Public financing and subsidization of child care can allow for more equitable access to child care in places where public provision and capacity are low. The mechanisms of the delivery of the subsidy matter, however, in terms of who gets the benefits of the subsidy and overall cost effectiveness, given the initial conditions in the child care market. This paper sets out an ex ante simulation model using a supply side provider level and demand side household model and combining the two models for estimating the benefit incidence of expanded capacity and enrolments as a result of the child care subsidies, looking at different mechanisms of the delivery including investment grants to providers, operational monthly grants to child care providers, combinations of the investment and operational grants and demand side vouchers to households. The model is applied to empirical data from child care centres and households in Turkey and results reveal that the choice of the subsidy delivery model is not trivial, and has a strong bearing on both the benefit incidence and cost effectiveness of the subsidy. In the case of Turkey, where significant supply side constraints exist in the market, a demand side voucher system is shown to be the least cost effectiveness measure of delivery of the subsidy, and while a demand-side voucher can be pro-poor targeted, it is not necessarily the option that reveals the most βpro-poor resultsβ both in terms of newly generated capacity and the impact of the subsidy on household welfare. The simulation model developed here can be applied in other country contexts, with the only data requirements being micro data on costs and pricing structure of child care providers as well as household data with variables on household welfare and child care utilization.
Building an Ex-Ante Simulation Model for Estimating Capacity Impact, Benefit Incidence and Cost Effectiveness of Child Care Subsidies
1. Building an Ex-Ante Simulation Model
for Estimating Capacity Impact, Benefit
Incidence and Cost Effectiveness of
Child Care Subsidies:
An application using provider-level data from Turkey
Meltem Aran
Ana Maria Munoz Boudet
Nazli Aktakke
Nov 3, 2016
Presentation at Harvard University
John F. Kennedy School of Government
3. Previous work on child care in Turkey
The bankβs engagement and analytical work on child care, gender and female labor force
participation dated back to 2009..
3
2009
Life Chances in Turkey
Expanding Opportunies for
the Next Generation
2010
Recent Trends in Female
Labor Force Participation
2014
Can Child care Vouchers get
Turkish mothers back to
work?
2015
Supply and Demand for Child
Care Services in Turkey
4. In Turkey pre-primary enrolment ratio
is low given GDP per capita
Source: World Bank 2015, Supply and Demand for Child Care Services in Turkey.
(Graph is drawn using data from 2012)
Pre-primary enrolment
rate, gross
Turkey: 38.6 % (2015)
OECD: 82.5 % (2013)
EU: 93.9 % (2013)
5. Children from disadvantaged backgrounds are
less likely to benefit from centre based child
care services
Enrolment rate in centre based child care for the age group 3-5 (%),
By quintiles of per capita household income, 2012
17 16.7 17.8 22.1 27.5
1.2 2.3 3.7
10.1
27.6
0
20
40
60
80
100
1 (En yoksul) 2 3 4 5 (En zengin)
Source: Turkey Income and Living Conditions Survey 2012, authors calculations
(Poorest) (Richest)
Kindergarten
Mostly pubic
provision
Child Care or Preschool
Mostly private
provision
6. 6
Low capacity of child care β capacity needs vary
by province
Source: World Bank 2015, Supply and Demand for Child Care Services in
Turkey
A total of 58,380 facilities are
needed to be built to reach
100% enrolment rate
7. Enrolment in private child care centres is low
Compared to the Latin American countries, Arab states, the OECD, or the EU countries,
children enrolled in private institutions remain low in Turkey
Percentage of enrolment in pre-primary education in private institutions (%)
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators
11.6
46.5
37.0
30.5
24.5
0.0
10.0
20.0
30.0
40.0
50.0
60.0
70.0
80.0
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Percentageofenrolmentinpre-primary
educationinprivateinstitutions(%)
Turkey Arab states EU OECD countries World Latin America and Caribbean
8. 1.01
0.92
0.84
0.740.730.71 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.68
0.620.610.590.58
0.52 0.5 0.49
0.460.450.45
0.410.41 0.4 0.4 0.4
0.350.330.32
0.190.18
0.1
0.04
0.52
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
Totalpublicexpenditureonpre-primaryeducation(ISCED0)asa
percentageofGDP,2010
Also not surprisingly, public expenditure on pre-primary education
as a share of GDP is very low in Turkey compared
to the EU countries
Total public expenditure on pre-primary education as a percentage of GDP, 2010
Source: Eurydice and Eurostat Report 2014
9. Purely demand side subsidy to households
Demand side subsidy to formally working
women using child care: highly regressiveβ’ Two prominent Turkish NGOs (ACEV
and KAGIDER) advocated for a
demand side transfer to formally
employed mothers 300 TL per month
(back in 2009).
β’ A purely demand side subsidy to formally
working mothers would have been highly
regressive.
β’ If targeting poorer women β not cost
effective in terms of activation.
β’ Targeting employable β middle income
women in urban areas would have
worked β but still not cost effective in
terms of generating supply of services
and increasing enrolments.
10. Questions going into the Child Care study
The pieces of the puzzles when we started supply and demand side data collection
10
Is there an βunmet demandβ for
child care β or is low utilization a
function of social
norms/unwillingness of households
to use child care?
Why is Utilization Low?
Norms or capacity
constraints?
Barriers to entry?
Why does the market not clear?
Why is private
investment low?
What are householdsβ
expectations of child care in terms
of quality standards? What is their
willingness to pay for these
services?
Willingness to Pay
What models can work for
improving access to poor/middle
class households? What are some of
the current constraints that impede
the development of such models?
What form (if any)
should subsidies take?
11. Most Binding Standards
Infrastructure (particularly garden) requirements are reported as most
difficult standards to comply with by MONE accredited private providers
7.2
8.6
10.5
12.5
13.8
13.8
14.5
14.5
15.8
16.4
16.4
18.4
23.0
31.6
39.5
43.4
0.0 5.0 10.0 15.0 20.0 25.0 30.0 35.0 40.0 45.0 50.0
In nursery classes under primary schools: teachers and administrative staff with university
degree
Teacher : four-years university degree in preschool education, child development
departments, vocational high school degree in child development plus university degreeβ¦
The curriculum provided by MoNE can be applied for both 0-36 month- and 36-66 month-
old children
Painting must be done with materials easy to be cleaned
Total area covered by windows in a classroom
In pre-schools: All teaching and managerial staff with university degree
1 director room (min. 10 m2)
1 play room (min. 15 m2)
In pre-schools: support staff, cook, furnaceman, driver, technician and security staff with
high school degree
Certificate from relevant public authorities indicating preparedness to fire
Director: four-years-university degree in educational sciences
Floor covered with a not harmful material for the health of children
Min. 1,5 m2 per child in the classroom
Floor covered with a material easy to be cleaned
The garden with a soft floor (with enough grass and soil min. 1,5 m2 per child for the
development motor and cognitive skills)
In a school building having garden or at the ground floor of a multi-floor building or at a
floor having connection with the ground floor
MoNE-Private
% of service providers that
report these specific standards
as being most difficult to follow.
Each provider was asked to
select 3 requirements from the
list.
11
12. Willingness to pay
Results from Demand Side Household Data set
12
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
willingnesstopay
Less than basic
education
Basic education
(8 yrs)
High school University or more
Education level of woman
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
willingnesstopay
<=300 300-600 >600
Income groups
Average willingness to pay increases with higher levels of education and higher household
income per capita
Source: Turkey Child Care Assessment Demand Side Dataset
13. Earnings difference is low
The difference between womenβs potential (and actual) earnings and child care
costs is too low (or negative), oftentimes not making it worthwhile for women less
than university degrees to take up workβ¦.
13
Earnings diffference = Potential (or actual) earnings - Child
care costs
Median monthly full day price of private service providers 700 TL
Median monthly full day price of public service providers 300 TL
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
Less than basic education Basic education (8 yrs) High school University or more
Education level of women
Average current monthly income (for employed women)
Average predicted monthly income if participated in the labor force (for non-employed women)
Average willingness to pay
Median monthly full day price of private service providers, data coming from supply side
Median monthly full day price of public service providers, data coming from supply side
Source: Turkey Childcare Assessment Demand Side dataset
Earnings difference and willingness to pay for a kindergarten in the neighborhood
14. 14
Conclusions after Child Care Study
Many families find child care unavailable and
expensive β and have positive perceptions about
centre based care (after age 2.5).
Lack of supply and unmet demand
Willing to Pay
Quality expectations of families are more
about the content of the child care services
and about psychological needs and security
of the child while current standards focus
on infrastructure.
Mismatch in quality and binding regulations
Some willingness to pay but lower than current prices.
class and poor households. The earnings difference
work working mothers is low. Services need to be
subsidized in order to make them more accessible for
middle class and the poor.
What is the most cost effective form of subsidies?
How much should we provide in subsidies? Who
should we target?
Subsidies
Missing
piece
15. Costs, willingness to pay and subsidies
TL /
month
Welfare
indicator,
education
level, SES
Current
costs for
private
provision
Lower costs
for private
provision
Requires
subsidy
Can be reached
through lower cost
private provision +
subsidies
Currently able
to access
services
15
16. Policy scenarios
Scenario Name Description
SimpleScenarios
Scenario 1 Supply Side Investment Grant only:
One-time investment grant to child care centres
Investment Grant: 50,000 TL given to the service provider one time for initial
investment.
Scenario 2A Supply Side Operational Grant only:
Monthly per student operational grant (no price cap)
Operational Grant: 300 TL per child per month given to the service provider for
5 years.
Scenario 2B Supply Side Operational Grant only with Price Cap:
Monthly per student operational grant (with price cap)
Operational Grant: 300 TL per child per month given to the service provider for
5 years.
Price cap: 750 TL (the service provider agrees to limit the maximum price to
750 TL per child per month under this contract for the duration of the subsidy)
Scenario 3 Demand Side Grant only:
Vouchers to households per child enrolled
Voucher to Household: 300 TL per child per month, targeting households in
bottom 40% of income percentile.
CombinationScenarios
Scenario 4A Supply Side Investment and Operational Grant combined:
One-time investment grant and monthly per child operational grant
combined (no price cap)
Investment Grant: 50,000 TL given to the service provider one time for initial
investment.
+
Operational Grant: 300 TL per child per month given to the service provider for
5 years.
Scenario 4B Supply Side Investment and Operational Grant combined with
Price Cap:
One-time investment grant and monthly per child operational grant
combined (with price cap)
Investment Grant: 50,000 TL given to the service provider one time for initial
investment.
+
Operational Grant: 300 TL per child per month given to the service provider for
5 years.
Price cap: 750 TL (the service provider agrees to limit the maximum price to
750 TL per child per month under this contract for the duration of the subsidy)
Scenario 5 Supply Side Investment Grant and Demand Side Grant combined:
One-time investment grant and monthly voucher to households
combined
Investment Grant: 50,000 TL given to the service provider one time for initial
investment.
+
Voucher to Household: 300 TL per child per month, targeting households in
bottom 40% of income percentile.
17. (+) Investment
grant
ο Increase in the
number of enrolled
through increase in
capacity
Government
Families
Childcare
Providers
Scenario1:
Investment Grant
Capacity impact only
18. (+) Operational grant
ο Increase in the
number of enrolled
through increase in
affordability
Government
Families
Childcare
Providers
Scenario 2:
Operational Grant
Scenario 2A: With price cap
Scenario 2B: Without price cap
Capacity and affordability impact
19. (+) Voucher
ο Increase in the
number of enrolled
through increase in
affordability
Government
FamiliesChildcare
Providers
Scenario 3:
Voucher
Affordability impact only
20. (+) Investment
grant
(+) Operational
grant
ο Increase in the
number of enrolled
through increase in
capacity
ο Increase in the
number of enrolled
through increase in
affordability
Government
FamiliesChildcare
Providers
Scenario 4:
Investment +
Operational Grant
Scenario 4A: With price cap
Scenario 4B: Without price cap
Capacity and affordability impact
21. (+) Investment
grant (+) Voucher
ο Increase in the
number of enrolled
through increase in
capacity
Government
FamiliesChildcare
Providers
Scenario 5:
Investment +
Voucher
Capacity and affordability impact
22. What We Can Estimate
Using the simulation model
22
Capacity
Impact on capacity
and estimated
number of new
centres
Enrolments
Impact on pre-school
enrolments (coming from new
capacity and increased
affordability)
Total CostBenefit Incidence
Benefit incidence of new
enrolments and grants
Cost Effectiveness
Total Revenue Net cost
23. The Model
STEP 1
Supply Side model
STEP 2
Demand Side Model
STEP 3
Simultaneous calculation that takes into
account changes in enrolment as a result of
capacity increase and affordability increase
24. Supply side simulation
Data
β’ Supply side data was in 2014 for the World
Bank study βSupply and Demand for Child
care Services in Turkeyβ (World Bank, 2015)
β’ Data was collected from 603 centre-based
child care providers in 5 provinces in Turkey
(Istanbul, Gaziantep, Denizli, EskiΕehir and
Samsun)
β’ For the simulation model we make use of a
sample of private providers in the dataset
making up a total of 226 providers
β’ The dataset includes a wide range of
information on child care centres such as
their set-up and operational costs and the
prices they charge per child
Methodology
β’ Our main assumption is that the centres in the dataset are
potential investors. The data come from the empirical data
set, but are treated in the model as hypothetical cases (as
if investments in these centres have not yet been made)
β’ Our aim is to calculate an investment probability for the
centres with and without subsidies
β’ In order to do this we use information from the dataset:
β’ Price per child
β’ Setup cost of the centre if it were to be opened up today
β’ Monthly variable costs: personnel costs, stationary costs,
utility costs and travel costs
β’ Total number of children enrolled in the centre
and calculate the net present value (NPV) of the centre for a
period of 10 years
β’ Secondly, the NPV of an investment is mapped onto a
probability of investment through a functional form
25. Supply side simulation
The Model
(+) Price per child
Net Present
Value
Probability to
invest
(-) setup cost of the
centre if the centre were
to be opened up today
(-) Monthly variable
costs
Net Present Value
= β Setup Cost +
π‘=1
10
πππππ πππ πβπππ β πΈππππππππ‘
βπππ‘ππ ππππ‘βππ¦ π£πππππππ πππ π‘π
β 12 β (1 β π‘ππ₯)
1 + π π‘
+ Terminal Value
(+) Investment
grant
(+) Operational grant * Pass through
Net Present Value (TL)
Probabilitytoinvest
26. Supply side simulation
Calculating the Estimated Capacity Increase Impact of the
Grants
β’ E(Capacity)Baseline = Probability to invest in Baseline*Total capacity of the centre
β’ E(Capacity)Sc X = Probability to invest in Sc. X*Total capacity of the centre
These expected capacities are then summed up and the percent capacity increase achieved with Sc.
X is calculated with the following equation:
β’ % Increase in total capacitySc X = (E(Total capacity)Sc X-E(Total capacity)Baseline)/ E(Total
capacity)Baseline
27. Example
Centre A in the baseline
β’ Setup cost of the centre if the centre were to be opened up today: 171,000 TL
β’ Monthly variable costs: 21,000 TL
β’ Price per child: 910 TL
β’ Total number of children enrolled: 51
Net Present Value = β171,000 + π‘=1
10 910β51 β21000 β12(1βπ‘ππ₯)
(1+π) π‘ +ππππππππ π£πππ’π
Net Present Value= 399,173
Probability to invest = %26.73
Note: r = 0.40, EBITDA Multiple = 10.5, tax=0.32.
28. Example β
Centre A receives an investment grant
Centre A recei
β’ If it were to receive 50,000 TL worth of investment grant
πππ‘ ππππ πππ‘ ππππ’π = β171,000 + ππ, πππ + π‘=1
10 910β51 β21000 β12(1βπ‘ππ₯)
(1+π) π‘ + ππππππππ π£πππ’π
Net Present Value = 449,173
Probability to invest = %37.56
Newly created capacity = (%37.56 - %26.73) x 51 = 5.52 children
29. Example β
Centre A receives an operational grant
Centre A
β’ If it were to receive 500 TL operational grant (for 5 years)
Net Present Value = β171,000 + π‘=1
5
910+ πππβπ.π β51 β21000 β12(1βπ‘ππ₯)
(1+π) π‘
+ π‘=6
10 910β51 β21000 β12(1βπ‘ππ₯)
(1+π) π‘ + ππππππππ π£πππ’π
Net Present Value = 610,911
Probability to invest = %75.20
Newly created capacity = (%75.2 - %26.73) x 51 = 24.7 children
Existing
capacity
30. Demand side simulation
β’ We make use of Turkey EU-SILC (Survey of
Income and Living Conditions) 2012 dataset
which is representative for Turkey
β’ Dataset has information on a wide range of
issues related to the household such as
wealth, income, labour force participation of
the members
β’ Dataset includes information on 3-5 year old
childrenβs enrolment to centre-based child
care
β’ We only make use of the part of the dataset
collected from households located in urban
areas
Methodology
β’ The capacity increase found in the supply side simulation
is used as the βexogenous shockβ in the demand side
simulations.
β’ The number of children aged 3-5 who are currently
enrolled in preschool or day care in the EU SILC 2012
dataset is multiplied with the estimated capacity increase
coming from the supply side simulation for each scenario.
β’ Once the new capacity is calculated, this value is divided
by the total number of children attending preschool in
Turkey in the baseline.
β’ Lastly, this value is used as the per cent capacity increase
and it is multiplied by the number of children attending
preschool in the dataset.
β’ After the capacity increase amounts in SILC are all
determined, the number of new spots due to the increased
capacity are allocated to the children in the dataset aged
3-5, based on their propensity to attend preschool.
Data
31. Demand side simulation
Example: Increase in capacity is %50
Children
benefitting from
pre-school
services
Children not
benefitting from
pre-school
services
Children who
will benefit
from the
capacity
increase
The propensity to attend preschool is
calculated using a probit model which uses a
wide range of independent variables to predict
a childβs propensity to attend preschool.
The probit equation is as follows:
P(pre-school or daycare)=Ο(Xβο’)
Independent variables are:
β’ childβs age,
β’ motherβs level of education,
β’ motherβs employment status,
β’ fatherβs level of education,
β’ fatherβs employment status,
β’ per capita household income,
β’ household size,
β’ number of adults in the household aged 65+,
β’ number of children in the household aged 0-6,
β’ region the household is located in
Impact of supply side grants on enrolment is through
capacity. Children who have the highest propensity to
enrol become enrolled.
32. Demand side simulation
Impact of vouchers
β’ The main impact of the vouchers is through the income effect
introduced by the voucher β hence the increased enrolment is
due to increased affordability
Independent variables are:
β’ childβs age,
β’ motherβs level of education,
β’ motherβs employment status,
β’ fatherβs level of education,
β’ fatherβs employment status,
β’ per capita household income,
β’ household size,
β’ number of adults in the household
aged 65+,
β’ number of children in the
household aged 0-6,
β’ region the household is located in
P1: Probability to
attend pre-schoolPro
b
(+) Voucher
P2: Recalculated probability to attend
pre-school
when there is a voucher creating a
positive income effect
Children
benefitting from
pre-school
services
Children not
benefitting from
pre-school
services
Children who
will benefit
from pre-
school
services
through
increased
affordability
33. Demand side simulation
Impact of vouchers
β’ The expected number of children attending preschool as a result of the affordability
increase is calculated using the equation below
E(Number of children enrolled due to affordability increaseSc X )= ο(P2-P1)*individual weight in the
dataset
34. Demand side simulation
Impact of the operational grants come both from the capacity and
affordability (income effect)
Independent variables are:
β’ childβs age,
β’ motherβs level of education,
β’ motherβs employment status,
β’ fatherβs level of education,
β’ fatherβs employment status,
β’ per capita household income,
β’ household size,
β’ number of adults in the household
aged 65+,
β’ number of children in the
household aged 0-6,
β’ region the household is located in
P1: Probability to
attend pre-school
when there is an
operational grant
and children are
allocated the new
capacity
Prob
(+) Operational
grant * Pass
through
P2: when there is an operational grant
and children are allocated the new
capacity and there is also the positive
income shock
Children benefitting
from pre-school
services
Children not
benefitting from pre-
school services
Children who
will benefit from
the capacity
increase
Children who
will benefit from
pre-school
services
because of an
affordability
increase
35. Demand side simulation
Impact of operational grants through increasing affordability and
capacity
β’ The expected number of children attending preschool as a result of the
affordability increases is calculated using the equation below
E(Number of children enrolled due to affordability increaseSc X )=
ο(P2-P1)*individual weight in the dataset
β’ The number of children enrolled due to capacity increase is also calculated
β’ Lastly these numbers are added together to have the overall effect:
Number of newly enrolled childrenSc X=Number of children enrolled due to the capacity
increaseSc X+ E(Number of children enrolled due to affordability increaseSc X)
Number of children enrolled due to the
capacity increaseSc X =
1
% πππππππ‘π¦ πππππππ π ππ ππ π βππ’ππππ ππ ππ’πππππ‘ππ¦ ππππππππ πβππππππ ππ π‘βπ πππ‘ππ ππ‘
πΌππππ£πππ’ππ π€πππβπ‘
36. Costing
β’ Different calculations are necessary to calculate the cost of the investment,
operational grants and the vouchers:
1. For investment grants:
Total Cost = (Number of children enrolled due to the capacity
increase/Average capacity of a centre)*Investment grant
2. For the operational grant, when there is no price cap:
Total cost =
π‘=1
5
ππ’ππππ ππ ππππππππ
πβππππππ ππ ππ’ππππ¦ πππ‘ππ πππππ‘
β πππ πβπππ πππππ‘
β 12
1 + π π‘
3. For the operational grant with the price cap:
Total cost =
π‘=1
5
(ππ’ππππ ππ πβππππππ πππππππ¦ ππππππππ
ππ π‘βπ πππ‘π‘ππ 80% +
ππ’ππππ ππ πππ€ππ¦ ππππππππ πβππππππ)
β πππ πβπππ πππππ‘
β 12
1 + π π‘
4. The cost of the vouchers:
Total cost =
π‘=1
5
(ππ’ππππ ππ πβππππππ πππππππ¦ ππππππππ
ππ π‘βπ πππ‘π‘ππ 40% +
ππ’ππππ ππ πππ€ππ¦ ππππππππ πβππππππ)
β πππ πβπππ π£ππ’πβππ
β 12
1 + π π‘
37. Tax revenues
β’ Two kinds of tax revenue is calculated for each scenario. These are corporation tax revenues and
income tax revenues from newly employed staff at the centres
1. Tax revenues obtained from the newly opening centres: This is in the form of
income and corporation taxes making a cumulative total of 32% of the profits
2. Tax revenues obtained from employee contributions: This is composed of the
women working in child care centres that opened up as a result of the grants. Hence
as a lower bound estimate for tax revenue - all the women employed in new child
care centres are assumed to be receiving the minimum wage .
β’ Net present value of tax revenues are calculated for a period of 10 years.
38. Impact on Capacity
Capacity increase is maximized in the scenario that combines the investment grant
and the operational grant (and does not impose a price cap) (Sc. 4A).
38
Capacity Increase (%)Capacity Increase: Number of New Centres
783
3,306
2,394
0
4,132
3,339
783
0 1,000 2,000 3,000 4,000
Supply Side Investment Grant only: One-time investment
grant to child care centres.
Supply Side Operational Grant only: Monthly per student
operational grant (no price cap)
Supply Side Operational Grant only with Price Cap:
Monthly per student operational grant (with price cap)
Demand Side Grant only:
Vouchers to households per child enrolled
Supply Side Investment and Operational Grant combined:
One-time investment grant and monthly per child
operational grant combined (no price cap)
Supply Side Investment and Operational Grant Combined
with Price Cap:
One-time investment grant and monthly per childβ¦
Supply Side Investment Grant and Vouchers Combined:
One-time investment grant and monthly voucher to
households combined
Scenari
o1
Scenari
o2A
Scenari
o2B
Scenari
o3
Scenari
o4A
Scenari
o4B
Scenari
o5
6
24
17
0
30
24
6
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
Supply Side Investment Grant only: One-time
investment grant to child care centres.
Supply Side Operational Grant only: Monthly per
student operational grant (no price cap)
Supply Side Operational Grant only with Price Cap:
Monthly per student operational grant (with price
cap)
Demand Side Grant only:
Vouchers to households per child enrolled
Supply Side Investment and Operational Grant
combined:
One-time investment grant and monthly per childβ¦
Supply Side Investment and Operational Grant
Combined with Price Cap:
One-time investment grant and monthly per childβ¦
Supply Side Investment Grant and Vouchers
Combined:
One-time investment grant and monthly voucher toβ¦
Scenari
o1
Scenari
o2A
Scenari
o2B
Scenari
o3
Scenari
o4A
Scenari
o4B
Scenari
o5
39. Impact on Preschool enrolment
Number of newly enrolled children
39
Capacity
Number of newly
enrolled children due
to capacity increase
Affordability
Number of newly
enrolled children due
to affordability
increase
0 100,000 200,000 300,000 400,000 500,000
Supply Side Investment Grant only: One-time investment grant to child care
centres.
Supply Side Operational Grant only: Monthly per student operational grant (no
price cap)
Supply Side Operational Grant only with Price Cap: Monthly per student
operational grant (with price cap)
Demand Side Grant only:
Vouchers to households per child enrolled
Supply Side Investment and Operational Grant combined:
One-time investment grant and monthly per child operational grant combined (noβ¦
Supply Side Investment and Operational Grant Combined with Price Cap:
One-time investment grant and monthly per child operational grant combinedβ¦
Supply Side Investment Grant and Vouchers Combined:
One-time investment grant and monthly voucher to households combined
Scen
ario
1
Scen
ario
2A
Scen
ario
2B
Scen
ario
3
Scen
ario
4A
Scen
ario
4B
Scen
ario
5
# of newly enrolled children due to capacity increase Total number of newly enrolled children
40. Impact on Enrolment Rate
Increase in Enrolment Rate (% points) for overall
population and for the poor
40
Enrolment rate
Increase I enrolment
rate (percentage
points)
Enrolment rate of poor(er) children
Increase in enrolment rate of
the poorest 40%
1.6
7.9
5.7
0.9
9.6
7.6
2.6
0.0
4.1
3.6
1.9
6.0
6.2
2.1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Supply Side Investment Grant only: One-time investment grant to child care
centres.
Supply Side Operational Grant only: Monthly per student operational grant
(no price cap)
Supply Side Operational Grant only with Price Cap: Monthly per student
operational grant (with price cap)
Demand Side Grant only:
Vouchers to households per child enrolled
Supply Side Investment and Operational Grant combined:
One-time investment grant and monthly per child operational grantβ¦
Supply Side Investment and Operational Grant Combined with Price Cap:
One-time investment grant and monthly per child operational grantβ¦
Supply Side Investment Grant and Vouchers Combined:
One-time investment grant and monthly voucher to households combined
Scena
rio1
Scena
rio2A
Scena
rio2B
Scena
rio3
Scena
rio4A
Scena
rio4B
Scena
rio5
41. Benefit Incidence
Benefits to the bottom 40% of population (%)
41
% of the newly enrolled
children from bottom 40%
% of the benefit going to
bottom 40%
0
25
31
100
30
40
39
0
29
41
100
30
43
100
0.0 10.0 20.0 30.0 40.0 50.0 60.0 70.0 80.0 90.0 100.0
Supply Side Investment Grant only: One-time investment grant to child care
centres.
Supply Side Operational Grant only: Monthly per student operational grant (no
price cap)
Supply Side Operational Grant only with Price Cap: Monthly per student
operational grant (with price cap)
Demand Side Grant only:
Vouchers to households per child enrolled
Supply Side Investment and Operational Grant combined:
One-time investment grant and monthly per child operational grant combined (noβ¦
Supply Side Investment and Operational Grant Combined with Price Cap:
One-time investment grant and monthly per child operational grant combinedβ¦
Supply Side Investment Grant and Vouchers Combined:
One-time investment grant and monthly voucher to households combined
Scenar
io1
Scenar
io2A
Scenar
io2B
Scenar
io3
Scenar
io4A
Scenar
io4B
Scenar
io5
42. Benefit Incidence of new enrolments
Preschool enrolment rates of children aged 3-5 by per capita income quintile
0
.2.4.6.8
1
1 2 3 4 5
Scenario 1: Supply Side Investment Grant only
Baseline Capacity increase Affordability increase 0
.2.4.6.8
1
EnrolmentrateforChildrenaged3-5
1 2 3 4 5
Scenario 2A: Supply Side Operational Grant only
Baseline Capacity increase Affordability increase
0
.2.4.6.8
1
1 2 3 4 5
Scenario 2B: Supply Side Operational Grant only
with Price Cap
Baseline Capacity increase Affordability increase
0
.2.4.6.8
1
EnrolmentrateforChildrenaged3-5
1 2 3 4 5
Scenario 3: Demand Side Grant only
Baseline Capacity increase Affordability increase
0
.2.4.6.8
1
1 2 3 4 5
Investment grant:50000 TL, Operational grant:300 TL
Price cap:750 TL, Voucher:0 TL
Baseline Capacity increase Affordability increase
0
.2.4.6.8
1
EnrolmentrateforChildrenaged3-5
1 2 3 4 5
Scenario 4A: Supply Side Investment
and Operational Grant combined
Baseline Capacity increase Affordability increase
0
.2.4.6.8
1
EnrolmentrateforChildrenaged3-5
1 2 3 4 5
Scenario 4B: Supply Side Investment
and Operational Grant combined with Price Cap
Baseline Capacity increase Affordability increase
0
.2.4.6.8
1
EnrolmentrateforChildrenaged3-5
1 2 3 4 5
Scenario 5: Supply Side Investment Grant
and Demand Side Grant combined
Baseline Capacity increase Affordability increase
0
.2.4.6.8
1
EnrolmentrateforChildrenaged3-5
1 2 3 4 5
Investment grant:50000 TL, Operational grant:300 TL
Price cap:750 TL, Voucher:0 TL
Baseline Capacity increase Affordability increase
43. Benefit incidence of grants
Benefit incidence of the grants and/or vouchers by per capita income quintile
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0
200400600800
1,000
1 2 3 4 5
Scenario 1: Supply Side Investment Grant only
157.3
252.2 265.9
311.3
427.6
0
200400600800
1,000
Totalbenefit(inmillionTL)
1 2 3 4 5
Scenario 2A: Supply Side Operational Grant only
151.1
247.9 264.0
309.6
0.0
0
200400600800
1,000
1 2 3 4 5
Scenario 2B: Supply Side Operational Grant only
with Price Cap
310.7
413.7
0.0 0.0 0.0
0
200400600800
1,000
Totalbenefit(inmillionTL)
1 2 3 4 5
Scenario 3: Demand Side Grant only
165.7
284.4 287.0
318.3
434.2
0
200400600800
1,000
Totalbenefit(inmillionTL)
1 2 3 4 5
Scenario 4A: Supply Side Investment
and Operational Grant combined
163.7
291.4 284.8
316.2
0.0
0
200400600800
1,000
Totalbenefit(inmillionTL)
1 2 3 4 5
Scenario 4B: Supply Side Investment
and Operational Grant combined with Price Cap
317.0
417.1
0.0 0.0 0.0
0
200400600800
1,000
Totalbenefit(inmillionTL)
1 2 3 4 5
Scenario 5: Supply Side Investment Grant
and Demand Side Grant combined
44. Total Costs (million TL)
(Accruing to Child care Providers vs Households)
44
Benefits to
Child Care
Providers
Benefits to
Households
39
3,939
2,639
568
4,342
3,025
885
0
1,414
973
724
1,490
1,056
734
0 1,000 2,000 3,000 4,000 5,000 6,000
Supply Side Investment Grant only: One-time investment grant to child care centres.
Supply Side Operational Grant only: Monthly per student operational grant (no price cap)
Supply Side Operational Grant only with Price Cap: Monthly per student operational grant
(with price cap)
Demand Side Grant only:
Vouchers to households per child enrolled
Supply Side Investment and Operational Grant combined:
One-time investment grant and monthly per child operational grant combined (no price cap)
Supply Side Investment and Operational Grant Combined with Price Cap:
One-time investment grant and monthly per child operational grant combined (with price cap)
Supply Side Investment Grant and Vouchers Combined:
One-time investment grant and monthly voucher to households combined
Scena
rio1
Scena
rio2A
Scena
rio2B
Scena
rio3
Scena
rio4A
Scena
rio4B
Scena
rio5
Total benefit accruing to child care providers (million TL) Total benefit accruing to households (million TL)
45. Total Tax Revenue (million TL)
(Accruing to Child care Providers vs Households)
45
Newly employed women
in centres
Corporation
and Income Tax
333
1,407
1,019
0
1,759
1,422
333
0 200 400 600 800 1,000 1,200 1,400 1,600 1,800 2,000
Supply Side Investment Grant only: One-time investment grant to child
care centres.
Supply Side Operational Grant only: Monthly per student operational
grant (no price cap)
Supply Side Operational Grant only with Price Cap: Monthly per student
operational grant (with price cap)
Demand Side Grant only:
Vouchers to households per child enrolled
Supply Side Investment and Operational Grant combined:
One-time investment grant and monthly per child operational grantβ¦
Supply Side Investment and Operational Grant Combined with Price
Cap:β¦
Supply Side Investment Grant and Vouchers Combined:
One-time investment grant and monthly voucher to householdsβ¦
Scen
ario
1
Scen
ario
2A
Scen
ario
2B
Scen
ario
3
Scen
ario
4A
Scen
ario
4B
Scen
ario
5
46. Total Net Cost (million TL)
(Total cost- tax revenue)
46
-314
3,861
2,532
1,292
3,968
2,574
1,266
-1,000 -500 0 500 1,000 1,500 2,000 2,500 3,000 3,500 4,000 4,500
Supply Side Investment Grant only: One-time investment grant to child care centres.
Supply Side Operational Grant only: Monthly per student operational grant (no price
cap)
Supply Side Operational Grant only with Price Cap: Monthly per student operational
grant (with price cap)
Demand Side Grant only:
Vouchers to households per child enrolled
Supply Side Investment and Operational Grant combined:
One-time investment grant and monthly per child operational grant combined (noβ¦
Supply Side Investment and Operational Grant Combined with Price Cap:
One-time investment grant and monthly per child operational grant combined (withβ¦
Supply Side Investment Grant and Vouchers Combined:
One-time investment grant and monthly voucher to households combined
Scena
rio1
Scena
rio2A
Scena
rio2B
Scena
rio3
Scena
rio4A
Scena
rio4B
Scena
rio5
Total Cost - Total Tax Revenue = Total Net Cost
47. Cost Effectiveness
Scenario 1
Scenario 2A
Scenario 2B
Scenario 3
Scenario 4A
Scenario 4B
Scenario 5
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
-2,000 -1,000 0 1,000 2,000 3,000 4,000 5,000 6,000 7,000
Increaseinenrolmentrate(%point)
Net annual cost per newly enrolled child (TL)
Most cost effective
Least cost effective
Revenue
generating
High cost,
high enrolment
High cost,
Low enrolment
Low cost,
High enrolment
Low cost,
Low enrolment
48. Cost Effectiveness and Benefit Incidence
Most cost effective
Least cost effective
Revenue
generating
High cost,
high enrolment
High cost,
Low enrolment
Low cost,
High enrolment
Low cost,
Low enrolment
Scenario 1
Scenario 2A
Scenario 2B
Scenario 3
Scenario 4A
Scenario 4B
Scenario 5
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
-2,000 -1,000 0 1,000 2,000 3,000 4,000 5,000 6,000 7,000
Increaseinenrolmentrateforthebottom40%
(%point)
Net annual cost per newly enrolled child (TL)
49. Conclusions on use of model
β’ The mechanism for the delivery of a child care
subsidy matters for results in terms of benefit
incidence and cost effectiveness.
β’ Targeting βpoor householdsβ may not be the
most pro-poor way of expanding services or
subsidizing child care - in fact the poor children
benefit more in absolute terms when they are
not targeted in the case of Turkey.
β’ Applications of the methodology to other country
contexts is possible. Both supply and demand
side data are needed to establish the simulation
model and results.
51. Acknowledgments
51
This study was supported by the Swedish International
Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA). The authors would like
to thank RΔ±dvan Kurtipek, YΔ±ldΔ±z Yapar, PΔ±nar Γzel Ucuzal and
Dilek OkkalΔ± ΕanalmΔ±Ε (Turkey Ministry of Development); Burcu
ErtuΔrul and Fatih Kaynar (Turkey Ministry of Education); GΓΌler
ΓzdoΔan, AkΔ±n YumuΕ and Fatma KüçükbaΕol (Turkey Ministry of
Family and Social Policies); Facundo Cuevas (The World Bank);
ΓykΓΌ UluΓ§ay and Tomas Bergenholtz (Swedish Consulate) for
comments and guidance received during methodology review
meetings held in Ankara in February-March 2016.
52. Suggested Citation for this Work
52
Aran, Meltem A. and Munoz Boudet, Ana Maria and
Aktakke, Nazli, Building an Ex Ante Simulation Model for
Estimating the Capacity Impact, Benefit Incidence, and
Cost Effectiveness of Child Care Subsidies: An
Application Using Provider-Level Data from Turkey
(December 14, 2016). World Bank Policy Research
Working Paper No. 7917. Available at SSRN:
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2885545
Editor's Notes
Rate for Turkey is from the Ministry of Educationβs National Education Statistics 2015/16, gross enrolment rate for 3-5 year olds. Rates for OECD and the EU are from World Bank, World Development Indicators (gross enrolment ratio, pre-primary, both sexes (%))
In the questionnaire we have asked the respondents three standards that are most difficult to comply with for their school. Listed are the percentage of MoNe private schools that have responded with the written standards.
In the model we assume that,
Investment grants have an impact on enrolments only through their impact on capacity,
The vouchers have an impact on enrolments through increasing affordability of the services for households while they do not have an impact on capacity in the short run
The operational grant has an impact on enrolments both through its impact on enhanced capacity and through its impact on affordability
This comes from Stata calculation directly. This school is the one with Anketno=3989.
Using "$dofiles_supply\Data Analysis - Supply Side Simulations - Net Present Value - Demand side sc1 v2.do"
Average capacity of a center is taken as 50
The highest level of new enrolments are observed in the set of scenarios that include investment grants and operational grants together (Scenario 4A and 4B) and providing operational grants without price cap (Scenario 2A).
Providing only demand side vouchers to families (Scenario 3) has a minimal impact on enrolments.
In the scenarios where there are no price caps, the newly created capacity accrues regressively and benefits the higher income quintiles disproportionately.
In the scenarios with the operational and investment grants implemented together (scenario 4A) without the price cap, 30.3 percent of capacity generated is utilized by children in the bottom 40% of the distribution as opposed to 39.9 percent in the scenario with the price cap (Scenario 4B).
Revenue generating scenario (Scenario 1 β Investment Grant Scenario): The investment grant scenarios have little impact on enrolments and hence are not advised to be applied on their own if the intention is to expand services and increase enrolments β though if they are provided on their own they are likely to have a positive impact on the budget in the medium term.
Least Cost Effective scenario: (Scenario 3 β Only voucher scenario): The scenario that uses vouchers only without an investment support, is the most expensive scenario in the analysis in terms of per child enrolled. The vouchers do not address the most binding capacity problem in the child care sector in the country.
Most Cost Effective scenarios (Scenarios 2A, 4A and 4B β Investment and Operational Grants with or without Price Cap and only operational grant without price cap): The most cost effective scenarios in terms of budget spent per child enrolled are Scenarios 2 and 4 where the operational grants are provided solo or together with investment grants.
When a price cap is introduced the benefit incidence accrues more to the poor households.
Hence Scenario 4B where operational grants are provided together with investment grants and with a price cap is the most cost-effective and pro-poor scenario in terms of benefit incidence.
Overall, these are the most cost effective and hence most recommended scenarios in the simulation β whereby the twin goals of attaining higher capacity and enrolments are also matched with a concern for lower costs per child and a pro-poor distribution.