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Disruptive Innovation, Kodak and digital imaging

The 'full' (long!) story about how Kodak got in trouble and how the challenges were handled... I put the other chapters together into one document, in case you just want to embed one slideshow.

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Disruptive Innovation, Kodak and digital imaging

  1. 1. Kodak Destruction and Survival
  2. 2. Christian Sandström holds a PhD from ChalmersUniversity of Technology, Sweden. He writes and speaks about disruptive innovation and technological change.
  3. 3. Building 65
  4. 4. Building 23
  5. 5. Building 9
  6. 6. Since paper and film had been manufactured and developed inthese buildings the shift to digital imaging rendered many of them obsolete.
  7. 7. In the end, demolition turnedout to be the right thing to do.
  8. 8. Some of these implosionswere made into PR events for the launch of Kodak’s new All-in-one printers.
  9. 9. Needless to say,these demolitions evoked many emotions…
  10. 10. Thomas Hoehn, Director of Brand Communications and New Media at Kodak wrote about this here.
  11. 11. In the comments below the blog entry, many different views were expressed about Kodak and this PR event:
  12. 12. “Kodak was great for Rochester. And for many it still has a place in their heart for all the good times and great friends that it brought together. However, those days are long gone now - as symbolized by this implosion. The Old Kodak is long gone.”
  13. 13. “I was embarassed for the TV media and for the people who were watching the implosion as a way to remember all the great years that B9 served Kodak. His presentation was loud, classless, and direspectful!”
  14. 14. “If you want good publicity.. take care of your current workers, not just the digitial employees. Remember were you got all the money to invest in digital (FILM)....”
  15. 15. “More thoughts should have been on the employees that were negatively impacted by the closings of these buildings. The celebration was a total disrepect for the individuals that worked for Kodak for many years and were let go.”
  16. 16. “It is wonderful for those still with the company that someone has finally accepted the changes in the industry and Kodak is trying to catch up with those changes... but for those of us who were sacrificed along the way it can at times feel like salt thrown on a wound.”
  17. 17. “Theres still a lot of great people at Kodak, just too few of them at the top. That to me is the greatest disrespect, when our CEO and upper management get great raises and we are offered fractions of a percent if anything - not even a cost of living increase.”
  18. 18. “No matter how they spin this, its just way too symbolic of Kodaks implosion after the decline of film. The whole Ink promo was utterly distasteful.”
  19. 19. “I think the company missed the mark in not realizing the emotional impact the implosions would have on employees (current and former).“
  20. 20. “After 28 years with this company i have seen it all until this, people making a mockery out of revolution, they did it to save a buck. i work for the new digital imaging group, with a 32% paycut and a 17% cut in work hours, just to save a buck, i find this hole implosion thing a joke, there was a lot of history with in these buildings to say it’s a revolution into digital, next time hire bevis and buthead they’ll show a little more compassion.”
  21. 21. “13 years ago Kodak in Peru had 300 workers, today we are 10. Put that in a picture and you will know we understand how you guys up there feel about so many people having left the company when they thought they had a life time job. We are a family and we feel the same down here.“
  22. 22. “Not many industries have had to face these challenges simultaneously and Kodak is doing it head on. This is the fourth year of a tectonic four-year digital transformation. Amazing progress has been made but not without ups and downs, tears and smiles, and myriad of other emotions. I am happy that Kodak embraces acceptance of comments on this blog. Many corporate blogs do not. This speaks to the brand and the values that underlay this great institution.”
  23. 23. “Some would say this implosion symbolizes Kodaks actual future ...”
  24. 24. Life at Kodak has not been easy.
  25. 25. How and why could this happen?
  26. 26. Let’s go back in history and take a look at the rise of Kodak…
  27. 27. The Rise of Photography
  28. 28. Back in the late 19th century, the Eastman Dry Plate Company produced the first cameras that were not aimed forprofessionals.
  29. 29. The first simple roll film camerasthat this company produced werecalled Kodak. The cameras were sosuccessful that the Kodak word was incorporated into the name.
  30. 30. The Eastman KodakCompany was founded in 1892.
  31. 31. By targeting non-photographers,Kodak createda huge market.
  32. 32. George Eastman, Kodaksfounder, coined the famous advertising slogan: "You press the button, we do the rest."
  33. 33. The slogan came to define Kodak and was usedduring most of the 20th century.
  34. 34. The simple ’point and shoot’Brownie camera allowed consumers to take their own pictures. They could then mailthe roll of film to Kodak, whichwould develop it and return the photos by mail.
  35. 35. Before Kodak, people could not afford or manage to take photos regularly and document their lives.
  36. 36. Kodak brought photographyto the people, just like Fordbrought cars to the people.
  37. 37. Kodak became a household name. Kodak moments, Kodak days, ’to Kodak’, the company defined consumer photography and the brand became very strong.
  38. 38. People loved to take photos, and as they became richer, they took more photos…
  39. 39. And thus,Kodak mademore money and keptgrowing, and growing.
  40. 40. The company was so dominant that it became a verb, ’to Kodak’, just like Google has become a verb today.
  41. 41. Simple, cheap photography turned out to be a business idea that worked globally and thus, Kodak took on new markets and kept growing.
  42. 42. In the early days of globalization, Kodak established its first wholly owned subsidiary in 1897, in France.
  43. 43. An image of the Kodak Park in Rochester, 1938.
  44. 44. Needless to say, George Eastman made a great personal fortune from the success of Kodak.
  45. 45. Som photos from his house in Rochester (NY)…
  46. 46. The company helped set the standard of 35 mm film, and introduced the 16 mm format format for amateurs.
  47. 47. In 1935, the KODACHROME Film was introduced and became the first amateur color film success.
  48. 48. Color film was the next big thing.
  49. 49. Along with this, theconsumer cameras were further developed.
  50. 50. In 1962, sales exceeded 1billion USD and John Glennbecame the first astronaut to orbit the earth. Of course thisKodak momentwas memorizedwith Kodak film.
  51. 51. In 1957, the Kodak Brownie Starmatic was launched. Over the coming five years more than 10 million of them were sold!
  52. 52. But even greater revenueswere madeby selling film.
  53. 53. Just like Gilette made great money by sellingrazor blades, Kodak made great money byselling film. The main source of profit was notthe razor or the camera, it was thecontinuous consumption of blades and film.
  54. 54. Film could be boughtand finished everywhere.
  55. 55. With signs,Kodak also sought to encourage people totake a lot of photos…
  56. 56. In the 1980s and 1990s Kodaklaunched even simpler cameras…
  57. 57. Targeting those people who only needed a few photos and not a camera.
  58. 58. The number of employeesincreased steadily over time: 1927 20 000 1946 60 000 1955 73 000 1973 120 000
  59. 59. In 1981, the company had a turnover of more than 10 billion USD.
  60. 60. In the 19th and 20th century Kodak became a true American classic.
  61. 61. It was founded by an energetic and visionary entrepreneur, and created joy and memories for millions of people.
  62. 62. Kodak was a true American dream.
  63. 63. George Eastman and theKodakers did to photography what Henry Ford did to cars.They made it available, usable and affordable for everyone.
  64. 64. So, this is the background, now let’s take a look at the dawn of digitalimaging and how Kodak handled this disruptive threat.
  65. 65. The dawn of digital imaging
  66. 66. During the20th century, Kodak grewup into large, profitable company.
  67. 67. People gotricher andconsumedmore andmore film.
  68. 68. Kodak built up a competencebase in precise mechanics…
  69. 69. … chemistry…
  70. 70. … manufacturing…
  71. 71. … Andconsumermarketing.
  72. 72. A globalinfrastructure for photography had emerged. A roll of Kodak film could be bought anywhere in theworld and be put into the camera.
  73. 73. For every Kodakmoment, thecompany made a profit.
  74. 74. … However, in the late 1970s, therise of the Japanese camera industry threatened Kodak…
  75. 75. The cameras and the film werecheaper and had high quality.
  76. 76. When Fuji sponsored the 1984olympics in Los Angeles it became clear that the threat was real.
  77. 77. Winning a price war against these guys was hard.
  78. 78. At the same time, Polaroid and instant photography was improved, thusundermining Kodak’s amateur market.
  79. 79. Kodak responded by diversifying throughout the 1980s.
  80. 80. The company went into medical imaging, pharma, batteries for video cassettes…
  81. 81. And digital imaging…
  82. 82. The development can be traced back toBell Labs in the 1960s and then to NASA and the transmission of photos fromunmanned space vehicles in the 1970s.
  83. 83. Through digital imaging, photos could be sent back to earth.
  84. 84. Kodak, Canon and RCA tried to convert light into digital images.
  85. 85. In 1979, Emory Kristof was thefirst to use an electronic camera while photographing life at the bottom of the ocean.
  86. 86. Electronic cameras were alsoused when Kristof took photos of Titanic at the bottom of the sea.
  87. 87. "What does this developmentmean? That the working newspaperphotographer in the not-too-distance future could be using anelectronic camera."// Edward Dooks photographer, 1979
  88. 88. "It sounds like it (the digital camera) couldgive us more speed, more time to do theselection and cropping of photographs andless time just doing the technical productionof it.“// Ralph Langer, Dallas Morning News 1984
  89. 89. "Electronic photography is going to replacethe silver image. We are going to have to havean understanding of how to edit pictures, howpictures are stored electronically and how toedit them electronically." // Charles Scott, Photojournalism educator
  90. 90. In 1981, the industry was shakenwhen SONY launched their Mavica, a camera that used floppy discs instead of film.
  91. 91. Many companies feared that this technology would eventuallysubstitute analogue photography.
  92. 92. In Japan it was referred toas ’the Mavica shock’. They feared that something like this would happen.
  93. 93. "When the electronic camera, and all that goes with it, is finally in our hands -- and it will be -- it will not be because we have sought it out, but because we are no longer left with a choice.“Ed Breen, News Photographer in 1982
  94. 94. Kodak recognized the threat and invested extensively in digitalimaging during the 1970s and 1980s.
  95. 95. In 1986, Kodak scientists releasedthe first megapixel sensor, with 1,4 Mpixel.
  96. 96. The JPEG standard for compression emergedin 1989 and further advancements were made in digital imaging.
  97. 97. Later on Kodak developed the sensor into a digitalback, which was built in to a Nikon camera in 1991.
  98. 98. A sensor with 1,3 Megapixel, an internalharddrive of 200 megabytes at a cost of 13 000 USD (about 21 000 USD today!)
  99. 99. It was marketed to photojournalists, hoping they’dbe willing to pay for being able to view images instantly , take a lot ofphotos and removing the long process of turning film into a digital format.
  100. 100. In 1994, Apple launched the QuickTake camera.
  101. 101. The QuickTake had been developed by Kodak.
  102. 102. It looked like a pair of binoculars, could store 32 photos and was thefirst camera that could be connected to a PC.
  103. 103. The price? 800 dollars.
  104. 104. After a collaboration with Philips, Kodak announced its Photo CD system in1990. Pictures could be digitized, stored on a compact disk, and then be viewed and manipulated on a PC.
  105. 105. In the 1990s Kodak focused more on its core business. The new CEO George Fisher divested many business units.
  106. 106. Fisher now had formulate andimplement a digital strategy.
  107. 107. He thought that Kodak should be an imaging company: “We are not in the photographic film business or in theelectronics business, we are in the picture business.”
  108. 108. A couple of different ideas came to define Kodak’sstrategy for how to handle the digital threat.
  109. 109. Greater coherence. Focus the digital efforts andcoordinate them in a better way.
  110. 110. Incrementality. The shift will be theconsequence of many small efforts.
  111. 111. Fisher said: “The future is not some harebrained scheme of the digital Information Highway or something. It is a step-by-step progression of enhancing photography using digital technology”
  112. 112. During the 1990s, digital imaging emerged in those segments where transmission and manipulation of photos was important. At the same time, film was doing well.
  113. 113. Kodak thus developed a hybrid approach, developing digitalimaging while making money on its established business.
  114. 114. In 1994, Kodak launched a digital news camera,it cost 15 000 USD and was co-developed with The Associated Press.
  115. 115. Kodak also developeddigital backswhich couldbe attached toprofessional cameras.
  116. 116. It looked like this.
  117. 117. Yes, big and bulky.
  118. 118. But the business utility was great. Many film photos were digitized sooner or later anyway. With a digital back, one step in the production ofphotos could be removed.
  119. 119. The first digital backs were expensive and had a moderateperformance. Kodak launched one with 6 Mpixels.
  120. 120. Press and Studio photographers loved it and NASA was veryinterested in the Kodak sensor.
  121. 121. 6 million pixel resolution is good enough for most applications. The perception of colour is more important than the perception of sharpness. Kodak, 1996
  122. 122. In these years, Kodak also launchedsoftware which could be used for editing and cropping digitized photos.
  123. 123. Kodak also developed a digital infrastructure that could be used byphotofinishers throughout their network.
  124. 124. In a press release from 1997, the following quote can be found: Four years ago, when we talked about the possibilities of digital photography, people laughed. Today, the high-tech world is stampeding to get a piece of the action, calling digital imaging perhaps the greatest growth opportunity in the computer world.And it may be. We surely see it as the greatest future enabler for people to truly “Take Pictures. Further.”
  125. 125. Kodak did everything to enter digital imaging – consumer cameras, professional cameras, storage systems, software, printing paper, you name it…
  126. 126. However, in the digital world, everything would be different.
  127. 127. Kodak used to be exceptionallyintegrated vertically, owning the entire value chain, from basic research to photo finishing.
  128. 128. The digital value chain could not be dominated in the same way – Compaq, HP and others were leaders in the PC market,Adobe dominated image software, in printers Canon and HP were leaders.
  129. 129. Kodak therefore launched many joint ventures with these firms, since the company did not possess these resources on their own.
  130. 130. With the launch of the digital DC40 in1995, Kodak teamed up with Microsoft, HP, IBM and tried to create an infrastructure for digital imaging.
  131. 131. Kodak, Olympus and Sanyo all had thousands of patents in digital imaging, they cross-licensed much of this in order to speed up the shift to digital imaging.
  132. 132. Thus, Kodak developed the digitalbusiness both in-house and through collaborations and partnerships.
  133. 133. Kodak had a strong brand and a global presence, these resources were crucial in the shift to digital imaging. Thecompany offered digital services such as digitizing film all over the world.
  134. 134. The company had a strong technologypresence in digital imaging. The company had more than 5000 engineers and scientists, more than 600 PhDs and had invested in digital research since the 1980s.
  135. 135. Kodak had a leading position inimage sensors for a long time and sold those to many other camera companies such as Olympus.
  136. 136. At the same time, the price war withFuji put Kodak into trouble. In 1997-98, Fisher had to fire 20 000 people, mainly because Fuji lowered their prices and expanded.
  137. 137. Kodak also responded by enteringemerging markets such as China.
  138. 138. During the late 1990s,Kodak kept launching smaller, cheaper andbetter digital cameras.
  139. 139. At the same time, the companycreated various digital consumer products and services.
  140. 140. Thus, Kodak did not only recognize the threat at an early point…
  141. 141. … The company pioneered digitalimaging and pushed it further…
  142. 142. … Despite the fact that digital imaging would render film obsolete…
  143. 143. … Kodak embraced, developed and commercialized digital imaging…
  144. 144. Daniel Carp, Kodak’s new CEO said in 2000: "Kodak is convinced that there hasnever been a better time to be in the picture business…. Digital canchange the way people take and use pictures. Suddenly there are no boundaries to how often you can take pictures because cost and availability are no longer issues."
  145. 145. With all these preparations, all R&D and successful digital businessdevelopment in the 1980s and 90s, what could possibly go wrong?
  146. 146. Demolition Times
  147. 147. In 2000, Daniel Carp became the new CEO of Kodak…
  148. 148. In a speech in 2000 he said: "Kodak is convinced that there has never been a better time to be in the picture business…. Digital can change the way people take and use pictures. Suddenly there are no boundaries to how often you can takepictures because costand availability are no longer issues."
  149. 149. A bit ofoptimism has never hurt anyone, butreality turned out to be somewhat different for Kodak.
  150. 150. Carp also said: ”… It will take more than one company to change acentury of consumer habits and perception. With the participation of the entire industry, I am confident that we can lead the waytoward a more picture-rich era, and that, together, we can break through the technical and marketing challenges facing our industry.”
  151. 151. He was right…
  152. 152. Once the price and performance of digitalcameras was good enough…
  153. 153. … An avalanche of growth in digital imaging now occurred.3025201510 5 0 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Number of film and digital cameras sold in the United States (guess which one is digital!)
  154. 154. Once the shift occurred, it was fasterthan anyone could have imagined…
  155. 155. In 2007, several Kodakbuildings were demolished.
  156. 156. The global distribution network forselling film was no longer a great asset.
  157. 157. Having pushed the frontiers of digitalphotography for decades, Kodakers mustlook at these pictures with mixed feelings.
  158. 158. For every year, less film was consumed, and thus revenues diminished rapidly.
  159. 159. A paper factory is destroyed, neighbours and former Kodakers record the event with theirdigital cameras and camcorders, and upload the images to flickr…
  160. 160. … Can the shift to digital imaging be illustrated in a better way?
  161. 161. Building 9
  162. 162. In January 2004 Carp announced that Kodak would cut between 20 and 25 percent of its worldwide employees.
  163. 163. Carp now said: We now know that digitaladoption accounts for the great majority of our sales decline in the United States
  164. 164. Up until 2005, Kodak had closed 7 filmprocessing labs in the United States.
  165. 165. In January 2009, another layoff of3500-4500 workers was announced.
  166. 166. Another huge loss had been posted.
  167. 167. At its height Kodak employed morethan 100 000 people. This figure has shrunk to around 25 000.
  168. 168. The stock has reached new record low levels almost every year.
  169. 169. Shareholders were angry,employees were angry, and management asked for more money…
  170. 170. Standard & Poor’s Equity Research Analyst Erik Kolb commented on the results:
  171. 171. “They were late to the game intheir shift to digital and they have been playing catch-up since.”
  172. 172. Wait aminute!
  173. 173. Kodak was not late!
  174. 174. Kodakembraced digitial imaging!
  175. 175. Remember?
  176. 176. Kodak stopped marketing film cameras in 2004.
  177. 177. If Kodak wasn’t late, why did the company encounter such great trouble…?
  178. 178. One reason is of course the current recession.
  179. 179. “During the last three months of theyear, we experienced dramatic declines in several of our key businesses due to the slowdown in consumer spending and significantly reduced demand forcapital equipment” // CEO Antonio Perez
  180. 180. But the problems came longbefore the economic downturn…
  181. 181. If Kodak wasn’t late, why did the company encounter such huge problems…?
  182. 182. First of all, people stopped buying film.
  183. 183. It sounds like a simple explanation, andit is. But the implications for a company like Kodak are tremendous.
  184. 184. Many of Kodak’s key resources andcapabilities became virtually useless with this change:
  185. 185. The global distributionnetwork lost its value.
  186. 186. People used PCs instead of photo finishing labs.
  187. 187. The film revenues diminished.
  188. 188. Kodak used to make money onevery photo you tookusing their film.
  189. 189. Well, notanymore.
  190. 190. The value of being positioned as a vertically integrated company diminished.
  191. 191. With the death of film, the value ofthese signs disappeared quickly.
  192. 192. Kodak’s business model(making money on film likeGillette makes money onrazors) was not compatiblewith digital photography.
  193. 193. The supplier network for producing film was also rendered obsolete.
  194. 194. Knowledge in chemistry and filmmanufacturing became an obsolete asset.
  195. 195. The value of film and paper manufacturing sites was literally demolished.
  196. 196. Thus, the shift to digital imaging implied thatKodak’s capital in terms of skills, processes, market position etc was destroyed…
  197. 197. … And no strategy or management idea could have changed this fact.
  198. 198. The same kind of capital destruction occurred in the camera market.
  199. 199. The rules of the game had changed.
  200. 200. Though Kodak launched many digital cameras, this could not make up for the decline in film.
  201. 201. Moreover, once products become digital, pricesdecline rapidly while the performance increases.
  202. 202. Margins are lost at a furious pace.
  203. 203. And the competition got tougher every year.
  204. 204. New models were launched all the time - withmore Megapixels, better zoom, lower battery consumption and lower prices.
  205. 205. Consumer Electronics companies like Sonyhad a resource base that was suddenly better for photography than Kodak’s resources.
  206. 206. Kodak could not really keep up with this competition in the long run.
  207. 207. To make things even worse, mobile cameras started to disrupt the compact cameras.
  208. 208. Sales of compact cameras actually started to decline in 2005 and has continued to do so ever since.
  209. 209. Making money in such a rapid industry is very difficult.
  210. 210. With the rise of digital imaging, the competence base shifted fromprecise mechanics to electronics.
  211. 211. Though Kodak had developedknowledge in electronics, much of theold competence base became useless.
  212. 212. The attempts at various digital printing businesses had a moderate success.
  213. 213. People were simply notprinting that many photos, nor were they using film.
  214. 214. The company launched Kodak Gallery,but competition from Google Pictures, Flickr and others was fierce.
  215. 215. Great new printers were not enough tocompensate for the losses in film sales.
  216. 216. Needless to say, the change of logo did not prevent the losses either.
  217. 217. So, how can a company like Kodak getinto so much trouble despite recognizingand pushing the shift to digital imaging?
  218. 218. I guess the answer is:
  219. 219. The value of Kodak’s resources, its position and its capabilities wasdestroyed in the shift to digital imaging.
  220. 220. Over time, a fish develops skills andfinds a good position in the ecosystem.
  221. 221. It may live and prosper inthe ocean for millions of years.
  222. 222. But that does not matteronce you put it on land.
  223. 223. That’s why Kodak encountered suchproblems despite their huge digital effort.
  224. 224. Kodak was a fish that had to learn how tobreath on land. And so far, it has survived.
  225. 225. Is this a failure?
  226. 226. Survival = Success
  227. 227. With all these layoffs, losses anddemolitions, can anyone claim that Kodak’s transition to digital imaging is a success story?
  228. 228. Based upon other slideshowsabout the Kodak Destruction and a look at other companies and industries I would say it is a success story.
  229. 229. The reason why those stories areregarded as failures is that people underestimate the difficulties related to a digital shift.
  230. 230. First of all, digital technology has a fantastictrack record of slaughtering established firms.
  231. 231. The following slides will illustrate how digitaltechnology has destroyed established firms…
  232. 232. The typewriter companies were extinguished…
  233. 233. The tube radio manufacturers were put out of business by the transistor radio.
  234. 234. The mechanical calculator companies became history with the rise of electronics.
  235. 235. More than two thirds of the Swiss watchindustry went out of business in 1970-85.
  236. 236. The music industry is collapsing right now…
  237. 237. These stories tell us that SURVIVALmust be regarded as a SUCCESS, since somany companies have died in those shifts.
  238. 238. Let’s take a look at Kodak’s competitors in the film and camera industry…
  239. 239. AgfaPhoto was demolished.
  240. 240. Konica left the industry after trying to survive through a merger with Minolta.
  241. 241. Polaroid is also resting in peace.
  242. 242. Fuji has survived, butencountered massive problems.
  243. 243. Thus, when looking at other industries, as well as Kodak’s competitors, it becomes clear that survival is rare and should therefore be regarded as success.
  244. 244. So far, Kodak has survived.
  245. 245. If this is a success story, which were the differentiating factors that made Kodak survive?
  246. 246. 1. Kodak recognized the threat at an early point and developed knowledge in-house about digital technology.
  247. 247. Doing it in-house is important for several reasons. One is to make the new technology accepted inside the company. Another one is of course to understand the nature of it.
  248. 248. 2. Kodak has shown a willingness to cannibalize on its film business.
  249. 249. If Kodak hadn’t done it, someoneelse would have destroyed the film business for them.
  250. 250. 3. Kodak collaborated with other companies, and other firms were acquired.
  251. 251. This is also important, because the resource base has to berenewed, and this is easier to doby drawing upon the competence others have developed.
  252. 252. 4. From the early 1990s and on, Kodakshowed a willingness to change and to embrace digital imaging.
  253. 253. If this hadn’t been the case, particularly in top management,Kodak would gone down the tube in record time like Polaroid.
  254. 254. 5. From an early point, Kodak not onlyexplored the new technology, but also tried tocommercialize it through various applications.
  255. 255. By doing so, the new technology would not tothe same extent be regarded as a cost for the company, but rather an investment.
  256. 256. Summing it up, these images come from what should be regarded as a successful transition to digital technology…
  257. 257. If these images come from a success story…
  258. 258. … We can then understand how difficult it is to survive digital revolutions…
  259. 259. SourcesThe Digital JournalistGrant, R.M., Eastman Kodak: Meeting the Digital Challenge,
  260. 260. Image attributions
  261. 261. Find out