Cross Domain Deterrence: Strategy in an Era of Complexity

1. Cross Domain
Deterrence
November
18,
2014
LLNL
(Livermore)

2. Cross Domain
Deterrence: Strategy in an
Era of Complexity
Mission:
Develop
a
theory
of
cross-­‐domain
deterrence
Humility,
but
with
opportunity
(low
expectaFons)
Complexity
is
the
challenge,
not
the
objecFve

3. Three(?) Harrison Fords of CDD
• Academics
tend
to
study
what
pracFFoners
already
know.
“That’s
all
well
in
pracFce,
but
how
does
it
work
in
theory?”
• In
CDD
there
is
an
Inversion
of
pracFce/ideas/aTtudes:
• Academic
perspecFve
(30,000
feet,
“too
cold”):
• Academics
think
they
already
know
how
deterrence
works.
• Simple
linear
argument
focusing
on
achieving
given
ends
• CDD
skepFcism:
Not
interesFng.
“Nothing
[new]
to
see
here”
• PracFFoner
perspecFve
(trenches,
“too
hot”?):
• Deterrence
is
abstract,
not
always
helpful
in
formulaFng
policy.
• Complex
process
involving
means
(“how”
to
deter)
• CDD
defies
analysis:
really
interesFng,
but
too
complex.
• Our
perspecFve
(“just
right”??):
Let’s
see
what’s
out
there
(Iowa:
field
of
dreams,
James
T.
Kirk
vs.
Missouri:
“show
me”).
• This
is
the
beginning
of
a
process
• I
will
share
iniFal
hunches
with
you

4. Agenda
• The
CDD
project
• CDD
as
a
policy
problem
• CDD
as
a
theoreFcal
problem

5. h^p://deterrence.ucsd.edu
DoD
Minerva
IniFaFve
Award:
“Deterring
Complex
Threats:
The
Effects
of
Asymmetry,
Interdependence,
and
MulF-­‐polarity
on
InternaFonal
Strategy”
supported
by
ONR
Research
Grant
N00014-­‐14-­‐1-­‐0071
DuraFon:
2013-­‐2018

6. Basic
research
quesFon
for
CDD:
How
does
the
increasing
number
or
“types”
of
means
available
for
poliFcal
influence
affect
deterrence
in
theory
and
pracFce?
Prior
research
interests
and
policy
concerns:
Nuclear
force
posture
GlobalizaFon
and
interdependence
Cybersecurity
and
the
RMA
Outer
space
security
Chinese
military
modernizaFon
US
Grand
Strategy

7. Agenda
• The
CDD
project
• CDD
as
a
policy
problem
• CDD
as
a
theoreFcal
problem

8. More types of means, linkages, threats
“The
fragility
of
chokepoints
in
air,
space,
cyberspace
and
on
the
sea
enable
an
increasing
number
of
enFFes,
states
and
non-­‐state
actors
alike
to
disrupt
the
global
economy
with
small
numbers
of
well-­‐
placed,
precise
a^acks…these
strategies
and
the
weapons
that
support
them
are
also
no
longer
the
exclusive
province
of
large
states…America’s
adversaries
today
are
embracing
a
strategy
of
access
denial
to
counter
American
power
projecFon.”
Gen.
Norton
A.
Schwartz
&
Adm.
Jonathan
W.
Greenert,
“Air-­‐Sea
Ba^le:
PromoFng
Stability
in
an
Era
of
Uncertainty,”
The
American
Interest
(February
2012)

9. The “Third Offset”
“The
criFcal
innovaFon
was
to
apply
and
combine
these
new
systems
and
technologies
with
new
strategic
operaFonal
concepts,
in
ways
that
enable
the
American
military
to
avoid
matching
an
adversary
“tank-­‐for-­‐tank
or
soldier-­‐for-­‐soldier.”
Secretary
of
Defense
Hagle
November
17,
Reagan
NaFonal
Defense
Forum

10. Complexity is a challenge for
strategy, and even grand strategy
• Emerging
capabiliFes
• Accessible,
omen
civilian,
technologies—e.g.,
cyber,
space,
manufacturing,
bio,
etc.—have
a
latent
capacity
to
inflict
harm,
possibly
even
commensurate
with
strategic
weapons
• (Yet
insFtuFonal
capacity
for
weaponizaFon
and
employment
of
technologies
is
underesFmated
in
techno-­‐centric
accounts)
• Dense
linkages
• The
most
connected
and
technology-­‐dependent
states
are
also
the
states
that
are
most
vulnerable
to
disrupFon
• (Yet
interdependence
is
also
thought
to
promote
restraint)
• Empowered
actors
• Weaker
states
or
non-­‐state
actors
are
gaining
the
ability
to
inflict
costs
on
stronger
rivals
while
avoiding
retaliaFon
• (Yet
rich
and
experienced
states
can
exploit
the
same
technologies
to
enhance
intelligence
and
military
power)

11. What is a domain?
• DoD
war-­‐fighFng
domains:
sea,
air,
land,
space,
cyber
• Are
these
disFnct
strategic
environments
or
bureaucraFc
turfs?
• Space
and
cyber
are
driving
policy
concerns
about
CDD
• There
are
other
ways
to
parse
the
means
of
influence
• Military
vs.
non-­‐military
tools
• Specialized
experFse,
economic
sectors,
or
jurisdicFons
• Differences
among
domains
are
probably
more
important
analyFcally
than
defining
boundaries
between
them
• “Cross
domain
deterrence”
is
the
use
of
one
type
of
means
to
dissuade
the
target
from
using
some
other
type
of
means

12. Agenda
• The
CDD
project
• CDD
as
a
policy
problem
• CDD
as
a
theoreFcal
problem

13. The Conceptual Limits of
Cross-Domain Deterrence
• “Domains”
are
arFficial
constructs
• Underlying
differences
in
capabiliFes
and
environments
are
real
• DefiniFonal
debates
risk
becoming
“academic”
(angels
+
pins)
• NaFons
(even
the
United
States)
don’t
just
wish
to
deter
• Deterrence
implies
a
staFc/limited
noFon
of
influence
• Symmetry:
if
someone
is
deterring,
others
are
compelling/conquering
• Even
deterrence
involves
reallocaFng
security
or
influence
• What
does
it
mean
to
“cross”
a
domain?
• Arbitrary
boundaries
imply
arbitrary
transiFons
• CapabiliFes/threats
may
not
be
specific
or
may
be
mulF-­‐
domain

14. CDD is not new: Actors have long
combined or shifted domains for
strategic advantage
Yet
the
number
and
complexity
of
means
now
available
make
it
hard
to
choose
wisely.
We
need
more
explicit
a^enFon
to
the
logic
of
combinaFon
of
means.
(Deterrence
itself
was
not
new,
but
“ripened”
when
nuclear
weapons
made
it
essenFal
to
consider
security
in
the
absence
of
defense.)

15. War is politics by many means
• Strategic
bargaining
is
a
contest
between
sets
of
means
and
ends
• TradiFonal
deterrence
theory
focuses
on
ends
• PrioriFes,
resolve,
credibility,
mispercepFon
• The
means
have
usually
been
assumed
to
be
nuclear,
while
consequences
were
generally
characterized
as
existenFal
• Chicken
games:
“swerving”
is
different
in
a
steam
roller
• CDD
focuses
on
means
(tension
between
policy/theory)
• OpFons,
combinaFons,
tradeoffs
• CDD
relaxes
the
assumpFons
of
tradiFonal
deterrence:
More
means
available,
more
linkages
across
them,
and
more
actors
with
different
porqolios
and
vulnerabiliFes
• Rock,
paper,
scissors
games

16. How do means matter?
• The
proliferaFon
of
capabiliFes
for
defense:
• “porqolio”
approach:
More
of
same
not
as
good
as
variety
• If
defense
is
increased
by
variaFon
in
capabiliFes…
• This
must
improve
deterrence
(det.
by
defense)
• Can
also
produce
deficiencies
• We
already
know
lots
about
this
tacFcally
• Combined
arms,
air/land/sea
ba^le
(Biddle)
• Apply
it
to
deterrence
(strategy/grand
strategy)
• What
are
“best
response”
acFons
to
threats?
• Can
we
develop
rules
of
thumb
(similar
to
combined
arms)?
• Humility
moment
• Real
limits
to
what
theory
can
do,
but…
• Decisions
in
anFcipaFon
of
consequences
requires
theory
• RelaFve
area
of
advantage:
“first”
is
be^er
than
“best”

17. Unpacking deterrence/TOW
• Deterrence
involves
at
least
three
objecFves:
1. Reduce
risk
of
escalaFon/war
(accommodaFon)
2. “Win”
policy
dispute
(internaFonal
“tug-­‐o-­‐war”)
3. Minimize
cost
of
achieving
first
two
objecFves
• Tradeoffs
(“speak
somly
AND
carry
a
big
sFck”)
• If
war
is
a
product
of
different
expectaFons
about
BOP
or
BOT
–
the
informaFonal
theory
of
war
• Then
deterrent
acFons/capabiliFes/threats
that
minimize
uncertainty
about
BOP/BOT
reduce
the
risk
of
war
(1)
• ...
But
reducing
uncertainty
does
not
necessarily
maximize
2,
3.
• Can
also
minimize
risk
of
war
by
conceding
policy
dispute
• Increasing
condiFons
increases
risk
of
deterrence
failure
• Use
of
deterrence
is
omen
response
to
low
risk
tolerance

18. Why act across domains?
• Crossing
domains
can
either:
1. Alter
BOP/BOT
(presumably
advantage
defender)
2. Reduce
uncertainty
about
intensions
• First
cut:
“ComparaFve
advantage”
• Threaten/deploy
capabiliFes
to
win
if
war
happens
• Maximize
influence
–
max
BOP/BOT,
diplomaFc
leverage
• Mobility
is
an
advantage
in
war
but
a
disadvantage
in
signaling
• Threaten/deploy
capabiliFes
that
make
war
less
likely
• “Tripwires”
are
bad
military
tacFcs
but
great
for
deterrence
• Example:
NATO
acFons
in
response
to
Ukrainian
crisis

19. Why do actors escalate?
• EscalaFon—like
war
itself—reflects
uncertainty
• Why
take
acFons
that
don’t
deter
in
hindsight?
• EscalaFon
reflects
effort
to
deter/compel
at
lower
cost.
• Cross
domain
may
lessen
or
heighten
escalaFon
• Lessen:
deterrent/compellent
acFons
must
do
more
to
inform
opponents
about
eventual
outcome
of
conflict
• Heighten:
• TentaFve
a^empts
to
“win”
indicate
ambivalence
• Increase
opponent’s
belief
that
persisFng/escalaFng
will
prevail
• An
increase
in
opFons
_inherently_
increases
uncertainty
• Actors
themselves
don’t
know
what
they
will
do
in
a
crisis

20. How do combinations work?
• Tough:
Can
fall
back
on
some
theory/heurisFcs
• EffecFve
combinaFons
win
wars,
affect
BOP/BOT
• More
costly/heighten
uncertainty
about
who
will
win
• Removing
opFons
for
an
opponent
also
creates
a
“wedge”
• More
likely
to
get
opponent
to
back
down
• More
likely
to
get
opponent
to
escalate
(which
do
you
prefer?)
• However,
“hybrid”
combinaFons
may
be
be^er
• ComparaFve
advantage
could
be
Fed
to
signaling
• 2nd-­‐mover
advantage
(mostly
focus
on
1st
mover)
• Power
projecFon
creates
depth
• Especially
useful
in
period
of
status
quo/decline
• Stability/instability
across
domains
• No
domain
is
stable/unstable
by
itself
given
CDD

21. Cyber and space (our final frontier!)
• IniFal
work
by
project
on
cyber:
• StuxNet
as
model
(Lindsay)
• The
myth
of
cyber
Pearl
Harbor
(Gartzke)
• DecepFon
as
alternaFve
strategy
(Gartzke
and
Lindsay)
• Nature
of
cyber
coercion
(Lindsay
and
Gartzke)
• Where
we
are
headed:
• SubsFtutes
and
complements
• When
is
cyber
used
instead
of
other
capabiliFes?
• When
is
cyber
used
because
of
other
capabiliFes?
• Interdependence—similariFes/differences
between
cyber,
nuclear
and
economic
modes
of
interdependence
• Space—deterrence
in
space
has
never
been
in
space.

22. Some thoughts about empirics
• PreconcepFon:
cannot
measure
CDD
• Historical
use
of
CDD/CDC
creates
basis
for
analysis
• InternaFonal
Crisis
Database
• Code
domains/capabiliFes
(acFons
and
outcomes
already
coded)
• Deterrence
data
(Huth)
• Uncertainty
and
war
project
(Gartzke
and
Kaplow
• Nuclear
force
structure
project
(Gartzke,
Kaplow
and
Mehta)
• Space
ISR/launch
data—informaFon
theory,
vulnerabiliFes
• Modeling/measuring/theorizing
• Complementarity
of
different
components
• Caveat:
when
“general”
deterrence
works,
there
is
nothing
to
see
(Russians
not
crossing
German
border)

23. Interdependence & Multi-polarity
• Interdependence
(economic,
nuclear,
cyber)
• Increase
consequences
for
unrestricted
warfare
• Deterrent
effect
on
escalaFon
(fewer
big
contests)
• Decrease
consequences
of
restricted
forms
of
conflict
• Stability/instability
paradox
(more
lower
intensity
contests)
• Passive
effect
of
interdep.
(PuFn:
sancFons
vs
markets)
• MulFpolarity
• Increased
uncertainty
(inherent
increase
in
conflicts)
• Pivotal
paradox:
declining
US
leverage
with
enemies
actually
increases
US
leverage
with
its
(many)
friends.
• More
and
more
circumspect
contests
• Increased
use
of
asymmetric
capabiliFes
(on
both
sides)
• A
“rock/paper/scissors/…
carrots/sFcks”
world
• Worth
understanding
how
these
offsets
work,
are
exploited

24. Thank you!
rock
paper
scissors
sFcks
and
carrots
cyberwar!