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Officer Manning: Armies of the Past

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Donald E. Vandergriff (Major, US Army, retired) looks at the best armies of the past. From these, he makes a powerful case that larger ratios of officers to enlisted ranks makes an army more effective.

Published in: Leadership & Management
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Officer Manning: Armies of the Past

  1. 1. Officer Manning: Armies of the past • Successful traits: – Armies with lower ratio (1:33) of officer to enlisted had faster decision cycle – Policies built around unit manning – Command and instructor positions most prized, lasting from 3-5 years in key positions • Unsuccessful traits: – Armies with higher ratio (1:13 to 1:6) of officer to enlisted had slower decision cycle at all levels – Policies were individual centric leading to lower unit success – Officers were rotated swiftly through many positions on average a new position every 10.1 months Insights into personnel systems (cultures) of other armies in history— objective: develop decisive leaders of character for uncertain and complex problems
  2. 2. Officer Management: Armies of the Past • Successful traits: – Officers attended extensive military schooling early in career • Most schooling comes at entry level through 4th year • Courses were intellectually demanding (German staff college so tough that falling out was not seen as failure) • Culture encouraged self-teaching, self-policing and professional discourse – Accessions into officer ranks tough (up to 80% failure rate) – Promotions and selections • Based on two measures, seniority and combat performance – “Perform or out” versus “up or out” promotion system • Decentralized at lower levels with local boards; senior selections centralized • Unsuccessful traits: – Officers viewed as generalists where rank meant assumed level of knowledge – Careers adhered to templates and patterns with little flexibility based on competence – Individual replacement rather than group replacement hindered cohesion – Individual career management assumed Social Darwinism, equal opportunity & progressive assumption of survival of fittest – Careerism outcome based individual’s psychological “investment” in their own career coupled with promotion for pay economic reward system – Incentive structure focused on individual failed to ensure superior group performance
  3. 3. US Army Officer Trends Officer to Enlisted Ratios Context: Technology breakthrough, Communication, Area of Operations, Doctrinal Focus, Operational Environment, Spectrum of Conflict, Army Purpose, Officer Development Civil War World War I World War II Vietnam/Cold War Today Strength Ratio to Enlisted Strength Ratio to Enlisted Strength Ratio to Enlisted Strength Ratio to Enlisted Strength Ratio to Enlisted Total Army 2,100,000 4,050,000 8,800,000 1,330,000 1,140,000 Officers 137,254 1: 14.3 250,000 1: 15.2 758,620 1: 10.6 172,727 1: 6.7 180,094 1: 5.3 Field Grade 41,176 1: 47.7 32,926 1: 115.4 42,307 1: 190.1 73,888 1: 15.7 78,082 1: 12.3 General 564 1: 3480 1,006 1: 3777.3 1,260 1: 6382 542 1: 2135.2 632 1: 1518.8 Infantry / Armor Force 1,606 1: 14.2 6,243 1: 35.3 3,966 1: 20.9 3,510 1: 15.7 IN: 3488 1: 12.1 HV: 3779 1: 11.3 ST: 4224 1: 11.4
  4. 4. Roman Army French Army Finnish Army German Army Israeli Army (52 AD) (1806) (1939) (1940) (1967) Strength Ratio to Enlisted Strength Ratio to Enlisted Strength Ratio to Enlisted Strength Ratio to Enlisted Strength Ratio to Enlisted Total Army 300,000 350,000 346,000 4,555,000 264,000 Officers 3,817 1: 77.6 4,215 1: 82 10,380 1: 32.3 133,970 1: 33 15,000 1: 16.6 Field Grade 1,980 1: 149.6 1,867 1: 185.2 2,147 1: 156.3 16,098 1: 274.6 2,358 1: 105.6 General 34 1: 8711.3 423 1: 817.5 56 1: 5993.2 4,561 1: 969.3 36 1: 6916.7 56 1: 5289 Infantry / Armor Force 5,000 1: 73.6 2,400 1: 41.9 3,100 1: 82.8 3,300 1: 79.5 2,800 1: 46.5 (Legion) (Brigade) (Regiment) (Reg't/Bde) (Brigade) US Army Officer Trends In Foreign Successful Armies
  5. 5. US Army Officer Trends In Unsuccessful Armies Prussian Army French Army Italian Army British Army (1806) (1940) (1940) (1940) Strength Ratio to Enlisted Strength Ratio to Enlisted Strength Ratio to Enlisted Strength Ratio to Enlisted Total Army 182,995 3,333,000 1,630,000 1,615,000 Officers 23,789 1: 6.7 666,600 1: 4 293,400 1: 4.6 177,650 1: 8.1 Field Grade 8,794 1: 18.1 23,498 1: 113.5 67,009 1: 19.9 46,000 1: 31.2 General 528 1: 301.5 1,843 1: 1446.8 1,101 1: 1214 748 1: 1921.6 Infantry / Armor Force 2,800 1: 18 3,800 1: 14.4 4,100 1: 19 2,500 1: 25 (Brigade) (Regiment) (Regiment) (Brigade)
  6. 6. Criteria Civil War World War I World War II Cold War / Vietnam Today Technology Breakthrough Railroad Rifled Weapons Machine Gun Long Range Arty Airplane as a weapon Armor Nuclear Wpn Helicopter Tactical Nuclear Wpn Precision Wpns Communications Telegraph Signal Flags Courier Telegraph Land Line Telephone Signal Flags / Courier Wireless (Radio) Telegraph Land Line Early Satellite Burst Transmission Wireless (Radio) Digital Commo Adv Satellite Multi Media Area of Operations (Reg/BDE Frontage) 300 m 3500 m 4-6 KM 5-9 KM Area Of Opn Defined by Situation Doctrinal Focus Sequential employment of Arty, IN, CAV Sequential employment of Fires & Maneuver Combined Arms Coordinated with Other Services & Nations Combined Arms Simultaneous Opn With Other Services & Nations Joint Operations Interagency & Multinational Operations Operational Environment Linear Battlefield Sequential Opns Expeditionary Linear Battlefield Trench Warfare Opn Stalemate Global War Multiple Theaters Opn Maneuver Simultaneous Opns Global Responsibility Small conflicts Within Nuclear parity Non-linear/Simultaneous Persistent Conflict Decline nation-state Rise non-state actors War among people Spectrum of Conflict Force-on-Force Mid-Intensity Force-on-Force Mid-Intensity Force-on-Force Mid & High Intensity Conventional/ Unconventional Low-Mid-High Intensity General Purpose & Special Forces Hybrid Threats Full spectrum Opn Army Purpose Mobilize Fight Demobilize Mobilize Fight Demobilize Mobilize Fight Demobilize Large Standing Army Forward Deployed to Deter Conflict Expeditionary Operating Force Generating Force Officer Development Branch Branch Combined Arms Combined Arms Joint Joint, Interagency Specialized Functional Expertise US Army Officer Trends Context
  7. 7. Officer to Enlisted Ratios ERA Civil War World War I World War II Vietnam/Cold War Today Total Army 2,100,000 4,050,000 8,800,000 1,330,000 1,140,000 Officers 1: 14.3 1: 15.2 1: 10.6 1: 6.7 1: 5.3 Field Grade 1: 47.7 1: 115.4 1: 190.1 1: 15.7 1: 12.3 General 1: 3480 1: 3777.3 1: 6382 1: 2135.2 1: 1518.8 Infantry / Armor Force 1: 14.2 1: 35.3 1: 20.9 1: 15.7 1: 12.1 1: 11.3 1: 11.4
  8. 8. Criteria Civil War World War I World War II Cold War / Vietnam Today Technology Breakthrough Communications Area of Operations (Reg/BDE Frontage) Leader Doctrinal Focus Top Down, centralized and hierarchal control C2 system Top Down, centralized and hierarchal control C2 system Top Down, centralized and hierarchal control C2 system, later mission cmd by exception Top Down, centralized and hierarchal control C2 system; 1982- 86 FM 100-5 encouraged more mission cmd, but culture did not support Joint Operations Interagency & Multinational Operations, emphasis toward mission command, but still retains top-down hierarchal system Operational Environment/ opponent Linear Battlefield Sequential Opns; CSA used same doctrine Linear Battlefield; Germans moved from operational to tactical maneuver warfare with strusstruppen tactics Linear Battlefield; Germans projected maneuver warfare in time, space and depth with mission cmd and technology Linear warfare against Soviet threat, but emerging non-state opponents using non-linear warfare US demonstrated ability to conduct maneuver warfare in OEF and OIF in initial phase; Rise non-state actors war among people Spectrum of Conflict Army Purpose Officer Development United States Military Academy, private Military Colleges in initial phase-focused on linear warfare United States Military Academy, private Military Colleges in initial phase, OCS/college degree, staff college. Learning was inward focused on process United States Military Academy, private military colleges, ROTC, but largely OCS w/college degree; staff college Learning was inward focused on process United States Military Academy, ROTC and OCS initially, templated school system Lieutenant through colonel. Learning was inward focused on process and driven by top down POI United States Military Academy, ROTC and OCS initially, templated school system Lieutenant through colonel. Learning moving from process to classical education system focused on cognitive development US Army Leader Development Context
  9. 9. Sources for officer/enlisted numbers/ratios • Center of Military History Research page, http://www.history.army.mil/index.html • US Army Human Resources Command, Department of Defense Military Personnel as of 31 March 2010 • Department of the Army, The Personnel System In The United States Army, 1954 (covers Civil War through World War II) • Kreidberg and Henry, History of the Mobilization in the United States Army, 1775-1945, 1955 • Vandergriff, Donald, Path to Victory: America’s Army and the Revolution in Human Affairs, 2002 • Access through Army G1, LTC Daniel Shimpton, 5 May 2010 • Dr. Blair Hayworth, US Army Center of Military History • Dr. Bruce Gudmundsson, Historian USMC TECOM • LTC Symon Tanner, British Army liaison to ARCIC Forward, 6 May 2010
  10. 10. Back ups
  11. 11. Use an empirical approach to understand how the U.S. Army’s personnel system (culture) evolved over time by comparing to other armies in snapshots of history Provide brief insights into personnel systems (cultures) of other armies in history. Key trend throughout is how to develop decisive leaders of character
  12. 12. Summary of traits • Successful armies started officer candidate earlier in age, with most beginning in the ranks or as an officer candidate 2-4 years • After 1871, American and Europeans tried to copy the German system, but many succeeded in copying them organizationally, but none succeeded at copying them culturally, but their systems lacked the requisite mutual trust needed to empower subordinates • France fought well in WWI, adjusted to conditions of trench warfare, but did not learn how to adapt to changed conditions in the next war (precursor: decentralized German storm tactics first used in 1916- 1918) • Excessive politicization undermined mutual trust – Atmosphere of mistrust and a Cartesian intellectual tradition (emanating from DeCartes) inspired a centralized officer culture that tried to reduce conflict to a series of predictable formulaic relations – Italy had courageous individual qualities smothered by rigid culture leads to failures without reforms – Britain excellent at basic soldiering skills with outstanding small unit leadership by NCOs but officer corps remained wedded to methodical frontal battles of
  13. 13. Successful Armies • The Roman Army of 216 BC to 52 AD • The French Army of 1798-1807 • The Finnish Army of 1926-1940 • The German Army of 1809-1942’ • The Israeli Army of 1948-1973 Common Features: All these armies faced the threat of a crushing defeat at the hands of well armed numerically superior opponents, and Officer corps open to wide population, but had high entrance standards with strenuous measurement tools, which resulted in small percentage of officers to enlisted (entire force from 3-7%); and built personnel system around unit manning
  14. 14. • The Prussian Army (1806) • The French Army (1870, 1914, 1940) • The Italian Army (1914-1942) • The British Army (Crimea 1856, S. Africa 1898, WWII 1939-1942) Unsuccessful Armies Common Features: Confined their officer corps to an aristocratic or privileged class-limited talent with entrance and promotion standards based on birth than competence; maintained larger than necessary officer corps anywhere from 15-20 percent; dogmatic, non-adaptive doctrine when faced with obvious need to change
  15. 15. Successful Armies
  16. 16. Roman Army 216 BC-52 AD • Battle of Cannae in 216 BC forced major reforms. Leadership dominated Roman thought – Publius Cornelius Scipio (Africanus after 202 BC) reformed officer corps with meritorious promotions – Garius Marius made tactical and structural changes to the legion • The entire army revolved around the legion – It recruited, trained and promoted its own officers based on merit (similar to regimental system) – Length of service was 20 years—leaders within the Legion came from the ranks – Legions were the basic building blocks of armies and were the regional specialists for operations other than war • Tactical doctrine demanded that subordinates exhibit initiative • Legion evolved a culture of unit cohesion and professionalism that gave the Romans an unbeatable Army for almost four centuries until: – Failed to adapt to the fighting methods of Germanic Tribes – Citizens serving diminished, and use of mercenaries and immigrants with no vested interest to Rome – Involvement of acquisition of its own supplies corrupted the officer corps (particularly at the furthest, most isolated corners of the empire)
  17. 17. Roman Military History • Craven, Brian, The Punic Wars, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1980 • Crawford, Michael, “Early Rome and Italy, in The Oxford History of the Classical World, Oxford University Press, 1988 • Ferrell, Arther, The Fall of Roman Empire: The Military Explanation, Thames and Hudson, 1986 • Gibbon, Edward, The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, Random House, Inc., 1909-1914 • Grant, Michael, History of Rome, Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1978 • Pareti, Luigi and Brezzi, Paolo and Petech, Luciano, History of Mankind, Cultural and Scientific Development Vol 2: The Ancient World, Harper and Row Publishers, 1965. Provides a detailed description of Marius reforms and campaigns • Scullard, H.H., Scipio Africanus: Soldier and Politician, Thames and Hudson, 1970 • Van Creveld, Martin, Command in War, Harvard University Press, January 1, 1987
  18. 18. The French Army 1798-1807 • Nation in Arms concept of mobilizing entire nation’s resources – Allowed the French to choose from a large number of candidates into the officer corps – Moral and physical energy of citizen-soldiers and new leaders generated by the revolution and magnified by successes against allied armies – Leaders promoted by merit (e.g., Davout) • Napoleon’s doctrine of the “corps-de-armee” demanded initiative by division and corps commanders operating over wide fronts • General to Emperor – Napoleon increasingly used top-down control to fight centralized battles (similar to modern concept of synchronization) – As Emperor, he did not encourage subordinates to operate autonomously (away from his oversight, e.g., Wagram in 1809, Central Germany campaign of 1813, Waterloo 1815) • Result: The cultural freedoms unleashed by the French Revolution and Napoleon’s background and genius induced him to, – As general, promote talent based on battlefield performance (“marshal’s baton in every knapsack”) – As Emperor, substitute central control & stereotyped tactics based on massed firepower for talent at all levels below corps (Wagram and beyond)
  19. 19. French Napoleonic History • Bertaud, J ."Napoleon's Officers", Past and Present, 112 (1986) • Butler, A.R.(trans). The Memoirs of Baron De Marbot: Late Lieutenant in the French Army, Longmans, Green & Co, London, 1897 • Chandler, D. The Campaigns of Napoleon, Macmillian Publishing, London, 1965 • Chandler, D. On the Napoleonic Wars, Stackpole Books, London, 1994 • Connelly, O. Blundering to Glory: Napoleons Military Campaigns, Scholarly Resources Inc, Delaware, 1984 • Ellis, G. The Napoleonic Empire, Macmillian Press, London, 1991 • Elting, J.R. Swords Around a Throne: Napoleon's Grande Armee, Macmillian, London, 1988 • Epstein, R.M. "Patterns of Change and Continuity in Nineteenth-Century Warfare.", Journal of Military History, 56, (July 1992) • Haythornthwaite, P.J. The Naploeonic Source Book, Arms and Armour, London, 1990 • Lyons, M. Napoleon Bonaparte And the Legacy of the French Revolution, MacMillan Press, London, 1994. • Lynn, J "Towards and Army of Honour: The Moral Evolution of the French Army, 1789-1815", French Historical Studies, 16, (Spring 1989) • Marbot, M.D. Memoirs du General Baron de Marbot, III,Paris, Plon, 1892 • Marshall-Cornwall, J. Napoleon As a Military Commander, Clowes and Son Ltd, London, 1965 • Morris, W. Napoleon: Warrior and Ruler, Putnam's, London, 1896 • Petre, F. Loraine. Napoleon at Bay, Greenhill Books, London, 1994 (first published 1914) • Rothenberg, G. The Art of Warfare in the Age of Napoleon, University of Indiana Press, 1978 • Weigley, R.F. The Age of Battles, Pimlico, London, 1991.
  20. 20. The Finnish Army, 1926-1940 • Origin of doctrine and personnel management systems—German Army • Destroyed the numerically superior invading Soviet Army in 1939 – Small unit leaders employed maneuver warfare doctrine within larger framework of commander’s intent, schwerpunkt and mission orders – The officer corps made up 3% of the force • Commanders & NCOs held leadership and command positions for long periods of time 3 to 5 years, in some cases even longer • Promotions and selections were decentralized to regimental level – Based on rigorous testing and performance in training exercises • Extraordinary training of the enlisted ranks, NCOs and officers – In one battle an NCO leading a 100 man detachment defeated a Soviet battalion • Strong regimental system (Army composed mainly of “National Guard”) – Swiss model (units from same town, district) – Mobilization plan required reserves to be well trained as small regular army • Results: – Finns achieved the highest exchange ratio in WWII—10:1 against the Soviets – Standards of Finnish officer and NCO accession process were even higher than the German system
  21. 21. Finnish Military History • Condon, Richard, The Winter War: Russia Against Finland (History of 2nd World War), • Edwards, Robert, The Winter War: Russia's Invasion of Finland, 1939-1940 , Peguin Books, 1992 • Engle, Eloise and Paananen, Lauri, The Winter War: The Soviet Attack on Finland 1939-1940, Stackpole Books (January 1992) • Trotter, William, Frozen Hell: The Russo-Finnish War of 1939-1940, Algonquin Books , January 2000 • Interviews with Dr. Bruce Gudmundsson, Historian, USMC TECOM
  22. 22. German/Prussian Army (1809-1942) • Gerhard Scharnhorst (leading Prussian reformer after 1806) believed Leadership: – Accession to officer corps should be determined by merit not social class (not completely achieved) – Standards for obtaining a commission should be strenuous (achieved-25% made it) – Officer selections and promotions were decentralized to the regiment and regimental commander (achieved) • Office candidate first served in the regiment as an “ensign” • Candidate required to pass demanding three day examination • Candidate’s character had to be approved by a board of regimental officers • Rigorous but fair standards ensured that officers could focus on their profession – Percentage of officers to force was 3-5% • 3-track officer system: General staff, regimental (line) and technical • Education and personnel system focused inward on character development and the art of war at the tactical and operational levels, but not at the strategic level of war • Result: – Institutionalized excellence at the tactical and operational levels of war, great for wars confined to Europe (victories Danish War of 1864, Austria in 1866 and France 1870) – Weak strategically and disastrous at the grand strategic level of national conflict as evidenced by WWI and WWII (“made enemies faster than they could kill them”)
  23. 23. German Military History • Barry, Quintin, The Franco-Prussian War 1870-71: Volume 1: the Campaign of Sedan: Helmuth Von Moltke and the Overthrow of the Second Empire, Helion & Company, 2007 • Corum, Robert, The Roots of Blitzkrieg: Hans von Seeckt and German Military Reform, University of Kansas Press, 1992 • Horne, Alistor, The Fall of Paris: The Siege and the Commune, 1870-71. Penguin Books, 1981 • Howard, Michael Eliot, The Franco-Prussian War: The German Invasion of France, 1870-1871, Routledge, 2001 • Millman, Richard, British Foreign Policy and the Coming of the Franco-Prussian War. Clarendon Press. 1965 • Ollivier, Emile, Translated by George Burnham Ives. The Franco-Prussian War and Its Hidden Causes, Little, Brown, and Company, 1912 • Stone, David, Fighting for the Fatherland: The Story of the German Soldier from 1648 to the Present Day, Conway. 2006 • Stone, David, First Reich: Inside the German Army During the War with France, 1870-71, Brassey‘s, 2002 • Wawro, Geoffrey, The Franco-Prussian War: The German Conquest of France in 1870-1871, Cambridge University Press, 2003 • Werstein, Irving, The Franco-Prussian War: Germany's Rise as a World Power, J. Messner. 1965 • Wetzel, David, A Duel of Giants: Bismarck, Napoleon III, and the Origins of the
  24. 24. The Israeli Army of 1948-1973 • High initiative, decentralized officer culture evolved out of commando operations of 1948 – Up through 1967, most senior tank officers served as commandos in 1948 or earlier – Commando heritage evolved naturally into an effective maneuver warfare doctrine copied from the German army between 1948 and 1956, reached fruition in 1967 and was sufficiently intact to recover in 1973 • Officer accession (up through 1973) focused on battlefield leadership – All officers began in enlisted ranks—top soldiers became NCOs and top NCOs became officers • NCO Squad leaders course considered one of the toughest in the world – Officers emerged from a unit cohesion system that kept crew and squads together from beginning of service – Rigorous selection process limited officer corps to 7-8 percent of the force • Officer assignments prioritized by success and initiative exhibited in combat operations – Priorities by initiative: highest to fighter pilots, then paratroopers, then tankers, then so on down to supporting branches – Twenty-year career norm, officers served in few assigned positions – Most served in combat arms then moved over to supporting arms • Promotions through Lt. COL & selection for command delegated to the brigade commander • Results: – Up to 1967, IDF achieved quick mobilization and quick victories with low casualties – Lost initiative during opening days of 1973 War, but recovered and quickly isolated Arab adversaries – Changed officer accession system approach to provide larger pool of officers in reaction to high officer casualties in 1973—witnessed marked downturn in performance in the 1982 Lebanon invasion and
  25. 25. • Author interviews with Martin van Creveld, October 1997 • Author interviews with Dr. Ben Uzi, Israeli Army March 2010 • Boyd, John, Patterns of Conflict. 1986. accessed 5 February 2005 • Rothenburg , Erich Gunther, The anatomy of the Israeli army: The Israel Defence Force, 1948-78, Praeger, 1997 • Schiff, Zeev, History of the Israeli Army, Sidgwick & Jackson Ltd, March 5, 1987 • Van Creveld, Martin, Command in War, Harvard University Press, January 1, 1987 • Van Creveld, Martin, The Sword and the Olive: A Critical History of the Israeli Defense Force, Public Affairs; 1st edition July 2, 2002 Israeli Military History
  26. 26. Unsuccessful Armies
  27. 27. Prussian Army of 1806 • Need to change: faced with doctrinal changes unleashed by the French Revolution & Napoleon’s operational level brilliance, the Prussians formalized Frederick the Great’s centralized concepts of operations and tactics without his brilliance • Debate was discouraged, even frowned upon – An enormous social gap between officers and enlisted men – The dry rot revealed itself at Jena-Auestadt (Oct 1806) when the Prussian Army collapsed and fled • Officer accessions, promotions and development: – Drawn largely from Prussian nobility – Selection & promotions based on connections, not performance – Professional education did not exist • Symbols glorifying bravery and elan preferred over professionalism • Result: German reformers realized that an Army’s performance depended on – Having a professional system of education and development to analyze lessons from military history – A culture that encourages debate and intellectual ferment that is needed to evolve these lessons into new ideas (and technologies) needed to fight the next war – A system of selection of promotion of officers that stresses ability and performance rather
  28. 28. The French Army 1870-1914, 1919-1940 • The Revolution democratized the French officer corps which continued throughout the 19th and 20th Centuries – But the trust and mutual respect that united the German officers never evolved in the French officer corps due to a system that promoted the individual at the cost of the whole – The failure of 1870 was an obsession with colonial warfare that made those at the top successful prior to 1870, and unable to cope with the new German method of war • Fatal weaknesses of the French officer corps of 1940 can be seen in many events or attitudes prior to WWII – Lack of mutual respect, careerism and corruption (e.g., Dreyfus Affair before WWI) – Alienation of the careerist military from the regime of the 1930s – Lack of solidarity with subordinates, particularly enlisted men (1920s and 1930s) – Suppression of internal debate (DeGualle) – Officer bloat (20% of total force) caused many officers to serve as NCOs – Inability to deal with unexpected situations (Metz and Sedan in 1870, Battle of Frontiers 1914 and the German breakthrough 1940) – Centralized control and authoritarianism crushed the initiative of subordinates and blocked cooperation between branches of army • Cartesian Outlook shaped education and thinking by attempting to impose order, method and routine on the chaos of war • Result: – A culture that discourages discussion, debate and intellectual ferment risks turning inward by imposing the unquestioned assumption on the lessons of history and new technologies to reinforce old ideas • Example, the French obsession with the doctrine of methodical battle after WWI (RMA) • Example, Maginot line (Star Wars)
  29. 29. French Military History • Numerous interviews with Dr. Bruce Gudmundsson on French Military culture. Dr. Gudmundsson founded and ran the USMC School of Advance Warfare (SAW) course of majors in the early 1990s, and is currently a historian for the USMC TECOM • Cook, Don, Charles De Gaulle: A Biography, G.P. Putman’s Sons, 1983 • De Gaulle, Charles, The Army of the Future, Hutchinson, 1940. • Doughty, Robert, “From the Offense a’ Outrance to the Methodical Battle,” in Maneuver Warfare an Anthology, Richard Hooker, editor, Presidio Press, 1993. Also, Vandergriff interviews with Dr. Robert Doughty September and November 1997 • Doughty, Robert, Seeds of Disaster: The Development of French Army Doctrine 1919-1939, Archon Book, 1985 • Horne, Alistair, The Price of Glory: Verdun 1916, Penguin Books, 1962 • Lottman, Herbert, Petain, Hero or Traitor: The Untold Story, William Morrow & Company, Inc. 1985 • Shirer, William, The Collapse of the Third Republic: An Inquiry into the Fall of France in 1940, Simon & Schuster, 1969
  30. 30. Italian Army 1914-1942 • Possessed the same doctrine as the Germans (copied their manuals verbatim), but failed to create an officer corps that could execute it • Up through WWII, officers were selected from the aristocratic class, and the separation between them and the enlisted ranks was considerable – officers were not united by a tradition on professional matters – Measures of performance, such as examinations, did not determine promotions, which were made by a centralized selection board in Rome, usually with considerable political or family influence – An excess of either “cleverness” (intelligence) or zeal was bad form • Combat experience came from beating primitive tribal adversaries in colonial wars, where there was no pressure to develop military art of combined arms warfare • Result: – The culture of the Italian Army in 1939 was incapable of executing Maneuver Warfare – They professed Speed and Initiative in their doctrine, but they practiced centralized control • Why? Hierarchal, stand-offish relationships paralyzed commanders and subordinates by introducing complex layers of bureaucratic procedures • Why? Formal requirements of protocol impeded frank communications – Careerism increased risk averse behavior which curtailed freedom of action
  31. 31. • Cloutier, Patrick, The Italian Royal Army In Mussolini’s Wars, 1935-1945, republished 1987 to 2010, available as download from www.lulu.com • Gooch, John, Mussolini and his Generals: The Armed Forces and Facist Foreign Policy, 1922-1945, Cambridge Military Press, 2007 • Nicolle, David, The Italian Invasion of Abyssinia 1935-36, Osprey Publishing, October 1997 • Sweet, John, The Mechanization of Mussolini’s Army, 1920-1940, Stackpole Military History, December 30, 2006 • Trye, Rex, Mussolini’s Africa Korps: The Italian Army in North Africa, 1940-1943, Axis Europa Books 1999 • Walker, Ian, Iron Hulls Iron Hearts: Mussolini’s Elite Armored Divisions in North Africa, The Crowood Press , July 15, 2006 Italian Military History
  32. 32. British Army 1856, 1898, 1939-42 • Regime was not interested in its Army officer corps during 19th Century – Did not need a professional army to protect its elites from social revolution, like colonial powers – Based its foreign policy on a maritime strategy & the colonial threats to its empire • While they maintained one of the finest regimental systems from the time of Cromwell’s army in the 1600s, its officer system – Recruited and selected officers from the aristocratic class up until WWII, but when offices were needed for WWI and WWII, they expanded the officer corps too quickly – Regimental systems decentralized promotions to the lower levels (good), but selection was influenced more by aristocratic background and wealth than by competence – De-emphasized education in the art of war, because the Army was viewed as a gentleman’s profession (club) • Fixation on colonial threats coupled by gentlemanly amateurism created conditions fostering a rigid doctrine with close (centralized) control • Authoritarian mentality of aristocratic tradition impeded learning by making it difficult to admit mistakes – Reports by junior officers were discarded after the Boer War and WWI • Results Regimental system built solid unit cohesion and a strong NCO corps that never broke in combat, but could not evolve with war or adapt during war – Balaklava (1856), small unit NCOs withstood encirclement by superior numbers of Russian – Rork’s Drift (1898), encircled company beat off 3,000 combat veterans, highly disciplined and motivated Zulus – N. Africa (1941-1942), maintained cohesion and avoided collapse despite repeated tactical and operational errors when facing
  33. 33. British Army History • Based on numerous discussions of British Army history with LTC Symon Tanner, British Army liaison to ARCIC Forward • Chandler and Beckett, The Oxford History of the British Army, Oxford Military Press, 2003 • Clayton, Anthony, The British Officer: Leading the Army from 1660 to Present, Longman, 2007 • Griffith, Paddy, Battle Tactics of the Western Front: The British Army’s Art of Attack 1916-1918, Yale University Press, 1996 • Hastings, Max, The British Army: A Definitive History of the 20th Century, Imperial War Museum, 2008 • Miller, Stephen, Volunteers in the Veld: Britain’s Citizen Soldiers and the South African War 1899-1902, Campaigns and Commanders, 2007 • Strachen, Hew, Big Wars and Small Wars: The British Army and the Lessons of the 20th Century, Routledge, 2006 • Strawson, John, Beggars in Red: The British Army 1789-1889, Pen & Sword, 2003
  34. 34. Mobilization doctrine • Need for massive mobilization shapes today’s personnel management policies – up or out promotion system in order to keep officers fit and young • Need a place to keep everyone in order to move them up – Numbers of officers kept top heavy to provide pool to lead new formations in time of mobilization – Large and many headquarters to oversee process and adherence to doctrine, and provides place to put people (institutionalized over time) • Legacy of General George Marshall’s view of the world – Remains organized to fight a linear war on the attritional model for WWII – Despite attempts at it, remains focused on individual vice unit replacement
  35. 35. Up or Out Promotion System • Navy personnel act of 1916 first introduced up or out promotion system, but failed because Navy had small officer corps (it requires a large, top heavy system to work) • Officer Personnel Act of 1947 (based on testimonies by Eisenhower, Marshall and Bradley), – Significantly increased the size of the officer corps at the middle and senior grades for mobilization – Embraced the up or out promotion system to develop “generalists” while keeping the officer corps “vigorous and youthful” – Established the “all or nothing” 20 year retirement system • 1970 War College Study of Professionalism stated that the “up or out” promotion system, – “contributed significantly to much of the undesirable and unethical conduct of its officers” – “seniors sacrificed integrity on the alter of personal success” – “junior officers perceived a preoccupation with insignificant statistics” • Debate began in 1974 over up or out that led to the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) of 1980, Senator Sam Nunn argued against it, – “The up or out promotion system forced too-many experienced officers out” – “The number of officers at middle and upper levels were too high” – But, the Services wanted up or out • The theory behind up or out, – If the system works properly, there will always be more officers qualified for promotion than there are vacancies available – Permits selectivity, the selection of the “best qualified” – By forcing officers up they would receive exposure to numerous jobs that could apply to a meaningful way in senior leadership positions
  36. 36. References • Author’s Note: I found it necessary to revisit the research I did for Path to Victory: America’s Army and the Revolution in Human Affairs due to many factors that influence the evolution of the Army’s personnel system influence Army ROTC. I added to the research I was in the progress of making for Raising the Bar (2006) and Manning the Legions (2008). I also found that I had to update my knowledge of Army doctrine (new FMs written during General Shinseki’s tenure at Chief of Staff (1999-2003) or as a result of his Transformation efforts, laid new foundation and guidance for Army ROTC. General Schoolmaker assumed the duties of Army Chief of Staff in July 2003 and has driven even more leadership-centric guidance, some documents such as “Adapt or Die” provided excellent direction for where the officer accession programs—ROTC, USMA and OCS—should go to develop an “adaptive leader.” Recently, I was involved in the ARCIC (TRADOC) Human Dimension study, as well as the 2010 writing and publication of the Army Capstone Concept. My research and sources involved 10 areas and continue to evolve to this day: • The history of the evolution of the U.S. Army and Army ROTC • A study of the U.S. Army officer’s corps study of warfare and its influence • A study of the evolution of the U.S. society and its influence on Army ROTC • The theories of leadership • An analysis of education and training approaches to teach cognitive skills • The history of political correctness • Reviews of psychology, sociology, anthropology, • The evolution of the influence of management science on leadership and academic development in the United States • A review of my research I had done for Learning From Others: The Officer Development Approaches of Armies through History. In this book, which I never finished, I had examined the cultures of the armies Ancient Rome, Britain, France, Germany, Israel, and Italy throughout periods of time to give insights to the officer development practices of other nations. For this, I am greatly indebted to Dr Bruce I Gudmundsson, Dr. John Sayan and William S. Lind for their patience and time in teaching and checking my attempts at the French and German languages. Bruce also directed me to many European military history web sites. • A study and understanding of the evolutions of war, particularly into the Fourth Generation of Warfare. I am indebted to Colonel T.X. Hammes USMC, Mr., William S. Lind, Dr. Chet Richards, Franklin C. Spinney, Greg Wilcox LTC U.S. Army retired, and Colonel G. I. Wilson USMC • I am indebted to Dr. Jonathan Shay for teaching me how to understand the value of trust in military organizations and being a “missionary” in the effort to reform the military personnel system. • I am also indebted to my former boss, Lieutenant Allen Gill for our great conversations on leadership, how to develop it, how to create it in our type of academic environment, talks on strategy, how the Army works, and just great stories about people. LTC Gill has allowed Georgetown ROTC to evolve into a “Learning Organization.”
  37. 37. References Listed below are a compilation of all the sources, including web sites. I am indebted to the staffs of The Archives of the United States: The Library of Congress; The Eisenhower Library U.S. Army Command & General Staff College, The Lauinger Memorial Library, Georgetown University; The U.S. Army War College, not only for their assistance, but for the maintenance of some great sources through web sites that saved so much time. At this time I am also completing a roll up of the hundreds of notes that I have taken since June 1998, as well as compiling informal surveys I recently conducted.
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