1.2 PLATO’S ALLEGORY OF THE CAVEWe can follow some of Socrates’
Sample Lecture, On Lacan
1. Note: this material was originally posted on www.jameselkins.com, under “Syllabi.” Send all comments to jelkins@artic.edu
2. Topic 4
Lacan
Note to viewers: this is a partial version of a lecture given in a Freshman course, “Issues in Visual
and Critical Studies.” I have uploaded it here to test Slideshare. It appears Slideshare lowers
screen resolution, removes fades and dissolves, misrepresents motions (wipes), and imposes a
standard slideshow interval on all slide transitions—it does not seem to do a very good job.
Note: this material was originally posted on www.jameselkins.com, under “Syllabi.” Send all comments to jelkins@artic.edu
3.
4. General remarks on psychoanalysis as criticism
versus psychoanalysis as clinical practice
5. General remarks on psychoanalysis as criticism
versus psychoanalysis as clinical practice
Psychoanalysis in general is taught throughout the
humanities—in English, literature, art, art history,
etc.—but not in psychology departments, and it is
not widely used as a clinical strategy.
6. General remarks on psychoanalysis as criticism
versus psychoanalysis as clinical practice
Psychoanalysis in general is taught throughout the
humanities—in English, literature, art, art history,
etc.—but not in psychology departments, and it is
not widely used as a clinical strategy.
This is quantified in American Psychoanalytic
Association journal, c. November 2007: of more
than 1,175 courses that refer to Freud, more than
86 percent were outside psychology departments.
7. General remarks on psychoanalysis as criticism
versus psychoanalysis as clinical practice
Psychoanalysis in general is taught throughout the
humanities—in English, literature, art, art history,
etc.—but not in psychology departments, and it is
not widely used as a clinical strategy.
This is quantified in American Psychoanalytic
Association journal, c. November 2007: of more
than 1,175 courses that refer to Freud, more than
86 percent were outside psychology departments.
There are also distinctions to be made between
Freud, Lacan, and Jung—we will encounter some
differences here, and some later in the course.
11. Needless to say this text is difficult, but it can be approached by
concentrating on key concepts. That strategy is not out of line
with uses of Lacan in the art world, which are often fragmentary.
12. Needless to say this text is difficult, but it can be approached by
concentrating on key concepts. That strategy is not out of line
with uses of Lacan in the art world, which are often fragmentary.
13. Needless to say this text is difficult, but it can be approached by
concentrating on key concepts. That strategy is not out of line
with uses of Lacan in the art world, which are often fragmentary.
14. Needless to say this text is difficult, but it can be approached by
concentrating on key concepts. That strategy is not out of line
with uses of Lacan in the art world, which are often fragmentary.
Here is the theme of
the difference between
the philosophic subject
(“I”) as it is known to
philosophy since
Descartes (recall
“cogito ergo sum”),
and “as we experience
it in psychoanalysis.”
15. Needless to say this text is difficult, but it can be approached by
concentrating on key concepts. That strategy is not out of line
with uses of Lacan in the art world, which are often fragmentary.
Here is the theme of
the difference between
the philosophic subject
(“I”) as it is known to
philosophy since
Descartes (recall
“cogito ergo sum”),
and “as we experience
it in psychoanalysis.”
16. Needless to say this text is difficult, but it can be approached by
concentrating on key concepts. That strategy is not out of line
with uses of Lacan in the art world, which are often fragmentary.
Here is the theme of
the difference between
the philosophic subject
(“I”) as it is known to
philosophy since
Descartes (recall
“cogito ergo sum”),
and “as we experience
it in psychoanalysis.”
This account is going to be a psychoanalytic re-interpretation of the
origin of the “I” that is different from Descartes’s idea of the cogito.
17.
18. Page 2, ¶ 2:
The simple fact that infants and monkeys discover their mirror reflections
leads Lacan to think that (a) “libidinal dynamism” is involved, and (b) an
“ontological structure” is revealed:
19. Page 2, ¶ 2:
The simple fact that infants and monkeys discover their mirror reflections
leads Lacan to think that (a) “libidinal dynamism” is involved, and (b) an
“ontological structure” is revealed:
20. Page 2, ¶ 2:
The simple fact that infants and monkeys discover their mirror reflections
leads Lacan to think that (a) “libidinal dynamism” is involved, and (b) an
“ontological structure” is revealed:
21. Page 2, ¶ 2:
The simple fact that infants and monkeys discover their mirror reflections
leads Lacan to think that (a) “libidinal dynamism” is involved, and (b) an
“ontological structure” is revealed:
By “libidinal dynamism” he means an inner
dynamics, a drama, within the libido. (That is
from Freud’s second topography; the Libido
is the source of instinctual drives. More on
this in the next screen.)
22. Page 2, ¶ 2:
The simple fact that infants and monkeys discover their mirror reflections
leads Lacan to think that (a) “libidinal dynamism” is involved, and (b) an
“ontological structure” is revealed:
By “libidinal dynamism” he means an inner
dynamics, a drama, within the libido. (That is
from Freud’s second topography; the Libido
is the source of instinctual drives. More on
this in the next screen.)
The mirror stage—the infant’s reaction to its
reflection—changes the configuration of its
unconscious drives.
23. Page 2, ¶ 2:
The simple fact that infants and monkeys discover their mirror reflections
leads Lacan to think that (a) “libidinal dynamism” is involved, and (b) an
“ontological structure” is revealed:
By “libidinal dynamism” he means an inner
dynamics, a drama, within the libido. (That is
from Freud’s second topography; the Libido
is the source of instinctual drives. More on
this in the next screen.)
The mirror stage—the infant’s reaction to its
reflection—changes the configuration of its
unconscious drives.
24. Page 2, ¶ 2:
The simple fact that infants and monkeys discover their mirror reflections
leads Lacan to think that (a) “libidinal dynamism” is involved, and (b) an
“ontological structure” is revealed:
By “libidinal dynamism” he means an inner Ontology is the philosophic study of
dynamics, a drama, within the libido. (That is being: for example, the idea of a dog
from Freud’s second topography; the Libido has a different “ontological status” than
is the source of instinctual drives. More on an actual dog: it exists in a different
this in the next screen.) sense.
The mirror stage—the infant’s reaction to its
reflection—changes the configuration of its
unconscious drives.
25. Page 2, ¶ 2:
The simple fact that infants and monkeys discover their mirror reflections
leads Lacan to think that (a) “libidinal dynamism” is involved, and (b) an
“ontological structure” is revealed:
By “libidinal dynamism” he means an inner Ontology is the philosophic study of
dynamics, a drama, within the libido. (That is being: for example, the idea of a dog
from Freud’s second topography; the Libido has a different “ontological status” than
is the source of instinctual drives. More on an actual dog: it exists in a different
this in the next screen.) sense.
The mirror stage—the infant’s reaction to its The implication is that the mirror stage
reflection—changes the configuration of its will affect the infant’s sense of how it
unconscious drives. exists in the world.
28. A note on first and second topographies
Freud’s first topography of the psyche: Conscious, Unconscious, Preconscious = Cs., Ucs.,
Pcs. (note not “subconscious”)
29. A note on first and second topographies
Freud’s first topography of the psyche: Conscious, Unconscious, Preconscious = Cs., Ucs.,
Pcs. (note not “subconscious”)
Freud compared the conscious and unconscious to an iceberg:
30. A note on first and second topographies
Freud’s first topography of the psyche: Conscious, Unconscious, Preconscious = Cs., Ucs.,
Pcs. (note not “subconscious”)
Freud compared the conscious and unconscious to an iceberg:
31. A note on first and second topographies
Freud’s first topography of the psyche: Conscious, Unconscious, Preconscious = Cs., Ucs.,
Pcs. (note not “subconscious”)
Freud compared the conscious and unconscious to an iceberg:
32.
33. Second topography of the psyche: ego, id, superego. People who visualize Freud’s “iceberg
metaphor” have to invent the places of ego, superego, and id.
34. Second topography of the psyche: ego, id, superego. People who visualize Freud’s “iceberg
metaphor” have to invent the places of ego, superego, and id.
35.
36. Page 2, ¶ 3:
Lacan prefers the “ancient” word imago for the image in the mirror:
37. Page 2, ¶ 3:
Lacan prefers the “ancient” word imago for the image in the mirror:
That is presumably because it refers to a “phase-effect.” Here is the
Oxford English Dictionary definition:
38. Page 2, ¶ 3:
Lacan prefers the “ancient” word imago for the image in the mirror:
That is presumably because it refers to a “phase-effect.” Here is the
Oxford English Dictionary definition:
The final and perfect stage or form of an insect after it has undergone
all its metamorphoses; the “perfect insect.”
39. Page 2, ¶ 3:
Lacan prefers the “ancient” word imago for the image in the mirror:
That is presumably because it refers to a “phase-effect.” Here is the
Oxford English Dictionary definition:
The final and perfect stage or form of an insect after it has undergone
all its metamorphoses; the “perfect insect.”
There was also a psychoanalytic meaning for this word, in
use according to the OED since 1916:
40. Page 2, ¶ 3:
Lacan prefers the “ancient” word imago for the image in the mirror:
That is presumably because it refers to a “phase-effect.” Here is the
Oxford English Dictionary definition:
The final and perfect stage or form of an insect after it has undergone
all its metamorphoses; the “perfect insect.”
There was also a psychoanalytic meaning for this word, in
use according to the OED since 1916:
A subjective image of someone (esp. a parent) which a person has
subconsciously formed and which continues to influence his
attitudes and behavior. So father-imago, mother-imago.
41.
42. Page 2, ¶ 4:
What is the infant before it encounters the mirror image?
43. Page 2, ¶ 4:
What is the infant before it encounters the mirror image?
44. Page 2, ¶ 4:
What is the infant before it encounters the mirror image?
45. Page 2, ¶ 4:
What is the infant before it encounters the mirror image?
Its “motor incapacity” and
“nursling dependence” mean
that it has limited sense of
itself as a unified thing, a
philosophic subject.
46. Page 2, ¶ 4:
What is the infant before it encounters the mirror image?
Its “motor incapacity” and
“nursling dependence” mean
that it has limited sense of
itself as a unified thing, a
philosophic subject.
At one moment it is the
breast, at another it is crying,
at another it is a sum of
flailing limbs...
47. Page 2, ¶ 4:
What is the infant before it encounters the mirror image?
Its “motor incapacity” and
“nursling dependence” mean
that it has limited sense of
itself as a unified thing, a
philosophic subject.
At one moment it is the
breast, at another it is crying,
at another it is a sum of
flailing limbs...
48. Page 2, ¶ 4:
What is the infant before it encounters the mirror image?
In that situation the “I” takes on a
Its “motor incapacity” and
“primordial form.”
“nursling dependence” mean
that it has limited sense of
The “situation” is a “symbolic
itself as a unified thing, a
matrix”: it has to do with what
philosophic subject.
Lacan calls the symbolic register,
that region of the psyche that is
At one moment it is the
comprised of symbols (signs, ideas,
breast, at another it is crying,
and finally language...).
at another it is a sum of
flailing limbs...
There are three registers: the
others are the imaginary and the
real. (Images and the inaccessible
real world, or rather ideas of it).
49. Page 2, ¶ 4:
What is the infant before it encounters the mirror image?
In that situation the “I” takes on a
Its “motor incapacity” and
“primordial form.”
“nursling dependence” mean
that it has limited sense of
The “situation” is a “symbolic
itself as a unified thing, a
matrix”: it has to do with what
philosophic subject.
Lacan calls the symbolic register,
that region of the psyche that is
At one moment it is the
comprised of symbols (signs, ideas,
breast, at another it is crying,
and finally language...).
at another it is a sum of
flailing limbs...
There are three registers: the
others are the imaginary and the
real. (Images and the inaccessible
real world, or rather ideas of it).
50. Page 2, ¶ 4:
What is the infant before it encounters the mirror image?
The mirror stage
In that situation the “I” takes on a “objectifies” the infant:
Its “motor incapacity” and
“primordial form.” remakes it, in its own eyes, as
“nursling dependence” mean
a thing or an object.
that it has limited sense of
The “situation” is a “symbolic
itself as a unified thing, a
matrix”: it has to do with what That happens through
philosophic subject.
Lacan calls the symbolic register, “dialectical exchange” with
that region of the psyche that is the other (usually mother!)
At one moment it is the
comprised of symbols (signs, ideas,
breast, at another it is crying,
and finally language...). And finally language gives it
at another it is a sum of
its final sense of itself—its
flailing limbs...
There are three registers: the “universal” awareness of
others are the imaginary and the itself as an entity among
real. (Images and the inaccessible others.
real world, or rather ideas of it).
54. A note on dialectics
Four definitions:
1. Medieval usage: in pedagogy, from the medieval period to the present: it means
argument, debate, discussion of presuppositions, testing and falsification (as in Popper)…
55. A note on dialectics
Four definitions:
1. Medieval usage: in pedagogy, from the medieval period to the present: it means
argument, debate, discussion of presuppositions, testing and falsification (as in Popper)…
2. Hegelian dialectics: “διαλεκτική is controversy… the exchange of arguments and
counter-arguments respectively advocating propositions (theses) and counter-
propositions (antitheses). The outcome of the exercise might not simply be the
refutation of one of the relevant points of view, but a synthesis or combination of the
opposing assertions, or at least a qualitative transformation in the direction of the
dialogue.” (From Wikipedia, which is borrowing from A.J. Ayer and J.M.E. McTaggart)
56. A note on dialectics
Four definitions:
1. Medieval usage: in pedagogy, from the medieval period to the present: it means
argument, debate, discussion of presuppositions, testing and falsification (as in Popper)…
2. Hegelian dialectics: “διαλεκτική is controversy… the exchange of arguments and
counter-arguments respectively advocating propositions (theses) and counter-
propositions (antitheses). The outcome of the exercise might not simply be the
refutation of one of the relevant points of view, but a synthesis or combination of the
opposing assertions, or at least a qualitative transformation in the direction of the
dialogue.” (From Wikipedia, which is borrowing from A.J. Ayer and J.M.E. McTaggart)
3. In Marxism, it is an ongoing, historical process, which acknowledges the current
condition of things as well as their negation, their “inevitable breaking up.” In Capital,
“every historically developed social form [is] in fluid movement.”
57. A note on dialectics
Four definitions:
1. Medieval usage: in pedagogy, from the medieval period to the present: it means
argument, debate, discussion of presuppositions, testing and falsification (as in Popper)…
2. Hegelian dialectics: “διαλεκτική is controversy… the exchange of arguments and
counter-arguments respectively advocating propositions (theses) and counter-
propositions (antitheses). The outcome of the exercise might not simply be the
refutation of one of the relevant points of view, but a synthesis or combination of the
opposing assertions, or at least a qualitative transformation in the direction of the
dialogue.” (From Wikipedia, which is borrowing from A.J. Ayer and J.M.E. McTaggart)
3. In Marxism, it is an ongoing, historical process, which acknowledges the current
condition of things as well as their negation, their “inevitable breaking up.” In Capital,
“every historically developed social form [is] in fluid movement.”
4. In vernacular usage, it is reduced to the idea of opposition, duality, or polarity. (But in
the arts and humanities it is more a mixture of nos. 2 and 3—it denotes ongoing,
irresolvable interdependence.)
58.
59. Page 2, ¶ 5, sentence 2:
This encounter with the imago remains “fictional”:
60. Page 2, ¶ 5, sentence 2:
This encounter with the imago remains “fictional”:
61. Page 2, ¶ 5, sentence 2:
This encounter with the imago remains “fictional”:
62. Page 2, ¶ 5, sentence 2:
This encounter with the imago remains “fictional”:
The encounter with the
imago affects the “agency of
the ego” in a “fictional” way:
63. Page 2, ¶ 5, sentence 2:
This encounter with the imago remains “fictional”:
The encounter with the
imago affects the “agency of
the ego” in a “fictional” way:
I.e., the mirror stage gives the
infant a fictional sense of
itself, its wholeness, its unity,
its difference from others,
64. Page 2, ¶ 5, sentence 2:
This encounter with the imago remains “fictional”:
The encounter with the
imago affects the “agency of
the ego” in a “fictional” way:
I.e., the mirror stage gives the
infant a fictional sense of
itself, its wholeness, its unity,
its difference from others,
—and it carries that fiction
with it through adulthood
65. Page 2, ¶ 5, sentence 2:
This encounter with the imago remains “fictional”:
The encounter with the
imago affects the “agency of
the ego” in a “fictional” way:
I.e., the mirror stage gives the
infant a fictional sense of
itself, its wholeness, its unity,
its difference from others,
—and it carries that fiction
with it through adulthood
66. Page 2, ¶ 5, sentence 2:
This encounter with the imago remains “fictional”:
The encounter with the Each of us is in “discord with [our] own [sense of] reality.”
imago affects the “agency of
the ego” in a “fictional” way:
I.e., the mirror stage gives the
infant a fictional sense of
itself, its wholeness, its unity,
its difference from others,
—and it carries that fiction
with it through adulthood
67. Page 2, ¶ 5, sentence 2:
This encounter with the imago remains “fictional”:
The encounter with the Each of us is in “discord with [our] own [sense of] reality.”
imago affects the “agency of
the ego” in a “fictional” way: That is, our self-image is always being adjusted to fit with the
ways that the Real seems to be impinging on us.
I.e., the mirror stage gives the
infant a fictional sense of
itself, its wholeness, its unity,
its difference from others,
—and it carries that fiction
with it through adulthood
68. Page 2, ¶ 5, sentence 2:
This encounter with the imago remains “fictional”:
The encounter with the Each of us is in “discord with [our] own [sense of] reality.”
imago affects the “agency of
the ego” in a “fictional” way: That is, our self-image is always being adjusted to fit with the
ways that the Real seems to be impinging on us.
I.e., the mirror stage gives the
infant a fictional sense of A “dialectical synthesis” governs this maladjustment. The
itself, its wholeness, its unity, result is the “I.”
its difference from others,
—and it carries that fiction
with it through adulthood
69. Page 2, ¶ 5, sentence 2:
This encounter with the imago remains “fictional”:
The encounter with the Each of us is in “discord with [our] own [sense of] reality.”
imago affects the “agency of
the ego” in a “fictional” way: That is, our self-image is always being adjusted to fit with the
ways that the Real seems to be impinging on us.
I.e., the mirror stage gives the
infant a fictional sense of A “dialectical synthesis” governs this maladjustment. The
itself, its wholeness, its unity, result is the “I.”
its difference from others,
The mirror stage imago is never necessarily in accord with
—and it carries that fiction the “I”: it can rejoin asymptotically, perhaps, but not be in
with it through adulthood perfect coincidence.
73. Page 4, ¶ 2:
(Skipping a couple of pages...)
The mirror stage is fundamental to the negotiation, and also the
conceptualization, of the difference between inner and outer. (German
Innenwelt = “inner world,” Umwelt = “outer” or “surrounding world”)
74. Page 4, ¶ 2:
(Skipping a couple of pages...)
The mirror stage is fundamental to the negotiation, and also the
conceptualization, of the difference between inner and outer. (German
Innenwelt = “inner world,” Umwelt = “outer” or “surrounding world”)
Lacan’s sense is that the mirror stage is an encounter of infancy, but also
an ongoing—permanent, adult—component of our sense of self. (This is
from a 1950s revision of his 1936 paper.)
75. Page 4, ¶ 2:
(Skipping a couple of pages...)
The mirror stage is fundamental to the negotiation, and also the
conceptualization, of the difference between inner and outer. (German
Innenwelt = “inner world,” Umwelt = “outer” or “surrounding world”)
Lacan’s sense is that the mirror stage is an encounter of infancy, but also
an ongoing—permanent, adult—component of our sense of self. (This is
from a 1950s revision of his 1936 paper.)
The account is non-Cartesian because it posits
76. Page 4, ¶ 2:
(Skipping a couple of pages...)
The mirror stage is fundamental to the negotiation, and also the
conceptualization, of the difference between inner and outer. (German
Innenwelt = “inner world,” Umwelt = “outer” or “surrounding world”)
Lacan’s sense is that the mirror stage is an encounter of infancy, but also
an ongoing—permanent, adult—component of our sense of self. (This is
from a 1950s revision of his 1936 paper.)
The account is non-Cartesian because it posits
(a) a different “libidinal dynamism”—Lacan’s account is not about a cogito
that is given at birth, as a soul, by God; it develops in complicated ways
77. Page 4, ¶ 2:
(Skipping a couple of pages...)
The mirror stage is fundamental to the negotiation, and also the
conceptualization, of the difference between inner and outer. (German
Innenwelt = “inner world,” Umwelt = “outer” or “surrounding world”)
Lacan’s sense is that the mirror stage is an encounter of infancy, but also
an ongoing—permanent, adult—component of our sense of self. (This is
from a 1950s revision of his 1936 paper.)
The account is non-Cartesian because it posits
(a) a different “libidinal dynamism”—Lacan’s account is not about a cogito
that is given at birth, as a soul, by God; it develops in complicated ways
(b) a different “ontological structure”—Lacan’s account is not about a
cogito that presupposes a separate outside world, but exists as different
structures in the psyche
80. Introducing Lacan’s model of vision
This is the subject of the last section of Lacan’s model in “The End of the Theory of the Gaze,”
which we will read as Topic 5.
81. Introducing Lacan’s model of vision
This is the subject of the last section of Lacan’s model in “The End of the Theory of the Gaze,”
which we will read as Topic 5.
In Lacan, vision is based on a traditional diagram of vision that is found in texts in the middle
ages, and goes back to Euclid’s Optics:
82. Introducing Lacan’s model of vision
This is the subject of the last section of Lacan’s model in “The End of the Theory of the Gaze,”
which we will read as Topic 5.
In Lacan, vision is based on a traditional diagram of vision that is found in texts in the middle
ages, and goes back to Euclid’s Optics:
83. Introducing Lacan’s model of vision
This is the subject of the last section of Lacan’s model in “The End of the Theory of the Gaze,”
which we will read as Topic 5.
In Lacan, vision is based on a traditional diagram of vision that is found in texts in the middle
ages, and goes back to Euclid’s Optics:
The eye (yours; the subject itself)
84. Introducing Lacan’s model of vision
This is the subject of the last section of Lacan’s model in “The End of the Theory of the Gaze,”
which we will read as Topic 5.
In Lacan, vision is based on a traditional diagram of vision that is found in texts in the middle
ages, and goes back to Euclid’s Optics:
The eye (yours; the subject itself)
85. Introducing Lacan’s model of vision
This is the subject of the last section of Lacan’s model in “The End of the Theory of the Gaze,”
which we will read as Topic 5.
In Lacan, vision is based on a traditional diagram of vision that is found in texts in the middle
ages, and goes back to Euclid’s Optics:
The eye (yours; the subject itself)
Lines of sight (not necessarily
flowing to the eye)
86. Introducing Lacan’s model of vision
This is the subject of the last section of Lacan’s model in “The End of the Theory of the Gaze,”
which we will read as Topic 5.
In Lacan, vision is based on a traditional diagram of vision that is found in texts in the middle
ages, and goes back to Euclid’s Optics:
The eye (yours; the subject itself)
Lines of sight (not necessarily
flowing to the eye)
87. Introducing Lacan’s model of vision
This is the subject of the last section of Lacan’s model in “The End of the Theory of the Gaze,”
which we will read as Topic 5.
In Lacan, vision is based on a traditional diagram of vision that is found in texts in the middle
ages, and goes back to Euclid’s Optics:
The eye (yours; the subject itself)
The object, or the world, or Lines of sight (not necessarily
the person who is seen flowing to the eye)
88.
89. In the Renaissance, the diagram’s middle line—sometimes absent in medieval
texts—acquired a new significance: it was the plane of projection,
90. In the Renaissance, the diagram’s middle line—sometimes absent in medieval
texts—acquired a new significance: it was the plane of projection,
the picture plane or just picture, the “window” or velo that interposes itself
between the world and the eye:
91. In the Renaissance, the diagram’s middle line—sometimes absent in medieval
texts—acquired a new significance: it was the plane of projection,
the picture plane or just picture, the “window” or velo that interposes itself
between the world and the eye:
92. In the Renaissance, the diagram’s middle line—sometimes absent in medieval
texts—acquired a new significance: it was the plane of projection,
the picture plane or just picture, the “window” or velo that interposes itself
between the world and the eye:
93. In the Renaissance, the diagram’s middle line—sometimes absent in medieval
texts—acquired a new significance: it was the plane of projection,
the picture plane or just picture, the “window” or velo that interposes itself
between the world and the eye:
Picture plane,
plane of projection
94. In the Renaissance, the diagram’s middle line—sometimes absent in medieval
texts—acquired a new significance: it was the plane of projection,
the picture plane or just picture, the “window” or velo that interposes itself
between the world and the eye:
There are distinctions between
these five terms.
Picture plane,
plane of projection
95. In the Renaissance, the diagram’s middle line—sometimes absent in medieval
texts—acquired a new significance: it was the plane of projection,
the picture plane or just picture, the “window” or velo that interposes itself
between the world and the eye:
There are distinctions between
these five terms.
Leon Battista Alberti, who codified
perspective in the 15th c., spoke of
a velo—a net or grid which was
also a window and a drawing aid.
Picture plane,
plane of projection
96. In the Renaissance, the diagram’s middle line—sometimes absent in medieval
texts—acquired a new significance: it was the plane of projection,
the picture plane or just picture, the “window” or velo that interposes itself
between the world and the eye:
There are distinctions between
these five terms.
Leon Battista Alberti, who codified
perspective in the 15th c., spoke of
a velo—a net or grid which was
also a window and a drawing aid.
Technically the plane of projection
is theoretical and the picture plane
is actual: i.e., your photo or canvas.
Picture plane,
plane of projection
97.
98. Lacan’s innovation was to flip the diagram and superimpose itself on itself.
That could have given rise to this kind of diagram:
101. This is Lacan’s chiasmatic diagram.
“Chiasmatic” = “x-shaped”: the
diagram shows how seeing is also
being seen.
We will see examples of this in the
unit on the body.
102. Now there is an eye in the landscape (left),
This is Lacan’s chiasmatic diagram.
“Chiasmatic” = “x-shaped”: the
diagram shows how seeing is also
being seen.
We will see examples of this in the
unit on the body.
103. Now there is an eye in the landscape (left),
and a landscape (object) surrounding the eye (right).
This is Lacan’s chiasmatic diagram.
“Chiasmatic” = “x-shaped”: the
diagram shows how seeing is also
being seen.
We will see examples of this in the
unit on the body.
104. Now there is an eye in the landscape (left),
and a landscape (object) surrounding the eye (right).
This is Lacan’s chiasmatic diagram.
“Chiasmatic” = “x-shaped”: the
diagram shows how seeing is also
being seen.
We will see examples of this in the
unit on the body.
105. Now there is an eye in the landscape (left),
and a landscape (object) surrounding the eye (right).
The central line is named the screen: it’s a paradoxical thing,
since it implies the object you see also “pictures” you:
This is Lacan’s chiasmatic diagram.
“Chiasmatic” = “x-shaped”: the
diagram shows how seeing is also
being seen.
We will see examples of this in the
unit on the body.
106. Now there is an eye in the landscape (left),
and a landscape (object) surrounding the eye (right).
The central line is named the screen: it’s a paradoxical thing,
since it implies the object you see also “pictures” you:
This is Lacan’s chiasmatic diagram.
“Chiasmatic” = “x-shaped”: the
diagram shows how seeing is also
being seen.
We will see examples of this in the
unit on the body.
107. Now there is an eye in the landscape (left),
and a landscape (object) surrounding the eye (right).
The central line is named the screen: it’s a paradoxical thing,
since it implies the object you see also “pictures” you:
This is Lacan’s chiasmatic diagram.
“Chiasmatic” = “x-shaped”: the
diagram shows how seeing is also
being seen.
We will see examples of this in the
unit on the body.
screen
109. A word on Lacan’s diagrams: they are part of his “algebra,”
which is partly intended to go against the grain of empirical
and scientific diagramming. (Mikkel Borch-Jakobsen)
Top: www.lacan.com/symptom
110. A word on Lacan’s diagrams: they are part of his “algebra,”
which is partly intended to go against the grain of empirical
and scientific diagramming. (Mikkel Borch-Jakobsen)
But they are also seriously studied and elaborated by
Lacanians.
Top: www.lacan.com/symptom
111. A word on Lacan’s diagrams: they are part of his “algebra,”
which is partly intended to go against the grain of empirical
and scientific diagramming. (Mikkel Borch-Jakobsen)
But they are also seriously studied and elaborated by
Lacanians.
Two examples are worth knowing: Borromean rings and the
L schema (next screens).
Top: www.lacan.com/symptom
120. The L-schema.
fr.wikipedia.org, Schéma L—see La lettre volée (Écrits, 1966)
121. The L-schema.
Es = Freud’s id, said in French ça, “it,” German Es. The subject “dans
son ineffable et stupide existence”
fr.wikipedia.org, Schéma L—see La lettre volée (Écrits, 1966)
122. The L-schema.
Es = Freud’s id, said in French ça, “it,” German Es. The subject “dans
son ineffable et stupide existence”
fr.wikipedia.org, Schéma L—see La lettre volée (Écrits, 1966)
124. a’ = le petit autre, the “little other,” usually called the objet petit a,
“object called the lowercase ‘a’”: the elements of the self seen in
the other, the “specular image” of the self
fr.wikipedia.org, Schéma L
125. a’ = le petit autre, the “little other,” usually called the objet petit a,
“object called the lowercase ‘a’”: the elements of the self seen in
the other, the “specular image” of the self
fr.wikipedia.org, Schéma L
