North East Lincolnshire Council Complaint Alleges Criminal Misconduct

North East Lincolnshire Council
Municipal Offices,
Town Hall Square
Grimsby
North East Lincolnshire
DN311HU
Dear SirlMadam
Grimsby
26 November 2020
Re: Council tax Ref: 55~~..-J - Formal Complaint (Misconduct in Public Office)
Please fmd enclosed a copy of the letter dated 19 July 2013 sent by Eve-Richardson Smith and
copies of emails (and attachments) of 10 January, 13 February and 22 April 2014 referred to in
this letter.
I am writing to formally submit details of my complaint which I outlined to Mr Hollingsworth in
a telephone conversation with him on 30 October 2020. The complaint in fact alleges criminal
misconduct against the council's Deputy Monitoring Officer, Eve-Richardson Smith.
On consulting the council's current Corporate Feedback Policy (version V04) it is evident that
the complaint will require referring to the Monitoring Officer or an officer nominated by them
for consideration (re, Appendix B3) as the matter concerns a criminal offence and the covering
up of the wrongdoing leading to gross injustice. Consequently the 12 months time limit within
which a complaint would normally be expected to be submitted can not reasonably apply,
however, as a precautionary measure to reduce the risk of the council fmding an excuse to
invalidate the complaint on a technicality I propose the following as an explanation as to why it
is imperative that an investigation is undertaken:
The misconduct to which the complaint refers can reasonably be linked to the 7 February 2017,
the date Ms Richardson Smith the Deputy Monitoring Officer communicated via corporate
complaints that no further acknowledgement or response will be provided to any correspondence
of a similar nature regarding the same issues. Since then, and as a consequence of the criminal
negligence, I have been engaged continuously with either the police, various Ombudsmen and
other regulatory bodies but without justice as they have all been proven to be complicit in related
matters.
The passing of almost 4 years since when the criminal misconduct occurred and the fact that the
council has not shown any willingness to remedy it more than justifies waiving the usual time

constraints. The protracted period over which the council has allowed it to continue adds to the
injustice, not least because of its pursuit of a criminally engineered debt by instructing bailiffs
and threatening prison, but also because of the need to engage with the aforementioned institutes
in an attempt to hold the council liable for its actions.
There would be no credible justification for the council to refuse to investigate on the grounds
that the police and/or the Local Government Ombudsman have purportedly investigated and
found favourably for the council. This would principally be because the specific wrongdoing
raised here has never been investigated by either, but also they have been proven to be
conspirators in criminal cover ups in respect of the investigations they have purportedly carried
out. These allegations have been made to the respective organisations backed up with
indisputable evidence.
The fact that none of the institutions have been able to provide contrary evidence to contest the
claims and none of them have taken action against me for making unfounded accusations is a
good indication that the allegations are true and the evidence indisputable.
Neither would there be credible justification for the council to refuse to investigate on the
grounds of unreasonable persistence. No amount of persistence is unreasonable if it is in the
pursuit of an issue which has not been remedied when it plainly concerns the continuous and
routine covering up of criminal activity.
The Feedback Policy itself has to be lawful in respect of matters that can be considered and what
falls outside the Policy, plus it has to be lawfully applied. For example, the council exploited a
previous version (V03–2) to avoid dealing with a complaint that raised issues that could not
credibly have been defended and would have had no other option than to uphold it, had it been
investigated.
The Council exploited the policy to assert that the concerns raised about the Liability Order fell
outside the scope of the complaints process. The policy, which has since been updated, gave
examples of circumstances where it may have been more appropriate for a complaint to be dealt
with through a different process, rather than the Feedback Policy, one of which was 'a complaint
that is being dealt with or was previously dealt with by legal proceedings' (Appendix B:3). So
the council demonstrated bad faith in its handling of the complaint because the concerns raised
did not fall outside the scope of the complaints process, the policy merely suggested that there
might be a more appropriate process for the complaint to be dealt with.
In accordance with its own policy the most the council was entitled to assert was that there was
an alternative process for the complaint to be dealt with than through the Feedback Policy (it was
still required to be dealt with if not by one process then by another). Evidently it could have been
dealt with through the Fraud Response Plan (as it existed then) which required complaint

handlers to refer all allegations of irregularity that were included in a complaint to the Audit,
Risk, Insurance and Corporate Fraud team immediately on receipt. The council could not
credibly refute anything in the complaint submission so resorted to misapply its own complaints
policy.
Notwithstanding the failure to properly apply its policies, it would evidently not be appropriate
to have in version V03–2 of the Feedback Policy, as erroneously claimed, the provision to
exclude a complaint if it had previously been dealt with by legal proceedings. Regulation 36A of
the Council Tax (Administration and Enforcement) Regulations 1992 enables a billing authority
to apply to the court which granted a Council Tax Liability Order to have it quashed if it came to
light afterwards that the application should not have been made. It was therefore irrational that
the council relied on a misinterpretation of its policy to justify not considering the irrefutable
facts that it had erroneously obtained the court order.
Notwithstanding that the Ombudsman failed to properly apply the law or its own statutory
guidance, it was the council's own investigating officer who was under the duty to consider the
complaint/allegations so Part III of the Local Government Act 1974 was irrelevant. In any event
the statement made by the Ombudsman in the exploited decision (Ref: 150 16 673) was that 'the
Ombudsman may not consider matters which are subject to the commencement of court
proceedings, regardless of the outcome'. Clearly the matter had not been considered (the law had
been misapplied to cover-up criminal misconduct). The council's attempt therefore to rely on
para 12.3 of its feedback policy (current version) not to investigate on the grounds that the matter
had been appropriately dealt with by the Ombudsman is irrational (the regulatory body was
statutorily barred from investigating the matter, so the report claimed). The council's
manipulation of the Corporate Feedback Policy was done underhandedly as a malicious act
which has caused the continued injustice ever since.
In any event, the council is required to investigate a complaint in accordance with the law,
mindful of the fact that a failure to 'act and take decisions impartially, fairly and on merit, using
the best evidence and without discrimination or bias' amounts to misconduct and to exploit its
own policies and what the Ombudsman might be statutorily barred from investigating as a way
of getting round its duties and/or avoid accountability increases the severity of the misconduct.
There are misconduct issues related to the handling of the above complaint. Officers implicated
here are the Investigating Officer, Susan Harrison (Customer Management Service Manager) and
Sally Jack (Assistant Director – Joint Delivery). Ultimately, though, the responsibility lies with
the Chief Executive, Mr Walsh because he signed off the complaint knowing that it concerned
fraud but nevertheless turned a blind eye by not referring the matter to the appropriate team for
investigation.

Pursuit of the engineered debt was initiated a second time, some time after the Deputy
Monitoring Officer’s 7 February 2017 refusal to investigate the criminal allegations, but by a
different bailiff firm. The reason is not obvious from records though it coincided shortly after a
judge of the upper tribunal (information rights) had released a decision which the council may
have seen as a green light to resume enforcement. The 26 April 2018 tribunal decision refused
permission to appeal a ruling of vexatiousness in respect of requests to the council for
information relating to the perjury and sham investigation by the Audit, Risk, Insurance and
Corporate Fraud team (it would not be required to disclose it). It is a possibility that the
Information Commissioner and the Tribunal's complicity on top of that of the Ombudsman, court
and police would send a message reassuring the council that it was immune from being held to
account. A letter from the council leader Mr Oxby on 11 August 2016 responding to allegations
of misconduct in public office against the Chief Executive, Monitoring officer and others
complicit in the sham investigation indicate that the tribunal's decision was the trigger
emboldening the council to re-instruct bailiffs. He stated that Humberside Police would be
referred the matter and the Council would consider its position in the light of the police response
and any findings arising from the outstanding complaints lodged with the Information
Commissioner and would not comment further on the matter in the meantime. The purported
police investigation was a cover-up as one would expect in a scenario where senior officers of
the investigated council have at least a working relationship, and probably mix socially with
senior officers of the police force. All the 19 November 2016 outcome amounted to was a license
for the council to continue conducting its business criminally with peace of mind that the police
would be in full support.
At no time did the investigator (whom the police refused to identify) seek clarification of any of
the evidence despite the complaint alleging criminal misconduct exceeding 60 pages. Another
indication that the process was just a box ticking exercise enabling the council to justify
operating criminally was that none of the omitted supporting documents referred to in the
evidence were asked to be provided. This and the response just being a series of spurious
statements with nothing supporting them and that the evidence irrefutably proved the case
against the council, all hints to the relationship between the two public authorities being so
disturbingly corrupt that any prospect of holding the local authority criminally accountable is
rendered impossible.
The complaints with the Commissioner referred to by Mr Oxby, related to matters outstanding in
August 2016, but were nevertheless those that remained outstanding until the 26 April 2018
when the permission to appeal to the upper tribunal was formally refused. It is safe to say that the
council re-instructing bailiffs in May 2018 was in fact linked to the council having reassurance
that it would not be required to disclose any self incriminating information that I had attempted
to obtain via Freedom of Information requests (the go ahead had already been given by the
police in November 2016).

The council knowing it had has a duty to conduct its business legally and knowing that it had
committed perjury and someone was liable to imprisonment for criminal misconduct gambled
that it could get away with not being held accountable if the responsibility was put on the police
to make a decision. But to pull this off relied at least on the police being able to back up its
investigation findings and demonstrate that it pursued all relevant lines of enquiry. It also relied
on the Monitoring Officer’s duty, to ensure that the council administered decisions correctly and
within the law, no longer applied, and that the requirement for employees to comply with the
“principles of public life” could be excused.
Just like the outcome of the police's phoney investigation does not exonerate the council of any
wrongdoing neither does the Information Commissioner agreeing with the council that the
requests were vexatious. The Council took the decision not to support the audit and assurance
team's findings (it would not respond to further correspondence) which points to a cover up and
the conclusion of the purported investigation could not credibly have been justified.
The council could reasonably have expected this to provoke an attempt to obtain the information
via Freedom of Information, thus the added injustice was preventable if officers fulfilled their
obligation by complying with the Nolan Principles of Conduct. The council is not that naive not
to know that the police and justice system are infested with corruption and it is a function of
regulatory bodies such as the Information Commissioner and Ombudsman to cover-up official
wrongdoing. Taking this into account you can attribute a significant amount of additional
injustice because of the work it required over the protracted period of time to challenge the
council's refusal to explain why it concluded that no fraudulent activity had taken place.
A notice of enforcement sent 22 May 2018 marked the start of the second bailiff action. A letter
left 8 June 2018 containing sensitive personal data in a place accessible to others led to yet
further concerns about the council's enforcement. The letter which revealed the nature of the
bailiff’s visit through the envelope window and threatened the removal of goods was discovered
in the stairwell of the building that contains my own and a number of other resident’s flats two
days after the bailiff had left it. The unauthorised disclosure of personal data was not the full
extent of the concerns as the circumstances indicated that the bailiff had accessed the building
but made no attempt to contact me to arrange payment which would mean in that case the
£235.00 fee for the enforcement visit was fraudulently charged.
The first stage of the council’s complaint process revealed that the bailiff had been able to post
the letter through a slight gap in the doorframe which was claimed to have been captured on
video, though this was not independently verified. The council accepted this without even
making enquiries to assess whether passing a letter successfully through the locked door is a
possibility (I attempted and was unable to). The failure to verify the events from the best
available evidence was effectively a refusal to address aspects of the complaint which raised a
question of fraud (if the bailiff had gained access) or a more serious failure to safeguard against

the unauthorised access, loss or damage etc. to my personal data (if the letter had been left
outside and discovered by someone by chance).
In a subsequent stage of the process, Investigating officer Helen Isaacs (Director of Governance,
Democracy and Community Engagement), claimed to have reviewed the video evidence and
committed herself to corroborating what was said by the bailiff firm which was that:
“The video footage clearly shows that when [the bailiff] arrived at the property that he
was unable to gain access through the main door to the building and as such he posted a
letter in a sealed envelope through the slight gap in the doorframe.”
The best chance of establishing whether the events happened in the way that was claimed would
have been if the purported bailiff bodycam footage was provided to the Ombudsman and myself
to independently verify what was captured. However, the council would not release the video
and the criminally liable Ombudsman and Information Commissioner between them, in a
betrayal of public trust, ensured that the council would not be required to (a claim supported by
indisputable evidence).
The complaint also raised conduct issues in the way the initial stage was handled, i.e., it was a
cover up amounting to a breach of the Nolan Principles of Conduct Underpinning Public Life.
The lack of objectivity of the investigating officer and his willingness to accept the bailiffs
account of events highlighted the total disregard of the ethical standards expected of public
office holders that require them to ‘act and take decisions impartially, fairly and on merit, using
the best evidence and without discrimination or bias’. Evidence supporting my concerns was
dismissed on the basis that the investigating officer was unable to verify it whilst uncorroborated
evidence from the bailiff contractor was good enough to be relied on (it fitted the council’s
agenda).
The question of fraud had been raised so the complaint should have been referred to the
Monitoring Officer and dealt with in line with the Council's Policy for Raising a Concern
(Incorporating the Whistleblowing Policy). However, Joanne Hewson, the Deputy Chief
Executive authorising the decision considered that the findings of the investigation had been
correctly and fairly carried out in accordance with the Council’s Feedback Policy. Investigating
officer, Helen Isaacs, found that the previous investigating officer had correctly dealt with the
complaint having followed appropriate steps and having reached a balanced and reasonable
conclusion (the basis for not investigating the complainant challenging the objectivity of the
officer).
In further justifying her decision she stated that I was known to the Council, but falsely and
libellously added that I had made spurious and cavalier comments against professionals and
officers, both within the Council and other organisations. She said they made a veiled reference
to criminal activity and alleged professional misconduct, but the matter had been formally

considered by the Monitoring Officer who had determined that the allegations were unfounded
and would therefore be no further enquiry. In a final bid to prejudice potential adjudicators
against me and/or goad others to do what the council knew it had no leg to stand on to do itself
she emphasised that I had elected to include other organisations within the distribution of the
allegations (she entrusted them to consider as they deemed appropriate).
It can not credibly be stated that the matter has already been dealt with and there will therefore
be no more enquiry when what actually happened was unquestionably a cover-up. Criminal
allegations of misconduct in public office were made in response against the officers endorsing
the decision (they were all considered to be public office holders) largely due to the completely
untrue statement about the previous fraud and perjury allegations being unfounded.
The investigation referred to was unquestionably a sham. The then Monitoring Officer, Mr
Maione stated he would not respond to further emails, and Mr Hanmer, Head of Audit and
Assurance leading the Council’s Internal Audit team investigation similarly stated that he would
not correspond further on the issue when he was asked for details of the investigation.
Subsequently he confirmed that a detailed investigation was carried out and all relevant
correspondence etc. had been reviewed, but would not when asked provide any proof.
It is not unreasonable to state that the Council’s Internal Audit team had no intention of dealing
properly with the matter and were just going through the motions, because the evidence
supporting my claim did not only prove the case beyond reasonable doubt, but beyond all doubt
whatsoever. Both the Fraud Response Plan and Whistleblowing Policy stipulate a requirement
for the person raising the concern to be assured that the matter has been properly addressed. The
former, for example says the person should receive information about how the matter is being
dealt with and the latter that they should receive information about the outcome of the
investigation.
The only clue as to what the purported detailed investigation found was that the actions taken by
officers regarding my Council Tax account were based on a misunderstanding of the information
and correspondence made available to them at the time. It is safe to say that what was made
available to officers at the time was the content posted on the Legal Beagle's help forum
(everything relevant to the high court matters were recorded publicly). If he had supported his
findings of no fraudulent activity, the Head of Audit and Assurance would have commented that
the officers were entitled to assume that the 20 November 2013 letter, notifying the court of my
wish to withdraw the judicial review, referred to the case stated application challenging the costs
(an excusable misreading of the situation under the confusing circumstances where two high
court applications were involved). He omitted for obvious reasons to state this in support of his
findings because the information and correspondence made available to the officers at the time
made it categorically clear that the case stated application challenging the costs continued to be
pursued.

The council obtained the 20 November letter from the aforementioned internet help forum and
exhibited it to the Magistrates’ court as evidence that I had withdrawn the appeal challenging the
costs (it had no further reason to believe that they were still being disputed). It was this to which
the council attributed its decision to allocate payment to the disputed costs which were
suspended until the outcome of the proceedings thus entitling it to also enforce recovery of the
shortfall created in respect of the in-year Council Tax account that had arisen due to improper
payment allocation.
The Head of Audit and Assurance could not have credibly defended the officers on the basis that
the information available at the time was capable of giving them the impression that the costs
were no longer being disputed. It was evident from the 20 November letter alone that there were
two high court applications i.e., the one challenging the costs was a case stated and the other, to
which the letter withdrawing it related, was a judicial review claim for a mandatory order. It was
clear from the context of the letter that the Magistrates' court had not responded to queries about
the Justices refusing to state the case unless it was subject to terms of a recognizance. The
judicial review claim was instituted with the aim of obtaining a court order that would require
the justices to state the case without entering into a recognizance.
It was also clear from the 20 November letter that the judicial review claim for a mandatory
order succeeded in prompting the production of the draft case (hence why the judicial review
was withdrawn) but the justices had not stated the final case in accordance with the relevant
procedure rules. The time limit within which the court had to deliver the final signed case,
following representations being made upon the draft, had overrun by 2 months at that point. The
letter also revealed that the court's failure to respond left me speculating as to whether the
judicial review claim was effective in prompting the draft case only and not the final case until
recognizance had been agreed and it was this possibility I would subsequently explore to
progress the case stated application.
If the 20 November letter lacked sufficient detail to make officers aware that the case stated
appeal was still being pursued then the same could not be said of the comment posted on the
forum from which the council obtained the 25 November letter it also exhibited to the court. The
comment was posted on the website on 27 November 2013 (together with the 25 November
letter) saying more or less that the judicial review claim had only succeeded in obtaining a draft
(a partial success) implying that a recognizance would still likely need entering into before the
justices would deliver the final signed case. It later transpired to be a misreading of the situation
because a letter purportedly sent by the court dated 13 December 2013 said that the final case
was enclosed (I never received this but obtained a copy 3 January 2017 minus the final case). As
well as the 13 December letter acknowledging my representations on the draft sent 4 months
earlier on 19 August 2013 it also said that NE Lincs Council had sought an extension to the time
in which they may submit representations on the draft case as the Council stated they had not
received the draft case. Nevertheless, the 27 November comment posted on the website was

unambiguous and the officers could not credibly have assumed anything other than the case
stated continued to be pursued as the sentence ending it was the following:
“The next move then will be to arrange to appear before the Magistrates' Court to agree
terms of a recognizance.”
Only the quoted letter in the forum post was contained in the council’s exhibit to the
Magistrates’ court. The accompanying note which explained in a way that left no ambiguity as to
the fact that the case stated continued to be pursued, despite the judicial review being withdrawn,
was omitted.
The information posted on the website in the run up to the withdrawal of the judicial review
claim was sufficiently detailed so that officers who were monitoring the developments could not
have been under any misapprehension as to why the mandatory order was instituted. It was a
necessary step to obtain the case stated so that the application challenging the costs could
progress without the appeal being subject to terms of a recognizance agreement.
For example, it was explained in a post published on the website on 14 November 2013 that the
‘the claim for judicial review was made because the Justices would only state the case on
condition that recognizance was entered into, in the sum of £500 to prosecute the appeal without
delay and to submit to the judgment of the High Court’. The Justices' Clerk’s response to the
claim for mandatory order (quoted in the post) explained why the defendant court agreed to serve
the draft case upon the defendant within fourteen days of the acknowledgement of service, rather
than formally responding to the judicial review, i.e., to save the Court time and public money on
a matter that was likely to reach the Administrative Court via an appeal by way of case stated.
Quoted in the same post was the letter dated 12 November 2013 from the Administrative Court
Office asking to be advised whether I would be withdrawing the judicial review as the claim was
against the Magistrates’ court’s refusal to state a case without entering into a recognizance and
that outcome had been achieved. Though this was information available to the officers at the
time it was not exhibited to the Magistrates' court as evidence that I had withdrawn the appeal
challenging the costs. This would make sense from the council's perspective because it was
obvious that the case stated application challenging the costs was not the judicial review claim
which the Administrative Court Office recommended withdrawing. The letter expressed its view
that the judicial review claim appeared no longer necessary due to ‘the process of stating a case
now being underway’.
The information available to the council at the time was everything posted on the internet forum
up until the council’s witness statement was served on 16 October 2015. It was unambiguously
explained in a forum post on 6 December 2013 that only the judicial review claim requiring the
court to state the case had been withdrawn and the case stated was being pursued as originally
intended.

Evidence that the high court appeal was still being pursued continued to be regularly posted on
the website, for example on 10 January, 13 February, 6 March and 22 April 2014. In respect of
10 January, contents were posted on the forum of a letter to the Justices’ Clerk querying the
failure to deliver the final signed case stated. Contents of another letter to the Justices’ Clerk
posted on the forum 13 February queried whether a recognizance was required (and if necessary
to arrange one). On 6 March the contents were quoted of an email from the Justices' Clerk stating
that either that day or the following the position regarding the case (advising on the next steps)
would be set out and communicated in writing. It was also detailed in the same forum post that
the email was prompted by several attempts by phone on 3, 4 and 5 March to find out what was
happening with the case stated appeal. Contents of another letter to the Justices' Clerk posted on
the forum 22 April explained that the communication referred to in the 6 March email was not
received and subsequent calls to her office made 19 and 28 March failed to elicit a response. The
letter requested the production of a certificate of refusal to state a case to enable yet another
judicial review claim to be instituted for a mandatory order requiring the case to be stated under
section 111(6) Magistrates Court’s Act.
Clearly there are criminal matters detailed above that have not properly been dealt with and still
require addressing, however, the present complaint primarily focuses on the council’s refusal to
consider new evidence, which proves conclusively that the liability order was applied for in
error. Subsequent representations (24 February 2017) that were formally responded to by then
leader of the council, Mr Oxby contained evidence that the council's acting Monitoring Officer,
Eve-Richardson Smith refused to consider previously unseen documents which backed up
conclusively that the appeal was never withdrawn. His 10 March reply supported her decision
not to address the new information. He predictably relied on the unsupported findings of the
Audit Team and police investigations into fraud and perjury (no evidence of dishonesty) and
reinforced this with the reference to the Ombudsman as a regulatory body that ‘also found no
evidence of wrong-doing’. But that is hardly a revelation given that the Ombudsman refused to
investigate the complaint because he considered that the courts were better placed to deal with
the matter and that the only element of the complaint taken into account was the misallocated
payments (the complaint was ignored about the balance being suspended from enforcement to
which monies were misallocated).
His letter amounted to a formal record identifying all the public authorities and regulatory bodies
who were complicit in the covering up of criminal misconduct, but also functioned as a scare
tactic as he threatened the possibility of taking legal recourse against me if I chose to perpetuate
the issue.
The new evidence that was actually raised was not considered so relying on the issues being
purportedly ‘addressed so many times by many different agencies, all with the same result’, was
a smoke screen to refuse taking it into account. However, these allegations as discussed during
the earlier conversation focus specifically on the fact that (i), it was the acting Monitoring

Officer, Eve-Richardson Smith who sent a letter dated 19 July 2013 informing me that the costs
had been suspended until the outcome of the proceedings, (ii) the letter that the officers
purportedly believed was notification to withdraw the case stated application challenging the
costs was dated 20 November 2013, (iii) the emails I sent to the Justices' Clerk containing
evidence that the high court (case stated) appeal was still being pursued were copied to her on 10
January, 13 February and 22 Apri12014, and (iv) it was the acting Monitoring Officer who took
the decision on 26 January 2017 that the Council would not be undertaking any further
investigation into the matter and confirmed afterwards that no further acknowledgement or
response would be provided to correspondence in relation to it.
Mrs Richardson-Smith has knowing that the Council obtained a liability order from the
Magistrates' court based upon false evidence taken sole responsibility for preventing any remedy
thus allowing the injustice to continue which includes but is not limited to the council's pursuit of
enforcement by bailiffs and the threat of imprisonment.
If a public officer makes a decision which is so manifestly contrary to all the established facts
then that officer's actions are clearly irrational, though if it is knowingly made to the detriment
of a member of the public against whom the council is known to hold a grudge, then it is by
definition an abuse of position and amounts to criminal misconduct. Mrs Richardson-Smith's
deliberate actions clearly amounted to a betrayal of trust and violation of the laws which impose
a duty on an officer in her position to act impartially, fairly and without discrimination or bias.
Any justification for her actions would be misconceived if sought by the council as a result of the
alleged police investigations or those of any of the aforementioned regulatory bodies.
Yours sincerely
J. /)/1-"7' /l
--11':l1ff- -.1;;--..- _
Enclosure

of 1
From: " " < @btopenworld.com>
To: <Alison.Watts@hmcts.gsi.gov.uk>
Cc: <eve.richardson-smith@nelincs.gov.uk>; "Crocken, Karen" <karen.crocken@hmcts.gsi.gov.uk>;
"Raven, Mike (Gov Connect)" <Mike.Raven@Nelincs.gcsx.gov.uk>
Sent: 10 January 2014 16:09
Attach: Doncaster CrimPR 64.3(6) 10 January 2014.pdf
Subject: Re: Representations on Draft Case - CrimPR 64.3 (6)
Dear Mrs Watts
Please find attached letter in regards the application to state a case.
Yours sincerely
.
07/09/2016

Justices' Clerk for Humber & South
Yorkshire
Doncaster Magistrates Court
PO Box 49
The Law Courts
College Road
Doncaster DN1 3HT
10 January 2014
Grimsby
Dear Mrs Watts
Re: North East Lincolnshire Council V
Grimsby and Cleethorpes Magistrates' Court - 2 November
2012 Application to State a Case
I refer to the draft case received 30 July 2013 and the 21 day time limit from receipt of the draft
case to submit any written representations upon its content.
May I bring it to your attention that on 19 August 2013, representations were served together with
letter advising the Court it had (from the latest day on which representations may be made) 21
days to state and sign the case in accordance with rule 78 of the Magistrates' Courts Rules 1981.
Accordingly, the final signed case was expected on or before 10 September 2013 (overrun by 4
months). I would therefore like to know why the justices have decided against complying with the
relevant rules.
Yours sincerely
.

of 1
Sent: 13 February 2014 17:18
Attach: Recognizance 13 February 2014.pdf
Subject: Case Stated - Recognizance (re, North East Lincolnshire Council)
Dear Mrs Watts
Please find attached letter in regards arranging recognizance.
Yours sincerely
.
07/09/2016

Yorkshire
PO Box 49
The Law Courts
College Road
Doncaster DN1 3HT
13 February 2014
Grimsby
Dear Mrs Watts
Further to there being no response to my letter of 10.1.14, I am left not knowing why the justices
did not state the case in accordance with rule 78 of the Magistrates' Courts Rules 1981.
It must be assumed that the court only gave an undertaking to serve the draft case, re
acknowledgement of service (Judicial Review 8.7.13) and not intended delivering the case stated
until recognizance had been agreed.
As a consequence of the judicial review claim, I understand that despite a sum (£500) being
stated in your letter (24.1.13), the appropriateness and/or the amount may be considered on
agreeing recognizance. It would appear that if this appeal is to be progressed it will be conditional
on entering into recognizance. I therefore ask that arrangements are made for this to take place
and await your response.
Yours sincerely
.

of 1
Sent: 22 April 2014 14:48
Attach: Cert - refusal to state case 22 April 2014.pdf
Subject: Re: Certificate of Refusal to state a case - s.111(5) MCA 1980 (re, North East Lincolnshire
Council)
Dear Mrs Watts
Please find attached letter for your attention requiring the production of a Certificate of refusal to state a case
under section 111(5) of the Magistrates Court's Act 1980.
Yours sincerely
.
07/09/2016

Yorkshire
PO Box 49
The Law Courts
College Road
Doncaster DN1 3HT
Grimsby
22 April 2014
Dear Mrs Watts
Thank you for your email of 6 March 2014 in which you stated:
“I will have written communication with you either later today or first thing tomorrow
setting out the position with your case and advising you on next steps”.
I did not receive the aforementioned communication, neither have subsequent calls to your office
made 19 and 28 March prompted a response. The net result being that the case, for which the
Magistrates owe a legal duty to state for the opinion of the High Court, has not been stated.
As no contact has been made regarding my 13 February 2014 letter to agree recognizance and
every attempt to proceed with the appeal has drawn a blank, it appears the court is refusing to
state the case.
Pursuant to section 111(5) of the MCA 1980, a magistrate can refuse to state a case, but must
consider the application 'frivolous'. The meaning of the term was considered by the Civil Division of
the Court of Appeal in (R v Mildenhall Magistrates' Court, ex p Forest District Council). The then
Lord Chief Justice in considering the meaning of 'frivolous' was of the view that in the context, the
Court should consider the application to be futile, misconceived, hopeless or academic. He went on
to say that such a conclusion was not one to which the justices can properly come simply because
they consider their decision to be right or immune from challenge.
Presuming the application is not considered 'frivolous' (a draft has been produced) there is no
obvious reason why the court has not stated the case as legally required. However, as the court
may only refuse on these grounds then I require a certificate stating that the application has been
refused (section 111(5) MCA 1980) setting out the reasons why, so I may under section 111(6)
seek a second mandatory order from the Administrative Court requiring the case to be stated.
Yours sincerely
.

North East Lincolnshire Council Complaint Alleges Criminal Misconduct

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North East Lincolnshire Council Complaint Alleges Criminal Misconduct