1. How the EU reshapes
the Belgian financial sector
Filip Dierckx, chairman of Febelfin &
Michel Vermaerke, CEO of Febelfin
2. AGENDA
Introduction
• The Unholy Trinity: changes on all ends
• EU today at a crossroads
Main subjects of today
• Banking Union
• Eurobonds
• Fiscal Union
• Liikanen, Volcker & Vickers
• Basel III – CRD IV
• Shadow Banking
• Consumer protection
Conclusion
Febelfin | 26/6/2012 2
3. Introduction
• The Unholy Trinity: changes on all ends
• EU today at a crossroads
Febelfin | 26/6/2012 3
4. The Unholy Trinity: changes on all ends
European Debt
Government Crisis reduction
Bank
Growth
stability
Economic Financial
crisis crisis
Febelfin | 26/6/2012 4
5. Eurozone crisis – historical perspective
10Y Government Bonds: Interest rate spread with German Bund 10Y (in bp)
5000
Bel um
gi
• Maastricht Treaty + Stability & Growth Pact 4500
• Sovereign debt max 60% of GDP I al
t y
4000
• Max 3% budgetary deficit Spai
n
• No actual enforcement measures in place Portugal 3500
France 3000
• Created a factual Eurobonds environment I and
rel
2500
Greece
• Provided access to (too) cheap money for member states 2000
1500
1000
500
0
01/00 01/01 01/02 01/03 01/04 01/05 01/06 01/07 01/08 01/09 01/10 01/11 01/12
10Y Government Bonds: Interest rate spread with German Bund 10Y (in bps)
Febelfin | 26/6/2012 5
6. Debt
Eurozone crisis – track record & result reduction
10Y Government Bonds: Interest rate spread with German Bund 10Y (in bp)
EA-17 general government gross debt (%GDP)
90
5000
85
60% to GDP norm was never Bel um
gi
80 reached as there was no 4500
incentive I al
t y
75
70 Spai
n 4000
65
Portugal 3500
60
55
France 3000
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
EA-17 general government deficit/surplus (%GDP) I and
rel
3 2500
Germany Greece
0 2000
-3 1500
The 3% max budget deficit
-6 covenant was quickly
1000
breached
(incl. Germany = precedent) 500
-9
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
0
01/00 01/01 01/02 01/03 01/04 01/05 01/06 01/07 01/08 01/09 01/10 01/11 01/12
10Y Government Bonds: Interest rate spread with German Bund 10Y (in bps)
Febelfin | 26/6/2012 6
7. Debt
reduction
Eurozone crisis –
sovereign debt evolution & outlook
2008-2011 Sovereign debt evolution and 2012-2013 forecast (%GDP)
180
160
140
120
GR
IT
100
BE
80
EA PT
DE FR
60
IE
40 ES
Source: European Commission Febelfin | 26/6/2012 7
8. Bank
Systemic risk stability
• Increase of the systemic risk of the banking sector
• Banks are an important buyer of government debt paper
• …
Febelfin | 26/6/2012 8
9. Bank
Banks in the eye of the storm: stability
the broader picture
• Observations
Bank run
Nationalisation of banks
Locally financed debt Against EU spirit
National solutions
Cheap liquidities (LTRO)
Basic belief: the functioning of banks is based on trust
today no trust and more importantly no LT plan to rebuild trust
Febelfin | 26/6/2012 9
10. Bank
Belgium takes the lead in ‘deleveraging’ – stability
transformation ongoing
Total Total equity Leverage
liabilities of capital of (in units)
Belgian Belgian
banking banking sector
sector (in billions of Belgium is a quick learner when
(in billions of EUR) it comes MFI'sdeleveraging
Size of
to as % of GDP
EUR) 450 Size of MFIs (%GDP)
End of June 1,595.2 48.5 31.9 EMU BE
400
2007 FR DE
350
End of Dec. 1,147.3 52.8 20.7
300
2011
% change -28.1% +8.9% -35.1% 250
200
98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11
Source: Febelfin calculations based on NBB data (consolidated basis) Source: ECB
Febelfin | 26/6/2012 10
11. Growth
Impact on world GDP growth
GDP growth 2008-2013 forecast (in %)
4,0
2,0
0,0
-2,0
-4,0
-6,0
-8,0
BE DE FR IT ES PT IE GR
6,0
4,0
2,0
0,0
-2,0
World
-4,0 EA
-6,0
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Source:European Commission
EU economy is missing the lubricant of trust and confidence
Febelfin | 26/6/2012 11
12. EU today at a crossroads
Crucial role of banks
• Financed economy during economic
growth (until 2007) & crisis (2008- Q1
2012)
Ad hoc solutions Long term solutions
• Spanish problem • Banking union
left in Spain • Eurobonds
• Further increase of • Fiscal union
Spanish deficit …
• Senior vs junior
debt holders
….
Basel III – CRD IV
• Middle of important changes
Banks directly impacted by any decision Febelfin | 26/6/2012 12
13. Main subjects of today
•Banking Union
•Eurobonds
•Fiscal Union
•Liikanen, Volcker & Vickers
•Basel III – CRD IV
•Shadow Banking
•Consumer protection
Febelfin | 26/6/2012 13
14. I.Banking Union : concept
One single cross-border supervisory
One EU-wide Deposit Guarantee Scheme
One resolution fund
Febelfin | 26/6/2012 14
15. Banking Union: general considerations
• General considerations
• No possibility for national discretion on capital requirements
• Direct recapitalization to avoid additional sovereign debt
• Strong & deep political and fiscal union required to mitigate the moral hazard risk
Break the vicious spiral between
sovereigns & banks
Febelfin | 26/6/2012 15
16. Banking Union: sector considerations
• Banking Union could be an answer
• To avoid regulatory competition & inconsistencies
• For effective crisis management of cross-border SIFI’s
•BUT
• Balance needed between EU-wide financial stability measures and proportionality
EU Level Playing Field
• Common DGS should take into account previous & current national DGS contributions
Profitablity
Belgium: evolution DGS
Febelfin | 26/6/2012 16
17. II. Eurobonds: considerations
10Y Government Bonds: Interest rate spread with German Bund 10Y (in bp)
• Possible need for formal Eurobonds 5000
• To lighten the interest rate burden of certain member Bel um
gi
4500
states I al
t y
• To break the vicious spiral between banks & sovereigns Spai
n 4000
• To fund a Banking Union resolution scheme
Portugal 3500
France 3000
• Eurobonds could limit the incentive for structural changes
I and
rel
2500
• Eurobonds in themselves could create moral hazard Greece
2000
• A strong & deep political and fiscal union is required to 1500
mitigate the moral hazard risk 1000
500
0
01/00 01/01 01/02 01/03 01/04 01/05 01/06 01/07 01/08 01/09 01/10 01/11 01/12
10Y Government Bonds: Interest rate spread with German Bund 10Y (in bps)
Febelfin | 26/6/2012 17
18. III. Fiscal Union: context
• Cornerstone of the eurosystem (Stability & Growth Pact, Semester and
Sixpack)
• Becomes even more acute with Banking Union
• Key in avoiding moral hazard and promoting eurozone economic
convergence as was envisioned with the Stability & Growth Pact
Moral
hazard
Fiscal
Union
Ensure a fiscally sound EMU & mitigate the moral hazard risk Febelfin | 26/6/2012 18
19. Fiscal Union: considerations
• Considerable sovereignty transfer needed
• On the short term, common borrowing on the bond market would be
required to create fiscal breathing room for currently struggling
member states
• The banking sector is indirectly suffering from the lack of confidence
in the market vis-à-vis the eurozone and member states’ outstanding
debt
Stabilize the market to restore confidence
Febelfin | 26/6/2012 19
20. IV. Ringfencing initiatives
Volcker vs. Vickers
Issue Volcker rule Vickers Report
Separation/segregation Commercial banking and Ringfence retail banking from
some investment banking wholesale and investment
banking
Prohibitions Banks cannot engage in Activities that must be
proprietary trading and offered/that are permitted
covered funds (exemptions) within ringfence
Scope of applications All banks benefiting from All UK banks
federal insurance of deposits
Extraterritoriality Applicable also to non-US No (only UK entities)
banks if US criteria matched
Febelfin | 26/6/2012 20
21. Ringfencing initiatives
Liikanen
• European Commission appointed a High-Level Expert Group (Liikanen group)
to discuss on possible reforms to the structure of the EU banking sector
• Mandate of Liikanen Group:
The Group has been requested to consider in-depth whether there is a need for reforms directly
targeted at the structure of individual banks themselves and the banking system as a whole, in
order to reduce the probability and impact of failure, better ensure the continuation of vital economic
functions and better protect retail clients, and to make any relevant proposals as appropriate.
The Group will have regard to on-going regulatory reform both, in the EU and globally, and will assess the
added value of structural reform. The group will pay particular attention to on-going structural
reforms, i.e. regarding activity restrictions (Volcker Rule), size limits (Dodd-Frank Act) and/or
structural separation of certain activities (Vickers Report).
• A final report of the Liikanen Group is expected in September 2012
Febelfin | 26/6/2012 21
22. Ringfencing initiatives
Sector considerations
Universal banks are an asset for the European economy.
Ringfencing would make dissappear the advantages the universal
banking model presents for banks, shareholders and the whole
economy, but can’t prevent financial crises resulting from market
activities
Financial sector not in favour of structural reforms (Vickers), as
current ongoing regulatory reforms, including the development
of a crisis management framework, are sufficient to reach the
objectives
Febelfin | 26/6/2012 22
23. V. Basel III – CRD IV
Important characteristic Timing
Capital Stronger than in Basel II 2017
2013
Leverage Reduce the size of activities 2018
Liquidity Survive 30 days 2015
Funding Certain funding > 1 year 2018
Febelfin | 26/6/2012 23
24. VI. Shadow Banking: context
• Current (re-)drafting of regulatory requirements in banking, could lead tot a
growing shadow banking sector
No clear definition (even after 2y of discussion)
Size, reach, utility unknown
Shadow banking investigated on different levels
- EU Commission (Green paper)
- Regulatory proposals Financial Stability Board (G20)
Shadow banking will prove to be very elusive to regulate
(absence of a clear definition poses a risk of inappropriate regulation)
Febelfin | 26/6/2012 24
25. Shadow Banking: considerations
• Micro-managing the banking sector through stringent regulations on a global,
European and national level, could push financing activities into the ‘unknown’
(source: Oliver Wyman)
• Effectively regulating the elusive shadow banking sector will prove to be
• Extremely difficult
• Sometimes inappropriate, as particular regulatory measures are already in
place (e.g.: UCITS for Exchange Traded and Money Market Funds)
Avoid overregulation on banks, to keep & manage the risk in plain sight
Febelfin | 26/6/2012 25
26. VII. Consumer protection
EU measures
• MiFID II
• SEPA
• European mortgage directive
Belgian initiatives
• Moratorium
• Savings account
Febelfin | 26/6/2012 26
28. Towards a new financial model through
dynamic and balanced regulation
Clear and stable regulation, via cumulative impact
assessments
Preserve integrated EU financial market through maximum
harmonisation at the European level
More coherent and consistent (implementation of) regulation
Respecting phasing-in
Sustain diversity through proportionality
Press Conference | 20| June 2012
Febelfin 26/6/2012 28
Deze slide geeft de evolutieweer van de evolutievan de staatsschuld van:‘probleemlanden’België,Frankrijk, DuitslandEurzonegemiddelde(voor 2012 & 2013 gaat het over voorspellingen)Eventueelbijkomend: Beligschestaatsschuldblijftbeheersbaarondermeer door heffingen op banken (raming 4 heffingenvoor 2012 bedragenbijna 1,4 mia EUR) & financiëleproducten.
Ontstaan van systemisch risico bij bankenDoor goedkope liquiditeiten worden banken steeds groter (zie grafiek op slide)(Let wel op: België is sneller begonnen met het deleveragen komt verderop aan bod)Banken zijn een belangrijke opkoper van overheidsobligaties (daling waarde obligaties impact kapitaal banken) & belangrijk: aankoop van overheidsobligaties door banken is onder meer op aanraden van autoriteiten gebeurd (cfr. overheidsobligaties = veilige beleggingen)
Weziendatoplossingenmeestal NATIONAAL getintwaren >< in tegenstellingtotwat Febelfin altijdheeftnaarvoorgeschovenzijndeoplossingen op Europees niveau.Some observationsReal depositoutflowfrombanks in certain countries (Greece, Spain,…) or ‘slow motion bankrun’ VoorGriekenlandbedraagtdeze 73 mia EUR sindsdec 2009 (peak-to-trough). In vergelijking met vorigjaar (april 2011) is ereenuitstroom van 32 mia. (naaraanloop van de tweedeverkiezingsrondeschat men daterongeveer 800 mio per dag werdafgehaald & volgensnationale bank van Griekenlandzou 10 à 20 mia in safes of thuisbewaardworden).VoorSpanjebedraagt de uitstroom 104 mia EUR in vgl met vorigjaar.Re-nationalisation of banksvoorbeeld Spain – interventieSpaanseoverheid in de spaarbanken/cajas – ter informatie: schattingenvolgensstresstestskapitaaltekortenSpaansebanken 40 mia EUR volgens IMF, 51 miavolgens Roland Berger en 62 mia Oliver Wyman)België: DexiaGovernmentdebtfinancedagainmuch more locally in many countries Bv. Spaansebankenkopen nu meer en meer & noodgedwongenSpaansstaatspapieraangezienbuitenlandseinvesteerdersSpanje de rugtoekerenSindsnovember 2011 (start LTRO 1) is de blootstellingaanoverheidspapier van zowelSpaansealsItaliaansebanken met elk 80 mia EUR gestegen. Voor de EMU alsgeheelbedroegdezetoenameslechts 140 mia ! Eenonderverdeling van dezeschuldwordtnietgegeven, maar we kunnenverwachtendatditoverwegendschuldpapier van eigenoverheid is.Gedetailleerdecijfers: Holdings of General goverment securities Spanje: nov 2011 177,9; april 2012 261,3 increase 83,4 Italië: nov 2011 247,4; april 2012 327,5 increase 80,1EMU: nov 2011 1381,8 ; april 2012 1526,7 increase 144,9If banksruninto trouble, always national solution (bijgevolggovernmentdebt in negative spiral)Issue withwholesaleinterbankingmarket; banksparktheirreservesat the ECB instead of tradingwitheachother, henceneed for LTROIn meijongstledenparkeerdeneuropesecommerciëlebanken 790 mia EUR bij de ECB. De 2 LTRO's bedroegen 1000 mia EUR. Bijkomend:naast LTRO’s, is erook ELA (emergency liquidity assistance): dusalsbankenniet in aanmerkingkomenvoor LTRO kanernogberoepgedaanworden op ELA (verstrekt door de nationalebanken) – watnationalestaatsschuldenfinaalverhoogt – erbestaatechtergeenduidelijkcijfermateriaal over de omloopaan ELA (grafiek in achtergrondliteratuur) als we ditdoortrekkennaarGriekenland: ELA gebruiktvoorGrieksebankenommogelijktemakendatmensendeposito’skunnenafhalen ELA financiert de bankrun. All the above go against harmonisation and spirit of EUBasic belief: the functioning of banksisbased on trust & today no trust and more importantly no LT plan to rebuild trust!
Transformatie bancaire balans in België volop aan de gangBelgië is een goede leerling op het vlak van deleveragingEn tegelijkertijd zijn de Belgische banken kredieten blijven verstrekken Ongeveer 90 mia EUR extra kredieten aan overheden, particulieren & ondernemingen op een termijn van 4 jaar zijnde 2008 tm 2011.Zie nog recent over ondernemingskredieten: meest recente cijfers van NBB betreffen april 2012 en opnieuw recordhoogte bijna 118 mia EUR.Zie ook Financial Stability Review 2012 hierover – executive summary pg.4:“….De voorbije jaren hebben ze immers de omvang van hun balansen aanzienlijk teruggeschroefd. Die aanpassing is wellicht nog niet ten einde, ook al is de neerwaartse tendens sinds kort aan het afvlakken. Dit schuldafbouwproces verloopt grotendeels via de ontmanteling van buitenlandse activiteiten of de inkrimping van effectenportefeuilles. Als zodanig hebben deze herschikkingen hoofdzakelijk de vorm aangenomen van overdrachten van activa naar andere instellingen en dus niet geleid tot een onmiddellijke inkrimping van kredietverlening ….De Belgische financiële instellingen zijn nog altijd zeer actief in hun kernmarkten. De afgelopen tijd hebben ze met name hun portefeuille aan Belgische overheidseffecten uitgebreid en hun kredietverlening aan de nationale economie opgevoerd.”
Uiteraardheeft crisis impact op groei. Op deze slide eenevolutie van groei van‘probleemlanden’België, Duitstland, FrankrijkGemiddelde EurozoneGemiddeldevoorwereldRecent heeft NBB prognoses bekendgemaaktvoorgroei in België die beterzijndan was vooropgesteld:-Oorspronkelijkvooropgesteldegroei: 0,0 % in 2012; 1,2 % in 2013- Nieuwevoorspelling NBB: 0,6% in 2012; 1,4% in 2013
Europa staatvandaag op eenkruispunt:I.Banks have been crucial in periods of economicgrowthPlayedtheirrole of financing the economy in periods of economicgrowth (..-2007)Playedtheirroleduring the crisis – no creditcrunch as demonstrated (2008 – Q1 2012)Conclusion: banks have a crucial role to play in all circumstancesalsogoingforwardII.With Basel III – CRD IV banks are in the middle of important changementsIII. Ad hoc solutions - Is EU helping or learning to solve the issues? NoSpanishbankingproblemisleft in SpainDebtholders have becomeovernight junior debtholders (to bechecked!)Spanish budget deficit has furtherincreased – debt rating reduction and increase of spreadsIV. Long term solutions to solve the government and financialcrisiswith positive effects on the economy:Banking UnionEurobondsFiscal Union Hier zullenwe nu op inzoemen
ContextNewly launched idea for a banking union (Barroso in FT)Wiestapt in? 1/All EU-27 large banks 2/ mogelijk EU 26 zonder GB of 3/enkel EU 17Eurozone. (Ditkaneenrisicoinhouden op bankbeschermingaan twee snelheden)Bankenuniebehelstdriepijlers:I.One single cross-border supervisory: While the current role of the European supervisory authorities is mainly to oversee the functioning and convergence of national supervisory systems, the Commission is intended to assess how this system is working in order to consider whether it would be appropriate for them to directly supervise financial institutions with a pan-European reach.( voorstelnaveuropese top: ECB voorsifi’s en EBAvooralleEuropesebanken)II. One EU-wide Deposit Guarantee Scheme:In the context of the DGS reform in 2010 Commission suggested that it would submit a report on the need for existing deposit guarantee schemes to be replaced by a single scheme for the whole Union.(Ter info: ontwerp EU DGS is nietnieuw – heeft reeds op tafelgelegenbij de vorming van de eurozone – niemandwoudit op dat moment want niemandwildegarantiesgevenvoorbankensectoren die zezelfnietcontroleerden & ook EU supervisory was nietbespreekbaar >< FDIC in US)One resolution fund:-The Commission proposal on bank recovery and resolution, published on 6 June, may be considered as a first step in this direction. In this proposal, the Commission proposes the setting up of funds at national level which would interact and lend to one another when necessary, notably in the case of cross-border groups, to constitute a European system of resolution funds. Funding of this resolution fund: 1 % of total covered deposits/contribution on basis of liabilities & risk profile.-Furthermore, the closer integration of supervisory and resolution arrangements for cross-border institutions will be explored further in the context of this mapping out exercise.
General policy considerationsNo possibility for national discretion on capital requirementsNot on minimaNor on definitionDirect recapitalization required to avoid additional sovereign debtA strong and deep political and fiscal union is required to mitigate the moral hazard riskAs a common insurance & resolution fund could bring moral hazard through shifting the burden from national to eurozone taxpayers in an institutionalized manner Objective of the banking union: break the vicious spiral between sovereigns & banks (vandaarherhaling van de driehoek)
Sector considerationsA banking union could be instrumental to avoid regulatory competition and inconsistenciesIt could provide an answer for effective crisis management of cross-border SIFIsBUT:It should, however, strike the right balance between EU-wide financial stability measures and proportionality, to allow for a true European Level Playing FieldA common DGS should take into account previous and current national DGS contributions avoid additional weight on profitability, important for strengthening solvencyVandaardatgrafiektoegevoegd is omteillustrerendat de Belgische DGS al aanzienlijk is opgetrokkende laatstejaren.Zieookstudie van IMF (Belgium Country Report 2012) die aangeeftdatrentabiliteit van Belgischebanksectorserieus is afgenomen.Financial Stability Review NBB (publicatievrijdag 22 juni 2012): ‘In 2011 behaalden de Belgischebankeneenrendement op het eigenvermogen van slechts 0,7% tegen 10,5% in 2010, en kendendaarmeeopnieuweenslechtjaar op het vlak van winstgevendheid’’ (executive summary pg 12)Eventueelbijkomend het volgendeaankaarten: Watzullengevolgen van EU DGS zijn op Belgischebegroting(aangezienverschillendeheffingen de staatskasspijzen)?In Belgiëkennen we nietalleen DGS, maar ook FSC (financial stability contribution)datvoor 2012 geraamdwordt op 251 mio EUR.(FSC ten belope van 3,5 bptwordtgeheven op balanstotaal – eigenvermogen – depositio’sonder DGS)
23 november 2011 heeftEuropeseCommissieeen green paper uitgegeven over eurobonds. EC onderscheidtdriemogelijkheden(optie 1 volledig & optie 2 en 3 gedeeltijkvoordeelboven 60% GDP):The full substitution by Stability Bond issuance of national issuance, with joint and several guarantees (meestambitieuzeoptie): this approach would seem the most ambitious option of all, as it would replace the entire national issuance by Stability Bonds and as each Member State would be fully liable for the entire issuance. This option would accordingly have strong potential positive effects on stability and integration. But at the same time, it would, by abolishing all market or interest rate pressure on Member States, pose a relatively high risk of moral hazard and it might need significant Treaty changes. ( vandaar het belang van eenpolitieke & fiscaleunieom moral hazard in tedijken)The partial substitution by Stability Bond issuance of national issuance, with joint and several guarantees: this approach would essentially be the same as the option mentioned above, but Stability Bonds under this option would only cover parts of national financing needs (allesschuldenboven 60% GDP). The partial substitution by Stability Bond issuance of national issuance, with several but not joint guarantees: this approach is the most limited one of the three options, as it would only partially cover Member States' financing needs (nl. deelboven 60% van GDP) and as it would only be covered by several guarantees.
De vraagnaareenfiscaleunieneemt toe in het kader van de bankenunie. Namelijk de creatie van eenbankenuniehoudteenrisico in op moral hazard. Vandaar de tekening: hoe groter de fiscaleunie hoe kleiner het risico op moral hazard bankenunie.Cfr. Merkel: pas bankenuniealsereenfiscaleunie is.
Eventueel – Er zijn nog een aantal topics die niet op de slides staan maar die ook zullen besproken worden tijdens de Europese top en die hierbij aansluiten. Dit kan hier eventueel vermeld worden.Naast de net besproken topics zoals bankenunie, eurobonds & fiscale unie zullen de Europese regeringsleiders ook bekijken hoe ze de Europese groei kunnen stimuleren. Spanje, Italië, Frankrijk & Duitsland bereikten daarover een principe-akkoord vrijdag 22 juni. The plan for closer banking and fiscal integration will come on top of a €130 billion short-term stimulus package to revive growth, agreed by the leaders of Germany, France, Spain and Italy on Friday. Ook heeft Van Rompuy aangekondigd te willen spreken over de pensioenhervormingen op Europese schaal tijdens de komende Europese top.
Aantal voorbeelden van initiatieven die hierover in het buitenland lopen, Volcker (US) & Vickers (GB)In België studie NBB over splitsing zakenbanken, retailbanken
Context:A clear definition remains difficult to find (even after 2y of discussions) ‘credit intermediation through entities or activities outside the regular banking system’It is still largely unknown in terms of size, reach, utility etc.European Commission just ended the consultation period on its Green Paper on shadow bankingOn 19 March, the European Commission published a green paper setting out how existing and proposed EU measures already address shadow banking activities. The aim of the Commission's current work is to examine existing measures carefully and to propose an appropriate approach to ensure comprehensive supervision of the shadow banking system, coupled with an adequate regulatory framework. The deadline for consultation by the European Commission was 1 June. Any regulatory follow-up will take into account the results of the work of the high-level expert group on structural banking reforms recently appointed by the Commission (Liikanen Group). After the publication of the Liikanen report, the Commission will assess the need for additional, targeted consultations on selected issues, if necessary.The financial Stability Board is currently investigating the shadow banking sector and will come up with regulatory proposals to the G20 before end 2012
KERN: vertrouwenherstellen. Ditheefttemaken met de financiëleinstellingen (cfr. Structuur, regelgeving, ….), MAAR ook met de producten die zijaanbieden.Hierzie je eigenlijkeenaantal EU maatregelen & intiatieven op Belgischvlakwaar de sector getuigt van haarconstructievehoudingvb. Vrijwilligeintekening op – in vgl met andereEuropeselanden - verregaand moratoriumVb. Meewerkenaanvergroten van de transparantieivmspaarboekje.Aantal Europese dossiers:PaymentsSEPA: Belgium a model student on the road to a unified European payments area Use of European money transfer higher in Belgium than Eurozone averageFebelfin also promotor of electronicpaymentsEuropean mortgagedirective:Commission proposal to create an efficient and effective single market for residential mortgage, with a high level of consumer protectionFebelfin supports the objective of the European Commission to establish an efficient and competitive integrated market for mortgage credit, with a high level of protection. MiFID II:Febelfin is in favour of a balanced European reglementation on consumer protection which leaves room for maximum harmonisation & a Level Playing Field.
