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8th	
  Security	
  Summit	
  
Portland,	
  Oregon	
  
9th	
  Security	
  Summit	
  
Denver,	
  Colorado	
  
Come	
  see	
  what’s	
  cooking	
  in	
  my	
  lab:	
  
Why	
  you	
  need	
  a	
  lab	
  and	
  how	
  to	
  get	
  one	
  
Chris	
  Sistrunk,	
  PE	
  
Sr.	
  Engineer	
  	
  
Entergy	
  –	
  Jackson,	
  MS	
  
8th	
  Security	
  Summit	
  
Portland,	
  Oregon	
  
9th	
  Security	
  Summit	
  
Denver,	
  Colorado	
  
Why	
  do	
  we	
  
need	
  a	
  lab,	
  
Chris?	
  
8th	
  Security	
  Summit	
  
Portland,	
  Oregon	
  
9th	
  Security	
  Summit	
  
Denver,	
  Colorado	
  
What	
  happens	
  when	
  you	
  use	
  nmap	
  
on	
  an	
  Industrial	
  Control	
  System	
  
http://securityreactions.tumblr.com
8th	
  Security	
  Summit	
  
Portland,	
  Oregon	
  
9th	
  Security	
  Summit	
  
Denver,	
  Colorado	
  
Why	
  do	
  we	
  need	
  a	
  lab?	
  
With	
  a	
  lab,	
  you	
  can	
  
•  Test	
  relay	
  and	
  RTU	
  seAngs	
  on	
  a	
  replica	
  of	
  
producDon	
  systems	
  
•  Test	
  new	
  firmware	
  before	
  issuing	
  to	
  field	
  
•  Perform	
  root-­‐cause	
  analysis	
  
– Why	
  is	
  this	
  device	
  locking	
  up	
  once	
  a	
  month?	
  
•  Try	
  out	
  new	
  equipment	
  from	
  a	
  vendor	
  
8th	
  Security	
  Summit	
  
Portland,	
  Oregon	
  
9th	
  Security	
  Summit	
  
Denver,	
  Colorado	
  
Why	
  do	
  we	
  need	
  a	
  lab?	
  
Save	
  Dme	
  &	
  money	
  by	
  
•  CreaDng	
  standard	
  seAngs	
  templates	
  
•  Find	
  problems	
  before	
  they	
  are	
  widespread	
  
(Not	
  having	
  to	
  recall	
  units	
  with	
  firmware	
  issues)	
  
•  Develop	
  and	
  test	
  equipment	
  pilots	
  in-­‐house	
  
rather	
  than	
  hiring	
  a	
  company	
  to	
  do	
  it	
  	
  
•  Use	
  lab	
  equipment	
  as	
  emergency	
  spare	
  
	
  
8th	
  Security	
  Summit	
  
Portland,	
  Oregon	
  
9th	
  Security	
  Summit	
  
Denver,	
  Colorado	
  
Why	
  security	
  tesDng?	
  
•  Not	
  all	
  SCADA/relay	
  vendors	
  do	
  negaDve	
  or	
  
security	
  tesDng	
  at	
  their	
  factories	
  
•  Even	
  if	
  they	
  did,	
  they	
  can’t	
  test	
  equipment	
  the	
  
EXACT	
  way	
  that	
  you	
  use	
  it	
  
•  Test	
  your	
  own	
  equipment	
  before	
  hackers	
  or	
  
some	
  drive-­‐by	
  malware	
  does	
  it	
  for	
  you	
  
•  Use	
  the	
  results	
  to	
  miDgate	
  vulnerabiliDes	
  
8th	
  Security	
  Summit	
  
Portland,	
  Oregon	
  
9th	
  Security	
  Summit	
  
Denver,	
  Colorado	
  
What	
  kinds	
  of	
  tesDng?	
  
8th	
  Security	
  Summit	
  
Portland,	
  Oregon	
  
9th	
  Security	
  Summit	
  
Denver,	
  Colorado	
  
•  Factory/Site	
  Acceptance	
  TesDng	
  (RTU	
  system)	
  
•  Firmware/SoTware	
  TesDng	
  (new	
  or	
  patches)	
  
•  Protocol	
  TesDng	
  (DNP3,	
  Modbus,	
  etc)	
  
•  Protocol	
  Fuzzing	
  (custom	
  or	
  off-­‐the-­‐shelf)	
  
•  PenetraDon	
  TesDng	
  (Metasploit,	
  etc)	
  
•  Physical	
  security	
  tesDng	
  (cabinet	
  locks	
  etc)	
  
•  DOCUMENT!	
  	
  DOCUMENT!	
  	
  DOCUMENT!	
  
What	
  kinds	
  of	
  tesDng?	
  
8th	
  Security	
  Summit	
  
Portland,	
  Oregon	
  
9th	
  Security	
  Summit	
  
Denver,	
  Colorado	
  
What	
  would	
  be	
  your	
  stuxnet?	
  
•  Be	
  a	
  hardhat	
  hacker	
  
•  Think	
  like	
  an	
  aacker	
  who	
  has	
  your	
  prints!	
  
•  Build	
  your	
  systems	
  with	
  layers	
  of	
  defense	
  
•  If	
  you	
  find	
  a	
  vulnerability,	
  let	
  your	
  vendor	
  
know	
  (they	
  might	
  even	
  have	
  a	
  patch)	
  
“To	
  make	
  things	
  work	
  well,	
  	
  
you	
  must	
  break	
  them!”	
  
8th	
  Security	
  Summit	
  
Portland,	
  Oregon	
  
9th	
  Security	
  Summit	
  
Denver,	
  Colorado	
  
How	
  I	
  Audit	
  SCADA	
  Systems	
  
http://securityreactions.tumblr.com
8th	
  Security	
  Summit	
  
Portland,	
  Oregon	
  
9th	
  Security	
  Summit	
  
Denver,	
  Colorado	
  
OK,	
  how	
  do	
  I	
  get	
  a	
  lab?	
  
8th	
  Security	
  Summit	
  
Portland,	
  Oregon	
  
9th	
  Security	
  Summit	
  
Denver,	
  Colorado	
  
OK,	
  how	
  do	
  I	
  get	
  a	
  lab?	
  
•  Ask	
  your	
  boss!	
  	
  Ask	
  the	
  CIO!	
  	
  Ask	
  Ask	
  Ask!	
  
•  If	
  you	
  are	
  the	
  boss,	
  ask	
  your	
  best	
  people	
  what	
  
they	
  want	
  in	
  their	
  lab	
  and	
  go	
  buy	
  it!	
  
•  Put	
  together	
  a	
  plan	
  or	
  a	
  business	
  case!	
  
– Add	
  it	
  to	
  NERC/CIP	
  compliance	
  budget	
  (big	
  driver)	
  
•  Go	
  get	
  spare	
  equipment	
  and	
  make	
  a	
  rack!	
  
•  Start	
  small	
  and	
  add	
  to	
  it.	
  
– Mine	
  started	
  as	
  2	
  relay	
  racks	
  in	
  my	
  cubicle	
  
	
  
8th	
  Security	
  Summit	
  
Portland,	
  Oregon	
  
9th	
  Security	
  Summit	
  
Denver,	
  Colorado	
  
Some	
  ideas	
  
8th	
  Security	
  Summit	
  
Portland,	
  Oregon	
  
9th	
  Security	
  Summit	
  
Denver,	
  Colorado	
  
SDll	
  can’t	
  afford	
  it?	
  
8th	
  Security	
  Summit	
  
Portland,	
  Oregon	
  
9th	
  Security	
  Summit	
  
Denver,	
  Colorado	
  
Can’t	
  afford	
  one,	
  don’t	
  have	
  the	
  
manpower,	
  don’t	
  have	
  the	
  experDse?	
  
•  3rd	
  party	
  tesDng	
  such	
  as	
  Enernex,	
  Digital	
  Bond,	
  
Kinectrics,	
  CimaDon	
  to	
  name	
  a	
  few	
  
•  The	
  US	
  Gov’t	
  has	
  the	
  Idaho	
  NL	
  NaDonal	
  SCADA	
  
Test	
  Bed,	
  Pacific	
  NW	
  NL,	
  &	
  Sandia	
  NL	
  	
  
•  Colleges	
  such	
  as	
  Louisiana	
  Tech,	
  Mississippi	
  State,	
  
Jackson	
  State	
  have	
  power,	
  SCADA,	
  and	
  security	
  
equipment	
  in	
  their	
  labs	
  
•  Farm	
  out	
  the	
  tesDng	
  and	
  work	
  with	
  them	
  to	
  get	
  
the	
  results	
  you	
  want	
  &	
  capitalize	
  the	
  test	
  costs	
  
8th	
  Security	
  Summit	
  
Portland,	
  Oregon	
  
9th	
  Security	
  Summit	
  
Denver,	
  Colorado	
  
To	
  be	
  the	
  best,	
  you	
  need	
  the	
  best	
  tools!	
  
8th	
  Security	
  Summit	
  
Portland,	
  Oregon	
  
9th	
  Security	
  Summit	
  
Denver,	
  Colorado	
  
Entergy	
  THQ	
  Virtual	
  Lab	
  Tour	
  
8th	
  Security	
  Summit	
  
Portland,	
  Oregon	
  
9th	
  Security	
  Summit	
  
Denver,	
  Colorado	
  
Transmission	
  HQ	
  Labs	
  
•  Transmission	
  HQ	
  moved	
  from	
  NOLA	
  to	
  Jackson	
  
•  Business	
  conDnuity	
  aTer	
  Hurricane	
  Katrina	
  
•  Brand	
  new	
  building	
  in	
  Fall	
  of	
  2009	
  
•  5	
  large	
  rooms	
  designated	
  for	
  lab	
  space	
  
–  Relay	
  &	
  SCADA	
  Lab	
  
–  CommunicaDons	
  &	
  Security	
  Lab	
  
–  Real-­‐Dme	
  Power	
  System	
  Simulator	
  Lab	
  
–  Mississippi	
  Grid	
  Lab	
  
–  High	
  Voltage	
  Lab	
  
8th	
  Security	
  Summit	
  
Portland,	
  Oregon	
  
9th	
  Security	
  Summit	
  
Denver,	
  Colorado	
  
Relay	
  &	
  SCADA	
  Lab	
  
8th	
  Security	
  Summit	
  
Portland,	
  Oregon	
  
9th	
  Security	
  Summit	
  
Denver,	
  Colorado	
  
Relay	
  &	
  SCADA	
  Lab	
  
NO	
  
LAB	
  RATS	
  
OR	
  
CYBERATTACK	
  
SQUIRRELS	
  
ALLOWED	
  
8th	
  Security	
  Summit	
  
Portland,	
  Oregon	
  
9th	
  Security	
  Summit	
  
Denver,	
  Colorado	
  
Relay	
  &	
  SCADA	
  Lab	
  
8th	
  Security	
  Summit	
  
Portland,	
  Oregon	
  
9th	
  Security	
  Summit	
  
Denver,	
  Colorado	
  
Relay	
  &	
  SCADA	
  Lab	
  
•  Cubicle:	
  2	
  racks	
  >>	
  Old	
  Break	
  Room:	
  7	
  racks	
  
•  New	
  THQ:	
  15	
  bolted	
  racks,	
  10	
  rolling	
  racks	
  
–  40+	
  ProtecDve	
  Relays	
  (7	
  different	
  standard	
  panels)	
  
–  Digital	
  Fault	
  Recorder	
  
–  8+	
  RTUs,	
  3	
  CommunicaDon	
  Processors	
  
–  SubstaDon	
  Grade	
  LAN	
  &	
  Corp	
  Network	
  
–  GPS	
  Clock	
  (IRIG-­‐B),	
  HMI	
  Screen	
  &	
  Keyboard	
  
–  Toolbox,	
  O-­‐Scope,	
  MulDmeter,	
  Cables,	
  WorkstaDons,	
  
Chip	
  Burner,	
  Relay	
  &	
  RTU	
  Test	
  Sets,	
  etc	
  
8th	
  Security	
  Summit	
  
Portland,	
  Oregon	
  
9th	
  Security	
  Summit	
  
Denver,	
  Colorado	
  
Relay	
  &	
  SCADA	
  Lab	
  
•  THE	
  LAB	
  OF	
  MY	
  DREAMS!	
  
•  We	
  can	
  replicate	
  almost	
  any	
  substaDon	
  
•  Test	
  new	
  configuraDons	
  
•  Test	
  problemaDc	
  field	
  configuraDons	
  
•  Test	
  new	
  firmware	
  &	
  soTware	
  
•  Test	
  drive	
  new	
  equipment	
  
•  Train	
  relay	
  &	
  RTU	
  technicians	
  and	
  engineers	
  
8th	
  Security	
  Summit	
  
Portland,	
  Oregon	
  
9th	
  Security	
  Summit	
  
Denver,	
  Colorado	
  
CommunicaDons	
  &	
  Security	
  Lab	
  
8th	
  Security	
  Summit	
  
Portland,	
  Oregon	
  
9th	
  Security	
  Summit	
  
Denver,	
  Colorado	
  
CommunicaDons	
  &	
  Security	
  Lab	
  
•  SubstaDon	
  Hardened	
  Router	
  &	
  Switch	
  
•  Radios	
  of	
  different	
  bands	
  and	
  technologies	
  
•  Six-­‐sided	
  PSP	
  for	
  simulaDng	
  CCA	
  sites	
  
•  Several	
  field	
  firewalls	
  
•  Wurldtech	
  Achilles	
  Fuzzer	
  
–  Test	
  network	
  robustness	
  of	
  devices	
  
–  Fuzzing	
  DNP3,	
  Modbus,	
  &	
  IEC	
  61850	
  
–  Test	
  new	
  RTU	
  &	
  Relay	
  firmware	
  patches	
  
–  Will	
  network	
  storm	
  affect	
  control	
  outputs?	
  
	
  
8th	
  Security	
  Summit	
  
Portland,	
  Oregon	
  
9th	
  Security	
  Summit	
  
Denver,	
  Colorado	
  
CommunicaDons	
  &	
  Security	
  Lab	
  
•  Custom	
  DNP3	
  Fuzzer	
  
– Created	
  by	
  Adam	
  Crain	
  to	
  test	
  openDNP3	
  
– Closed	
  source	
  for	
  now	
  
– Tests	
  DNP3	
  *Client*	
  and	
  Server	
  
– Project	
  Robus	
  
– hp://Automatak.com/robus	
  
– Plan	
  to	
  release	
  as	
  open	
  source	
  next	
  year	
  
…stay	
  tuned	
  
	
  
	
  
8th	
  Security	
  Summit	
  
Portland,	
  Oregon	
  
9th	
  Security	
  Summit	
  
Denver,	
  Colorado	
  
Power	
  Real-­‐Time	
  Simulator	
  Lab	
  
8th	
  Security	
  Summit	
  
Portland,	
  Oregon	
  
9th	
  Security	
  Summit	
  
Denver,	
  Colorado	
  
Power	
  Real-­‐Time	
  Simulator	
  Lab	
  
8th	
  Security	
  Summit	
  
Portland,	
  Oregon	
  
9th	
  Security	
  Summit	
  
Denver,	
  Colorado	
  
Power	
  Real-­‐Time	
  Simulator	
  Lab	
  
“Hypersim	
  is	
  the	
  only	
  real-­‐Dme	
  digital	
  simulator	
  
with	
  the	
  power	
  to	
  simulate	
  and	
  analyze	
  very	
  
large-­‐scale	
  power	
  systems	
  with	
  more	
  than	
  2000	
  
three-­‐phase	
  buses.”	
  	
  -­‐	
  hp://www.opal-­‐rt.com	
  
•  Simulate	
  different	
  fault	
  scenarios	
  	
  
– Will	
  the	
  Relay	
  A,	
  B,	
  C	
  have	
  a	
  misoperaDon?	
  
– Will	
  relay	
  fault	
  acDvity	
  affect	
  comm	
  	
  (vice	
  versa)?	
  
•  R&D	
  &	
  commissioning	
  tests	
  
	
  
8th	
  Security	
  Summit	
  
Portland,	
  Oregon	
  
9th	
  Security	
  Summit	
  
Denver,	
  Colorado	
  
Mississippi	
  Grid	
  Lab	
  
8th	
  Security	
  Summit	
  
Portland,	
  Oregon	
  
9th	
  Security	
  Summit	
  
Denver,	
  Colorado	
  
Mississippi	
  Grid	
  Lab	
  
•  MulDpurpose	
  type	
  lab	
  used	
  by	
  Entergy	
  
Mississippi	
  	
  T&D	
  Grid	
  Engineers	
  
•  InspecDng/repairing	
  equipment	
  
•  Pre-­‐test	
  new	
  panels	
  before	
  field	
  installaDon	
  
•  Spare	
  parts	
  inventory	
  
	
  
8th	
  Security	
  Summit	
  
Portland,	
  Oregon	
  
9th	
  Security	
  Summit	
  
Denver,	
  Colorado	
  
High	
  Voltage	
  Lab	
  
8th	
  Security	
  Summit	
  
Portland,	
  Oregon	
  
9th	
  Security	
  Summit	
  
Denver,	
  Colorado	
  
High	
  Voltage	
  Lab	
  
•  The	
  Hi-­‐VARC	
  (High	
  Voltage	
  AC	
  ResisDve	
  
Current)	
  test	
  set	
  provides	
  rapid,	
  automaDc	
  
evaluaDon	
  of	
  MOV	
  arresters	
  and	
  polymer	
  
insulators	
  using	
  AC	
  voltages	
  up	
  to	
  132kV.”	
  
hp://www.jmxservices.com	
  
•  InspecDon	
  &	
  root	
  cause	
  of	
  failed	
  insulators,	
  
HV	
  circuit	
  breaker	
  components,	
  etc	
  
	
  
8th	
  Security	
  Summit	
  
Portland,	
  Oregon	
  
9th	
  Security	
  Summit	
  
Denver,	
  Colorado	
  
Last	
  but	
  not	
  least…	
  
8th	
  Security	
  Summit	
  
Portland,	
  Oregon	
  
9th	
  Security	
  Summit	
  
Denver,	
  Colorado	
  
Go	
  make	
  stuff…Go	
  break	
  stuff	
  
8th	
  Security	
  Summit	
  
Portland,	
  Oregon	
  
9th	
  Security	
  Summit	
  
Denver,	
  Colorado	
  
A	
  Few	
  Thoughts	
  
SCADA	
  Security	
  isn’t	
  easy	
  
•  Doing	
  the	
  best	
  we	
  can	
  with	
  what	
  we	
  have	
  
SCADA,	
  Relay,	
  &	
  Security	
  Labs	
  
•  Having	
  a	
  lab	
  is	
  so	
  valuable	
  for	
  tesDng,	
  
troubleshooDng,	
  breaking	
  &	
  fixing	
  stuff	
  
•  Yes	
  I	
  have	
  a	
  fuzzer	
  and	
  I’m	
  not	
  afraid	
  to	
  use	
  it	
  
DNP3/IP	
  Secure	
  AuthenDcaDon	
  v5	
  
•  Please	
  tell	
  your	
  vendors	
  you	
  want	
  NEED	
  it	
  
	
  
8th	
  Security	
  Summit	
  
Portland,	
  Oregon	
  
9th	
  Security	
  Summit	
  
Denver,	
  Colorado	
  
Dream	
  BIG!	
  
8th	
  Security	
  Summit	
  
Portland,	
  Oregon	
  
9th	
  Security	
  Summit	
  
Denver,	
  Colorado	
  
Follow @chrissistrunk
csistru@entergy.com	
  
QuesDons?	
  

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Why You Need an ICS Lab

  • 1. 8th  Security  Summit   Portland,  Oregon   9th  Security  Summit   Denver,  Colorado   Come  see  what’s  cooking  in  my  lab:   Why  you  need  a  lab  and  how  to  get  one   Chris  Sistrunk,  PE   Sr.  Engineer     Entergy  –  Jackson,  MS  
  • 2. 8th  Security  Summit   Portland,  Oregon   9th  Security  Summit   Denver,  Colorado   Why  do  we   need  a  lab,   Chris?  
  • 3. 8th  Security  Summit   Portland,  Oregon   9th  Security  Summit   Denver,  Colorado   What  happens  when  you  use  nmap   on  an  Industrial  Control  System   http://securityreactions.tumblr.com
  • 4. 8th  Security  Summit   Portland,  Oregon   9th  Security  Summit   Denver,  Colorado   Why  do  we  need  a  lab?   With  a  lab,  you  can   •  Test  relay  and  RTU  seAngs  on  a  replica  of   producDon  systems   •  Test  new  firmware  before  issuing  to  field   •  Perform  root-­‐cause  analysis   – Why  is  this  device  locking  up  once  a  month?   •  Try  out  new  equipment  from  a  vendor  
  • 5. 8th  Security  Summit   Portland,  Oregon   9th  Security  Summit   Denver,  Colorado   Why  do  we  need  a  lab?   Save  Dme  &  money  by   •  CreaDng  standard  seAngs  templates   •  Find  problems  before  they  are  widespread   (Not  having  to  recall  units  with  firmware  issues)   •  Develop  and  test  equipment  pilots  in-­‐house   rather  than  hiring  a  company  to  do  it     •  Use  lab  equipment  as  emergency  spare    
  • 6. 8th  Security  Summit   Portland,  Oregon   9th  Security  Summit   Denver,  Colorado   Why  security  tesDng?   •  Not  all  SCADA/relay  vendors  do  negaDve  or   security  tesDng  at  their  factories   •  Even  if  they  did,  they  can’t  test  equipment  the   EXACT  way  that  you  use  it   •  Test  your  own  equipment  before  hackers  or   some  drive-­‐by  malware  does  it  for  you   •  Use  the  results  to  miDgate  vulnerabiliDes  
  • 7. 8th  Security  Summit   Portland,  Oregon   9th  Security  Summit   Denver,  Colorado   What  kinds  of  tesDng?  
  • 8. 8th  Security  Summit   Portland,  Oregon   9th  Security  Summit   Denver,  Colorado   •  Factory/Site  Acceptance  TesDng  (RTU  system)   •  Firmware/SoTware  TesDng  (new  or  patches)   •  Protocol  TesDng  (DNP3,  Modbus,  etc)   •  Protocol  Fuzzing  (custom  or  off-­‐the-­‐shelf)   •  PenetraDon  TesDng  (Metasploit,  etc)   •  Physical  security  tesDng  (cabinet  locks  etc)   •  DOCUMENT!    DOCUMENT!    DOCUMENT!   What  kinds  of  tesDng?  
  • 9. 8th  Security  Summit   Portland,  Oregon   9th  Security  Summit   Denver,  Colorado   What  would  be  your  stuxnet?   •  Be  a  hardhat  hacker   •  Think  like  an  aacker  who  has  your  prints!   •  Build  your  systems  with  layers  of  defense   •  If  you  find  a  vulnerability,  let  your  vendor   know  (they  might  even  have  a  patch)   “To  make  things  work  well,     you  must  break  them!”  
  • 10. 8th  Security  Summit   Portland,  Oregon   9th  Security  Summit   Denver,  Colorado   How  I  Audit  SCADA  Systems   http://securityreactions.tumblr.com
  • 11. 8th  Security  Summit   Portland,  Oregon   9th  Security  Summit   Denver,  Colorado   OK,  how  do  I  get  a  lab?  
  • 12. 8th  Security  Summit   Portland,  Oregon   9th  Security  Summit   Denver,  Colorado   OK,  how  do  I  get  a  lab?   •  Ask  your  boss!    Ask  the  CIO!    Ask  Ask  Ask!   •  If  you  are  the  boss,  ask  your  best  people  what   they  want  in  their  lab  and  go  buy  it!   •  Put  together  a  plan  or  a  business  case!   – Add  it  to  NERC/CIP  compliance  budget  (big  driver)   •  Go  get  spare  equipment  and  make  a  rack!   •  Start  small  and  add  to  it.   – Mine  started  as  2  relay  racks  in  my  cubicle    
  • 13. 8th  Security  Summit   Portland,  Oregon   9th  Security  Summit   Denver,  Colorado   Some  ideas  
  • 14. 8th  Security  Summit   Portland,  Oregon   9th  Security  Summit   Denver,  Colorado   SDll  can’t  afford  it?  
  • 15. 8th  Security  Summit   Portland,  Oregon   9th  Security  Summit   Denver,  Colorado   Can’t  afford  one,  don’t  have  the   manpower,  don’t  have  the  experDse?   •  3rd  party  tesDng  such  as  Enernex,  Digital  Bond,   Kinectrics,  CimaDon  to  name  a  few   •  The  US  Gov’t  has  the  Idaho  NL  NaDonal  SCADA   Test  Bed,  Pacific  NW  NL,  &  Sandia  NL     •  Colleges  such  as  Louisiana  Tech,  Mississippi  State,   Jackson  State  have  power,  SCADA,  and  security   equipment  in  their  labs   •  Farm  out  the  tesDng  and  work  with  them  to  get   the  results  you  want  &  capitalize  the  test  costs  
  • 16. 8th  Security  Summit   Portland,  Oregon   9th  Security  Summit   Denver,  Colorado   To  be  the  best,  you  need  the  best  tools!  
  • 17. 8th  Security  Summit   Portland,  Oregon   9th  Security  Summit   Denver,  Colorado   Entergy  THQ  Virtual  Lab  Tour  
  • 18. 8th  Security  Summit   Portland,  Oregon   9th  Security  Summit   Denver,  Colorado   Transmission  HQ  Labs   •  Transmission  HQ  moved  from  NOLA  to  Jackson   •  Business  conDnuity  aTer  Hurricane  Katrina   •  Brand  new  building  in  Fall  of  2009   •  5  large  rooms  designated  for  lab  space   –  Relay  &  SCADA  Lab   –  CommunicaDons  &  Security  Lab   –  Real-­‐Dme  Power  System  Simulator  Lab   –  Mississippi  Grid  Lab   –  High  Voltage  Lab  
  • 19. 8th  Security  Summit   Portland,  Oregon   9th  Security  Summit   Denver,  Colorado   Relay  &  SCADA  Lab  
  • 20. 8th  Security  Summit   Portland,  Oregon   9th  Security  Summit   Denver,  Colorado   Relay  &  SCADA  Lab   NO   LAB  RATS   OR   CYBERATTACK   SQUIRRELS   ALLOWED  
  • 21. 8th  Security  Summit   Portland,  Oregon   9th  Security  Summit   Denver,  Colorado   Relay  &  SCADA  Lab  
  • 22. 8th  Security  Summit   Portland,  Oregon   9th  Security  Summit   Denver,  Colorado   Relay  &  SCADA  Lab   •  Cubicle:  2  racks  >>  Old  Break  Room:  7  racks   •  New  THQ:  15  bolted  racks,  10  rolling  racks   –  40+  ProtecDve  Relays  (7  different  standard  panels)   –  Digital  Fault  Recorder   –  8+  RTUs,  3  CommunicaDon  Processors   –  SubstaDon  Grade  LAN  &  Corp  Network   –  GPS  Clock  (IRIG-­‐B),  HMI  Screen  &  Keyboard   –  Toolbox,  O-­‐Scope,  MulDmeter,  Cables,  WorkstaDons,   Chip  Burner,  Relay  &  RTU  Test  Sets,  etc  
  • 23. 8th  Security  Summit   Portland,  Oregon   9th  Security  Summit   Denver,  Colorado   Relay  &  SCADA  Lab   •  THE  LAB  OF  MY  DREAMS!   •  We  can  replicate  almost  any  substaDon   •  Test  new  configuraDons   •  Test  problemaDc  field  configuraDons   •  Test  new  firmware  &  soTware   •  Test  drive  new  equipment   •  Train  relay  &  RTU  technicians  and  engineers  
  • 24. 8th  Security  Summit   Portland,  Oregon   9th  Security  Summit   Denver,  Colorado   CommunicaDons  &  Security  Lab  
  • 25. 8th  Security  Summit   Portland,  Oregon   9th  Security  Summit   Denver,  Colorado   CommunicaDons  &  Security  Lab   •  SubstaDon  Hardened  Router  &  Switch   •  Radios  of  different  bands  and  technologies   •  Six-­‐sided  PSP  for  simulaDng  CCA  sites   •  Several  field  firewalls   •  Wurldtech  Achilles  Fuzzer   –  Test  network  robustness  of  devices   –  Fuzzing  DNP3,  Modbus,  &  IEC  61850   –  Test  new  RTU  &  Relay  firmware  patches   –  Will  network  storm  affect  control  outputs?    
  • 26. 8th  Security  Summit   Portland,  Oregon   9th  Security  Summit   Denver,  Colorado   CommunicaDons  &  Security  Lab   •  Custom  DNP3  Fuzzer   – Created  by  Adam  Crain  to  test  openDNP3   – Closed  source  for  now   – Tests  DNP3  *Client*  and  Server   – Project  Robus   – hp://Automatak.com/robus   – Plan  to  release  as  open  source  next  year   …stay  tuned      
  • 27. 8th  Security  Summit   Portland,  Oregon   9th  Security  Summit   Denver,  Colorado   Power  Real-­‐Time  Simulator  Lab  
  • 28. 8th  Security  Summit   Portland,  Oregon   9th  Security  Summit   Denver,  Colorado   Power  Real-­‐Time  Simulator  Lab  
  • 29. 8th  Security  Summit   Portland,  Oregon   9th  Security  Summit   Denver,  Colorado   Power  Real-­‐Time  Simulator  Lab   “Hypersim  is  the  only  real-­‐Dme  digital  simulator   with  the  power  to  simulate  and  analyze  very   large-­‐scale  power  systems  with  more  than  2000   three-­‐phase  buses.”    -­‐  hp://www.opal-­‐rt.com   •  Simulate  different  fault  scenarios     – Will  the  Relay  A,  B,  C  have  a  misoperaDon?   – Will  relay  fault  acDvity  affect  comm    (vice  versa)?   •  R&D  &  commissioning  tests    
  • 30. 8th  Security  Summit   Portland,  Oregon   9th  Security  Summit   Denver,  Colorado   Mississippi  Grid  Lab  
  • 31. 8th  Security  Summit   Portland,  Oregon   9th  Security  Summit   Denver,  Colorado   Mississippi  Grid  Lab   •  MulDpurpose  type  lab  used  by  Entergy   Mississippi    T&D  Grid  Engineers   •  InspecDng/repairing  equipment   •  Pre-­‐test  new  panels  before  field  installaDon   •  Spare  parts  inventory    
  • 32. 8th  Security  Summit   Portland,  Oregon   9th  Security  Summit   Denver,  Colorado   High  Voltage  Lab  
  • 33. 8th  Security  Summit   Portland,  Oregon   9th  Security  Summit   Denver,  Colorado   High  Voltage  Lab   •  The  Hi-­‐VARC  (High  Voltage  AC  ResisDve   Current)  test  set  provides  rapid,  automaDc   evaluaDon  of  MOV  arresters  and  polymer   insulators  using  AC  voltages  up  to  132kV.”   hp://www.jmxservices.com   •  InspecDon  &  root  cause  of  failed  insulators,   HV  circuit  breaker  components,  etc    
  • 34. 8th  Security  Summit   Portland,  Oregon   9th  Security  Summit   Denver,  Colorado   Last  but  not  least…  
  • 35. 8th  Security  Summit   Portland,  Oregon   9th  Security  Summit   Denver,  Colorado   Go  make  stuff…Go  break  stuff  
  • 36. 8th  Security  Summit   Portland,  Oregon   9th  Security  Summit   Denver,  Colorado   A  Few  Thoughts   SCADA  Security  isn’t  easy   •  Doing  the  best  we  can  with  what  we  have   SCADA,  Relay,  &  Security  Labs   •  Having  a  lab  is  so  valuable  for  tesDng,   troubleshooDng,  breaking  &  fixing  stuff   •  Yes  I  have  a  fuzzer  and  I’m  not  afraid  to  use  it   DNP3/IP  Secure  AuthenDcaDon  v5   •  Please  tell  your  vendors  you  want  NEED  it    
  • 37. 8th  Security  Summit   Portland,  Oregon   9th  Security  Summit   Denver,  Colorado   Dream  BIG!  
  • 38. 8th  Security  Summit   Portland,  Oregon   9th  Security  Summit   Denver,  Colorado   Follow @chrissistrunk csistru@entergy.com   QuesDons?