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INTERNET ANONYMITY
By Brokemane
mobman has nothing to do with this bullshit stolen
powerpoint nor does JonDonym
THE INTRO BITCHES
 Introduction
 Types of Anonymity Systems
 TOR Overview
 Working Mechanism of TOR
 I2P Overview
 Mechanism of I2P
 Conclusion
INTRODUCTION, DERP LAST SLIDE WAS AN
INTRO ALSO WHO WROTE THIS SHIT??
 Anonymity means that the real author of a message
is not known
INTRODUCTION, REALLY A FOOKING
THIRD INTRO?
 Anonymity is a combination of both
Unidentifiability; observers cannot identify any
individual agent
Unlinkability; observers cannot link an agent to a
specific message or action
-- uh-um… They told us to say this
INTRODUCTION; DO ALL THESE SLIDES HAVE
INTRODUCTION?
Why is anonymity needed on Internet?
 Privacy
 Freedom of Speech
 Anti-cencorship
THIS ONE - MISSING A TITLE!!
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Steps to hide the real identity through several servers
DR. REV. POPE. SIR. PROXY(MANE)
SERVERS
The basic idea behind a proxy server is that a client
uses a proxy server to surf the web as in the figure
below.
REMAILERS
Remailers enable users to send electronic
messages through their server so that sender can not
be traced. Remailers typically remove all identifying
information from e-mails before forwarding them to
their destination.
Known examples are Cypherpunk, Mixmaster.
And Julian Assange’s email
MIX NETWORK
The basic building block of these systems, is a set of
mix processes where each mix process takes
ciphertext messages that are encrypted with the mix
process’s public key as inputs. Mix process groups
messages together as a batch and forwards the
encrypted messages to the next mix process at
certain flush times along with dummy messages.
No fooking idea
ONION ROUTING
The basic idea is very similar to the mix system but
performance is improved by using symmetric keys for
relaying messages and asymmetric keys to establish
circuits in the system.
SYMMETRIC ENCRYPTION
 Symmetric encryption is the oldest and best-known
technique. A secret key, which can be a number, a
word, or just a string of random letters, is applied to
the text of a message to change the content in a
particular way. This might be as simple as shifting
each letter by a number of places in the alphabet.
As long as both sender and recipient know the
secret key, they can encrypt and decrypt all
messages that use this key.
ASYMMETRIC ENCRYPTION
 The problem with secret keys is exchanging them over the Internet or a
large network while preventing them from falling into the wrong hands.
Anyone who knows the secret key can decrypt the message. One
answer is asymmetric encryption, in which there are two related keys--a
key pair. A public key is made freely available to anyone who might want
to send you a message. A second, private key is kept secret, so that only
you know it.
Any message (text, binary files, or documents) that are encrypted by
using the public key can only be decrypted by applying the same
algorithm, but by using the matching private key. Any message that is
encrypted by using the private key can only be decrypted by using the
matching public key.
This means that you do not have to worry about passing public keys over
the Internet (the keys are supposed to be public). A problem with
asymmetric encryption, however, is that it is slower than symmetric
encryption. It requires far more processing power to both encrypt and
decrypt the content of the message.
TOR
 The Tor (The Onion Router) Project is one of the
open-source solutions available to protect privacy
and security over the network communication.
PICTURES !!
 Originally developed by the US Naval Research
Laboratory and formerly funded by the Electronic
Frontier Foundation, Tor is designed to protect
users from traffic analysis and other kinds of
network surveillance.
--So they “say”
HOW TOR WORKS
HOW TOR WORKS
HOW TOR WORKS
HIDDEN SERVICES
 Tor also makes it possible for users to hide their
locations while offering various kinds of services,
such as web publishing or an instant messaging
server. Using Tor "rendezvous points," other Tor
users can connect to these hidden services, each
without knowing the other's network identity
Note: So they “Say”
CYPHERPUNKS RULE !!
 Keep in Mind!
TOR does not provide end-to-end encryption !!
Any unencrypted traffic sent through TOR will only be
protected until it exits the TOR network
I2P
 I2P (Invisible Internet Project) is an anonymous
network, exposing a simple layer that applications
can use to anonymously and securely send
messages to each other.
THIS IS CRAZY
MORE PICS THAT I DON’T WANNA EXPLAIN
 I2P works by routing traffic through other peers, as
shown in the picture. All traffic is encrypted end-to-
end.
CONCLUSION
Anonymity networks such as Tor & I2P can't solve all
anonymity problems. It focuses only on protecting the
transport of data.
Meaning you can easily Fcuk this up by going to your
FACEBOOK acct.
INTRODUCTION # 99
Also, to protect your anonymity, be smart. Don't
provide your name or other revealing information in
web forms.
-- Social Media will revel YOU !!
INTRODUCTION # 38
Be aware that, like all anonymizing networks that
are fast enough for web browsing, Tor does not
provide protection against end-to-end timing attacks:
If your attacker can watch the traffic coming out of
your computer, and also the traffic arriving at your
chosen destination, he can use statistical analysis to
discover that they are part of the same circuit.
Note: Akamai Technologies (formally Prolexic) is
WATCHING YOU!
FINAL INTRODUCTION
QUESTIONS ?
$1.99 dollar per question
Going to the proceeds to feed
brokemane @ cyber pizza cafe
 To gain higher protection of anonymity, a clever
impostor can use various techniques to make
identification more difficult. Examples of such
techniques are:
IP numbers, trace lists and other identification
can be falsified. Since this information is often
created in servers, it is easier to falsify them if you
have control of one or more servers.
 Even though anonymity and pseudonymity is not
something new with the Internet, the net has
increased the ease for a person to distribute
anonymous and pseudonymous messages.
Anonymity on the Internet is almost never 100 %,
there is always a possibility to find the perpetrator,
especially if the same person uses the same way to
gain anonymity multiple times.
 Anon.penet.fri was a pseudonymity server started
by Johan Helsingius in Finland in 1992. It was very
popular by people in other countries, since they
thought that relaying messages through an
anonymity server in Finland would reduce the risk
of their real identity being divulged. At its peak, it
had 500 000 registered users and transferred 10
000 messages per day.
Percentage Topic
18,8 % Sex
18,5 % Partner search ad
9,4 % Test
8,7 % Software
5,8 % Hobby, work
4,7 % Unclassified
4,3 % Computer hardware
4,0 % Religion
3,6 % Picture
2,5 % Races, racism
2,5 % Politics
2,2 % Internet etiquette (people complaining of other
people's misuse of the net sometimes wrote
anonymously)
1,4 % Personal criticism of identified person
1,4 % Internet reference
1,4 % Ads selling something
1,4 % Psychology
1,1 % War, violence
1,1 % Drugs except pharmaceutical drugs)
1,1 % Ethics
1,1 % Contact ad which was not partner ad
0,7 % Poetry
0,7 % Celebrity gossip
0,7 % Pharmaceutical drugs
0,4 % Fiction
0,4 % Censorship

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Anonymizers

  • 1. INTERNET ANONYMITY By Brokemane mobman has nothing to do with this bullshit stolen powerpoint nor does JonDonym
  • 2. THE INTRO BITCHES  Introduction  Types of Anonymity Systems  TOR Overview  Working Mechanism of TOR  I2P Overview  Mechanism of I2P  Conclusion
  • 3. INTRODUCTION, DERP LAST SLIDE WAS AN INTRO ALSO WHO WROTE THIS SHIT??  Anonymity means that the real author of a message is not known
  • 4. INTRODUCTION, REALLY A FOOKING THIRD INTRO?  Anonymity is a combination of both Unidentifiability; observers cannot identify any individual agent Unlinkability; observers cannot link an agent to a specific message or action -- uh-um… They told us to say this
  • 5. INTRODUCTION; DO ALL THESE SLIDES HAVE INTRODUCTION? Why is anonymity needed on Internet?  Privacy  Freedom of Speech  Anti-cencorship
  • 6. THIS ONE - MISSING A TITLE!! sentto-1119315-3675-1008119937-jpalme=dsv.su.se@returns.groups.yahoo.com Received: from n12.groups.yahoo.com (n12.groups.yahoo.com [216.115.96.62]) by unni.dsv.su.se (8.9.3/8.9.3) with SMTP id CAA21903 for <jpalme@dsv.su.se>; Wed, 12 Dec 2001 02:19:32 +0100 (MET) X-eGroups-Return: sentto-1119315-3675-1008119937-jpalme=dsv.su.se@returns.groups.yahoo.com Received: from [216.115.97.162] by n12.groups.yahoo.com with NNFMP; 12 Dec 2001 01:19:00 -0000 Received: (qmail 11251 invoked from network); 12 Dec 2001 01:18:56 -0000 Received: from unknown (216.115.97.167) by m8.grp.snv.yahoo.com with QMQP; 12 Dec 2001 01:18:56 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO n26.groups.yahoo.com) (216.115.96.76) by mta1.grp.snv.yahoo.com with SMTP; 12 Dec 2001 01:18:59 -0000 X-eGroups-Return: lizard@mrlizard.com Received: from [216.115.96.110] by n26.groups.yahoo.com with NNFMP; 12 Dec 2001 01:12:56 -0000 X-eGroups-Approved-By: simparl <simparl@aol.com> via web; 12 Dec 2001 01:18:15 -0000 X-Sender: lizard@mrlizard.com X-Apparently-To: web-law@yahoogroups.com Received: (EGP: mail-8_0_1_2); 11 Dec 2001 20:50:42 -0000 Received: (qmail 68836 invoked from network); 11 Dec 2001 20:50:42 -0000 Received: from unknown (216.115.97.172) by m12.grp.snv.yahoo.com with QMQP; 11 Dec 2001 20:50:42 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO micexchange.loanperformance.com) (64.57.138.217) by mta2.grp.snv.yahoo.com with SMTP; 11 Dec 2001 20:50:40 -0000 Received: from mrlizard.com (IAN2 [192.168.1.119]) by micexchange.loanperformance.com with SMTP (Microsoft Exchange Internet Mail Service Version 5.5.2653.13) id W11PL97B; Tue, 11 Dec 2001 12:53:11 -0800
  • 7. Steps to hide the real identity through several servers
  • 8. DR. REV. POPE. SIR. PROXY(MANE) SERVERS The basic idea behind a proxy server is that a client uses a proxy server to surf the web as in the figure below.
  • 9. REMAILERS Remailers enable users to send electronic messages through their server so that sender can not be traced. Remailers typically remove all identifying information from e-mails before forwarding them to their destination. Known examples are Cypherpunk, Mixmaster. And Julian Assange’s email
  • 10. MIX NETWORK The basic building block of these systems, is a set of mix processes where each mix process takes ciphertext messages that are encrypted with the mix process’s public key as inputs. Mix process groups messages together as a batch and forwards the encrypted messages to the next mix process at certain flush times along with dummy messages.
  • 12. ONION ROUTING The basic idea is very similar to the mix system but performance is improved by using symmetric keys for relaying messages and asymmetric keys to establish circuits in the system.
  • 13. SYMMETRIC ENCRYPTION  Symmetric encryption is the oldest and best-known technique. A secret key, which can be a number, a word, or just a string of random letters, is applied to the text of a message to change the content in a particular way. This might be as simple as shifting each letter by a number of places in the alphabet. As long as both sender and recipient know the secret key, they can encrypt and decrypt all messages that use this key.
  • 14. ASYMMETRIC ENCRYPTION  The problem with secret keys is exchanging them over the Internet or a large network while preventing them from falling into the wrong hands. Anyone who knows the secret key can decrypt the message. One answer is asymmetric encryption, in which there are two related keys--a key pair. A public key is made freely available to anyone who might want to send you a message. A second, private key is kept secret, so that only you know it. Any message (text, binary files, or documents) that are encrypted by using the public key can only be decrypted by applying the same algorithm, but by using the matching private key. Any message that is encrypted by using the private key can only be decrypted by using the matching public key. This means that you do not have to worry about passing public keys over the Internet (the keys are supposed to be public). A problem with asymmetric encryption, however, is that it is slower than symmetric encryption. It requires far more processing power to both encrypt and decrypt the content of the message.
  • 15. TOR  The Tor (The Onion Router) Project is one of the open-source solutions available to protect privacy and security over the network communication.
  • 17.  Originally developed by the US Naval Research Laboratory and formerly funded by the Electronic Frontier Foundation, Tor is designed to protect users from traffic analysis and other kinds of network surveillance. --So they “say”
  • 21. HIDDEN SERVICES  Tor also makes it possible for users to hide their locations while offering various kinds of services, such as web publishing or an instant messaging server. Using Tor "rendezvous points," other Tor users can connect to these hidden services, each without knowing the other's network identity Note: So they “Say”
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  • 26. CYPHERPUNKS RULE !!  Keep in Mind! TOR does not provide end-to-end encryption !! Any unencrypted traffic sent through TOR will only be protected until it exits the TOR network
  • 27. I2P  I2P (Invisible Internet Project) is an anonymous network, exposing a simple layer that applications can use to anonymously and securely send messages to each other.
  • 29. MORE PICS THAT I DON’T WANNA EXPLAIN  I2P works by routing traffic through other peers, as shown in the picture. All traffic is encrypted end-to- end.
  • 30. CONCLUSION Anonymity networks such as Tor & I2P can't solve all anonymity problems. It focuses only on protecting the transport of data. Meaning you can easily Fcuk this up by going to your FACEBOOK acct.
  • 31. INTRODUCTION # 99 Also, to protect your anonymity, be smart. Don't provide your name or other revealing information in web forms. -- Social Media will revel YOU !!
  • 32. INTRODUCTION # 38 Be aware that, like all anonymizing networks that are fast enough for web browsing, Tor does not provide protection against end-to-end timing attacks: If your attacker can watch the traffic coming out of your computer, and also the traffic arriving at your chosen destination, he can use statistical analysis to discover that they are part of the same circuit. Note: Akamai Technologies (formally Prolexic) is WATCHING YOU!
  • 33. FINAL INTRODUCTION QUESTIONS ? $1.99 dollar per question Going to the proceeds to feed brokemane @ cyber pizza cafe
  • 34.  To gain higher protection of anonymity, a clever impostor can use various techniques to make identification more difficult. Examples of such techniques are: IP numbers, trace lists and other identification can be falsified. Since this information is often created in servers, it is easier to falsify them if you have control of one or more servers.
  • 35.  Even though anonymity and pseudonymity is not something new with the Internet, the net has increased the ease for a person to distribute anonymous and pseudonymous messages. Anonymity on the Internet is almost never 100 %, there is always a possibility to find the perpetrator, especially if the same person uses the same way to gain anonymity multiple times.
  • 36.  Anon.penet.fri was a pseudonymity server started by Johan Helsingius in Finland in 1992. It was very popular by people in other countries, since they thought that relaying messages through an anonymity server in Finland would reduce the risk of their real identity being divulged. At its peak, it had 500 000 registered users and transferred 10 000 messages per day.
  • 37. Percentage Topic 18,8 % Sex 18,5 % Partner search ad 9,4 % Test 8,7 % Software 5,8 % Hobby, work 4,7 % Unclassified 4,3 % Computer hardware 4,0 % Religion 3,6 % Picture 2,5 % Races, racism 2,5 % Politics 2,2 % Internet etiquette (people complaining of other people's misuse of the net sometimes wrote anonymously) 1,4 % Personal criticism of identified person 1,4 % Internet reference 1,4 % Ads selling something 1,4 % Psychology 1,1 % War, violence 1,1 % Drugs except pharmaceutical drugs) 1,1 % Ethics 1,1 % Contact ad which was not partner ad 0,7 % Poetry 0,7 % Celebrity gossip 0,7 % Pharmaceutical drugs 0,4 % Fiction 0,4 % Censorship