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1. Different classification of war:
Epochs
UNCLASSIFIED
Dr T. Lindsay Moore and Robert J. Bunker :
4 epochs, based on energy sources
human energy
animal-based energy
mechanical energy
post-mechanical energy:
Advanced
technology
warfare
Non-Western
warfare
11. 11/26
Waves
Agricultural war
Industrial-based war (late of 17th century)
Knowledge-based war (from 1980s)
UNCLASSIFIED
Alvin and Heidi Toffler developed a theory of warfare
based on the economic and societal changes of
civilization.
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Symmetric
In symmetric conflicts, the two opposing
adversaries dispose of armed forces that are
similar in all aspects such as force structure,
doctrine and assets and have comparable
tactical, operational and strategic objectives.
UNCLASSIFIED
15. 15/26
A conflict is dissymmetric when one of the
opposing forces is superior by means of force
structure, doctrine and assets, but both
parties are striving for similar political
and military objectives.
Dissymmetric
UNCLASSIFIED
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2. Asymmetric Warfare (AW)
One of the opponents is unable or unwilling to wage
the war with comparable force structure, doctrine
and assets and has different political and military
objectives than his adversary.
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Asymmetric Warfare (AW)
What is it?
David and Goliath warfare
Unsophisticated vs. the sophisticated (technologically)
Poor countries or entities against rich countries or rich entities
Threat can be internal or external (i.e. Israel, Vietnam or
Afghanistan)
Often state sponsored/supported
Attacking opponent via indirect means such as
Terrorism
Critical infrastructures
Avoids combat w/ conventional forces
Tends to have a purpose that focuses on a force, but not always
the case
Misc. unconventional means i.e., poisoning water/food supplies,
exploitation of media by staging scenes to sway public opinion.
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3. Military cultures
Clausewitz: „War is an act of force, and there
is no logical limit to the application of that
force.”
UNCLASSIFIED
The way of application of force depends on the
military culture.
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Strategy of „indirect
approach”
Characteristics:
Daggering wars;
Defence;
Strategic objective:
exhausting of enemy
Indirect warfare- not only
with military means
Main services: air force,
navy
Preferred by: maritime
powersUNCLASSIFIED
Indirect approach
Material-centric
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Guerilla warfare
UNCLASSIFIED
Strategy of „indirect
approach in irregular
form”
Supported by people
Characteristics:
Hit and run actions;
Offence;
Strategic objective:
exhausting of enemy,
provoke a collapse
internally
Media
Indirect warfare- not
only with military
means
Main services: land
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4. Generations of Warfare
UNCLASSIFIED
COL BOYD
Non-linear warfare
Focuses on moral-mental-physical
portions of enemy & as single entity
Focus on the enemy and environment
Knowledge of strategic environment
Interact w/ environment
appropriately
33. 33/26UNCLASSIFIED
States &
non-
states
wage war
States &
non-states
wage war
1600 1700 1800 1900 2000
The “generations of war” model
New commo &
transport networks
3 GW
Precursor activities –
going back to Alexander
& Sun Tzu (and before)
New
weapons
&
concepts
Peace of
Westphalia
State-vs-state—
only “legal” form
of war
2 GW
Nonstate armed groups:
partisans, insurgents,
anarchists, criminal
organizations, etc.
Nuclear
Weapons
Proliferate
Fall of
USSR
1
GW
4 GW
state vs.
state
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Definition
Formless and most deadly kind of war
Undermines enemy strengths (this may seem
obvious, but most of modern warfare has involved
direct attacks on enemy strengths -- find the
enemy army and destroy it).
Exploits enemy weaknesses.
Uses asymmetric operations (weapons and
techniques that differ substantially from
opponents).
UNCLASSIFIED
4GW can be defined as a method of warfare that
uses the following to achieve a moral victory:
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Drivers
UNCLASSIFIED
The rise of 4GW is both a product and a driver of the
following:
The loss of the nation-
state's monopoly on
violence.
The rise of cultural,
ethnic, and religious
conflict.
Globalization (via
technological
integration).
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Characteristics
Violent non-state actor (VNSA) fighting the
state.
lacks hierarchal authority
lack of formal structure
patience and flexibility
ability to keep a low profile when needed
small size
VNSA’s forces are decentralized
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Tactics
4GW is fought on the tactical level via:
Rear area operations -- 4GW
warriors do not confront a
nation-state's military but
rather it society.
Psychological operations --
terror.
Ad-hoc innovation -- use of
the enemy's strengths against
itself
Human shields
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Tactics of 4GW
Ethnic cleansing
Attacking C4I networks
Exploitation of rules of engagement (ROEs)
and International laws of war (ILOW)
Exploitation of humanitarian relief
organizations i.e. Red Crescent, CAIR, etc…
Shift in focus from enemy’s front to his
rear;
Use the enemy’s strength against him
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Differences
Global -- modern technologies and economic
integration enable global operations.
Pervasive -- the decline of nation-state warfare has
forced all open conflict into the 4GW mold.
Granularity -- extremely small viable groups and
variety of reasons for conflict.
Vulerability -- open societies and economies.UNCLASSIFIED
Many of the methods used in 4GW aren't new and
have robust historical precedent. However, there are
important differences in how it is applied today.
These include:
40. 40/26
Differences II.
Technology -- new technologies have
dramatically increased the productivity of
small groups of 4GW warriors.
Media -- global media saturation makes
possible an incredible level of manipulation.
Networked -- new organizational types
made possible by improvements in
technology are much better at learning,
surviving, and acting.
UNCLASSIFIED
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4th Generation Warfare (4GW)
Formless and most deadly kind of war
4GW ops are intelligence driven.
Requires constant preparation and
resourcefulness
Distinguishing a combatant from a non-
combatant (civil) can be extremely difficult
Can hit anytime, anywhere, anything and
anyone
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Winning a 4GW conflict
Menace. Attacks that undermine or threaten
basic human survival instincts.
Mistrust. Increases divisions between
groups (ie. conservatives and liberals in the
US).
Uncertainty. Undermine economic activity
by decreasing confidence in the future.
UNCLASSIFIED
Victory in 4GW warfare is won in the moral sphere. The aim
of 4GW is to destroy the moral bonds that allows the organic
whole to exist -- cohesion. This is done by reinforcing the
following (according to Boyd):
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Center of Gravity Is The People
Leverage unconventional capabilities
against insurgents. Become cellular like
“them”. Defeat a networked threat with a
network.
Develop small independent action forces
(SIAF).
Establish disciplined, well trained and
highly mobile, counter guerrilla forces.
UNCLASSIFIED
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Power of Perception & Influence As
“Ammo”
Money is ammunition
Food is ammunition
Medicine is ammunition
Education is ammunition
Fuel is ammunition
Employment is ammunition
Recognition is ammunition
Respect is ammunition
Information and knowledge is ammunition
Why we have military science and theory of war?
Just because the humanıty spent much more time in war then in peace. So the war is quite loyal phenomen escorting the humanity.
What we are waiting from the military science?
Whom future wars will be fought, what they will be about, how they will
be fought, what wars will be fought for and why people will participate in it.
How we will fight the next war?
Lets see a little bit the statistics.
AW IS JUST A FANCY WAY OF SAYING “SUCKER PUNCH”. IF THE ENEMY EXPECTS YOU TO HIT W/ A RIGHT HOOK, HIT W/ THE LEFT HOOK INSTEAD. In Sun Tzu’s terms, AW is a way of maintaining “formlessness”
Hannibal crossed the Alps on elephants
Russia invaded by Napoleon.
Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor.
Vietnamese & United States’ lack of will (as a Nation) to win.
Fourth generation warfare(4GW) is a concept defined by William S. Lind and expanded by Thomas X. Hammes, used to describe the decentralized nature of modern warfare. The simplest definition includes any war in which one of the major participants is not a state but rather a violent ideological network. Fourth Generation wars are characterized by a blurring of the lines between war and politics, soldier and civilian, conflict and peace, battlefield and safety.
Clausewitzian trinitarian paradigm the western conceptualization of nation-state warfare,
Second Generation Warfare was based on massed firepower. Tactics relied on fire and movement, with heavy reliance on indirect fire from artillery. It was different, but still essentially linear.
Third Generation Warfare was based on maneuver and real time communications. It was best exemplified by World War II's "Blitzkrieg".
The attack relied on infiltration to bypass, cut off and collapse the enemy's main combat forces rather than seeking to close with and destroy them.
Fourth Generation Warfare is based on dispersion and communications that remove the battle front entirely. Attackers rely on cultural/media attack and coordinated violent actions to and paralyze or collapse the enemy's political will, rather than seeking decisive combat.
Fourth Generation war is the greatest change since the Peace of Westphalia, because it marks the end of the state’s monopoly on war.
Once again, as before 1648, many different entities, not states, are fighting war. They use many different means, including "terrorism" and immigration, not just formal armies. Differences between cultures, not just states, become paramount, and other cultures will not fight the way we fight.
the Western rules and conventions guiding and constraining the conduct of war do not apply at all. There are no fronts, no
campaigns, no bases, no uniforms, no publicly displayed honors, and no respect for the territorial limits of
states.
This chart plays well as a slide show.
As Echevarria rightly notes, 4GW does not lie in the logical sequence of 1/2/3 GW. In fact, the two vertical red lines on the right imply that that sequence has played itself out as state-vs-state warfare fades in significance. 4GW rises from the swamp at the bottom of the figure.
The reason that 4GW is sometimes confused with guerrilla warfare is that violent transnational entities often use terrorism and guerrilla warfare methods - the classical way for militarily weak forces to defeat stronger ones. What defines 4GW is - as Lind and van Creveld insist - who fights and what they’re fighting for. Hammes observed that the transnational nature of 4GW means that networking (as in “social networking”) will be an important tool – see The Sling and the Stone – and so successful 4GW groups may resemble political parties that also have an armed component. Hezbullah fits this model, and the events of July 2006 shows how effective it can be.
In this chart, “insurgents” are fighting the established government of a state, and “partisans” are fighting occupiers. Clearly there is a lot of overlap and both often use terrorism and guerrilla warfare at various stages of their campaigns. States also employ terrorism against their state and nonstate opponents and often against their own citizens (e.g., Reign of Terror, Halabja, the Holocaust, etc.)
Nobody is exactly sure what “anarchists” were fighting for.
While this term is similar to terrorism and asymmetric warfare, it is much narrower. Classical insurgencies and the Indian Wars are examples of Pre-Modern War, not 4GW. Fourth generation warfare usually has the insurgency group or non-state side trying to implement their own government or reestablish an old government over the one currently running the territory. The blurring of lines between state and non-state is further complicated in a democracy by the power of the media.
Fourth generation warfare is normally characterized by a violent non-state actorr (VNSA) fighting a state. This fighting can be physically done, such as by modern examples Hezbollah or the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). In this realm the VNSA uses all three levels of fourth generation warfare. These are the physical (actual combat; it is considered the least important), mental (the will to fight, belief in victory, etc.) and moral (the most important, this includes cultural norms, etc.) levels.
Another characteristic of fourth generation warfare is that as with third generation, the VNSA’s forces are decentralized. With fourth generation warfare there may even be no single organisation and that smaller groups organize into impromptu alliances to target a bigger threat (that being the state armed forces or another faction). As a result these alliances are weak and if the state’s military leadership is smart enough they can split their enemy and cause them to fight amongst themselves
22 countries of Arab League 300 – 330 millions 5 % of the world population has the youngest 40% under 14. From this population 60 million people is illiterate.
Number of translated books from foreign language to Arab in the Arab world is 4.4 / 1 million people this figure in western world is around 900.
Poor access to the knowledge!!!
