Jeffrey White, Defense Fellow at The Washington Institute and former DIA analyst, presents this look at the Russian military buildup in Syria. Includes detailed information on order of battle, potential operations and objectives, and military and political implications for the Syrian conflict. For more, watch the panel discussion, Russia's Military Escalation in Syria, at http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/russias-military-escalation-in-syria
Russia in Syria: Military Buildup and Implications
1. Russia in Syria
Military Buildup and Implications
Jeffrey White @JeffWhite25
The Washington Institute for Near East
Policy
The Washington Institute for Near East
Policy
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2. Reasons
• Support the regime
• Bolster Russian influence on Syrian situation
• Increase Russian role in region
• Fight “terrorism”
• Divert attention from domestic troubles
• Challenge the U.S.
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3. Continuing Build-up
• Sea bridge: Landing ships,
commercial vessels
• Air bridge:
– An-124/Condor, IL62, Tu-
154, and IL-76
– RU-IR-IZ-SY route
– Masked
• Facilities
– Expansion of Basel al-
Assad Airport
– Helicopter base at Istamo
– Ports of Latakia and Tartus
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An-124/Condor Inbound Latakia
Alligator Class Large Landing Ship
Photo courtesy of Yörük Işık, ACTECON International Consulting
4. Order of Battle
• Air
– 4 x Su-30 SM/Flanker-C
– 12 x Su-24/Flanker
– 12 x Su-25/Frogfoot
– Attack and transport helos
– Yakovlev Pchela-1T Drones
– IL-20/Coot intelligence collector
– Possible ABN CP
• Ground
– Elements 810th Naval Infantry Brigade
– Possible elements 363rd Naval
Infantry Brigade
– T-90 tanks
– BTR-80 type APCs
– Field Artillery
– Several thousand troops
• Air Defense
– SA-22/Greyhound
• Presumed C2 structure
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Su-24/Fencer
SA-22/Greyhound
5. Potential Missions
• Air
– Reconnaissance
– Close air support
– Strike
– Interdiction
– Airborne C2
• Ground
– Advising
– Embedding
– Security
– Defense
– Offense
– SF
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Su-25/Frogfoot
6. Potential Operational Areas
• Selective employment
• Key targets
– Priority enemies
– Where regime forces/positions are threatened
– Tailored packages
• Key areas
– Northern Latakia
– Northern Hama
– Damascus region
– Aleppo
– Eastern Homs
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7. Potential Effects on the War
• Direct effects:
– Provide decisive edge on select battlefields
– Increase the ability of regime forces to hold/take key
positions and territory
– Increase the attrition of opposition forces
– Restore the regime’s waning offensive capabilities.
• Indirect effects:
– Raise the combat effectiveness of regime forces
– Raise the morale of regime forces
– Depress the morale of opposition forces
– Rally Jihadist forces
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8. Conclusions
• Quite capable
joint/combined arms force
• Russian force tailored for
regime support mission
• Intended to fight, but
cannot fight everywhere at
once
• Can be expanded with air
and sea bridge capabilities
• Can have significant effects
on the battlefield
• Can give Russia a direct role
in war’s direction
• Can have significant political
effects
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