Soraya Ghebleh - Iranian Land Reform and the 1979 Revolution

Soraya Ghebleh
The Social, Political, and Economic Effects of Iranian Land Reform and its
Contribution to the 1979 Revolution
Introduction
Iran experienced tremendous change in the post-war era that stemmed from both
domestic and international catalysts. The Shah of Iran, Reza Shah Pahlavi, meant to
ensure the modernization of Iran by instituting a wide range of reforms, backed by the
United States and other international institutions. The largely rural-based economy was
ingrained in a system that closely resembled feudalism,which was not conducive to
modern agrarian reform. Examination of Iran‟s political economy recommended land
reform as a vital centerpiece and starting point to affect change. Land reform was
implemented by the Shah‟s government in order to consolidate the power of the
government and modernize the economy but instead resulted in irreversible changes in
the social, political, and economic structure of the villages and urban centers with adverse
consequences that greatly contributed and set the stage for the 1979 Revolution.
The Iranian Village Before 1962
Iranian land was divided up into four different kinds of land that included the
crown lands, state lands (khalesejat), endowment lands (ouaf), and private lands that were
owned by large landowners. The vast lands that were owned by these landlords were
farmed by peasants on the basis of the traditional „five-element formula,‟ according to

which labor, land, water, seed, and animals were taken as the basis of the division of the
produce with the peasant retaining 1/3rd
of the crop.1
In 1956, when the first national census was done, there were approximately
51,300 villages. Approximately 95% of total holdings were less than 20 hectares with
decreasing number of holdings as the size of the holding increased.2
Over 62% of all
agricultural land was under some system of sharecropping, where peasants tilled land that
was not theirs.3
The relationship between the landlord and peasant was complex, serving to the
benefit of the landlord and the detriment of the peasant. Lambton describes that the
“landowner regards peasants as a drudge whose sole function is to provide him with his
profits; education, better hygiene, and improved housing are considered unnecessary.”4
This attitude was prevalent among landlords throughout the country and the relationship
between landlord and peasant was often one of tension and mistrust on both sides.
Although the landlord was wealthy and powerful, he was constantly fearful of being
“despoiled or cheated by a discontented peasantry.”5
There were two types of peasants in the villages, nasaqdars and khoshneshins,
both having different roles and creating different classes within the peasants. Nasaqdars
were essentially peasants with land-use rights and khoshneshins were peasants without
1Bashiriyeh, 17
2Distribution of Landholdings, by Size, 1960, Source: OAS 1960: vol. 15, table 101
3Distribution of Type of Tenure in Different Categories of Landholding Size, 1960, OAS
1960: vol 15, table 101
4 Lambton, 20
5 Lambton, 24

them.6
Production organized through work units, or cooperative societies that were
composed of several peasant households were extremely common because cultivation
was difficult alone unless one had the means to support cultivation individually. These
societies, however, were able to be function primarily with support from the landlord.
The landlords enforced land rotation among the nasaqdars in order to avoid peasant
attachment to a specific plot of land. Landlords often had villages that were spread out
with fragmented land to cultivate due to the difficult geography that existed in certain
areas of Iran and the traditional split of land. Peasants often had many scattered pieces of
land for their use, which later had negative implications during the first phase of land
redistribution.7
Iran-US Relations and Origins of Modern Land Reform
In the post war era, the United States, the United Nations, and other international
organizations began to push for the development of the Third World. For the United
States, Iran was a strategic country of interest because of its vast resources, geopolitical
location, and proximity to the Soviet Union. A UN Resolution recognized that
“Unsatisfactory forms of agrarian structure, and in particular systems of land tenure, tend
in a variety of ways to impede economic development in underdeveloped countries,”
which was the case of Iran in the 1940s and 1950s.”8
Political debates in Iran regarding how to meet the political and economic
challenges that the West posed were most commonly seen in two ways. The more
6Najmabadi, 49
7Danesh, Urban Anthropology & Studies of Cultural Systems & World Economic
Development, 1992
8 UN 1951b: 15

conservative view maintained that Iran was in no way inferior to the West, no
fundamental changes were required in domestic or foreign policy, and that Iran should
exploit the bipolar political rivalry that existed between the United States and the Soviet
Union for Iran‟s benefit or merely disengage and keep the relationship at a minimum.
The alternative view to this was that Iran needed to implement domestic economic,
political, and social reforms to essentially modernize the country in order to be globally
competitive in the Western world.9
The Shah and his government wanted to maintain close ties with Western nations
and achieve the same economic and political success so the orientation was directed
towards implementing reform. Iran wanted to industrialize and forming a strategic
alliance with the United States could give Iran the means to do so. The Shah developed
close ties with the United States as a result of US involvement in the expulsion of
Mossadegh and US interest in containment of communism and became one of the
greatest recipients of economic and military aid.10
The Point Four Program of aid
announced by President Truman that offered “technical, scientific, and managerial
knowledge necessary to economic development”marked the beginning of a cooperative
program where American experts would consult with the Iranian government in areas of
agriculture, health, and education and would work to train thepeasants and villagers of
Iran.11
This concept of “give aid and demand reform” was continued through the Kennedy
administration and characterized the relationship between the US and Iran at this time.12
9Hooglund, 33
10 Ricks, Land Reform and Social Change in Iran, 1991
11 Truman, Four Points Program, 1949
12Najmabadi, 18

A recurring theme in the reports of the experts sent by the United States as well as
within models of development occurring around the Third World was the application of
agrarian development and land reform as a precursor to industrialization. It was
suggested, initially, that Iran focus on “mechanization of agriculture to increase work
output of each peasant family and productivity of lands” rather than changing the land
tenure in Iran. The recognition of the archaic nature and the deep-rooted nature of the
tenure system indicated that it could not be changed overnight and “to attempt this could
result in famine, chaos in agricultural relationship, and in the long run would not benefit
the peasant.13
This mentality changed however, and as discussions in the 1950s
progressed the change of the system of land tenure became essential to land reform
policies for various motivations.14
The Shah’s Vision
Reza Shah began his reign as an extremely young and ineffectual ruler who had
limited authority over his country and transformed himself politically into an
authoritarian figure integral and inseparable from the state.15
Land reform had been a
topic of discussion in the 1940s and 1950s but the Shah was reluctant to confront the
landed class until he was assured that land reform would be successful.16
He wanted to
consolidate his power but was not yet ready or in a position to upset the landlords.17
As
his confidence grew in the 1950s and economic crisis shook Iran in the beginning of the
13 Overseas Consultants, 1949: vol. 5, p. 239, the Report on the Seven Year Economic
Development Plan
14Najmabadi, 61
15Kamrava, 15
16Araghi and Majd, Land Reform Policies in Iran: Comment and Reply, 1989
17Najmabadi, 32

1960s, the Shah along with his newly appointed Prime Minister Ali Amini, and Minister
of Agriculture Hassan Arsanjani became confident that it was time to institute land
reform.18
Arsanjani believed that land reform was the absolute key to political and
economic reform in Iran. He was convinced that the peasant had great potential to be an
independent proprietor of land and was completely capable of running his own affairs.
Arsanjani recognized that “although the peasant is uneducated, he still has a long
tradition of civilization behind him.”19
Arsanjani believed in profit-oriented farming. He
wanted to release the agriculture that was locked up in villages, mechanize farming, and
have farmers own the product of his work in order that the agricultural economy would
find a more solid basis. The presumed effects of this would be an increase in national
income and production, creation of political and social stability, and a rise in economic
prosperity from agriculture.20
His convictions along with the information collected in the
1950s convinced the Shah that changes of land tenure must occur in order for the country
to move forward and industrialize.
Land reform became the centerpiece for his modernization campaign more for
political reasons than for the development of the agrarian sector and of the peasantry.
This is not to say that the Shah did not care about the actual reform because that would
discredit his well-known interest for modernization for which agrarian development was
essential. His political gains, however, would be substantial if his programs achieved his
18 Lambton, 64
19 Lambton, 63
20Najmabadi, 93

desired goals. The two main political objectives would be to break up the traditional
dominance of landlords over rural areas and at the same time create a solid support
system of the large rural peasantry for the monarchy and the Shah‟s government.21
By
means of land redistribution, the overwhelming power of the landlords would cease and
the government would be in a position to present itself as a “progressive advocate of the
peasant‟s reform ideas” and win over their support.22
Implementation of Land Reform Laws
The first stage of land reform‟s main provision was to limit the amount of land by one
individual to one village, irrespective of size. Any land in excess of this should then be
transferred to those nasaqdars who were cultivating that land, recognizing that
khoshneshin who worked the land would not benefit from land reform directly. The
excess land of the landowners was to be sold to the government who then sold it back to
the nasaqdars at low-interest rates to be paid back over a long periods of time. Qanats, the
archaic but widely ingenious irrigation system prevalent in Iran at the time, were also to
be transferred to the peasants along with water rights.23
The responsibility of the upkeep
and maintenance of these qanats that were usually built and maintained by the
landowners was transferred to the peasants who were to form a cooperative society in
charge of the upkeep.24
By the time the rapid redistribution of land had occurred, there was a shift in the
attitude of Shah towards the peasantry and how he felt the rest of land and agrarian
21Kazemi, 280
22Hooglund, 42
23Najmabadi, 93
24 Lambton, 66

reform should develop. He feared rural political instability and wanted to regulate
relations between the landowners and peasants in a more moderate manner. This was a
huge change from the first phase of land reform where the government had embarked on
a propaganda campaign against the landowners, viciously attempting to undermine their
authority.25
The second stage of land reform in 1963 was intended to improve the situation of
peasants who cultivated land in villages not subject to purchase by the government as
well as to regulate relations between peasants and landowners. These reforms no longer
required landlords to sell their excess land to the government but gave them regulations
with how to distribute their land in direct action with peasants. Landlords could rent the
land to the peasants working on it, sell the land to the peasants, divide the land between
himself and the peasants working on it in proportion to traditional sharecropping
divisions, or form a joint stockholding unit in which each would share proportionate to
their traditional share of crops.26
The third stage of land reform in 1969 was an extension of the joint agricultural
units. This law required landlords who had chosen to rent their lands to set up joint units
or divide land according to sharecropping ratios. Membership in cooperatives by the
peasants, however, was a precondition to receiving any land. These cooperatives were
meant to take over the responsibilities the landowners held that included repair of qanats
25 Lambton, 76
26Najmabadi, 94

and irrigation canals, use of common farm machinery, pesticide operations, and vet
services.27
Results of Land Reform
The official end of land reform was declared successful and complete in
1971. Only 3,967 whole villages and 10,995 parts of villages out of an estimated total of
60,000 villages had been divided under the first stage of land reform.28
With each
progressive stage of land reform there was diminishing success and contentment. The
first stage of land reform excluded a very large amount of the rural population to the
point where these khoshneshin had extreme difficulty even finding agricultural work in
rural areas. There were difficulties of setting up and running cooperative societies due to
lack of experience in organization and low rates of literacy so in many places, qanats and
other modes of production and upkeep fell into disrepair.29
The disrepair of qanats was
also affected by the tense relationships that existed between the landowners and the
peasants. The landowners no longer felt obligated to maintain the upkeep of every qanat
that had once been in their range of land. Many peasants did not have the means to take
this responsibility. The difficulties cooperatives societies faced, inadequate means and
lack of real government support and provision of infrastructure exacerbated these
problems.30
27Najmabadi, 98
28Statistical Yearbook of Iran(Plan Organization, Statistical Center 1973: chapter 12,
table 63)
29Najmabadi, 104
30 Lambton, 98

There was great opposition by small landowners and middle peasants to land
reform because they lacked the ability to acquire crops from the peasants working their
lands because they did not have the same power and wealth larger landowners
did.31
These small landowners and middle peasants felt that the land reform policies
discriminated against them unfairly and they were to become the among the greatest
peasant supporters of the Revolution in the following decade.32
Iranian agriculture still had very low degrees of productivity by the end of land
reform and had not been integrated into the world market. The orientation remained
towards internal consumption but with the growing population and deteriorating
conditions of the countryside, Iran could not even support the internal market.33
Land fragmentation was a serious problem for peasants who were trying to
become self-sufficient and establish agricultural units that could be commercially viable
and profitable.34
When the government redistributed land, they gave it according to what
the peasant was already working on which often times were difficult pieces of land that
were very far apart. Difficulties arose when peasants tried to cultivate these lands with
little to no help from anyone based on the geographical distribution. The government had
viewed this as pragmatic because division in such a way would not disrupt the usual
activity of the village and would encourage small-scale farming, which was initially the
promoted mechanism of improving agriculture.35
31 Lambton, 101
32Hooglund, 115
33Najmabadi, 187
34Najmabadi, 97
35Hooglund, 91

Consequences of Land Reform Policies
When land reform was first implemented, there was meant to be a “push to
employ mechanized means and modern farming, become a progressive society,
strengthen and develop agriculture along with agriculturally related industries first then
move to heavy industries who will need experienced workers that can be provided by the
growing population in the villages.”36
This was the image of the realization of what
successful land reform was to look like but the reality was far removed from this image
because in many cases the villagers and villages were not better off in any way and in
many cases were worse off.37
The Shah was successful in realizing his political goal of removal of the landed
class. After land reform was complete the political and economic power of the landed
class was essentially destroyed.38
He also greatly increased the amount of actual
landowners but the unfortunate reality was many of these plots of land were completely
insufficient to provide any kind of standard of living and landed peasants were often left
even more destitute than they had been before. The amount of rural families who owned
land increased but the amount of landless migrants to urban sectors may have also
accounted for what seemed like a huge percentage increase of the rural population.39
These adverse consequences affected those nasaqdars who were eligible to
receive land but the khoshneshins were left out of land reform completely and rendered
ineligible to ever become a landowner. Once this exclusion occurred, the hope and
36 Ministry of Agriculture 1962: 98
37Najmabadi, 112
38Majd, Land reform policies in Iran, 1987
39Najmabadi, 124

possibility of access to land diminished forever and in the time period of 1961 to 1980 the
amount of khoshneshin who remained in the countryside deteriorated sharply.40
This
migration, however, was not seen in a negative light by the government.
Consultants in the 1950s calculated that approximately 50% of the workers could
be “removed from the land without adverse effect on the level of agricultural production
and productivity” but there was no way to remove this “surplus population.”41
By
excluding the khoshneshin, an urban labor force ready to engage in the processes of
industrialization would easily come to place. The problem, however, lied within the fact
that the agricultural sector of Iran never completed its transition. The government focused
on land reform for its political motivations and assumed that agriculture would fall into
place as a result of a stronger peasant class but without providing strong agrarian reforms,
education, and maintenance of infrastructure the shift would be next to impossible. To a
certain degree, the urban sector was able to provide industrial and manufacturing jobs but
because the level of income among the rural population was still low, they did not have
the purchasing power to maintain domestic industrial markets.42
The foundation was laid for the emergence of a “self-reliant and independent
peasantry” but this could not occur without increases and investments in the standard of
living of peasants and implementation of a national solution to the problem of low
productivity.43
This lack of follow through on the promises of reform, despite minor
40Najmabadi, 135
41Najmabadi, 33
42Farazmand, 94
43 Lambton, 69

successes it may have had in improving the lot of those peasants who did in fact enhance
their situations, led to disappointment and disillusionment among the peasantry.
Iranian Agriculture, Imports, and Oil Rent
In the years before land reform, total agricultural production grew very slowly
and agricultural production per capita declined with the average yields of all major crops
remaining rather low.44
The Shah‟s land reform had succeeded at weakening the
landlords‟ political and economic goal in favor of a capitalist system; the land reform also
caused “lasting stagnation in the agricultural sector.”45
Obstacles that were in the way of
Iranian agriculture included lack of strong water and irrigation systems, lack of seeds and
fertilizers, increasing rural-urban migration that caused a decline in the amount of rural
cultivators, improper allocation of investments and loans, and depletion of expertise and
managerial resources.46
Iran was unique in the early 1970s, however, in its position as a developing nation
of the third world due to its ability to obtain income from oil rents. Most developing
nations could not ignore their agricultural development because if their economy was
undergoing a demographic transition from rural to industrialized they most likely had no
other source of income. Iran, however, was receiving exorbitant amounts of income due
to its geopolitical position, allowing Iran to spend on importing food rather than
developing agriculture.47
Iran‟s oil revenues increased from 5 billion to 20 million in the
44 Table 11, Source F. Khamsi, 1969
45Parvin, 170
46Parvin, 176
47Parvin, 173

time period of 1972 – 1973.48
This quickly led to a huge budget deficit by 1975, which
affected the Iranian economy and those at the bottom of it greatly.
The share of agriculture‟s contribution to the GDP declined drastically dropping from
35% in 1955 to 24% in 1967 all the way down to an extreme low of 9% in 1976.49
This
great decrease in agriculture‟s contribution was not a direct result of land redistribution
but a result of many of the consequences of land redistribution. Migration of agricultural
workers to urban centers, higher wage earnings in urban vs. rural areas, difficulties in
maintenance of small land holdings and in the upkeep of technology needed to support
farming, disillusionment of the peasantry, combined with all of the unsuccessful aspects
of the land reform in the 1960s were factors in agricultural stagnation.50
Rural-Urban Migration
Land reform did not benefit all peasants equally and the khoshneshin along with
peasants who received insufficient land holdings were in more poverty than before,
becoming a “push” factor towards urban migration. Rural-urban migration accelerated
rapidly from the onset of land reform with over 2 million people migrating from the
countryside to the cities from 1962 to 1971.51
The failure of land reform and the
deterioration of agriculture were push actors that were prevalent throughout the entire
48Bashiriyeh, 67
49 Central Bank of Iran, Annual Reports for 1968-1976 (Teheran); Plan Organization
of Iran, Statistical Center, Statistical Yearbook of Iran 1968-1976
50Hooglund, 108
51Bashiriyeh, 58

country.52
Landlessness among the khoshneshin with the removal of the hope to ever
improve their situation caused a drastic migration from rural areas.
The standard of living and the amount of wages earned in the 1970s far exceeded
those of rural Iran, which served as one of the “pull” factors of rural-urban migration.
Whereas rural “push factors” were predominant in the 1960s when land reform was
taking place, the economic boom coupled with dramatic increases in industrialization and
manufacturing became the major “pull factors” that took precedent in the 1970s.53
Industrial expansion that emerged in the late 1960s and early 1970s involved
labor-intensive projects like construction as well as manufacturing jobs. The difficulty
rural migrant workers had with much of the labor needed was its inconsistency. They
were often hired on a daily wage basis with termination upon completion of the
project.54
An increasing majority of these migrant workers or commuters were young
males between the ages of 15 to 29. This particular population of migrants posed a
problem when extensive out-migration occurred causing many villages to be devoid of
young men. It is also important to note that unlike most situations of migration, villagers
who had family members working in the cities did not benefit from “remittances.”
Because so many of the migrant workers were young men, whatever surplus income they
had needed to be saved for marriage.55
Social Unrest, Mobilization and Revolution
52Aghajanian, 154
54Hooglund, 113
55Hooglund, 116

Social consequences of land reform were reflected in the mass of urban dwellers of
rural origin and commuting youth of villages involved in demonstration as well as
peasants bursting out onto the political scene. Iranian peasants had long been known for
their tranquility but after the land reforms gave peasants their own land and they had a
taste of what ownership and relative social freedom felt like, it was very difficult for them
to turn back and sit voiceless.56
By the middle of the 1970s, the economic boom gained from oil was no longer able to
provide for the great amount of imports being brought into the country. Price increases
surpassed wage increases, which led to labor unrest, unemployment, and further
disillusionment and disappointment among both peasants who remained in the villages
but especially those who commuted or migrated to urban centers.57
Rural-urban migration played a huge role in mobilizing the peasant population
towards revolution. The young men who worked in urban centers either as commuters or
migrant workers were imbued with new political ideas and for the first time were
becoming involved in politics. The rural economy of the 1970s in Iran was not isolated as
a result, with land reform linking the Iranian village more closely than ever to urban
centers.“58
Migration” did not mean an “uprooting,” with migrants most often continuing
regular contact with relatives and friends in their native villages.59
The movements against
the Shah occurred nationally in virtually all major cities and towns and much of these
57Bashiriyeh, 112
58Najmabadi, 154
59Hooglund, 147

movements began with information and ideas disseminated by the young migrant
population.60
From the beginning of land reform, there was great opposition towards the Shah‟s
shift in policies by the ulama, or clergy. The generalization can be made that the ulama
did not want their endowed lands, or oufs, redistributed by the Shah but this is an
oversimplification. The ulama greatly disagreed with the Shah‟s reforms, particularly
those of his “White Revolution,” that included universal suffrage and local elections.
They viewed these reforms as an “assault on Islam.”61
The ulama were of the mindset that
the government should have consulted the ulama before instituting such reforms. It is also
historically known that the ulama were often closely tied to the landowning class with
many landowners having relatives in the ulama. The landowning class also held great
respect for the ulama and allowed their involvement among the peasants that worked on
their villages and with secular government interference this sphere of influence could
potentially be interrupted.
The peasants became great allies for the opposition to the Shah because their lives
and situations had been so greatly affected by the policies he implemented. Land reform
completely shifted their way of life and while the ideas of the Shah were initially very
attractive to those peasants who could benefit, the implementation fell short and caused
great disappointment. Those peasants who felt they had suffered as a result of the Shah‟s
reforms and had fallen into destitution or despair empathized with the plight of the exiled
leader of the opposition, Ayatollah Khomeini and felt shared commonalities. While the
60Najmabadi, 205
61Najmabadi, 206

clergy opposed land reform at a time when peasants were still hopeful for benefit, the
ulama made sure to underline that it was the “application and implementation of reform
law” they were protesting, not the idea of beneficial reform itself.62
Many peasants felt as
though the government had claimed to be progressive but recognized the thinly veiled
political goal of asserting government power and had experienced merely a replacement
of the landlords with the government.63
Conclusions
The effects of land reform were far reaching within the political, social, and economic
context of pre-Revolutionary Iran. Reforms intended to bring out modernization,
productivity, and a new social class that was a solid base of support for the monarchy did
not achieve any of these things. The reforms overall did not benefit the peasant
economically but in a certain light they marked the awakening of the social and political
consciousness of the peasant population. The land reform laws stimulated a response in
this class of people that had never been seen before in centuries. Political involvement
became for the first time a part of the life of the peasant who felt they could now make
demands for social reform and improvements in their lives. Although the peasant class
was disillusioned, poverty-stricken, and overlooked, they were able to mobilize
politically to make social demands.
Lambton predicted that “Disillusion may well lead to disaster, economically,
politically and socially,” and that the “government should give practical reaffirmation to
the aims of the first stage of land reform and regain the full confidence of the peasants…
62Najmabadi, 207
63Hooglund, 148

without this there will be no rise in production over the country as a whole.”64
These
words written by Lambton well before the major crisis of agricultural stagnation, extreme
political unrest, and revolution, recognized how important the role of the peasant was in
the Shah‟s aims of transforming Iran. Unfortunately, the Shah did not share this same
recognition and haphazardly focused on the peasantry without really implementing
institutions that would have carried the peasantry as well as the overall economy of Iran
very far. More than half the population of Iran fell into the category of rural peasantry
and without developing their potential, great losses ensued in human capital.
Works Cited
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Revolutionary Iran. Ed. HooshangAmirahmadi, ManoucherParvin. Boulder, Colorado:
Westview Press, 1988.
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Amirahmadi, Parvin, and ManoucherHooshang. Post-Revolutionary Iran.
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Araghi, Farshad A., and M.G. Majd. "Land reform policies in Iran: comment and reply."
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Arjomand, Said Amir. "Land Reform and Social Change in Iran." The American Journal
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Danesh, Abol Hassan. "Land reform, state policy, and social change in Iran." Urban
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Lambton, Ann .The Persian Land Reform: 1962-1966. London, England:
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Najmabadi, Afsaneh. Land Reform and Social Change in Iran. Salt Lake
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Ricks, Thomas M. "Land Reform and Social Change in Iran." International Journal of
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Siavoshi, Sussan. Liberal Nationalism in Iran: The Failure of a Movement.
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