Officer Manning: Armies of the Past

Officer Manning: Armies of the past
• Successful traits:
– Armies with lower ratio (1:33) of officer to enlisted had faster decision cycle
– Policies built around unit manning
– Command and instructor positions most prized, lasting from 3-5 years in key
positions
• Unsuccessful traits:
– Armies with higher ratio (1:13 to 1:6) of officer to enlisted had slower
decision cycle at all levels
– Policies were individual centric leading to lower unit success
– Officers were rotated swiftly through many positions on average a new
position every 10.1 months
Insights into personnel systems (cultures) of other armies in history—
objective: develop decisive leaders of character for uncertain and complex problems

Officer Management: Armies of the Past
• Successful traits:
– Officers attended extensive military schooling early in career
• Most schooling comes at entry level through 4th
year
• Courses were intellectually demanding (German staff college so tough that falling
out was not seen as failure)
• Culture encouraged self-teaching, self-policing and professional discourse
– Accessions into officer ranks tough (up to 80% failure rate)
– Promotions and selections
• Based on two measures, seniority and combat performance
– “Perform or out” versus “up or out” promotion system
• Decentralized at lower levels with local boards; senior selections centralized
• Unsuccessful traits:
– Officers viewed as generalists where rank meant assumed level of knowledge
– Careers adhered to templates and patterns with little flexibility based on competence
– Individual replacement rather than group replacement hindered cohesion
– Individual career management assumed Social Darwinism, equal opportunity &
progressive assumption of survival of fittest
– Careerism outcome based individual’s psychological “investment” in their own career
coupled with promotion for pay economic reward system
– Incentive structure focused on individual failed to ensure superior group performance

US Army Officer Trends
Officer to Enlisted Ratios
Context: Technology breakthrough, Communication, Area of Operations, Doctrinal Focus,
Operational Environment, Spectrum of Conflict, Army Purpose, Officer Development
Civil War World War I World War II Vietnam/Cold War Today
Strength
Ratio to
Enlisted Strength
Ratio to
Enlisted Strength
Ratio to
Enlisted Strength
Ratio to
Enlisted Strength
Ratio to
Enlisted
Total Army 2,100,000 4,050,000 8,800,000 1,330,000 1,140,000
Officers 137,254 1: 14.3 250,000 1: 15.2 758,620 1: 10.6 172,727 1: 6.7 180,094 1: 5.3
Field Grade 41,176 1: 47.7 32,926 1: 115.4 42,307 1: 190.1 73,888 1: 15.7 78,082 1: 12.3
General 564 1: 3480 1,006 1: 3777.3 1,260 1: 6382 542 1: 2135.2 632 1: 1518.8
Infantry /
Armor
Force
1,606 1: 14.2 6,243 1: 35.3 3,966 1: 20.9 3,510 1: 15.7
IN: 3488 1: 12.1
HV: 3779 1: 11.3
ST: 4224 1: 11.4

Roman Army French Army Finnish Army German Army Israeli Army
(52 AD) (1806) (1939) (1940) (1967)
Strength
Ratio to
Enlisted Strength
Ratio to
Enlisted Strength
Ratio to
Enlisted Strength
Ratio to
Enlisted Strength
Ratio to
Enlisted
Total Army 300,000 350,000 346,000 4,555,000 264,000
Officers 3,817 1: 77.6 4,215 1: 82 10,380 1: 32.3 133,970 1: 33 15,000 1: 16.6
Field Grade 1,980 1: 149.6 1,867 1: 185.2 2,147 1: 156.3 16,098 1: 274.6 2,358 1: 105.6
General
34 1: 8711.3
423 1: 817.5 56 1: 5993.2 4,561 1: 969.3 36 1: 6916.7
56 1: 5289
Infantry /
Armor
Force
5,000 1: 73.6 2,400 1: 41.9 3,100 1: 82.8 3,300 1: 79.5 2,800 1: 46.5
(Legion) (Brigade) (Regiment) (Reg't/Bde) (Brigade)
In Foreign Successful Armies

In Unsuccessful Armies
Prussian Army French Army Italian Army British Army
(1806) (1940) (1940) (1940)
Strength
Ratio to
Enlisted Strength
Ratio to
Enlisted Strength
Ratio to
Enlisted Strength
Ratio to
Enlisted
Total Army 182,995 3,333,000 1,630,000 1,615,000
Officers 23,789 1: 6.7 666,600 1: 4 293,400 1: 4.6 177,650 1: 8.1
Field Grade 8,794 1: 18.1 23,498 1: 113.5 67,009 1: 19.9 46,000 1: 31.2
General 528 1: 301.5 1,843 1: 1446.8 1,101 1: 1214 748 1: 1921.6
Infantry /
Armor
Force
2,800
1: 18
3,800
1: 14.4
4,100
1: 19
2,500
1: 25
(Brigade) (Regiment) (Regiment) (Brigade)

Criteria Civil War World War I World War II Cold War / Vietnam Today
Technology
Breakthrough
Railroad
Rifled Weapons
Machine Gun
Long Range Arty
Airplane as a weapon
Armor
Nuclear Wpn
Helicopter
Tactical Nuclear Wpn
Precision Wpns
Communications
Telegraph
Signal Flags
Courier
Telegraph
Land Line Telephone
Signal Flags / Courier
Wireless (Radio)
Telegraph
Land Line
Early Satellite
Burst Transmission
Wireless (Radio)
Digital Commo
Adv Satellite
Multi Media
Area of Operations
(Reg/BDE Frontage)
300 m 3500 m 4-6 KM 5-9 KM
Area Of Opn
Defined by
Situation
Doctrinal Focus
Sequential
employment of
Arty, IN, CAV
Sequential
employment of
Fires & Maneuver
Combined Arms
Coordinated with
Other Services
& Nations
Combined Arms
Simultaneous Opn
With Other Services
& Nations
Joint Operations
Interagency &
Multinational
Operations
Operational
Environment
Linear Battlefield
Sequential Opns
Expeditionary
Linear Battlefield
Trench Warfare
Opn Stalemate
Global War
Multiple Theaters
Opn Maneuver
Simultaneous Opns
Global Responsibility
Small conflicts
Within Nuclear parity
Non-linear/Simultaneous
Persistent Conflict
Decline nation-state
Rise non-state actors
War among people
Spectrum of
Conflict
Force-on-Force
Mid-Intensity
Force-on-Force
Mid-Intensity
Force-on-Force
Mid & High
Intensity
Conventional/
Unconventional
Low-Mid-High
Intensity
General Purpose &
Special Forces
Hybrid Threats
Full spectrum Opn
Army Purpose
Mobilize
Fight
Demobilize
Mobilize
Fight
Demobilize
Mobilize
Fight
Demobilize
Large Standing
Army Forward Deployed
to Deter Conflict
Expeditionary
Operating Force
Generating Force
Officer
Development
Branch Branch Combined Arms
Combined Arms
Joint
Joint, Interagency
Specialized Functional
Expertise
Context

Officer to Enlisted Ratios
ERA Civil War World War I World War II Vietnam/Cold War Today
Total Army 2,100,000 4,050,000 8,800,000 1,330,000 1,140,000
Officers 1: 14.3 1: 15.2 1: 10.6 1: 6.7 1: 5.3
Field Grade 1: 47.7 1: 115.4 1: 190.1 1: 15.7 1: 12.3
General 1: 3480 1: 3777.3 1: 6382 1: 2135.2 1: 1518.8
Infantry /
Armor
Force
1: 14.2 1: 35.3 1: 20.9 1: 15.7
1: 12.1
1: 11.3
1: 11.4

Criteria Civil War World War I World War II Cold War / Vietnam Today
Technology
Breakthrough
Communications
Area of Operations
(Reg/BDE Frontage)
Leader Doctrinal
Focus
Top Down, centralized
and hierarchal control
C2 system
Top Down, centralized
and hierarchal control
C2 system
Top Down, centralized and
hierarchal control C2
system, later mission cmd
by exception
Top Down, centralized and
hierarchal control C2 system; 1982-
86 FM 100-5 encouraged more
mission cmd, but culture did not
support
Joint Operations
Interagency &
Multinational
Operations, emphasis toward
mission command, but still retains
top-down hierarchal system
Operational
Environment/
opponent
Linear Battlefield
Sequential Opns;
CSA used same
doctrine
Linear Battlefield;
Germans moved from
operational to tactical
maneuver warfare with
strusstruppen tactics
Linear Battlefield; Germans
projected maneuver
warfare in time, space and
depth with mission cmd
and technology
Linear warfare against Soviet
threat, but emerging non-state
opponents using non-linear warfare
US demonstrated ability to conduct
maneuver warfare in OEF and OIF
in initial phase; Rise non-state
actors war among people
Spectrum of
Conflict
Army Purpose
Officer
Development
United States Military
Academy, private
Military Colleges in
initial phase-focused
on linear warfare
Academy, private
Military Colleges in
initial phase,
OCS/college degree,
staff college. Learning
was inward focused on
process
Academy, private military
colleges, ROTC, but
largely OCS w/college
degree; staff college
Learning was inward
focused on process
United States Military Academy,
ROTC and OCS initially, templated
school system Lieutenant through
colonel. Learning was inward
focused on process and driven by
top down POI
United States Military Academy,
ROTC and OCS initially, templated
school system Lieutenant through
colonel. Learning moving from
process to classical education
system focused on cognitive
development
US Army Leader Development
Context

Sources for officer/enlisted numbers/ratios
• Center of Military History Research page,
http://www.history.army.mil/index.html
• US Army Human Resources Command, Department of Defense
Military Personnel as of 31 March 2010
• Department of the Army, The Personnel System In The United
States Army, 1954 (covers Civil War through World War II)
• Kreidberg and Henry, History of the Mobilization in the United States
Army, 1775-1945, 1955
• Vandergriff, Donald, Path to Victory: America’s Army and the
Revolution in Human Affairs, 2002
• Access through Army G1, LTC Daniel Shimpton, 5 May 2010
• Dr. Blair Hayworth, US Army Center of Military History
• Dr. Bruce Gudmundsson, Historian USMC TECOM
• LTC Symon Tanner, British Army liaison to ARCIC Forward, 6 May
2010

Use an empirical approach to understand
how the U.S. Army’s personnel system
(culture) evolved over time by comparing
to other armies in snapshots of history
Provide brief insights into personnel
systems (cultures) of other armies in
history. Key trend throughout is how to
develop decisive leaders of character

Summary of traits
• Successful armies started officer candidate earlier in age, with most
beginning in the ranks or as an officer candidate 2-4 years
• After 1871, American and Europeans tried to copy the German
system, but many succeeded in copying them organizationally, but
none succeeded at copying them culturally, but their systems lacked
the requisite mutual trust needed to empower subordinates
• France fought well in WWI, adjusted to conditions of trench warfare,
but did not learn how to adapt to changed conditions in the next war
(precursor: decentralized German storm tactics first used in 1916-
1918)
• Excessive politicization undermined mutual trust
– Atmosphere of mistrust and a Cartesian intellectual tradition (emanating from
DeCartes) inspired a centralized officer culture that tried to reduce conflict to a
series of predictable formulaic relations
– Italy had courageous individual qualities smothered by rigid culture leads to
failures without reforms
– Britain excellent at basic soldiering skills with outstanding small unit leadership
by NCOs but officer corps remained wedded to methodical frontal battles of

Successful Armies
• The Roman Army of 216 BC to 52 AD
• The French Army of 1798-1807
• The Finnish Army of 1926-1940
• The German Army of 1809-1942’
• The Israeli Army of 1948-1973
Common Features: All these armies faced the threat of a crushing defeat at the hands of well armed
numerically superior opponents, and
Officer corps open to wide population, but had high entrance standards with strenuous measurement tools,
which resulted in small percentage of officers to enlisted (entire force from 3-7%); and built personnel system
around unit manning

• The Prussian Army (1806)
• The French Army (1870, 1914, 1940)
• The Italian Army (1914-1942)
• The British Army (Crimea 1856, S. Africa
1898, WWII 1939-1942)
Unsuccessful Armies
Common Features: Confined their officer corps to an aristocratic or privileged class-limited talent with
entrance and promotion standards based on birth than competence; maintained larger than necessary officer
corps anywhere from 15-20 percent; dogmatic, non-adaptive doctrine when faced with obvious need to
change

Roman Army 216 BC-52 AD
• Battle of Cannae in 216 BC forced major reforms. Leadership dominated
Roman thought
– Publius Cornelius Scipio (Africanus after 202 BC) reformed officer corps with
meritorious promotions
– Garius Marius made tactical and structural changes to the legion
• The entire army revolved around the legion
– It recruited, trained and promoted its own officers based on merit (similar to
regimental system)
– Length of service was 20 years—leaders within the Legion came from the ranks
– Legions were the basic building blocks of armies and were the regional
specialists for operations other than war
• Tactical doctrine demanded that subordinates exhibit initiative
• Legion evolved a culture of unit cohesion and professionalism that gave the
Romans an unbeatable Army for almost four centuries until:
– Failed to adapt to the fighting methods of Germanic Tribes
– Citizens serving diminished, and use of mercenaries and immigrants with no vested interest
to Rome
– Involvement of acquisition of its own supplies corrupted the officer corps (particularly at the
furthest, most isolated corners of the empire)

Roman Military History
• Craven, Brian, The Punic Wars, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1980
• Crawford, Michael, “Early Rome and Italy, in The Oxford History of the Classical
World, Oxford University Press, 1988
• Ferrell, Arther, The Fall of Roman Empire: The Military Explanation, Thames and
Hudson, 1986
• Gibbon, Edward, The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, Random House, Inc.,
1909-1914
• Grant, Michael, History of Rome, Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1978
• Pareti, Luigi and Brezzi, Paolo and Petech, Luciano, History of Mankind, Cultural and
Scientific Development Vol 2: The Ancient World, Harper and Row Publishers, 1965.
Provides a detailed description of Marius reforms and campaigns
• Scullard, H.H., Scipio Africanus: Soldier and Politician, Thames and Hudson, 1970
• Van Creveld, Martin, Command in War, Harvard University Press, January 1, 1987

The French Army 1798-1807
• Nation in Arms concept of mobilizing entire nation’s resources
– Allowed the French to choose from a large number of candidates into the officer corps
– Moral and physical energy of citizen-soldiers and new leaders generated by the revolution
and magnified by successes against allied armies
– Leaders promoted by merit (e.g., Davout)
• Napoleon’s doctrine of the “corps-de-armee” demanded initiative by division
and corps commanders operating over wide fronts
• General to Emperor
– Napoleon increasingly used top-down control to fight centralized battles (similar to modern
concept of synchronization)
– As Emperor, he did not encourage subordinates to operate autonomously (away from his
oversight, e.g., Wagram in 1809, Central Germany campaign of 1813, Waterloo 1815)
• Result: The cultural freedoms unleashed by the French Revolution and
Napoleon’s background and genius induced him to,
– As general, promote talent based on battlefield performance (“marshal’s baton in every
knapsack”)
– As Emperor, substitute central control & stereotyped tactics based on massed firepower for
talent at all levels below corps (Wagram and beyond)

French Napoleonic History
• Bertaud, J ."Napoleon's Officers", Past and Present, 112 (1986)
• Butler, A.R.(trans). The Memoirs of Baron De Marbot: Late Lieutenant in the French Army,
Longmans, Green & Co, London, 1897
• Chandler, D. The Campaigns of Napoleon, Macmillian Publishing, London, 1965
• Chandler, D. On the Napoleonic Wars, Stackpole Books, London, 1994
• Connelly, O. Blundering to Glory: Napoleons Military Campaigns, Scholarly Resources Inc,
Delaware, 1984
• Ellis, G. The Napoleonic Empire, Macmillian Press, London, 1991
• Elting, J.R. Swords Around a Throne: Napoleon's Grande Armee, Macmillian, London, 1988
• Epstein, R.M. "Patterns of Change and Continuity in Nineteenth-Century Warfare.", Journal of
Military History, 56, (July 1992)
• Haythornthwaite, P.J. The Naploeonic Source Book, Arms and Armour, London, 1990
• Lyons, M. Napoleon Bonaparte And the Legacy of the French Revolution, MacMillan Press,
London, 1994.
• Lynn, J "Towards and Army of Honour: The Moral Evolution of the French Army, 1789-1815",
French Historical Studies, 16, (Spring 1989)
• Marbot, M.D. Memoirs du General Baron de Marbot, III,Paris, Plon, 1892
• Marshall-Cornwall, J. Napoleon As a Military Commander, Clowes and Son Ltd, London, 1965
• Morris, W. Napoleon: Warrior and Ruler, Putnam's, London, 1896
• Petre, F. Loraine. Napoleon at Bay, Greenhill Books, London, 1994 (first published 1914)
• Rothenberg, G. The Art of Warfare in the Age of Napoleon, University of Indiana Press, 1978
• Weigley, R.F. The Age of Battles, Pimlico, London, 1991.

The Finnish Army, 1926-1940
• Origin of doctrine and personnel management systems—German Army
• Destroyed the numerically superior invading Soviet Army in 1939
– Small unit leaders employed maneuver warfare doctrine within larger framework of
commander’s intent, schwerpunkt and mission orders
– The officer corps made up 3% of the force
• Commanders & NCOs held leadership and command positions for long
periods of time 3 to 5 years, in some cases even longer
• Promotions and selections were decentralized to regimental level
– Based on rigorous testing and performance in training exercises
• Extraordinary training of the enlisted ranks, NCOs and officers
– In one battle an NCO leading a 100 man detachment defeated a Soviet battalion
• Strong regimental system (Army composed mainly of “National Guard”)
– Swiss model (units from same town, district)
– Mobilization plan required reserves to be well trained as small regular army
• Results:
– Finns achieved the highest exchange ratio in WWII—10:1 against the Soviets
– Standards of Finnish officer and NCO accession process were even higher than the German
system

Finnish Military History
• Condon, Richard, The Winter War: Russia Against Finland (History of 2nd World
War),
• Edwards, Robert, The Winter War: Russia's Invasion of Finland, 1939-1940 , Peguin
Books, 1992
• Engle, Eloise and Paananen, Lauri, The Winter War: The Soviet Attack on Finland
1939-1940, Stackpole Books (January 1992)
• Trotter, William, Frozen Hell: The Russo-Finnish War of 1939-1940, Algonquin Books
, January 2000
• Interviews with Dr. Bruce Gudmundsson, Historian, USMC TECOM

German/Prussian Army (1809-1942)
• Gerhard Scharnhorst (leading Prussian reformer after 1806) believed
Leadership:
– Accession to officer corps should be determined by merit not social class (not completely
achieved)
– Standards for obtaining a commission should be strenuous (achieved-25% made it)
– Officer selections and promotions were decentralized to the regiment and regimental
commander (achieved)
• Office candidate first served in the regiment as an “ensign”
• Candidate required to pass demanding three day examination
• Candidate’s character had to be approved by a board of regimental officers
• Rigorous but fair standards ensured that officers could focus on their
profession
– Percentage of officers to force was 3-5%
• 3-track officer system: General staff, regimental (line) and technical
• Education and personnel system focused inward on character development
and the art of war at the tactical and operational levels, but not at the
strategic level of war
• Result:
– Institutionalized excellence at the tactical and operational levels of war, great for wars
confined to Europe (victories Danish War of 1864, Austria in 1866 and France 1870)
– Weak strategically and disastrous at the grand strategic level of national conflict as
evidenced by WWI and WWII (“made enemies faster than they could kill them”)

German Military History
• Barry, Quintin, The Franco-Prussian War 1870-71: Volume 1: the Campaign of
Sedan: Helmuth Von Moltke and the Overthrow of the Second Empire, Helion &
Company, 2007
• Corum, Robert, The Roots of Blitzkrieg: Hans von Seeckt and German Military
Reform, University of Kansas Press, 1992
• Horne, Alistor, The Fall of Paris: The Siege and the Commune, 1870-71. Penguin
Books, 1981
• Howard, Michael Eliot, The Franco-Prussian War: The German Invasion of France,
1870-1871, Routledge, 2001
• Millman, Richard, British Foreign Policy and the Coming of the Franco-Prussian War.
Clarendon Press. 1965
• Ollivier, Emile, Translated by George Burnham Ives. The Franco-Prussian War and
Its Hidden Causes, Little, Brown, and Company, 1912
• Stone, David, Fighting for the Fatherland: The Story of the German Soldier from
1648 to the Present Day, Conway. 2006
• Stone, David, First Reich: Inside the German Army During the War with France,
1870-71, Brassey‘s, 2002
• Wawro, Geoffrey, The Franco-Prussian War: The German Conquest of France in
1870-1871, Cambridge University Press, 2003
• Werstein, Irving, The Franco-Prussian War: Germany's Rise as a World Power, J.
Messner. 1965
• Wetzel, David, A Duel of Giants: Bismarck, Napoleon III, and the Origins of the

The Israeli Army of 1948-1973
• High initiative, decentralized officer culture evolved out of commando operations of
1948
– Up through 1967, most senior tank officers served as commandos in 1948 or earlier
– Commando heritage evolved naturally into an effective maneuver warfare doctrine copied from the German
army between 1948 and 1956, reached fruition in 1967 and was sufficiently intact to recover in 1973
• Officer accession (up through 1973) focused on battlefield leadership
– All officers began in enlisted ranks—top soldiers became NCOs and top NCOs became officers
• NCO Squad leaders course considered one of the toughest in the world
– Officers emerged from a unit cohesion system that kept crew and squads together from beginning of
service
– Rigorous selection process limited officer corps to 7-8 percent of the force
• Officer assignments prioritized by success and initiative exhibited in combat
operations
– Priorities by initiative: highest to fighter pilots, then paratroopers, then tankers, then so on down to
supporting branches
– Twenty-year career norm, officers served in few assigned positions
– Most served in combat arms then moved over to supporting arms
• Promotions through Lt. COL & selection for command delegated to the brigade
commander
• Results:
– Up to 1967, IDF achieved quick mobilization and quick victories with low casualties
– Lost initiative during opening days of 1973 War, but recovered and quickly isolated Arab adversaries
– Changed officer accession system approach to provide larger pool of officers in reaction to high officer
casualties in 1973—witnessed marked downturn in performance in the 1982 Lebanon invasion and

• Author interviews with Martin van Creveld, October 1997
• Author interviews with Dr. Ben Uzi, Israeli Army March 2010
• Boyd, John, Patterns of Conflict. 1986. accessed 5 February 2005
• Rothenburg , Erich Gunther, The anatomy of the Israeli army: The Israel Defence
Force, 1948-78, Praeger, 1997
• Schiff, Zeev, History of the Israeli Army, Sidgwick & Jackson Ltd, March 5, 1987
• Van Creveld, Martin, Command in War, Harvard University Press, January 1, 1987
• Van Creveld, Martin, The Sword and the Olive: A Critical History of the Israeli
Defense Force, Public Affairs; 1st edition July 2, 2002
Israeli Military History

Prussian Army of 1806
• Need to change: faced with doctrinal changes unleashed by the French
Revolution & Napoleon’s operational level brilliance, the Prussians
formalized Frederick the Great’s centralized concepts of operations and
tactics without his brilliance
• Debate was discouraged, even frowned upon
– An enormous social gap between officers and enlisted men
– The dry rot revealed itself at Jena-Auestadt (Oct 1806) when the Prussian Army collapsed
and fled
• Officer accessions, promotions and development:
– Drawn largely from Prussian nobility
– Selection & promotions based on connections, not performance
– Professional education did not exist
• Symbols glorifying bravery and elan preferred over professionalism
• Result: German reformers realized that an Army’s performance depended
on
– Having a professional system of education and development to analyze lessons from
military history
– A culture that encourages debate and intellectual ferment that is needed to evolve these
lessons into new ideas (and technologies) needed to fight the next war
– A system of selection of promotion of officers that stresses ability and performance rather

The French Army 1870-1914, 1919-1940
• The Revolution democratized the French officer corps which continued throughout
the 19th
and 20th
Centuries
– But the trust and mutual respect that united the German officers never evolved in the French officer corps
due to a system that promoted the individual at the cost of the whole
– The failure of 1870 was an obsession with colonial warfare that made those at the top successful prior to
1870, and unable to cope with the new German method of war
• Fatal weaknesses of the French officer corps of 1940 can be seen in many events or
attitudes prior to WWII
– Lack of mutual respect, careerism and corruption (e.g., Dreyfus Affair before WWI)
– Alienation of the careerist military from the regime of the 1930s
– Lack of solidarity with subordinates, particularly enlisted men (1920s and 1930s)
– Suppression of internal debate (DeGualle)
– Officer bloat (20% of total force) caused many officers to serve as NCOs
– Inability to deal with unexpected situations (Metz and Sedan in 1870, Battle of Frontiers 1914 and the
German breakthrough 1940)
– Centralized control and authoritarianism crushed the initiative of subordinates and blocked cooperation
between branches of army
• Cartesian Outlook shaped education and thinking by attempting to impose order,
method and routine on the chaos of war
• Result:
– A culture that discourages discussion, debate and intellectual ferment risks turning inward by imposing the
unquestioned assumption on the lessons of history and new technologies to reinforce old ideas
• Example, the French obsession with the doctrine of methodical battle after WWI (RMA)
• Example, Maginot line (Star Wars)

French Military History
• Numerous interviews with Dr. Bruce Gudmundsson on French Military culture. Dr.
Gudmundsson founded and ran the USMC School of Advance Warfare (SAW) course
of majors in the early 1990s, and is currently a historian for the USMC TECOM
• Cook, Don, Charles De Gaulle: A Biography, G.P. Putman’s Sons, 1983
• De Gaulle, Charles, The Army of the Future, Hutchinson, 1940.
• Doughty, Robert, “From the Offense a’ Outrance to the Methodical Battle,” in
Maneuver Warfare an Anthology, Richard Hooker, editor, Presidio Press, 1993. Also,
Vandergriff interviews with Dr. Robert Doughty September and November 1997
• Doughty, Robert, Seeds of Disaster: The Development of French Army Doctrine
1919-1939, Archon Book, 1985
• Horne, Alistair, The Price of Glory: Verdun 1916, Penguin Books, 1962
• Lottman, Herbert, Petain, Hero or Traitor: The Untold Story, William Morrow &
Company, Inc. 1985
• Shirer, William, The Collapse of the Third Republic: An Inquiry into the Fall of France
in 1940, Simon & Schuster, 1969

Italian Army 1914-1942
• Possessed the same doctrine as the Germans (copied their manuals
verbatim), but failed to create an officer corps that could execute it
• Up through WWII, officers were selected from the aristocratic class, and the
separation between them and the enlisted ranks was considerable
– officers were not united by a tradition on professional matters
– Measures of performance, such as examinations, did not determine promotions, which were
made by a centralized selection board in Rome, usually with considerable political or family
influence
– An excess of either “cleverness” (intelligence) or zeal was bad form
• Combat experience came from beating primitive tribal adversaries in
colonial wars, where there was no pressure to develop military art of
combined arms warfare
• Result:
– The culture of the Italian Army in 1939 was incapable of executing Maneuver Warfare
– They professed Speed and Initiative in their doctrine, but they practiced centralized control
• Why? Hierarchal, stand-offish relationships paralyzed commanders and subordinates by introducing
complex layers of bureaucratic procedures
• Why? Formal requirements of protocol impeded frank communications
– Careerism increased risk averse behavior which curtailed freedom of action

• Cloutier, Patrick, The Italian Royal Army In Mussolini’s Wars, 1935-1945, republished
1987 to 2010, available as download from www.lulu.com
• Gooch, John, Mussolini and his Generals: The Armed Forces and Facist Foreign
Policy, 1922-1945, Cambridge Military Press, 2007
• Nicolle, David, The Italian Invasion of Abyssinia 1935-36, Osprey Publishing, October
1997
• Sweet, John, The Mechanization of Mussolini’s Army, 1920-1940, Stackpole Military
History, December 30, 2006
• Trye, Rex, Mussolini’s Africa Korps: The Italian Army in North Africa, 1940-1943, Axis
Europa Books 1999
• Walker, Ian, Iron Hulls Iron Hearts: Mussolini’s Elite Armored Divisions in North
Africa, The Crowood Press , July 15, 2006
Italian Military History

British Army 1856, 1898, 1939-42
• Regime was not interested in its Army officer corps during 19th
Century
– Did not need a professional army to protect its elites from social revolution, like colonial
powers
– Based its foreign policy on a maritime strategy & the colonial threats to its empire
• While they maintained one of the finest regimental systems from the time of
Cromwell’s army in the 1600s, its officer system
– Recruited and selected officers from the aristocratic class up until WWII, but when offices
were needed for WWI and WWII, they expanded the officer corps too quickly
– Regimental systems decentralized promotions to the lower levels (good), but selection was
influenced more by aristocratic background and wealth than by competence
– De-emphasized education in the art of war, because the Army was viewed as a gentleman’s
profession (club)
• Fixation on colonial threats coupled by gentlemanly amateurism created
conditions fostering a rigid doctrine with close (centralized) control
• Authoritarian mentality of aristocratic tradition impeded learning by making it
difficult to admit mistakes
– Reports by junior officers were discarded after the Boer War and WWI
• Results Regimental system built solid unit cohesion and a strong NCO
corps that never broke in combat, but could not evolve with war or adapt
during war
– Balaklava (1856), small unit NCOs withstood encirclement by superior numbers of Russian
– Rork’s Drift (1898), encircled company beat off 3,000 combat veterans, highly disciplined and motivated Zulus
– N. Africa (1941-1942), maintained cohesion and avoided collapse despite repeated tactical and operational errors when facing

British Army History
• Based on numerous discussions of British Army history with LTC Symon Tanner,
British Army liaison to ARCIC Forward
• Chandler and Beckett, The Oxford History of the British Army, Oxford Military Press,
2003
• Clayton, Anthony, The British Officer: Leading the Army from 1660 to Present,
Longman, 2007
• Griffith, Paddy, Battle Tactics of the Western Front: The British Army’s Art of Attack
1916-1918, Yale University Press, 1996
• Hastings, Max, The British Army: A Definitive History of the 20th
Century, Imperial War
Museum, 2008
• Miller, Stephen, Volunteers in the Veld: Britain’s Citizen Soldiers and the South
African War 1899-1902, Campaigns and Commanders, 2007
• Strachen, Hew, Big Wars and Small Wars: The British Army and the Lessons of the
20th
Century, Routledge, 2006
• Strawson, John, Beggars in Red: The British Army 1789-1889, Pen & Sword, 2003

Mobilization doctrine
• Need for massive mobilization shapes today’s personnel
management policies
– up or out promotion system in order to keep officers fit and
young
• Need a place to keep everyone in order to move them up
– Numbers of officers kept top heavy to provide pool to lead new
formations in time of mobilization
– Large and many headquarters to oversee process and
adherence to doctrine, and provides place to put people
(institutionalized over time)
• Legacy of General George Marshall’s view of the world
– Remains organized to fight a linear war on the attritional model
for WWII
– Despite attempts at it, remains focused on individual vice unit
replacement

Up or Out Promotion System
• Navy personnel act of 1916 first introduced up or out promotion system, but failed
because Navy had small officer corps (it requires a large, top heavy system to work)
• Officer Personnel Act of 1947 (based on testimonies by Eisenhower, Marshall and
Bradley),
– Significantly increased the size of the officer corps at the middle and senior grades for mobilization
– Embraced the up or out promotion system to develop “generalists” while keeping the officer corps “vigorous
and youthful”
– Established the “all or nothing” 20 year retirement system
• 1970 War College Study of Professionalism stated that the “up or out” promotion
system,
– “contributed significantly to much of the undesirable and unethical conduct of its officers”
– “seniors sacrificed integrity on the alter of personal success”
– “junior officers perceived a preoccupation with insignificant statistics”
• Debate began in 1974 over up or out that led to the Defense Officer Personnel
Management Act (DOPMA) of 1980, Senator Sam Nunn argued against it,
– “The up or out promotion system forced too-many experienced officers out”
– “The number of officers at middle and upper levels were too high”
– But, the Services wanted up or out
• The theory behind up or out,
– If the system works properly, there will always be more officers qualified for promotion than there are
vacancies available
– Permits selectivity, the selection of the “best qualified”
– By forcing officers up they would receive exposure to numerous jobs that could apply to a meaningful way in
senior leadership positions

References
• Author’s Note: I found it necessary to revisit the research I did for Path to Victory: America’s Army and the Revolution in Human Affairs
due to many factors that influence the evolution of the Army’s personnel system influence Army ROTC. I added to the research I was in
the progress of making for Raising the Bar (2006) and Manning the Legions (2008). I also found that I had to update my knowledge of
Army doctrine (new FMs written during General Shinseki’s tenure at Chief of Staff (1999-2003) or as a result of his Transformation efforts,
laid new foundation and guidance for Army ROTC. General Schoolmaker assumed the duties of Army Chief of Staff in July 2003 and has
driven even more leadership-centric guidance, some documents such as “Adapt or Die” provided excellent direction for where the officer
accession programs—ROTC, USMA and OCS—should go to develop an “adaptive leader.” Recently, I was involved in the ARCIC
(TRADOC) Human Dimension study, as well as the 2010 writing and publication of the Army Capstone Concept. My research and
sources involved 10 areas and continue to evolve to this day:
• The history of the evolution of the U.S. Army and Army ROTC
• A study of the U.S. Army officer’s corps study of warfare and its influence
• A study of the evolution of the U.S. society and its influence on Army ROTC
• The theories of leadership
• An analysis of education and training approaches to teach cognitive skills
• The history of political correctness
• Reviews of psychology, sociology, anthropology,
• The evolution of the influence of management science on leadership and academic development in the United States
• A review of my research I had done for Learning From Others: The Officer Development Approaches of Armies through History. In this
book, which I never finished, I had examined the cultures of the armies Ancient Rome, Britain, France, Germany, Israel, and Italy
throughout periods of time to give insights to the officer development practices of other nations. For this, I am greatly indebted to Dr Bruce
I Gudmundsson, Dr. John Sayan and William S. Lind for their patience and time in teaching and checking my attempts at the French and
German languages. Bruce also directed me to many European military history web sites.
• A study and understanding of the evolutions of war, particularly into the Fourth Generation of Warfare. I am indebted to Colonel T.X.
Hammes USMC, Mr., William S. Lind, Dr. Chet Richards, Franklin C. Spinney, Greg Wilcox LTC U.S. Army retired, and Colonel G. I.
Wilson USMC
• I am indebted to Dr. Jonathan Shay for teaching me how to understand the value of trust in military organizations and being a “missionary”
in the effort to reform the military personnel system.
• I am also indebted to my former boss, Lieutenant Allen Gill for our great conversations on leadership, how to develop it, how to create it in
our type of academic environment, talks on strategy, how the Army works, and just great stories about people. LTC Gill has allowed
Georgetown ROTC to evolve into a “Learning Organization.”

References
Listed below are a compilation of all the sources, including web
sites. I am indebted to the staffs of The Archives of the United
States: The Library of Congress; The Eisenhower Library U.S. Army
Command & General Staff College, The Lauinger Memorial Library,
Georgetown University; The U.S. Army War College, not only for
their assistance, but for the maintenance of some great sources
through web sites that saved so much time.
At this time I am also completing a roll up of the hundreds of notes
that I have taken since June 1998, as well as compiling informal
surveys I recently conducted.

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