SlideShare a Scribd company logo
1 of 30
Download to read offline
Fabienne ILZKOVITZ & Adriaan DIERX
Economic Evaluation of Competition Policy
DG Competition, European Commission
Workshop on the selection and prioritisation of sectors or
industries for market studies
Paris, 9 March 2017
Selection and prioritisation of sectors or
industries for EU sector inquiries
1
Outline
1. Scope
2. Definition, purpose and legal basis
3. Approach used to select sectors
4. Overview of main reasons for past Sector Inquiries
5. Concluding remarks
2
Definition of tools to deal with poorly performing markets
3
Tools Objectives
Sector screening Identification of poorly performing markets/sectors
Market monitoring
First analysis of market/sector developments with a
view to identify the nature and source of problems
Market study/
Sector Inquiry
In-depth analysis of the problems detected with a
view to identify if there is scope for policy
interventions
1. Scope
4
Market studies are defined as (ICN 2016 Report):
Research projects aimed at gaining an in-depth
understanding of how sectors, markets, or market
practices are working.
Why conduct a market study?
To gain a better knowledge of poorly performing
markets/sectors with a view to identifying if there is
scope for policy interventions that could remedy the
poor performance.
1. Scope
5
European Commission Sector inquiries are market studies aimed at
determining whether competition is restricted or distorted, and if
there is scope for competition policy interventions.
Other types market studies in the European Commission:
 Sectors not functioning well from a consumer's perspective 
Market studies on e-commerce, second-hand cars, internet
service providers, meat, retail financial services, and retail energy
to identify if there is scope for consumer policy interventions.
 Sectors not functioning well from a Single Market perspective 
Single Market Information Tool to identify important cases of
cross-border Single Market malfunctioning.
1. Scope
6
2.1 Definition
Sector inquiries are:
 investigations that the European Commission (DG
Competition) carries out into a particular sector of the
economy or into a particular practice across various
sectors in order to better understand how competition
in the sector works in practice;
 when it believes that a market is not working as well
as it should, and also believes that breaches of the
competition rules might be a contributory factor.
2. Definition, purpose and legal basis
7
2.1 Definition
Sector Inquiries can be carried out in the areas of
antitrust and State aids
Antitrust:
 To identify agreements or other practices breaching
antitrust rules
State aid:
 To identify whether State aid measures in a particular
sector distort competition within the Internal Market
 First State aid inquiry into electricity capacity
mechanisms launched in April 2015 .
2. Definition, purpose and legal basis
8
2.2 Main purpose
To achieve a better knowledge of a particular sector of the
economy or a particular practice/aid instrument across various
sectors with a view to identifying areas where competition
policy interventions may be necessary.
Further beneficial effects:
 Deterrence of anticompetitive behaviour
 Strengthening of the complementarities between
competition and regulatory policies
 Competition advocacy
2. Definition, purpose and legal basis
9
2.3 Legal basis
In the area of antitrust, Article 17(1) of Regulation
1/2003 allows the European Commission to conduct an
inquiry into a sector of the economy or into particular
agreements across various sectors if
 Trend of trade between MS
 Price rigidity
 Or other circumstances
suggest a restriction or distortion of competition within
the Internal Market.
2. Definition, purpose and legal basis
10
2.3 Legal basis
In the area of State aid, Article 25 of the State aid Procedural
Regulation empowers COM to conduct an inquiry into a sector
of the economy or the use of the aid instrument:
 where the information available substantiates a reasonable
suspicion that State aid measures in a particular sector or
based on a particular aid instrument may materially restrict
or distort competition within the internal market in several
Member States, or
 that existing aid measures in a particular sector in several
Member States are not, or no longer, compatible with the
internal market.
2. Definition, purpose and legal basis
3.1 Main principles
The European Commission has a wide discretion in
choosing when and where to launch a Sector Inquiry.
Sector selection is based on a flexible approach
combining:
 Top down and bottom up criteria
 Objective criteria and judgement
 Not used in a mechanical way
11
3. Approach used to select sectors
3.2 Top down criteria
Has the sector been identified as a strategic priority?
A sector can be considered as a strategic priority because it is
important for economic efficiency and welfare of consumers.
A sector can also be selected because considered as a strategic
priority by the European Commission (EC). The EC may also take
into account requests by the European Parliament (EP) but the EP's
requests have no binding power.
12
3. Approach used to select sectors
3.2 Top down criteria
Has the sector been identified as a strategic priority?
For example, strategic priority for the European Commission:
 E-commerce Sector Inquiry  Digital Single Market = one of the
ten most important priorities of the Juncker Commission.
 E-commerce = important driver of price transparency and price
competition.
For example, strategic priorities for the European Parliament:
 In its March 2010 resolution on the Annual Competition Report,
the European Parliament called on the Commission to carry out
Sector Inquiries in certain specific areas: food supply, media
concentration, telecommunications and financial services.
 European Commission has followed up by launching sector
inquiries or expert studies in these areas. 13
3. Approach used to select sectors
3.2 Top down criteria
Are there indications that a sector/market is not
functioning well from a competition policy perspective?
Readily available information is used to determine whether
 Obstacles to trade and a lack of integration of the Internal
Market
 Price rigidity leading to differences in prices between
Member States
 Lack of market entry by competitors, decrease in innovation,
misuse of IPRs, …
may be due to a restriction of competition.
(criteria Article 17(1) of Regulation 1/2003) 14
3. Approach used to select sectors
3.2 Top down criteria
Are there indications that the sector/market is not
functioning well from a competition policy perspective?
For example, in June 2005 the Commission adopted a decision
launching the energy sector inquiry inter alia because:
 Cross-border flows seemed to be limited and integration between
national wholesale markets had been slow
 Prices had risen and forward prices pointed to further price rises
in the future
 Market concentration remained very high and limited new entry
+ Sector representing a strategic priority 15
3. Approach used to select sectors
3.2 Top down criteria
Sector Inquiry requires significant resources from the European
Commission and represents a burden on those under
investigation
Is the Sector Inquiry the appropriate and necessary tool?
A decision needs to be taken as to the proportionality of
launching a Sector Inquiry
 SI appropriate and necessary:
- when the competition problems are industry-specific
- when it is likely that competition problems concern various
categories of actors or types of agreements
- when it is necessary to make use of the Commission’s
formal investigative powers to get the relevant information
16
3. Approach used to select sectors
3.2 Top down criteria
A sector Inquiry may not be necessary and appropriate:
 If there are no suspicions of industry-specific competition
problems
 If the main objective is to get general information on a sector
In this case, less burdensome, time-consuming and resource-
intensive means should be considered.
Examples of other means to get such information:
- Informal contacts with market players
- Expert study
17
3. Approach used to select sectors
3.3 Bottom-up approach
Based on information obtained from market players or case
handlers specialised in the sector:
Market players:
 Complaints from competitors, consumers
 Market players’ submissions to the Commission about the
sector
Case handlers responsible for regular sector monitoring:
Sector monitoring = Monitoring of sector developments by
collecting and organising readily available information about the
sector with a view to identifying problems of malfunctioning
18
3. Approach used to select sectors
3.3 Bottom-up approach
Matrix organisation of DG COMP allows to carry out sector monitoring
Matrix organisation allows combining policy instrument and sector
knowledge
19
Sector Directorates/Instruments Antitrust Mergers State aid
Energy and environment
Information, communication and media
Financial services
Basic industries, manufacturing and agriculture
Transport, post and other services
3. Approach used to select sectors
Flexible approach combining top down and bottom up
information taking into account:
 Strategic importance
 Indications of competition problems
 Proportionality of the Sector Inquiry
 Information from market players
 Information from case handlers
3.4 Summary
20
3. Approach used to select sectors
21
Since 1999, six antitrust Sector Inquiries and one
State aid Sector Inquiry have been launched:
 Telecommunications
 Media
 Financial services
 Energy
 Pharmaceuticals
 E-commerce
 Capacity mechanism in the area of State aid
4. Overview of main reasons for past Sector Inquiries
22
Sector Period Reasons for selecting this sector
Telecommunication
services, including
international
roaming and leased
lines
1999-2002  Strategic sector
 No competitive prices and pan-European
offers. For example, large difference in price
between roamed and non-roamed
international mobile calls to the same
destination within the EU
 Complaints about extremely high roaming
charges and collusion on roaming rates
 Complaints about very high leased line
prices
4.Overview of main reasons for past Sector Inquiries
23
Sector Period Reasons for selecting this sector
Financial services, including
retail banking and business
insurance
2005-2007  Priority sector (parallel initiatives to
remove regulatory barriers within the
Single Market for financial services)
 Sector important for competitiveness
and consumer welfare
 Indicators of market fragmentation and
entry barriers such as variation of prices
for comparable products across the EU
 Indicators of lack of countervailing
demand power in retail banking
 Concerns regarding market foreclosure
and practice of excessive cooperation
4.Overview of main reasons for past Sector Inquiries
24
Sector Period Reasons for selecting this sector
Energy 2005-2007  Gas and electricity provide crucial inputs for
European industry
 Potential important benefits for consumers in terms
of lower price and larger choice.
 High concentration and small number of entrants
 Limited market integration (in particular, limited
cross-border flows)
 Significant price increases and lack of transparency in
prices
 Network operators favour their affiliates due to
vertical integration and inadequate unbundling
 Consumer complaints (lack of competitive offers
from existing suppliers and little trust in existing
mechanism of price formation)
4.Overview of main reasons for past Sector Inquiries
25
Sector Period Reasons for selecting this sector
E-commerce 2015-2017  Priority sector: improving online access is one of the
pillars of the Digital Single Market strategy.
 Sector important for consumer welfare as business
practices adopted by e-commerce operators limit the
ability of consumers to find the best deals.
 Limited cross-border online trade and significant
differences between member states in the proportion of
customers that shop online from retailers located cross-
border.
 Concerns about vertical restrictions, in particular
suppliers’ restrictions imposed on retailers and affecting
online sales.
4. Overview of main reasons for past sector Inquiries
26
Sector Period Reasons for selecting this sector
New media
(3G/Sport Rights)
2004-2005  Availability of attractive content, in
particular sports-related content, has a
critical role to play in the roll-out of 3G
technology which is important for growth
and innovation.
 Media sector characterised by strong
contractual relations between a limited
number of players, thus raising barriers to
entry.
 Concerns that commercial practices in the
sale and purchase of sport rights could
hinder the development of sports services
over 3G networks.
4. Overview of main reasons for past Sector Inquiries
27
Sector Period Reasons for selecting this sector
Pharmaceuticals 2008-2009  Sector vital to the health of Europe's
citizens
 Decline in innovation as measured by
number of novel medicines
 Delayed generic market entry
 Indication of anti-competitive commercial
practices by pharmaceutical suppliers
(using patents to block innovative and/or
generic competition)
 Concerns about agreements
 Market information/monitoring and
information through cases ( e.g., Astra
Zeneca case)
4.Overview of main reasons for past Sector Inquiries
28
Important to use a flexible approach combining top-
down and bottom-up information to select the sectors
Overall practice shows that Sector Inquiries were
mostly launched in sectors that are:
 highly regulated;
 important for economic efficiency and consumer
welfare;
and often where
 undertakings have significant market power
 the application of competition rules raises
complex issues
5. Concluding remarks
29
Sector Inquiries have proven to be an effective and
efficient tool for
 collecting valuable information; and
 contributing directly (through case enforcement) and
indirectly (deterrence effect, regulatory changes) to
improved competition.
Very important to select the right sectors:
 Benefits of the intervention.
 Credibility of the institution.
 Resource requirements
 Burden for stakeholders
5. Concluding remarks
30
• See the website of DG Competition
• on Sector Inquiry
• http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/
sector_inquiries.html
• http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid
/overview/state_aid_procedures_en.html

More Related Content

What's hot

What's hot (20)

Competition and Market Studies in Latin America: The case of Chile, Colombia,...
Competition and Market Studies in Latin America: The case of Chile, Colombia,...Competition and Market Studies in Latin America: The case of Chile, Colombia,...
Competition and Market Studies in Latin America: The case of Chile, Colombia,...
 
Market Studies and Competition - Miguel de la Mano - Executive Vice President...
Market Studies and Competition - Miguel de la Mano - Executive Vice President...Market Studies and Competition - Miguel de la Mano - Executive Vice President...
Market Studies and Competition - Miguel de la Mano - Executive Vice President...
 
Safe harbours – Swedish Competition Authority – December 2017 OECD discussion
Safe harbours – Swedish Competition Authority – December 2017 OECD discussionSafe harbours – Swedish Competition Authority – December 2017 OECD discussion
Safe harbours – Swedish Competition Authority – December 2017 OECD discussion
 
Market study methodologies for competition authorities – Chile FNE - June 201...
Market study methodologies for competition authorities – Chile FNE - June 201...Market study methodologies for competition authorities – Chile FNE - June 201...
Market study methodologies for competition authorities – Chile FNE - June 201...
 
Economic analysis and evidence in abuse cases – Break-out Session 2 – Techniq...
Economic analysis and evidence in abuse cases – Break-out Session 2 – Techniq...Economic analysis and evidence in abuse cases – Break-out Session 2 – Techniq...
Economic analysis and evidence in abuse cases – Break-out Session 2 – Techniq...
 
Economic analysis and evidence in abuse cases – Break-out Session 1 – Techniq...
Economic analysis and evidence in abuse cases – Break-out Session 1 – Techniq...Economic analysis and evidence in abuse cases – Break-out Session 1 – Techniq...
Economic analysis and evidence in abuse cases – Break-out Session 1 – Techniq...
 
Economic Analysis in Merger Investigations – Break-out Session 2 – Quantitati...
Economic Analysis in Merger Investigations – Break-out Session 2 – Quantitati...Economic Analysis in Merger Investigations – Break-out Session 2 – Quantitati...
Economic Analysis in Merger Investigations – Break-out Session 2 – Quantitati...
 
October 2021 Newsletter: OECD KPC Asia-Pacific Competition News
October 2021 Newsletter: OECD KPC Asia-Pacific Competition NewsOctober 2021 Newsletter: OECD KPC Asia-Pacific Competition News
October 2021 Newsletter: OECD KPC Asia-Pacific Competition News
 
Market study methodologies for competition authorities – OECD Competition Div...
Market study methodologies for competition authorities – OECD Competition Div...Market study methodologies for competition authorities – OECD Competition Div...
Market study methodologies for competition authorities – OECD Competition Div...
 
The role of market studies as a tool to promote competition – CANADA – Novemb...
The role of market studies as a tool to promote competition – CANADA – Novemb...The role of market studies as a tool to promote competition – CANADA – Novemb...
The role of market studies as a tool to promote competition – CANADA – Novemb...
 
Line of business restrictions – UK CMA – June 2020 OECD discussion
Line of business restrictions – UK CMA – June 2020 OECD discussionLine of business restrictions – UK CMA – June 2020 OECD discussion
Line of business restrictions – UK CMA – June 2020 OECD discussion
 
PERSONALISED PRICING – UK – November 2018 OECD discussion
PERSONALISED PRICING – UK – November 2018 OECD discussionPERSONALISED PRICING – UK – November 2018 OECD discussion
PERSONALISED PRICING – UK – November 2018 OECD discussion
 
Environmental Considerations – INDERST – December 2021 OECD discussion
Environmental Considerations – INDERST – December 2021 OECD discussionEnvironmental Considerations – INDERST – December 2021 OECD discussion
Environmental Considerations – INDERST – December 2021 OECD discussion
 
December 2020 newsletter OECD KPC Asia-Pacific Competition News
December 2020 newsletter OECD KPC Asia-Pacific Competition NewsDecember 2020 newsletter OECD KPC Asia-Pacific Competition News
December 2020 newsletter OECD KPC Asia-Pacific Competition News
 
Methodologies to Measure Market Competition – CABRAL PIRES-ALVES – June 2021 ...
Methodologies to Measure Market Competition – CABRAL PIRES-ALVES – June 2021 ...Methodologies to Measure Market Competition – CABRAL PIRES-ALVES – June 2021 ...
Methodologies to Measure Market Competition – CABRAL PIRES-ALVES – June 2021 ...
 
Small and developing competition agencies – CUTS – December 2017 OECD discussion
Small and developing competition agencies – CUTS – December 2017 OECD discussionSmall and developing competition agencies – CUTS – December 2017 OECD discussion
Small and developing competition agencies – CUTS – December 2017 OECD discussion
 
Using market studies to tackle emerging competition issues – OECD Secretariat...
Using market studies to tackle emerging competition issues – OECD Secretariat...Using market studies to tackle emerging competition issues – OECD Secretariat...
Using market studies to tackle emerging competition issues – OECD Secretariat...
 
Ex-Ante Regulation and Competition in Digital Markets – OECD Secretariat – De...
Ex-Ante Regulation and Competition in Digital Markets – OECD Secretariat – De...Ex-Ante Regulation and Competition in Digital Markets – OECD Secretariat – De...
Ex-Ante Regulation and Competition in Digital Markets – OECD Secretariat – De...
 
Economic Analysis in Merger Investigations – Break-out Session 1 - Surveys an...
Economic Analysis in Merger Investigations – Break-out Session 1 - Surveys an...Economic Analysis in Merger Investigations – Break-out Session 1 - Surveys an...
Economic Analysis in Merger Investigations – Break-out Session 1 - Surveys an...
 
Line of business restrictions – DG COMP European Commission – June 2020 OECD ...
Line of business restrictions – DG COMP European Commission – June 2020 OECD ...Line of business restrictions – DG COMP European Commission – June 2020 OECD ...
Line of business restrictions – DG COMP European Commission – June 2020 OECD ...
 

Similar to Market Studies and Competition - EU - Fabienne ILZKOVITZ & Adriaan DIERX, DG Competition, European Commission

Manual on Market Examinations
Manual on Market ExaminationsManual on Market Examinations
Manual on Market ExaminationsOECD Governance
 
Regulatory Structure In Convergence
Regulatory Structure In ConvergenceRegulatory Structure In Convergence
Regulatory Structure In ConvergenceJorge Bossio
 
Snapshot 19 15 single market strategy
Snapshot 19 15 single market strategySnapshot 19 15 single market strategy
Snapshot 19 15 single market strategyArne Koeppel
 
Japan Telemedicine Market Analysis
Japan Telemedicine Market AnalysisJapan Telemedicine Market Analysis
Japan Telemedicine Market AnalysisInsights10
 
European Competition Policy: Design, Implementation and Political Support
European Competition Policy: Design, Implementation and Political Support European Competition Policy: Design, Implementation and Political Support
European Competition Policy: Design, Implementation and Political Support thinkingeurope2011
 
EU Assessment of PSI Re-use in Europe 2008
EU Assessment of PSI Re-use in Europe 2008EU Assessment of PSI Re-use in Europe 2008
EU Assessment of PSI Re-use in Europe 2008Michael Fanning
 
Competition Assessment: UK
Competition Assessment: UKCompetition Assessment: UK
Competition Assessment: UKOECD Governance
 
20091127 Ec Gaal Estali 2
20091127 Ec Gaal Estali 220091127 Ec Gaal Estali 2
20091127 Ec Gaal Estali 2gaalnorb
 
Business Environment Analysis
Business Environment AnalysisBusiness Environment Analysis
Business Environment AnalysisNGANG PEREZ
 
D bove and a yokwana 'the role of competition advocacy in shaping 20 years of...
D bove and a yokwana 'the role of competition advocacy in shaping 20 years of...D bove and a yokwana 'the role of competition advocacy in shaping 20 years of...
D bove and a yokwana 'the role of competition advocacy in shaping 20 years of...Daniela Bove
 
3 macro environment+demand analysis sf
3 macro environment+demand analysis sf3 macro environment+demand analysis sf
3 macro environment+demand analysis sfSilvio Filippi
 
Competition Assessment: The OECD Toolkit
Competition Assessment: The OECD ToolkitCompetition Assessment: The OECD Toolkit
Competition Assessment: The OECD ToolkitOECD Governance
 

Similar to Market Studies and Competition - EU - Fabienne ILZKOVITZ & Adriaan DIERX, DG Competition, European Commission (20)

Manual on Market Examinations
Manual on Market ExaminationsManual on Market Examinations
Manual on Market Examinations
 
Regulatory Structure In Convergence
Regulatory Structure In ConvergenceRegulatory Structure In Convergence
Regulatory Structure In Convergence
 
Andrew Daly, Hempsons
Andrew Daly, HempsonsAndrew Daly, Hempsons
Andrew Daly, Hempsons
 
Next Generation Networks: What does the future hold?
Next Generation Networks: What does the future hold?Next Generation Networks: What does the future hold?
Next Generation Networks: What does the future hold?
 
Snapshot 19 15 single market strategy
Snapshot 19 15 single market strategySnapshot 19 15 single market strategy
Snapshot 19 15 single market strategy
 
Public interest considerations in merger control: a practitioner's perspectiv...
Public interest considerations in merger control: a practitioner's perspectiv...Public interest considerations in merger control: a practitioner's perspectiv...
Public interest considerations in merger control: a practitioner's perspectiv...
 
Japan Telemedicine Market Analysis
Japan Telemedicine Market AnalysisJapan Telemedicine Market Analysis
Japan Telemedicine Market Analysis
 
Interactions between competition authorities and sector regulators – CAVE – D...
Interactions between competition authorities and sector regulators – CAVE – D...Interactions between competition authorities and sector regulators – CAVE – D...
Interactions between competition authorities and sector regulators – CAVE – D...
 
European Competition Policy: Design, Implementation and Political Support
European Competition Policy: Design, Implementation and Political Support European Competition Policy: Design, Implementation and Political Support
European Competition Policy: Design, Implementation and Political Support
 
EU Assessment of PSI Re-use in Europe 2008
EU Assessment of PSI Re-use in Europe 2008EU Assessment of PSI Re-use in Europe 2008
EU Assessment of PSI Re-use in Europe 2008
 
Competition Assessment: UK
Competition Assessment: UKCompetition Assessment: UK
Competition Assessment: UK
 
PPT, B Garcia Porras, EC, Third ENP East public procurement conference, Tbili...
PPT, B Garcia Porras, EC, Third ENP East public procurement conference, Tbili...PPT, B Garcia Porras, EC, Third ENP East public procurement conference, Tbili...
PPT, B Garcia Porras, EC, Third ENP East public procurement conference, Tbili...
 
Interactions between competition authorities and sector regulators – MASETI –...
Interactions between competition authorities and sector regulators – MASETI –...Interactions between competition authorities and sector regulators – MASETI –...
Interactions between competition authorities and sector regulators – MASETI –...
 
Competition Compliance Programmes - OECD Competition Division - June 2021 dis...
Competition Compliance Programmes - OECD Competition Division - June 2021 dis...Competition Compliance Programmes - OECD Competition Division - June 2021 dis...
Competition Compliance Programmes - OECD Competition Division - June 2021 dis...
 
20091127 Ec Gaal Estali 2
20091127 Ec Gaal Estali 220091127 Ec Gaal Estali 2
20091127 Ec Gaal Estali 2
 
Business Environment Analysis
Business Environment AnalysisBusiness Environment Analysis
Business Environment Analysis
 
D bove and a yokwana 'the role of competition advocacy in shaping 20 years of...
D bove and a yokwana 'the role of competition advocacy in shaping 20 years of...D bove and a yokwana 'the role of competition advocacy in shaping 20 years of...
D bove and a yokwana 'the role of competition advocacy in shaping 20 years of...
 
3 macro environment+demand analysis sf
3 macro environment+demand analysis sf3 macro environment+demand analysis sf
3 macro environment+demand analysis sf
 
Competition Assessment: The OECD Toolkit
Competition Assessment: The OECD ToolkitCompetition Assessment: The OECD Toolkit
Competition Assessment: The OECD Toolkit
 
Energy transparencyindex eng
Energy transparencyindex engEnergy transparencyindex eng
Energy transparencyindex eng
 

More from OECD Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs

More from OECD Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs (20)

OECD Competition Trends 2024 - Highlights
OECD Competition Trends 2024 - HighlightsOECD Competition Trends 2024 - Highlights
OECD Competition Trends 2024 - Highlights
 
Use of Economic Evidence in Cartel Cases – CAMACHO – December 2023 OECD discu...
Use of Economic Evidence in Cartel Cases – CAMACHO – December 2023 OECD discu...Use of Economic Evidence in Cartel Cases – CAMACHO – December 2023 OECD discu...
Use of Economic Evidence in Cartel Cases – CAMACHO – December 2023 OECD discu...
 
Ex-post Assessment of Merger Remedies – KOVACIC – December 2023 OECD discussion
Ex-post Assessment of Merger Remedies – KOVACIC – December 2023 OECD discussionEx-post Assessment of Merger Remedies – KOVACIC – December 2023 OECD discussion
Ex-post Assessment of Merger Remedies – KOVACIC – December 2023 OECD discussion
 
Ex-post Assessment of Merger Remedies – KWOKA – December 2023 OECD discussion
Ex-post Assessment of Merger Remedies – KWOKA – December 2023 OECD discussionEx-post Assessment of Merger Remedies – KWOKA – December 2023 OECD discussion
Ex-post Assessment of Merger Remedies – KWOKA – December 2023 OECD discussion
 
Ex-post Assessment of Merger Remedies – FLETCHER – December 2023 OECD discussion
Ex-post Assessment of Merger Remedies – FLETCHER – December 2023 OECD discussionEx-post Assessment of Merger Remedies – FLETCHER – December 2023 OECD discussion
Ex-post Assessment of Merger Remedies – FLETCHER – December 2023 OECD discussion
 
Ex-post Assessment of Merger Remedies – OECD – December 2023 OECD discussion
Ex-post Assessment of Merger Remedies – OECD – December 2023 OECD discussionEx-post Assessment of Merger Remedies – OECD – December 2023 OECD discussion
Ex-post Assessment of Merger Remedies – OECD – December 2023 OECD discussion
 
Use of Economic Evidence in Cartel Cases – DAVIES – December 2023 OECD discus...
Use of Economic Evidence in Cartel Cases – DAVIES – December 2023 OECD discus...Use of Economic Evidence in Cartel Cases – DAVIES – December 2023 OECD discus...
Use of Economic Evidence in Cartel Cases – DAVIES – December 2023 OECD discus...
 
Use of Economic Evidence in Cartel Cases – ROBERTS – December 2023 OECD discu...
Use of Economic Evidence in Cartel Cases – ROBERTS – December 2023 OECD discu...Use of Economic Evidence in Cartel Cases – ROBERTS – December 2023 OECD discu...
Use of Economic Evidence in Cartel Cases – ROBERTS – December 2023 OECD discu...
 
Alternatives to Leniency Programmes – SERBIA – December 2023 OECD discussion
Alternatives to Leniency Programmes – SERBIA – December 2023 OECD discussionAlternatives to Leniency Programmes – SERBIA – December 2023 OECD discussion
Alternatives to Leniency Programmes – SERBIA – December 2023 OECD discussion
 
Alternatives to Leniency Programmes – ITALY – December 2023 OECD discussion
Alternatives to Leniency Programmes – ITALY – December 2023 OECD discussionAlternatives to Leniency Programmes – ITALY – December 2023 OECD discussion
Alternatives to Leniency Programmes – ITALY – December 2023 OECD discussion
 
Out-of-Market Efficiencies in Competition Enforcement – CRANE – December 2023...
Out-of-Market Efficiencies in Competition Enforcement – CRANE – December 2023...Out-of-Market Efficiencies in Competition Enforcement – CRANE – December 2023...
Out-of-Market Efficiencies in Competition Enforcement – CRANE – December 2023...
 
Out-of-Market Efficiencies in Competition Enforcement – DAVIES – December 202...
Out-of-Market Efficiencies in Competition Enforcement – DAVIES – December 202...Out-of-Market Efficiencies in Competition Enforcement – DAVIES – December 202...
Out-of-Market Efficiencies in Competition Enforcement – DAVIES – December 202...
 
Out-of-Market Efficiencies in Competition Enforcement – ROSE – December 2023 ...
Out-of-Market Efficiencies in Competition Enforcement – ROSE – December 2023 ...Out-of-Market Efficiencies in Competition Enforcement – ROSE – December 2023 ...
Out-of-Market Efficiencies in Competition Enforcement – ROSE – December 2023 ...
 
Out-of-Market Efficiencies in Competition Enforcement – ROSENBOOM – December ...
Out-of-Market Efficiencies in Competition Enforcement – ROSENBOOM – December ...Out-of-Market Efficiencies in Competition Enforcement – ROSENBOOM – December ...
Out-of-Market Efficiencies in Competition Enforcement – ROSENBOOM – December ...
 
Serial Acquisitions and Industry Roll-ups –TZANAKI – December 2023 OECD discu...
Serial Acquisitions and Industry Roll-ups –TZANAKI – December 2023 OECD discu...Serial Acquisitions and Industry Roll-ups –TZANAKI – December 2023 OECD discu...
Serial Acquisitions and Industry Roll-ups –TZANAKI – December 2023 OECD discu...
 
Serial Acquisitions and Industry Roll-ups – GOGA – December 2023 OECD discussion
Serial Acquisitions and Industry Roll-ups – GOGA – December 2023 OECD discussionSerial Acquisitions and Industry Roll-ups – GOGA – December 2023 OECD discussion
Serial Acquisitions and Industry Roll-ups – GOGA – December 2023 OECD discussion
 
Serial Acquisitions and Industry Roll-ups – KOKKORIS – December 2023 OECD dis...
Serial Acquisitions and Industry Roll-ups – KOKKORIS – December 2023 OECD dis...Serial Acquisitions and Industry Roll-ups – KOKKORIS – December 2023 OECD dis...
Serial Acquisitions and Industry Roll-ups – KOKKORIS – December 2023 OECD dis...
 
Serial Acquisitions and Industry Roll-ups – OECD – December 2023 OECD discussion
Serial Acquisitions and Industry Roll-ups – OECD – December 2023 OECD discussionSerial Acquisitions and Industry Roll-ups – OECD – December 2023 OECD discussion
Serial Acquisitions and Industry Roll-ups – OECD – December 2023 OECD discussion
 
Competition and Innovation - The Role of Innovation in Enforcement Cases – VE...
Competition and Innovation - The Role of Innovation in Enforcement Cases – VE...Competition and Innovation - The Role of Innovation in Enforcement Cases – VE...
Competition and Innovation - The Role of Innovation in Enforcement Cases – VE...
 
Competition and Innovation - The Role of Innovation in Enforcement Cases – OE...
Competition and Innovation - The Role of Innovation in Enforcement Cases – OE...Competition and Innovation - The Role of Innovation in Enforcement Cases – OE...
Competition and Innovation - The Role of Innovation in Enforcement Cases – OE...
 

Recently uploaded

Chizaram's Women Tech Makers Deck. .pptx
Chizaram's Women Tech Makers Deck.  .pptxChizaram's Women Tech Makers Deck.  .pptx
Chizaram's Women Tech Makers Deck. .pptxogubuikealex
 
Simulation-based Testing of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles with Aerialist
Simulation-based Testing of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles with AerialistSimulation-based Testing of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles with Aerialist
Simulation-based Testing of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles with AerialistSebastiano Panichella
 
Quality by design.. ppt for RA (1ST SEM
Quality by design.. ppt for  RA (1ST SEMQuality by design.. ppt for  RA (1ST SEM
Quality by design.. ppt for RA (1ST SEMCharmi13
 
PHYSICS PROJECT BY MSC - NANOTECHNOLOGY
PHYSICS PROJECT BY MSC  - NANOTECHNOLOGYPHYSICS PROJECT BY MSC  - NANOTECHNOLOGY
PHYSICS PROJECT BY MSC - NANOTECHNOLOGYpruthirajnayak525
 
Work Remotely with Confluence ACE 2.pptx
Work Remotely with Confluence ACE 2.pptxWork Remotely with Confluence ACE 2.pptx
Work Remotely with Confluence ACE 2.pptxmavinoikein
 
Mathan flower ppt.pptx slide orchids ✨🌸
Mathan flower ppt.pptx slide orchids ✨🌸Mathan flower ppt.pptx slide orchids ✨🌸
Mathan flower ppt.pptx slide orchids ✨🌸mathanramanathan2005
 
Gaps, Issues and Challenges in the Implementation of Mother Tongue Based-Mult...
Gaps, Issues and Challenges in the Implementation of Mother Tongue Based-Mult...Gaps, Issues and Challenges in the Implementation of Mother Tongue Based-Mult...
Gaps, Issues and Challenges in the Implementation of Mother Tongue Based-Mult...marjmae69
 
Genshin Impact PPT Template by EaTemp.pptx
Genshin Impact PPT Template by EaTemp.pptxGenshin Impact PPT Template by EaTemp.pptx
Genshin Impact PPT Template by EaTemp.pptxJohnree4
 
INDIAN GCP GUIDELINE. for Regulatory affair 1st sem CRR
INDIAN GCP GUIDELINE. for Regulatory  affair 1st sem CRRINDIAN GCP GUIDELINE. for Regulatory  affair 1st sem CRR
INDIAN GCP GUIDELINE. for Regulatory affair 1st sem CRRsarwankumar4524
 
miladyskindiseases-200705210221 2.!!pptx
miladyskindiseases-200705210221 2.!!pptxmiladyskindiseases-200705210221 2.!!pptx
miladyskindiseases-200705210221 2.!!pptxCarrieButtitta
 
SaaStr Workshop Wednesday w/ Kyle Norton, Owner.com
SaaStr Workshop Wednesday w/ Kyle Norton, Owner.comSaaStr Workshop Wednesday w/ Kyle Norton, Owner.com
SaaStr Workshop Wednesday w/ Kyle Norton, Owner.comsaastr
 
Call Girls In Aerocity 🤳 Call Us +919599264170
Call Girls In Aerocity 🤳 Call Us +919599264170Call Girls In Aerocity 🤳 Call Us +919599264170
Call Girls In Aerocity 🤳 Call Us +919599264170Escort Service
 
SBFT Tool Competition 2024 -- Python Test Case Generation Track
SBFT Tool Competition 2024 -- Python Test Case Generation TrackSBFT Tool Competition 2024 -- Python Test Case Generation Track
SBFT Tool Competition 2024 -- Python Test Case Generation TrackSebastiano Panichella
 
The Ten Facts About People With Autism Presentation
The Ten Facts About People With Autism PresentationThe Ten Facts About People With Autism Presentation
The Ten Facts About People With Autism PresentationNathan Young
 
Dutch Power - 26 maart 2024 - Henk Kras - Circular Plastics
Dutch Power - 26 maart 2024 - Henk Kras - Circular PlasticsDutch Power - 26 maart 2024 - Henk Kras - Circular Plastics
Dutch Power - 26 maart 2024 - Henk Kras - Circular PlasticsDutch Power
 
Presentation for the Strategic Dialogue on the Future of Agriculture, Brussel...
Presentation for the Strategic Dialogue on the Future of Agriculture, Brussel...Presentation for the Strategic Dialogue on the Future of Agriculture, Brussel...
Presentation for the Strategic Dialogue on the Future of Agriculture, Brussel...Krijn Poppe
 
RACHEL-ANN M. TENIBRO PRODUCT RESEARCH PRESENTATION
RACHEL-ANN M. TENIBRO PRODUCT RESEARCH PRESENTATIONRACHEL-ANN M. TENIBRO PRODUCT RESEARCH PRESENTATION
RACHEL-ANN M. TENIBRO PRODUCT RESEARCH PRESENTATIONRachelAnnTenibroAmaz
 
PAG-UNLAD NG EKONOMIYA na dapat isaalang alang sa pag-aaral.
PAG-UNLAD NG EKONOMIYA na dapat isaalang alang sa pag-aaral.PAG-UNLAD NG EKONOMIYA na dapat isaalang alang sa pag-aaral.
PAG-UNLAD NG EKONOMIYA na dapat isaalang alang sa pag-aaral.KathleenAnnCordero2
 
Event 4 Introduction to Open Source.pptx
Event 4 Introduction to Open Source.pptxEvent 4 Introduction to Open Source.pptx
Event 4 Introduction to Open Source.pptxaryanv1753
 
The 3rd Intl. Workshop on NL-based Software Engineering
The 3rd Intl. Workshop on NL-based Software EngineeringThe 3rd Intl. Workshop on NL-based Software Engineering
The 3rd Intl. Workshop on NL-based Software EngineeringSebastiano Panichella
 

Recently uploaded (20)

Chizaram's Women Tech Makers Deck. .pptx
Chizaram's Women Tech Makers Deck.  .pptxChizaram's Women Tech Makers Deck.  .pptx
Chizaram's Women Tech Makers Deck. .pptx
 
Simulation-based Testing of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles with Aerialist
Simulation-based Testing of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles with AerialistSimulation-based Testing of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles with Aerialist
Simulation-based Testing of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles with Aerialist
 
Quality by design.. ppt for RA (1ST SEM
Quality by design.. ppt for  RA (1ST SEMQuality by design.. ppt for  RA (1ST SEM
Quality by design.. ppt for RA (1ST SEM
 
PHYSICS PROJECT BY MSC - NANOTECHNOLOGY
PHYSICS PROJECT BY MSC  - NANOTECHNOLOGYPHYSICS PROJECT BY MSC  - NANOTECHNOLOGY
PHYSICS PROJECT BY MSC - NANOTECHNOLOGY
 
Work Remotely with Confluence ACE 2.pptx
Work Remotely with Confluence ACE 2.pptxWork Remotely with Confluence ACE 2.pptx
Work Remotely with Confluence ACE 2.pptx
 
Mathan flower ppt.pptx slide orchids ✨🌸
Mathan flower ppt.pptx slide orchids ✨🌸Mathan flower ppt.pptx slide orchids ✨🌸
Mathan flower ppt.pptx slide orchids ✨🌸
 
Gaps, Issues and Challenges in the Implementation of Mother Tongue Based-Mult...
Gaps, Issues and Challenges in the Implementation of Mother Tongue Based-Mult...Gaps, Issues and Challenges in the Implementation of Mother Tongue Based-Mult...
Gaps, Issues and Challenges in the Implementation of Mother Tongue Based-Mult...
 
Genshin Impact PPT Template by EaTemp.pptx
Genshin Impact PPT Template by EaTemp.pptxGenshin Impact PPT Template by EaTemp.pptx
Genshin Impact PPT Template by EaTemp.pptx
 
INDIAN GCP GUIDELINE. for Regulatory affair 1st sem CRR
INDIAN GCP GUIDELINE. for Regulatory  affair 1st sem CRRINDIAN GCP GUIDELINE. for Regulatory  affair 1st sem CRR
INDIAN GCP GUIDELINE. for Regulatory affair 1st sem CRR
 
miladyskindiseases-200705210221 2.!!pptx
miladyskindiseases-200705210221 2.!!pptxmiladyskindiseases-200705210221 2.!!pptx
miladyskindiseases-200705210221 2.!!pptx
 
SaaStr Workshop Wednesday w/ Kyle Norton, Owner.com
SaaStr Workshop Wednesday w/ Kyle Norton, Owner.comSaaStr Workshop Wednesday w/ Kyle Norton, Owner.com
SaaStr Workshop Wednesday w/ Kyle Norton, Owner.com
 
Call Girls In Aerocity 🤳 Call Us +919599264170
Call Girls In Aerocity 🤳 Call Us +919599264170Call Girls In Aerocity 🤳 Call Us +919599264170
Call Girls In Aerocity 🤳 Call Us +919599264170
 
SBFT Tool Competition 2024 -- Python Test Case Generation Track
SBFT Tool Competition 2024 -- Python Test Case Generation TrackSBFT Tool Competition 2024 -- Python Test Case Generation Track
SBFT Tool Competition 2024 -- Python Test Case Generation Track
 
The Ten Facts About People With Autism Presentation
The Ten Facts About People With Autism PresentationThe Ten Facts About People With Autism Presentation
The Ten Facts About People With Autism Presentation
 
Dutch Power - 26 maart 2024 - Henk Kras - Circular Plastics
Dutch Power - 26 maart 2024 - Henk Kras - Circular PlasticsDutch Power - 26 maart 2024 - Henk Kras - Circular Plastics
Dutch Power - 26 maart 2024 - Henk Kras - Circular Plastics
 
Presentation for the Strategic Dialogue on the Future of Agriculture, Brussel...
Presentation for the Strategic Dialogue on the Future of Agriculture, Brussel...Presentation for the Strategic Dialogue on the Future of Agriculture, Brussel...
Presentation for the Strategic Dialogue on the Future of Agriculture, Brussel...
 
RACHEL-ANN M. TENIBRO PRODUCT RESEARCH PRESENTATION
RACHEL-ANN M. TENIBRO PRODUCT RESEARCH PRESENTATIONRACHEL-ANN M. TENIBRO PRODUCT RESEARCH PRESENTATION
RACHEL-ANN M. TENIBRO PRODUCT RESEARCH PRESENTATION
 
PAG-UNLAD NG EKONOMIYA na dapat isaalang alang sa pag-aaral.
PAG-UNLAD NG EKONOMIYA na dapat isaalang alang sa pag-aaral.PAG-UNLAD NG EKONOMIYA na dapat isaalang alang sa pag-aaral.
PAG-UNLAD NG EKONOMIYA na dapat isaalang alang sa pag-aaral.
 
Event 4 Introduction to Open Source.pptx
Event 4 Introduction to Open Source.pptxEvent 4 Introduction to Open Source.pptx
Event 4 Introduction to Open Source.pptx
 
The 3rd Intl. Workshop on NL-based Software Engineering
The 3rd Intl. Workshop on NL-based Software EngineeringThe 3rd Intl. Workshop on NL-based Software Engineering
The 3rd Intl. Workshop on NL-based Software Engineering
 

Market Studies and Competition - EU - Fabienne ILZKOVITZ & Adriaan DIERX, DG Competition, European Commission

  • 1. Fabienne ILZKOVITZ & Adriaan DIERX Economic Evaluation of Competition Policy DG Competition, European Commission Workshop on the selection and prioritisation of sectors or industries for market studies Paris, 9 March 2017 Selection and prioritisation of sectors or industries for EU sector inquiries 1
  • 2. Outline 1. Scope 2. Definition, purpose and legal basis 3. Approach used to select sectors 4. Overview of main reasons for past Sector Inquiries 5. Concluding remarks 2
  • 3. Definition of tools to deal with poorly performing markets 3 Tools Objectives Sector screening Identification of poorly performing markets/sectors Market monitoring First analysis of market/sector developments with a view to identify the nature and source of problems Market study/ Sector Inquiry In-depth analysis of the problems detected with a view to identify if there is scope for policy interventions 1. Scope
  • 4. 4 Market studies are defined as (ICN 2016 Report): Research projects aimed at gaining an in-depth understanding of how sectors, markets, or market practices are working. Why conduct a market study? To gain a better knowledge of poorly performing markets/sectors with a view to identifying if there is scope for policy interventions that could remedy the poor performance. 1. Scope
  • 5. 5 European Commission Sector inquiries are market studies aimed at determining whether competition is restricted or distorted, and if there is scope for competition policy interventions. Other types market studies in the European Commission:  Sectors not functioning well from a consumer's perspective  Market studies on e-commerce, second-hand cars, internet service providers, meat, retail financial services, and retail energy to identify if there is scope for consumer policy interventions.  Sectors not functioning well from a Single Market perspective  Single Market Information Tool to identify important cases of cross-border Single Market malfunctioning. 1. Scope
  • 6. 6 2.1 Definition Sector inquiries are:  investigations that the European Commission (DG Competition) carries out into a particular sector of the economy or into a particular practice across various sectors in order to better understand how competition in the sector works in practice;  when it believes that a market is not working as well as it should, and also believes that breaches of the competition rules might be a contributory factor. 2. Definition, purpose and legal basis
  • 7. 7 2.1 Definition Sector Inquiries can be carried out in the areas of antitrust and State aids Antitrust:  To identify agreements or other practices breaching antitrust rules State aid:  To identify whether State aid measures in a particular sector distort competition within the Internal Market  First State aid inquiry into electricity capacity mechanisms launched in April 2015 . 2. Definition, purpose and legal basis
  • 8. 8 2.2 Main purpose To achieve a better knowledge of a particular sector of the economy or a particular practice/aid instrument across various sectors with a view to identifying areas where competition policy interventions may be necessary. Further beneficial effects:  Deterrence of anticompetitive behaviour  Strengthening of the complementarities between competition and regulatory policies  Competition advocacy 2. Definition, purpose and legal basis
  • 9. 9 2.3 Legal basis In the area of antitrust, Article 17(1) of Regulation 1/2003 allows the European Commission to conduct an inquiry into a sector of the economy or into particular agreements across various sectors if  Trend of trade between MS  Price rigidity  Or other circumstances suggest a restriction or distortion of competition within the Internal Market. 2. Definition, purpose and legal basis
  • 10. 10 2.3 Legal basis In the area of State aid, Article 25 of the State aid Procedural Regulation empowers COM to conduct an inquiry into a sector of the economy or the use of the aid instrument:  where the information available substantiates a reasonable suspicion that State aid measures in a particular sector or based on a particular aid instrument may materially restrict or distort competition within the internal market in several Member States, or  that existing aid measures in a particular sector in several Member States are not, or no longer, compatible with the internal market. 2. Definition, purpose and legal basis
  • 11. 3.1 Main principles The European Commission has a wide discretion in choosing when and where to launch a Sector Inquiry. Sector selection is based on a flexible approach combining:  Top down and bottom up criteria  Objective criteria and judgement  Not used in a mechanical way 11 3. Approach used to select sectors
  • 12. 3.2 Top down criteria Has the sector been identified as a strategic priority? A sector can be considered as a strategic priority because it is important for economic efficiency and welfare of consumers. A sector can also be selected because considered as a strategic priority by the European Commission (EC). The EC may also take into account requests by the European Parliament (EP) but the EP's requests have no binding power. 12 3. Approach used to select sectors
  • 13. 3.2 Top down criteria Has the sector been identified as a strategic priority? For example, strategic priority for the European Commission:  E-commerce Sector Inquiry  Digital Single Market = one of the ten most important priorities of the Juncker Commission.  E-commerce = important driver of price transparency and price competition. For example, strategic priorities for the European Parliament:  In its March 2010 resolution on the Annual Competition Report, the European Parliament called on the Commission to carry out Sector Inquiries in certain specific areas: food supply, media concentration, telecommunications and financial services.  European Commission has followed up by launching sector inquiries or expert studies in these areas. 13 3. Approach used to select sectors
  • 14. 3.2 Top down criteria Are there indications that a sector/market is not functioning well from a competition policy perspective? Readily available information is used to determine whether  Obstacles to trade and a lack of integration of the Internal Market  Price rigidity leading to differences in prices between Member States  Lack of market entry by competitors, decrease in innovation, misuse of IPRs, … may be due to a restriction of competition. (criteria Article 17(1) of Regulation 1/2003) 14 3. Approach used to select sectors
  • 15. 3.2 Top down criteria Are there indications that the sector/market is not functioning well from a competition policy perspective? For example, in June 2005 the Commission adopted a decision launching the energy sector inquiry inter alia because:  Cross-border flows seemed to be limited and integration between national wholesale markets had been slow  Prices had risen and forward prices pointed to further price rises in the future  Market concentration remained very high and limited new entry + Sector representing a strategic priority 15 3. Approach used to select sectors
  • 16. 3.2 Top down criteria Sector Inquiry requires significant resources from the European Commission and represents a burden on those under investigation Is the Sector Inquiry the appropriate and necessary tool? A decision needs to be taken as to the proportionality of launching a Sector Inquiry  SI appropriate and necessary: - when the competition problems are industry-specific - when it is likely that competition problems concern various categories of actors or types of agreements - when it is necessary to make use of the Commission’s formal investigative powers to get the relevant information 16 3. Approach used to select sectors
  • 17. 3.2 Top down criteria A sector Inquiry may not be necessary and appropriate:  If there are no suspicions of industry-specific competition problems  If the main objective is to get general information on a sector In this case, less burdensome, time-consuming and resource- intensive means should be considered. Examples of other means to get such information: - Informal contacts with market players - Expert study 17 3. Approach used to select sectors
  • 18. 3.3 Bottom-up approach Based on information obtained from market players or case handlers specialised in the sector: Market players:  Complaints from competitors, consumers  Market players’ submissions to the Commission about the sector Case handlers responsible for regular sector monitoring: Sector monitoring = Monitoring of sector developments by collecting and organising readily available information about the sector with a view to identifying problems of malfunctioning 18 3. Approach used to select sectors
  • 19. 3.3 Bottom-up approach Matrix organisation of DG COMP allows to carry out sector monitoring Matrix organisation allows combining policy instrument and sector knowledge 19 Sector Directorates/Instruments Antitrust Mergers State aid Energy and environment Information, communication and media Financial services Basic industries, manufacturing and agriculture Transport, post and other services 3. Approach used to select sectors
  • 20. Flexible approach combining top down and bottom up information taking into account:  Strategic importance  Indications of competition problems  Proportionality of the Sector Inquiry  Information from market players  Information from case handlers 3.4 Summary 20 3. Approach used to select sectors
  • 21. 21 Since 1999, six antitrust Sector Inquiries and one State aid Sector Inquiry have been launched:  Telecommunications  Media  Financial services  Energy  Pharmaceuticals  E-commerce  Capacity mechanism in the area of State aid 4. Overview of main reasons for past Sector Inquiries
  • 22. 22 Sector Period Reasons for selecting this sector Telecommunication services, including international roaming and leased lines 1999-2002  Strategic sector  No competitive prices and pan-European offers. For example, large difference in price between roamed and non-roamed international mobile calls to the same destination within the EU  Complaints about extremely high roaming charges and collusion on roaming rates  Complaints about very high leased line prices 4.Overview of main reasons for past Sector Inquiries
  • 23. 23 Sector Period Reasons for selecting this sector Financial services, including retail banking and business insurance 2005-2007  Priority sector (parallel initiatives to remove regulatory barriers within the Single Market for financial services)  Sector important for competitiveness and consumer welfare  Indicators of market fragmentation and entry barriers such as variation of prices for comparable products across the EU  Indicators of lack of countervailing demand power in retail banking  Concerns regarding market foreclosure and practice of excessive cooperation 4.Overview of main reasons for past Sector Inquiries
  • 24. 24 Sector Period Reasons for selecting this sector Energy 2005-2007  Gas and electricity provide crucial inputs for European industry  Potential important benefits for consumers in terms of lower price and larger choice.  High concentration and small number of entrants  Limited market integration (in particular, limited cross-border flows)  Significant price increases and lack of transparency in prices  Network operators favour their affiliates due to vertical integration and inadequate unbundling  Consumer complaints (lack of competitive offers from existing suppliers and little trust in existing mechanism of price formation) 4.Overview of main reasons for past Sector Inquiries
  • 25. 25 Sector Period Reasons for selecting this sector E-commerce 2015-2017  Priority sector: improving online access is one of the pillars of the Digital Single Market strategy.  Sector important for consumer welfare as business practices adopted by e-commerce operators limit the ability of consumers to find the best deals.  Limited cross-border online trade and significant differences between member states in the proportion of customers that shop online from retailers located cross- border.  Concerns about vertical restrictions, in particular suppliers’ restrictions imposed on retailers and affecting online sales. 4. Overview of main reasons for past sector Inquiries
  • 26. 26 Sector Period Reasons for selecting this sector New media (3G/Sport Rights) 2004-2005  Availability of attractive content, in particular sports-related content, has a critical role to play in the roll-out of 3G technology which is important for growth and innovation.  Media sector characterised by strong contractual relations between a limited number of players, thus raising barriers to entry.  Concerns that commercial practices in the sale and purchase of sport rights could hinder the development of sports services over 3G networks. 4. Overview of main reasons for past Sector Inquiries
  • 27. 27 Sector Period Reasons for selecting this sector Pharmaceuticals 2008-2009  Sector vital to the health of Europe's citizens  Decline in innovation as measured by number of novel medicines  Delayed generic market entry  Indication of anti-competitive commercial practices by pharmaceutical suppliers (using patents to block innovative and/or generic competition)  Concerns about agreements  Market information/monitoring and information through cases ( e.g., Astra Zeneca case) 4.Overview of main reasons for past Sector Inquiries
  • 28. 28 Important to use a flexible approach combining top- down and bottom-up information to select the sectors Overall practice shows that Sector Inquiries were mostly launched in sectors that are:  highly regulated;  important for economic efficiency and consumer welfare; and often where  undertakings have significant market power  the application of competition rules raises complex issues 5. Concluding remarks
  • 29. 29 Sector Inquiries have proven to be an effective and efficient tool for  collecting valuable information; and  contributing directly (through case enforcement) and indirectly (deterrence effect, regulatory changes) to improved competition. Very important to select the right sectors:  Benefits of the intervention.  Credibility of the institution.  Resource requirements  Burden for stakeholders 5. Concluding remarks
  • 30. 30 • See the website of DG Competition • on Sector Inquiry • http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/ sector_inquiries.html • http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid /overview/state_aid_procedures_en.html