Union was estimated
to have reduced the metropolitan milk supply by thirty percent after just one day, and by
the third day the DFU experienced considerable control over the New York City
100 Dupuis, 179.
101 Dupuis, 179.
104 Nicholas Clifford, “The Dairy Farmers’ Union in Vermont, 1939-1942,” Vermont
History 79 (2011), 61.

28
market.105 Some violent actions were reported, however it is difficult to distinguish which
accusations actually occurred and at whose hand. This discrepancy is due to the fact that
many non-DFU members actually joined the strike “either by refusing to deliver their
product or by arranging for DFU pickets to dump their milk.”106 Allegations of violence
ensured that these cooperative farmers could aid in the strike movement, while ostensibly
appearing to continue their allegiance to their cooperative organizations. This solidarity
between farmers is a complete contrast from the disunity that marked the strikes of early
1930s. Greatly contributing to the Dairy Farmers Union success, one striker’s sign
exemplified the different nature of the strikes: “If we all pull together & nobody kicks,
We will show the dealers, We are not Hicks.”107
The successful withholding of milk to various plants throughout New York State
had created a crisis in New York City, shown by Mayor Fiorello LaGuardia’s
intervention in August 1939. The metropolitan milk supply had dropped about sixty
percent by day three of the strike, and it became necessary to come to terms with the
striking producers for the benefit of the consumers. LaGuardia orchestrated a conference
in which DFU leaders, as well as major dealers and cooperatives, would meet and come
to a settlement over farm milk prices.108 The final settlement constituted a price of $2.15
for “a hundredweight for September milk,” and Mayor LaGuardia later denounced the
big industry dealers for their role in market unrest.109 This agreement was a major victory
109 “LaGuardia Cudgels Milk Firms Into Paying His Price,” The Post-Standard, August
12, 1940.

29
for the Dairy Farmers Union, as in a single stroke “the rate paid to farmers jumped by
about 40 percent.”110
Thus, the Dairy Farmers Union strike of 1939 had achieved a tangible change in
the dairy market, and ensured that milk prices had increased to an acceptable level for all
farmers within the New York milkshed. Celebrations occurred throughout the state, such
as the farmers in Canton, New York who “marched in a mock funeral procession down
Main Street complete with two coffins- one for Dairymen’s League, the other for the
‘Milk Monopoly.’”111 The overarching sentiment in the farming community was that the
Dairy Farmers Union and its vision of small, family-run farms had triumphed over
industrial groups, which had continually threatened their way of life into the twentieth
century.
Unfortunately, the fate of the Dairy Farmers Union did not continue this trajectory
of success. Following the 1939 strike, the DFU faced many accusations and threats by
those who wished to see Archie Wright and the Union fail. For example, the DCLA, Milk
Producers’ Bargaining Agency, and other notable groups, pointed to Wright’s close
association with Communist organizations such as the Transport Workers’ Union.112
Critics accused Wright and the DFU of attempting to “gain Communist control over the
milkshed,” and DCLA-funded periodicals asserted that Wright “was leading the gullible
farmers of the DFU down the path to communism.”113 The weight of these accusations
110 Dyson, 70.
112 Dyson, 70.
113 Dyson, 70.

30
proved to be too much for Wright and the DFU, and amidst this controversy, the Union
would eventually merge with the United Dairy Farmers in 1942.114
Although the Dairy Farmers Union had an anticlimactic and surprising end, at the
time of its merger there were over 30,000 farmers across five states in DFU membership.
The Dairy Farmers Union following their 1939 success was a collective bulwark for dairy
farmers, especially within upstate New York. Archie Wright and the leaders of the DFU
helped to foster a different image of dairy farmers across the United States. Gone was the
popular image of farmers as poor and unintelligent, such as the Scarecrow in The Wizard
of Oz.115 Independent farmers saw themselves, shown in the Milk Control Board hearing
minutes, as “the backbone…they loyalty…the very basis upon which we have [built]
America.”116 Through the Dairy Farmers Union’s success, the public image of the dairy
farmer had shifted to better reflect their role in an agricultural economy, as well as bring
attention to the plight of the dairy farmer in New York State.
A lack of solidarity and disunity among actors was a defining feature of New
York farming strikes. Kerosene fires and overturned milk trucks were met with tear gas
and arrests, particularly in 1933. Dairy farmers were hurting their cause in the early years
of the 1930s, although enough attention was gained to establish a Milk Control Board.
Some scholars viewed the 1933 Milk Control Board, following these violent strikes, as
having achieved the dairy producers’ goal of price reform. However, this was not real
success, shown by the continuing market fluctuation, industry domination by the Big
Three, and repeated signs of unrest by independent farmers. Rather, ‘success’ in the form
114 Dyson, 70.

31
of strikes did not occur until the Dairy Farmers Union was established. The DFU
provided organized leadership and calculated methods to bring order to the struggling
dairy farmers in upstate New York.
While strikes had always been a method for agricultural workers to achieve
changes, the DFU promoted a much different type of strike. Instead of overturning milk
trucks and injuring cooperative farms and farmers, members of the DFU utilized ‘sit-
down’ strikes to peacefully ensure that milk shipments could not reach their destination.
As shown in the 1937 case, when striking a dairy plant, rather than wasting the perishable
commodity, the DFU diverted shipments to other processing plants, effectively ‘drying’
out industrial plants run by dairy cooperatives. Because the DFU achieved results without
violence, many independent farmers flocked to their organization, and this accounted for
the successful overhaul of the metropolitan milkshed and the undermining of market
control by the Big Three.
The DFU and its organization and leadership ensured that farmers could strike in
a way that was popular with the public, other farmers, as well as the state government.
Although the DFU was eventually merged with another dairy organization, this is not
indicative of its failure as a farming collective. Rather, the Dairy Farmers Union strikes
were the only successful strikes in the 1930s, because they brought actual changes to the
market. Prices were increased by the DFU’s actions, not the 1933 Milk Control Board
legislation. At its peak in 1939, the Dairy Farmers Union had successfully raised prices
about 40 percent through the use of strikes, and was therefore celebrated by dairy farmers
throughout New York State.

32
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