This webinar is for the lawyer -or anyone else- who wants to brush up on the latest issues and strategies to be aware of regarding legal ethics and best practices. The panelists discuss recent and important case law in the area and explain how those decisions can have real-world impact on the situations you may be involved in. Among others, the panel will address the following Model Rules of Professional Conduct: Rule 1.7-Conflict of Interest: Current Clients; Rule 1.8-Conflict of Interest: Current Clients: Specific Rules; Rule 3.8 - Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor; and Rule 4.4(a) Respect for Rights of Third Persons.
To view the accompanying webinar, go to: https://www.financialpoise.com/financial-poise-webinars/recent-cases-decisions-2021/
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Practical and entertaining education for
attorneys, accountants, business owners and
executives, and investors.
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4. Disclaimer
The material in this webinar is for informational purposes only. It should not be considered
legal, financial or other professional advice. You should consult with an attorney or other
appropriate professional to determine what may be best for your individual needs. While
Financial Poise™ takes reasonable steps to ensure that information it publishes is accurate,
Financial Poise™ makes no guaranty in this regard.
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5. Meet the Faculty
MODERATOR:
Michelle Gershfeld - Law Offices of Michelle Gershfeld
PANELISTS:
George Kuney - University of TN College of Law
Bernard Burk - Formerly University of North Carolina School of Law
Gerald Meyer - MoloLamken LLP
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6. About This Webinar
Hot Off the Presses - Recent Cases & Decisions
This webinar is for the lawyer -or anyone else- who wants to brush up on the latest
issues and strategies to be aware of regarding legal ethics and best practices. The
panelists discuss recent and important case law in the area and explain how those
decisions can have real-world impact on the situations you may be involved
in. Among others, the panel will address the following Model Rules of Professional
Conduct: Rule 1.7-Conflict of Interest: Current Clients; Rule 1.8-Conflict of Interest:
Current Clients: Specific Rules; Rule 3.8 - Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor;
and Rule 4.4(a) Respect for Rights of Third Persons.
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7. About This Series
Legal Ethics – Best Practices
Corporate scandals make the headlines periodically, but businesses and the lawyers that
work with them face ethical challenges every day, even in situations that are legally
compliant. This webinar series examines ethical issues confronted by lawyers in a variety of
contexts. The panelists consider and recommend different approaches to ethical decision-
making and lawyers responsibilities and concerns, especially in light of the impact of the
COVID-19 pandemic.
Each Financial Poise Webinar is delivered in Plain English, understandable to investors, business owners, and
executives without much background in these areas, yet is of primary value to attorneys, accountants, and other
seasoned professionals. Each episode brings you into engaging, sometimes humorous, conversations designed to
entertain as it teaches. Each episode in the series is designed to be viewed independently of the other episodes so that
participants will enhance their knowledge of this area whether they attend one, some, or all episodes.
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8. Episodes in this Series
#1: Best Practices Regarding Technology
Premiere date: 2/10/21
#2: How to Avoid Malpractice & Disciplinary Actions - General Do's and Don'ts
Premiere date: 4/14/21
#3: Hot Off the Presses- Recent Cases & Decisions
Premiere date: 5/12/21
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10. Prosecutors’ Use of Coercive Process on Lawyers:
The Search Warrant Served on Rudy Giuilani
There are multiple constraints on prosecutors’ use of coercive process (search
warrants and grand jury subpoenas) on lawyers in order to safeguard the attorney-
client privilege and prevent undue intrusion into the attorney-client relationship:
• Ethical Constraints: ABA Model Rule 3.8(e):
The prosecutor in a criminal case shall . . . not subpoena a lawyer in a grand jury or other
criminal proceeding to present evidence about a past or present client unless the
prosecutor reasonably believes:
(1) the information sought is not protected from disclosure by any applicable privilege;
(2) the evidence sought is essential to the successful completion of an ongoing
investigation or prosecution; and
(3) there is no other feasible alternative to obtain the information . . . .
The rule is by its terms limited to prosecutorial subpoenas to lawyers, but
prosecutors tend to be even more careful with more intrusive means such as
search warrants.
11. Prosecutors’ Use of Coercive Process on Lawyers:
The Search Warrant Served on Rudy Giuilani
• Self-imposed constraints adopted by prosecutorial authorities
For example, the Justice Manual, an internal handbook governing the conduct
of all federal prosecutors, requires that prosecutors not seek a search warrant
on an attorney’s premises or materials unless:
Less intrusive methods will substantially jeopardize the effectiveness of the process;
The materials sought are of substantial importance to the investigation;
The warrant is drawn as narrowly as reasonably possible; and
A senior Justice Dept. official has approved seeking the warrant
Justice Manual §§ 9-13.420, 9-19.220
Many state prosecutors’ offices have voluntarily adopted similar constraints
• Court-supervised processes during and after search and seizure to protect
privileged materials:
Execution of the warrant and post-seizure review by a separate ―taint‖ or ―privilege
team‖
Review of seized materials for privilege by a judicial officer or special master
12. Prosecutors’ Use of Coercive Process on Lawyers:
The Search Warrant Served on Rudy Giuilani
What if a lawyer is served with a subpoena?
• Ethical Constraints: ABA Model Rule 3.8(e):
The prosecutor in a criminal case shall . . . not subpoena a lawyer in a grand jury or other
criminal proceeding to present evidence about a past or present client unless the
prosecutor reasonably believes:
(1) the information sought is not protected from disclosure by any applicable privilege;
(2) the evidence sought is essential to the successful completion of an ongoing
investigation or prosecution; and
(3) there is no other feasible alternative to obtain the information . . . .
• Some states have statutory or case law applicable in civil disputes limiting subpoenas on
lawyers in similar terms
13. Prosecutors’ Use of Coercive Process on Lawyers:
The Search Warrant Served on Rudy Giuilani
• The Lawyer’s Obligations when Served with a Subpoena:
The lawyer must respond to the subpoena (it’s a court order directed to the lawyer, not
the client)
The lawyer must take reasonable care to protect the client’s confidential and privileged
information and documents. ABA Model Rule 1.6(c).
That includes asserting all reasonably available privilege and other objections
The lawyer must confer with the client about which objections to assert (unless precluded
by law), but has the final call except about whether to disclose confidential information or
waive any privilege, which is the client’s call. ABA Model Rules 1.2(a), 1.4, 1.6(a).
If the client is unwilling or unable to confer, the lawyer must assert all colorable
objections
The lawyer must defend those objections through a final order
The lawyer must do all this whether or not the client is willing or able to pay for it
Consequences for failing to do so include potential discipline and civil liability
Practice tip: Include a provision in your engagement letter requiring the client to pay for
such services
14. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11
Overview: Pleadings filed in federal court must have a good faith basis
Factual assertions are, to the best of the signer’s knowledge after a reasonable inquiry,
well-grounded in fact
Legal arguments are warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law
Pleading, as a whole, is not made for an improper purpose, such as:
To harass,
To cause unnecessary delay, or
To needlessly increase the costs of litigation.
15. Sanctions for Violations of Rule 11
• Initiated by a motion of a party or by the court on its own initiative
• The person facing sanctions must be given prior notice and an opportunity to respond
• The Court may order sanctions against an attorney, a law firm, or a party to the litigation
• Sanctions:
Are within the discretion of the court;
Must be limited to what suffices to deter the conduct;
May include nonmonetary penalties;
May include order to pay penalty to court;
May include order to pay opponent’s reasonable attorney’s fees and expenses
directly resulting from violation.
16. Other Consequences for Pursuing Meritless Litigation
Professional Discipline
Model Rule 3.1:
A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein,
unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a
good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law. A lawyer for
the defendant in a criminal proceeding, or the respondent in a proceeding that could
result in incarceration, may nevertheless so defend the proceeding as to require that
every element of the case be established.
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17. Other Consequences for Pursuing Meritless Litigation
• Conduct subject to discipline:
Bring or defend a proceeding whose basis in law or fact is ―frivolous‖
Assert or controvert an issue on grounds whose basis in law or fact is ―frivolous‖
• Two exceptions:
Assert a claim, defense, or issue based on ―good faith argument for an extension,
modification or reversal of existing law‖
Criminal defense counsel may put the prosecution to its proof, and deny each element
of the crime (reflects the defendant’s constitutional right to proof of guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt)
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18. Other Consequences for Pursuing Meritless Litigation
• What does ―frivolous‖ mean for these purposes?
• Model Rule 3.1 Comment [2]:
―The filing of an action or defense or similar action taken for a client is not frivolous
merely because the facts have not first been fully substantiated or because the lawyer
expects to develop vital evidence only by discovery. What is required of lawyers,
however, is that they inform themselves about the facts of their clients’ cases and the
applicable law and determine that they can make good faith arguments in support of their
clients’ positions. Such action is not frivolous even though the lawyer believes that the
client’s position ultimately will not prevail. The action is frivolous, however, if the lawyer is
unable either to make a good faith argument on the merits of the action taken or to
support the action taken by a good faith argument for an extension, modification or
reversal of existing law.‖
Given this standard (which is quite similar to Rule 11’s), it’s not surprising that
disciplinary proceedings are pending or have been referred or urged against a number
of the lawyers involved in litigating presidential election challenges
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19. Other Consequences for Pursuing Meritless Litigation
• Civil Liability (besides sanctions)
• Defamation:
Not for the statements in the lawsuits, which are typically privileged (that is, immune
from liability) under state law
But for the extrajudicial public statements at press conferences and the like, which are
typically not protected
For example, the billion-dollar defamation claims filed by the makers of accused voting
machines and software against Rudy Giuliani and Sidney Powell
• Abuse of Process
the existence of an ulterior purpose or motive underlying the use of some legal
process; and
some act in the use of the legal process that is not proper in the regular prosecution of
the proceedings.
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20. Other Consequences for Pursuing Meritless Litigation
• Malicious Prosecution
the institution (and in some states, the continuation) of a civil or criminal legal
proceeding against the plaintiff
by, or abetted by, the defendant (the prosecutor or plaintiff in the underlying malicious
action)
without probable cause and
with primarily malicious purpose
with termination of the proceeding on the merits in favor of the plaintiff (the defendant
in the underlying maliciously prosecuted action)
causing damages.
• These are all intentional torts that can bear punitive damages
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21. Other Consequences for Pursuing Meritless Litigation
Practical tip: It’s the cases about which you feel most deeply in which you must always force
yourself to step back and take a cold-eyed look at your case’s legal and factual basis.
Write your opposing counsel’s Rule 11 (or state-law equivalent) motion in your head.
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22. In-House Counsel’s Obligations Under Rule 1.8
ABA Model Rule 1.8:
―A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client or knowingly acquire an ownership,
possessory, security or other pecuniary interest adverse to a client unless:
(1) the transaction and terms on which the lawyer acquires the interest are fair and reasonable to the
client and are fully disclosed and transmitted in writing in a manner that can be reasonably
understood by the client;
(2) the client is advised in writing of the desirability of seeking and is given a reasonable opportunity
to seek the advice of independent legal counsel on the transaction; and
(3) the client gives informed consent, in a writing signed by the client, to the essential terms of the
transaction and the lawyer's role in the transaction, including whether the lawyer is representing
the client in the transaction.‖
In-house counsel are not exempt from Rule 1.8 and cannot obtain an ownership interest in their client-
employer without following the requirements of Rule 1.8. Kaye v. Rosefielde, 75 A.3d 1168, 1203 (N.J.
App. Div. 2013).
23. In-house Counsel: How to Keep the Comp You’re Promised
• First, determine if Rule 1.8 applies to your compensation
• Rule 1.8(a) covers
any ―business transaction with a client‖ or
the ―acqui[sition of] an ownership, possessory, security or other pecuniary interest
adverse to a client,‖ whether or not related to the services the lawyer is providing,
EXCEPT
An ―ordinary fee arrangement‖—that is, an agreement for the payment of money in
return for legal services. Model Rule 1.8 Comment [1]. Nonmonetary
compensation is generally still covered by the Rule.
A security interest in the litigation claims the lawyer will assert on the client’s
behalf, or their proceeds (at least in a contingent-fee arrangement). Model Rule
1.8 Comment [16].
―[S]tandard commercial transactions between the lawyer and the client for
products or services that the client generally markets to others, for example,
banking or brokerage services, medical services, products manufactured or
distributed by the client, and utilities’ services.‖ Model Rule 1.8 Comment [1].
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24. In-house Counsel: How to Keep the Comp You’re Promised
• If the exchange is excluded from Rule 1.8(a) but concerns a fee arrangement, then it still
must comply with Rule 1.5, which requires the fee arrangement to be
Reasonable
Agreed at or near the inception of the engagement
―Preferably in writing‖ (see Model Rule 1.5(b)), and mandatorily in writing and signed
by the client for any part of the fee that is contingent (with all material terms of the
contingent fee disclosed in writing, see Model Rule 1.5(c))
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25. In-house Counsel: How to Keep the Comp You’re Promised
• If the exchange is governed by Model Rule 1.8(a), then:
Substantively, it must be ―fair and reasonable to the client.‖ Model Rule 1.8(a)(1)
Procedurally,
The terms of the transaction must be ―[i] fully disclosed and [ii] transmitted in
writing [iii] in a manner that can be reasonably understood by the client . . . .
Model Rule 1.8(a)(1)
The client must be ―advised in writing of the desirability of seeking . . . independent
legal counsel on the transaction‖ and be ―given a reasonable opportunity‖ to do so.
Model Rule 1.8(a)(2)
The client must ―give[] informed consent, in a writing signed by the client, to the
essential terms of the transaction and the lawyer’s role in the transaction, including
whether the lawyer is repre-senting the client in the transaction.‖ Model Rule
1.8(a)(3).
• Failure to meet all of these requirements is a ground for professional discipline, and for
rescission or avoidance of all or parts of the agreement
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26. Inadvertent Disclosure of Confidential Information
• Ethical and Legal Implications for Sending Attorneys
• Act reasonably to prevent inadvertent disclosure
RPC 1.1 competence; RPC 1.6(c) confidentiality. Comment [18] adds that Rule 1.6
is not violated if disclosure occurs despite an attorney’s reasonable efforts
• Common instance: In discovery and in electronic communication with opposing counsel
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27. Inadvertent Disclosure of Confidential Information
• Ethical and Legal implications for Sending Attorneys
• Prevention
Privilege Review (in litigation)
Care in Using Email, such as checking email addressing before sending and
marking privileged documents privileged
• Planning
Clawback Agreements and Order – Fed. R. Evid. 502
Do not borrow standard from Fed. R. 502(b)
Seek client informed consent. Why?
• Acting reasonably to mitigate the damage when inadvertent disclosure inevitably occurs
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28. Inadvertent Disclosure of Confidential Information
• Ethical and Legal Obligations of Receiving Attorneys
• RPC 4.4(b) or Case Law
―Notice only‖ approach – This is the Model Rules approach followed by the majority
of states
―Notice+‖ approach – A receiving attorney must provide notice to the sender and
take other steps to protect the confidential information
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29. Inadvertent Disclosure of Confidential Information
• Ethical and Legal Obligations of Receiving Attorneys
• In civil litigation in federal court, FRCP 26(b)(5)(B), Fed. R. Evid. 502 clawback
agreements, and case law should also be considered.
If the document was disclosed in discovery, the receiving attorney will have to
protect the confidentiality of the document in the short term, but may decide to seek
a court ruling that the privilege was waived, which will turn on the clawback
agreement or order (if there is one) or the court’s application of the waiver standard
found in Fed. R. Evid. 502(b).
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30. ABA Opinion 497
• Model Rules 1.9(a) and 1.18(c) prohibit a lawyer from representing anyone with interests that are
―materially adverse‖ to the interests of a former or prospective client in the same or a substantially
related matter.
• Clear examples:
Does not include mere competing economic interests (e.g., competitors in a marketplace);
Prohibits a lawyer from attacking own prior work for a client (e.g., challenging a patent the
lawyer prepared for a prior client).
• Opinion 497 explains ―material adversity‖ in more detail, providing three examples:
On one end of the spectrum, a lawyer cannot undermine prior work (as opposed to attacking it
outright) (e.g., a lawyer cannot sue to undermine an element of a settlement agreement he
helped negotiate);
Lawyer can generally sue a third party that has a business relationship with a former client;
and
Lawyer cannot represent a client in a case in which a former client may be an adverse
witness.
31. Can a Breach of Professional Duty Cause Forfeiture of
Fees?
Basic Answer: Sometimes. Here’s how it works:
• Most states have a general principle of fiduciary law that a fiduciary who is operating
under a significant breach of fiduciary duty is not entitled to compensation
There is interjurisdictional variation as to how serious the breach of fiduciary duty must
be to invoke this doctrine
Where the rule applies, in many states that means no compensation at all, not just the
avoiding of any contractual compensation in favor of quantum meruit
Which means that the rule is a complete defense to any claim for compensation
And it can ground a claim by the beneficiary for unjust enrichment to obtain the
disgorgement (repayment) of any compensation already paid (within the statute of
limitations)
• That matters here because lawyers are fiduciaries to their clients, and quite a few
jurisdictions have recognized this rule as applying to lawyers
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32. Can a Breach of Professional Duty Cause Forfeiture of
Fees?
• This raises the question what kind of breach of professional duty is sufficient work a
forfeiture of a lawyer’s compensation.
Answer: It varies from state to state
The most common kind of breach grounding a fee forfeiture is a serious conflict of
interest (no resulting harm to the client generally need be shown!)
But some courts are growing receptive to relying on other serious ethical breaches as
well. E.g., recent case of Vandenberg v. RQM, LLC, No. 1-19-0544 (Ill. App. June 26,
2020).
• Practice tips:
Figure out the law in your state
Conflicts of interest (and other breaches of duty) can not only get you disciplined and
disqualified; they can result in your forfeiting fees for work you already performed.
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33. Prohibitions on Discrimination or Harassment: Model
Rule 8.4(g)
• Let’s start by talking about prohibitions on discrimination and harassment outside the
Rules of Professional Conduct: Federal and most states’ law have powerful provisions
forbidding discrimination and harassment in the workplace, commerce, and elsewhere for
many different protected classes.
• In addition, many states’ Rules of Professional Conduct address discrimination by lawyers:
The original version of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct promulgated in 1983
contained a Comment to Model Rule 8.4 explaining that knowing manifestation of bias
or prejudice on any of numerous grounds ―in the course of representing a client‖ that
was ―prejudicial to the administration of justice‖ violates Rule 8.4(d), which forbids
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.
20-30 states adopted that Rule and Comment in identical or similar form, and still have
it in effect today.
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34. Prohibitions on Discrimination or Harassment: Model
Rule 8.4(g)
• In 2016, the ABA promulgated Model Rule 8.4(g), providing that it constitutes professional
misconduct to:
Engage in conduct that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is harassment
or discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion, national origin, ethnicity,
disability, age, sexual orientation, gender identity, marital status or socioeconomic
status in conduct related to the practice of law.
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35. Prohibitions on Discrimination or Harassment: Model
Rule 8.4(g)
• Conduct the new Rule says it does not prohibit:
It ―does not limit the ability of a lawyer to accept, decline or withdraw from a representation in
accordance with Rule 1.16‖
It also is not a violation to charge any fee authorized by Model Rule 1.5. Model Rule 8.4 Comment
[5]
It ―does not preclude legitimate advice or advocacy consistent with these Rules.‖ Expression of
views that are unpopular or offensive regarding matters of public concern does not violate the Rule,
consistent with the First Amendment rights of petition and free expression. ABA Formal Ethics Op.
No. 493.
It does not prohibit Conduct undertaken by lawyers or law firms to promote inclusiveness or diversity
in the workplace or the bar that are permitted under other applicable law. Model Rule 8.4 Comment
[4]
Discriminatory exercise of peremptory juror challenges in violation of Batson v. Kentucky does not by
itself establish a violation of the Rule. Model Rule 8.4 Comment [5]
It is not a violation to ―limit[] the scope or subject matter of the lawyer’s practice or . . . limit[] the
lawyer’s practice to members of underserved populations in accordance with these Rules and other
law.‖ Model Rule 8.4 Comment [5]
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36. Prohibitions on Discrimination or Harassment: Model Rule 8.4(g)
• How is the new Rule different from the interpretation of Rule 8.4(d) provided by the former
Comment?
The new Rule covers a broader range of protected classes, adding ethnicity, gender identity,
and marital status to the older Comment’s list.
The new Rule covers a significantly broader range of contexts:
The old Comment was limited to discriminatory conduct ―in the course of representing a
client‖ that was specifically ―prejudicial to the administration of justice,‖ which was generally
understood to mean it had affected, or at least taken place in, a pending proceeding
The new Rule defines the forbidden conduct to be any discriminatory or harassing activity,
adding an express prohibition on harassment
The new Rule has no requirement the conduct be ―prejudicial to the administration of
justice‖
And the new Rule applies to ―conduct related to the practice of law.‖ ―Conduct related to
the practice of law‖ is a much broader scope that ―includes representing clients; interacting
with witnesses, coworkers, court personnel, lawyers and others while engaged in the
practice of law; operating or managing a law firm or law practice; and participating in bar
association, busi-ness or social activities in connection with the practice of law‖
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37. Prohibitions on Discrimination or Harassment: Model
Rule 8.4(g)
• How is this new Rule different from the interpretation of Rule 8.4(d) provided by the former
Comment?
Although Model Rule 8.4 Comment [3] defines ―discrimination‖ and ―harassment‖ in
terms similar to other anti-discrimination laws, ABA Formal Ethics Op. No. 493 (2020)
suggests that ―discrimination‖ or ―harassment‖ need not be ―pervasive‖ or ―severe‖ to
violate the Rule, making the Rule more stringent than most anti-discrimination laws in
this regard
The new Rule has a less demanding intent standard
The old Comment was limited to ―knowingly‖ manifesting bias or prejudice
The new Rule forbids anything the lawyer ―knows or reasonably should know‖ is
discrimination or harassment
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38. Prohibitions on Discrimination or Harassment: Model
Rule 8.4(g)
• Very few states have adopted Model Rule 8.4(g)
Only Vermont, Maine, and three U.S. territories have adopted the new Rule.
Pennsylvania also adopted the new Rule in 2020, but a federal district judge has
preliminarily enjoined its enforcement on the ground it excessively chills speech
protected by the First Amendment. An appeal is currently pending.
• Given the broad patchwork of laws and regulations prohibiting discrimination and
harassment, the state of the ethical rules on this subject in your jurisdiction will probably
not change whether you will be in a world of hurt if you are shown to have engaged in
discrimination or harassment. The only thing it will change is whether you are censured,
suspended, or disbarred on top of everything else
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39. Bitcoin, other Cryptocurrency, and NFTs
• Lawyers can generally accept Bitcoin, other Cryptocurrency, or NFTs as payment
• The Washington, DC Bar recently released an ethics opinion (Opinion 378) approving of the practice:
Model Rules 1.1, 1.5, 1.8, and 1.15 apply
Rule 1.5: The fee must be reasonable.
Given the volatility of cryptocurrency, the financial risks of the fee arrangement to the client must
be adequately explained.
Rule 1.8(a): Business transactions with a client must be fair and reasonable, executed with informed
consent, and the client must be advised of the desirability of seeking advice of independent counsel.
Rule 1.8 is implicated when the fee arrangement requires advance payment of fees or when the
fee is calculated in cryptocurrency (rather than calculated in dollars and paid in cryptocurrency)
Fairness is evaluated at the time of the agreement
Lawyer should advise the client of all terms of payment in writing, including the financial risks to
the client
Rules 1.1 and 1.15: The lawyer must competently and appropriately safeguard client property
Lawyer must understand how cryptocurrency is stored, and how to keep it from being lost or
stolen
40. Lawyer Mobility and Client Choice of Counsel
• Lawyers departing their firms have an ethical duty to protect clients’ interests during the
transition.
• ABA Formal Ethics Opinion 489 (2019) reiterates that a lawyer has the right to switch firms
and notes that ethics rules do not allow non-competition agreements in legal employment
or firm membership agreements.
• When a lawyer is departing a firm, the lawyer and the firm must develop a plan that will
allow the client to make decisions about who will represent them. It is the client’s choice
of representation that governs; firms may not put in place rigid procedures that restrict or
interfere with the client’s choice in this regard.
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41. Can a lawyer representing him or herself receive an
award of attorneys’ fees per a statutory or
contractual provision?
• The general rule at the federal level is ―no‖ per Kay v. Erhler, 499 U.S. 432, 438 (1991):
• ―A rule that authorizes awards of counsel fees to pro se litigants—even if limited to those
who are members of the bar—would create a disincentive to employ counsel whenever such
a plaintiff considered himself competent to litigate on his own behalf. The statutory policy of
furthering the successful prosecution of meritorious claims is better served by a rule that
creates an incentive to retain counsel in every such case.‖
• This appears to be an extension of the hoary maxim that an attorney representing
themselves has a fool for a client and also appears to attempt to limit members of the bar
from ―do it yourself‖ work when they may be prone to litigate matters with excessive zeal
given that they are not having to pay a lawyer or find one willing to underwrite the litigation
under a contingency fee arrangement.
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42. Exceptions to Kay v. Erhler
Gregory G. Sarno, Recoupment by pro se litigant of attorney's fees under Equal Access to
Justice Act, 107 A.L.R. Fed. 888, § 2 (1992): ―While the Supreme Court held in Kay v Ehrler
… that pro se litigants who are attorneys were entitled to attorneys' fees under the Civil Rights
Attorney's Fee Awards Act of 1976 (42 U.S.C.A. § 1988), the courts have reached mixed
results as to whether, pursuant to the EAJA, pro se litigants who were attorneys should be
awarded attorneys' fees under particular circumstances. … Similarly, the courts have reached
mixed results in cases involving pro se litigants other than attorneys, awarding attorneys' fees
under the EAJA in one case, but denying them in other cases.‖) (internal citations omitted).).
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43. These Exceptions are Limited, but They Exist
• Rickley v. County of Los Angeles, 654 F.3d 950 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that Plaintiff was
entitled to reasonable fees under Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act for wife's work in §
1983 action).
• Krislov v. Rednour, 97 F.Supp.2d 862 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (holding that an attorney who
represented himself and other parties in civil rights suit recovered attorney fees).
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44. State Courts Largely Parallel the Federal Approach,
including the Exceptions
• Sonja A. Soehnel, Recovery Under State Law of Attorney's Fees by Lay Pro-se Litigant,
14 A.L.R.5th 947, § 1 (1993) (providing examples of cases in which state courts of various
jurisdictions have applied the general rule.)
• See Calhoun v. Calhoun, 529 S.E.2d 14 (S.C. 2000) (stating that ―whether a pro se litigant
who is an attorney should be allowed to recover attorney fees is a novel issue in this state
and that there is a split of authority on the issue in jurisdictions where it has been
addressed.‖) The South Carolina supreme court in Calhoun was under the impression that ―A
majority of those states have allowed pro se attorney litigants to recover attorney fees, while
the minority rule denies such relief." While this may have been true of the majority position in
2000, most of the more recent sources have suggested that the majority was in favor of
denying attorney fees, even to attorney pro se litigants.
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45. The Same Analysis Applies to Contractual Provisions
for Attorneys’ Fees
• Trope v. Katz, 902 P.2d 259, 264 (Cal. 1995), is typical.
• ―[A]ll the California courts that had considered the matter had held for many years that an
attorney appearing on his own behalf could not recover attorney fees under either a statutory
exception to the American rule or under a contractual attorney fee provision, because in such
circumstances the attorney did not pay or become liable to pay consideration in exchange for
legal representation.‖
• See, generally, Lonnie E. Griffith et al, Statute or rule authorizing attorney's fees—
Contract or Commercial Transaction Cases, 20 C.J.S. Costs § 139 (2021).
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47. About The Faculty
Michelle Gershfeld - MGershfeldlaw@gmail.com
Michelle Gershfeld is a bankruptcy attorney, debt negotiator and personal financial life coach
who advises people who are in debt, or building wealth, by identifying and overcoming
obstacles that lie in their path to securing worry-free, financial wellness. Michelle’s private
practice, Law Offices of Michelle Gershfeld, provides services to clients in financial distress to
create a strategic, customized plan for each unique financial situation. Michelle defends
foreclosures and evictions when necessary, and will assist clients to move forward with
dignity, despite current hardships. Michelle also works with commercial clients to reorganize
outside of a formal bankruptcy filing, which effectively serves businesses at reduced costs.
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48. About The Faculty
George Kuney - gkuney@utk.edu
George W. Kuney is a Lindsay Young Distinguished Professor of Law and Director of the Clayton Center for
Entrepreneurial Law at The University of Tennessee College of Law in Knoxville, Tennessee. He holds a J.D.
from the University of California, Hastings College of the Law, an M.B.A. from The University of San Diego, and
a B.A. in Economics from the University of California, Santa Cruz. Before joining the UT faculty in 2000, he was
a partner in the Allen Matkins firm’s San Diego office. Previously he practiced with the Howard Rice and
Morrison & Foerster firms in his hometown of San Francisco, doing litigation and transactional work largely in the
context of business restructuring and insolvency. He teaches business law courses including Business
Associations, Contracts, Contract Drafting, Commercial Law, Consumer Bankruptcy, Debtor-Creditor, Mergers
and Acquisitions, Representing Enterprises, and Workouts and Reorganizations. Kuney has written a number of
books and articles and given presentations about business, contracts, and commercial law and insolvency-
related topics. He advises clients nationwide regarding bankruptcy, restructuring, reorganization, and related
subjects. He is admitted to the bar in California and Tennessee.
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49. About The Faculty
Bernie Burk - bernie.burk@bernieburk.com
Professor Bernard Burk previously taught at the University of North Carolina School of Law.
He is currently sitting out the pandemic finishing a textbook on legal ethics, to be published
later this year by Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, entitled Ethical Lawyering: A Guide for the
Well-Intentioned (with Nancy Rapoport of the University of Nevada at Las Vegas School of
Law, and Veronica Finkelstein, Asst. U.S. Attorney for the E.D. Pa. and adjunct at Drexel
University School of Law). Prof. Burk engages in consulting and expert witness work in the
areas of legal ethics and professional conduct.
49
50. About The Faculty
Gerald Meyer - gmeyer@mololamken.com
Gerald Meyer’s practice focuses on complex business litigation, white collar criminal matters and
investigations, and appellate litigation. He has represented businesses, senior corporate officials, and
individuals in a broad array of subject matters, including securities litigation, class actions, antitrust law,
and constitutional law. He has tried cases to verdict and drafted and argued dispositive, discovery, and
evidentiary motions in trial courts across the country. He has argued appeals before the Seventh Circuit,
and has briefed appeals in the Supreme Court of the United States and numerous courts of appeals.
Before joining MoloLamken, Mr. Meyer was an associate with Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom
LLP in Chicago. He has represented companies and individuals in a wide range of tax planning matters,
including mergers and acquisitions, restructurings, securities offerings, and issues involving tax-exempt
organizations. Mr. Meyer also served as a law clerk to Judge Robert R. Beezer of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and to Judge G. Steven Agee of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit.
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51. Questions or Comments?
If you have any questions about this webinar that you did not get to ask during the live
premiere, or if you are watching this webinar On Demand, please do not hesitate to email us
at info@financialpoise.com with any questions or comments you may have. Please include
the name of the webinar in your email and we will do our best to provide a timely response.
IMPORTANT NOTE: The material in this presentation is for general educational purposes
only. It has been prepared primarily for attorneys and accountants for use in the pursuit of
their continuing legal education and continuing professional education.
51
52. About Financial Poise
52
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