The document summarizes the process of judicial conduct and discipline in the United States. It discusses how state judicial conduct organizations were established to investigate complaints against judges and can impose sanctions. It also outlines the federal Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1990 which established a process for investigating complaints against federal judges. Key points made include criticisms of the current system for appearing to lack impartiality and recommendations for reform, such as having complaints reviewed by judges outside the circuit of the subject judge.

1. Michael Pinckney
Judicial Discipline
When one thinks about the role and authority given to a judge, there must be a high level
of public trust in the person whom holds the title and office. When any of these judges engage in
behavior that endangers the trust bestowed upon them, whether by direct or indirect misconduct.
In light thereof there must be safeguards for justice although some state other purposes. Gray
emphasizes in an article, that supreme courts have repeatedly stated that the purpose of discipline
in judicial conduct cases is not to punish a judge. Instead, the general purpose of judicial
discipline proceedings is preserving the integrity of the judicial system and public confidence in
the system and, when necessary, safeguarding the bench and the public from those who are unfit
(2002).
Other purposes of judicial discipline include the importance of: impressing upon the
judge the severity and significance of the misconduct; deterring similar conduct by the judge;
reassuring the public that judicial misconduct is not tolerated; fostering public confidence in the
self-policing system
Overview
Most complaints filed with judicial conduct commissions are dismissed, many because
they claim that the judge made an incorrect finding of fact, misapplied the law, or abused his or
her discretion, which is usually a matter not for discipline but for appellate remedy. Many other
complaints are resolved each year through informal or private remedies. Each year, however,
approximately 100 judges are publicly sanctioned in state judicial discipline proceedings (Gray,
2002)

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Federal judges under the 13 circuits are comprised of the 11 numbered circuits, the U.S.
Circuit for the District of Columbia, and the Federal Circuit. The two national courts are the U.S.
Court of Federal Claims and the U.S. Court of International Trade.
Regulating Judicial Conduct
In order to regulate the conduct of judges states began to form judicial conduct
organizations and or committees responsible for disciplining and establishing procedures to
discipline a judge. Each of the 50 states and the District of Columbia established a judicial
conduct organization charged with investigating and prosecuting complaints against judicial
officers.
These organizations are formed and describes by words such as is described with terms
such as: inquiry, discipline, qualifications, disability, performance, review, tenure, retirement,
removal, responsibility, standards, advisory, fitness, investigation, or supervisory.
In 1960, California became the first state to establish a permanent commission charged
with the regulation of judges’ conduct. By 1981, all fifty states and the District of Columbia had
created judicial conduct organizations empowered to investigate, prosecute, and adjudicate
allegations of judicial misbehavior. (Gray, 2002)
There are two main types of complaints rendered. The complainant writes one, and a
chief judge may issue the other. Many of the complainants include prison inmates, litigants,
attorneys, and public officials. The officials most complained about include Circuit Judges,
District Judges, National Court Judges (International Trade/Federal Claims), Bankruptcy Judges,
and Magistrate Judges. By 1990 congress passes the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act.
Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1990

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Under the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 351-364, any person
alleging that a judge has engaged in conduct prejudicial to the effective and expeditious
administration of the business of the courts, or that a judge cannot discharge all the duties of the
office because of physical or mental disability, may file a complaint with the clerk of the court of
appeals for the circuit in which the judge holds office or, if the judge serves on a national court,
with the office specified in that court’s rules. The complaint must concern the actions or capacity
of a circuit judge, a district judge, a bankruptcy judge, a magistrate judge, or a judge of a court
specified in 28 U.S.C. § 363.
Judicial Conduct Procedural Process
Once an allegation has been made the judicial conduct process begins. The allegations
made range from A) Disability – Mental and Physical B) Demeanor – Litigant or Attorney C)
Abuse of Judicial Power D) Bias / Prejudice - Racial, Religious, Ethnic, Personal E) Conflict of
Interest F) Bribery/Corruption G) Undue Delay H) Incompetence, Neglect and Erroneous
Decision I) Other Misconduct to include: 1) Improper Discussion with party/counsel 2) Financial
Disclosure Requirements 3) Improper Outside Income 4) Partisan Political Activity 5)
Solicitation of funds for Organization 6) Violation of other standards.
Procedures
According to www.uscourts.gov, the website for federal courts, neither the clerk of
circuit court, nor the chief judge, nor the “circuits” are authorized to refuse filing a complaint or
hold a filing “invalid” a priori. Under 28 U.S.C. §351(a), “any person…may file with the clerk of
the court…a written complaint containing a brief statement of the facts constituting such
(mis)conduct”. Moreover, §351(c) provides that “upon receipt of a complaint filed under
subsection (a), the clerk shall promptly transmit the complaint to the chief judge of the

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circuit…The clerk shall simultaneously transmit a copy of the complaint to the judge whose
conduct is the subject of the complaint.” Similarly, under §352(a), “The chief judge shall
expeditiously review any complaint…In determining what action to take, the chief judge may
conduct a limited inquiry…” The “circuits” as such are given no role under the Act. Their
judicial councils are entitled under §352(c) et seq. only to adjudicate petitions for review of a
final order of the chief judge; they have no role in the filing of complaints.
Available Disciplinary Actions
There are different disciplinary actions, which can be imposed upon judges. Some of
these actions include informal dispositions and pr private sanctions, which usually occur before
any formal charges have been brought forward. Formal sanctions may result after formal charges
have been filed. Agreed resignations may also be a form of action taking in conjunction with
suspensions and some suspensions may be without pay. The ultimate disciplinary action for
which an egregious or criminal act usually occurs is the removal from office.
Issues and Concerns
Lubet states friction between accountability and judicial independence occurs primarily at
the state level, largely in consequence of disciplinary measures taken (or potentially taken) by
state judicial conduct organizations. He mentions further that there are significant areas of
discipline - many of which are truly burdensome and some which are quite controversial that
have no palpable impact on judicial independence. Finally, judicial independence is most gravely
threatened when judges face sanctions for “decisional conduct,” which may be defined as
discipline based upon the merits of a ruling (1998).
The question of judicial accountability and independence arises primarily in the context
of state courts. Federal judges can be criticized, but they are protected by the Constitution’s

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provision for life tenure during good behavior. This in itself presents a problem, which will be
addressed in critique section on the paper.
Judicial Councils are now authorized to investigate complaints of judicial misconduct
while their disciplinary powers are narrowly circumscribed. When it comes to accountability, it
is state judges who must be concerned about re-election or retention, that are most concerned
about threats to their independence.
Of key significance is the fact that judicial independence does not require absolute
immunity, so it is hardly threatened when judges are called to account for personal
transgressions.
Current Trends
The statistics for judicial conduct and discipline reveal a terrible process that needs to be
re-examined. The current system does not present a picture to the public that the system for
judicial misconduct is an effective one. In a twelve year period as seen in Table 1. 99.82% of
complaints of judges have been dismissed. Table 2 presents the actions taken by judicial
councils.
Over time cases filed in Supreme Courts, the Court of Appeals, and Bankruptcy courts
have continually risen. If the amount of cases continues to rise and the actions taken by judicial
councils and chief judges remain the same, the problem will persist, endangering the public’s
trust in the system of judicial discipline.
New York Case Study
As a New York City resident, while researching the topic of Judicial Conduct, a
surprising fact emerged. The state of New York has the largest number of judges that have been
removed from office. New York accounts for 38% of the removals (Gray, 2002). From 1990

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through 2001, 41 judges were removed in New York, five times as many as the eight removed in
Florida, the state with the next highest number.
One explanation is the vast amount of judges. Another factor that may contribute to the
relatively high number of removals is that New York does not offer the option for suspension,
therefore an only choice for serious misconduct other than removal is a censure. Gray iterates
that another possible explanation may be that New York is one of only four states in which the
commission has the authority to remove a judge from office subject to review by the court of
appeals (the highest court in New York) at the request of the judge; in most states, the
commission can only recommend removal to the supreme court (2002).
No one factor can definitively answer the question, but another lies in the fact that there
are large number of town and village judges, most of whom are not lawyers and therefore are not
very versed in law. Other factors may also contribute to the number of judges removed in New
York compared to other states the fact that the process in New York has only one-tier compared
to a two-layer system in other states.
Critique of Current System
The statistics do not show any change whatsoever in the way judges use those complaints
to monitor or control the conduct or disability of their complained-against peers. Conduct
complaints are dismissed and judicial councils are ineffective, to say the least. Judges are rarely
censured, or reprimanded, or removed, or suspended from assignment. In essence, filing a
complaint under the Act against a judge is an exercise in futility for the complainant and an
opportunity for judges to waive their power.
Any system that allows chief judges to discipline their own judges within their authority
is subject to fail and be scrutinized. Another issue is the narrow approach of the constitution for

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impeachment. This impeachment is for criminal behavior. This is too restrictive as there are
other reasons which not necessarily criminal which should subject a judge to removal. Redish
believes that this provision prevents Congress from removing judges who engage in public
drunkenness, sexual harassment, or behavior exhibiting insanity, merely because such behavior
could not be characterized as criminal (1998)
Recommendations
Rather than providing chief judges within the same circuit to be the disciplinarians of
their own, this should be entrusted to another. This would remove skepticism and doubt from the
process. The key problem with the present system is the appearance of a lack of impartiality, a
lack of fairness, an appearance of possible bias, or at worst, partial biased review.
Additionally there should be a three-strike rule as to prevent those judges who continue to
engage in wrongful acts, which further causes public mistrust of the system. This would help to
alleviate the problem of the large number of judges who commit multiple acts of misconduct.
In the event that having a judge outside of the circuit would create other complications
such as time and distance, a special three or five panel committee could be formed. These
proposed recommendations present a starting point for which to correct the current flawed
system of judicial discipline.

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Table
1
Complaints
Filed
in
13
Circuits
1996-­‐2008

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Table
2
Judicial
Councils’
Actions
1997-­‐2006
1997-­2006
POSSIBLE
ACTIONS
97
98
99
00
01
02
03
04
05
06
Filed
by
Chief
Judges
1
2
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
88
Directed
Chief
Judge
Action
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
Certified
Disability
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Voluntary
Retirement
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Temporary
Suspension
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Privately
Censured
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
Publicly
Censured
0
1
0
2
0
2
0
0
0
0
Other
Action
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
Referred
to
Judicial
Conf.
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Special
Inv.
Comm.
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
7
TOTAL
1
4
0
3
1
3
1
0
0
96
Source:
Administrative
Office
of
the
U.S.
Courts-­‐
www.uscourts.gov

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Table
3
(*Table
10)
Judicial
Complaints
2010-­‐2012
2010
2011
2012
Complaints
Commenced
1,455
1,408
1,364
Complaints
Terminated
by
Final
Action
1,341
1,630
1,352
By
Withdrawal
Complaint
Withdrawn
by
Complainant
13
6
7
Petition
for
Review
Withdrawn
0
0
0
By
Chief
Judges
With
No
Further
Review
Dismissed
742
945
818
Concluded2
15
24
8
By
Judicial
Councils
Upon
Petition
for
Review
of
Chief
Judge’s
Disposition
Chief
Judge’s
Disposition
Affirmed
560
652
518
Other
Action
10
0
0
After
Report
by
Special
Investigating
Committee
Dismissed
1
2
1
Other
Disposition
0
0
0
Referred
to
Judicial
Conference
0
0
0
Remedial
Action
0
1
0
Complaints
Pending
946
724
736
Special
Investigating
Committee
Appointed
4
1
4
Source:
http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2012/complaints-­‐against-­‐
judges.aspx

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11
Works Cited
Gray, C. (2002). A Study of State Judicial Discipline Sanctions (p. 1). American Judicature
Society.
Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980 (28 U.S.C. §§ 351-364)
Lubet, S. (1998). Judicial Discipline and Judicial Independence. Law and Contemporary
Problems, 61(3), 59-74.
Redish, M. H. (1998). Judicial Discipline, Judicial Independence, and the Constitution: A
Textual and Structural Analysis. S. Cal. L. Rev., 72, 673.
www.uscourts.gov