More Related Content More from The Washington Institute for Near East Policy (17) The Ballistic Axis: Strategic Implications of DPRK and Iran's Cooperation in Missiles and Space1. The Ballistic Axis : DPRK and Iran's cooperation in missiles
and space - strategic implications
© 2016 by Tal Inbar
Tal Inbar
Head, Space Research Center
The Fisher Institute for Air & Space Strategic Studies, Israel
April 21, 2016, Washington DC
2. Disclaimer
• The presentation is based exclusively on unclassified open source
information
• The views represents the author and are NOT necessarily represent an
official Israeli governmental position;
© 2016 by Tal Inbar
3. Content of the presentation
• Introduction to Iran’s ballistic missile arsenal
• Introduction to DPRK ballistic missile arsenal
• Recent revelations on DPRK missile technologies and nuclear warhead
• Iran’s silos for ballistic missiles
• Iran’s space program – and DPRK technologies incorporated
• Prospects for the future
© 2016 by Tal Inbar
4. Iran’s Ballistic missiles
First missiles acquired from DPRK during the Iran-Iraq War.
© 2016 by Tal Inbar
Teharani Moghadem,
“Father of Iranian missiles”
Refueling
vehicle
Scud
Missile
Note the
horizontal
refuel
8. Shahab 3 / Ghadr (DPRK Nodong)
© 2016 by Tal Inbar
10. Sajil – 2 stage, solid propelled
© 2016 by Tal Inbar
11. Sajil – 2 stage, solid propelled
© 2016 by Tal Inbar
Thrust
termination
port (1/4)
Housing for second
stage jet vanes (1/4)
12. Fateh 110 – the accuracy revolution
© 2016 by Tal Inbar
13. Fateh 110 – the accuracy revolution
© 2016 by Tal Inbar
Guidance
section
14. Khalij Fars – Anti ship ballistic
missile
© 2016 by Tal Inbar
17. Fateh 313 – Extended range
© 2016 by Tal Inbar
Note the pattern –
possible carbon
fiber outer skin of
the missile
18. Fateh 313 – Extended range
© 2016 by Tal Inbar
Test launch of the
missile (2015)
19. Shahab 3 with sub munitions
© 2016 by Tal Inbar
Note the sub-
munitions inside
the missile’s
warhead
27. Shahab 2 with new guidance
© 2016 by Tal Inbar
Movable
steering fins
28. Emad – advanced Ghadr
© 2016 by Tal Inbar
Note the movable
steering fins
30. Iran’s Silo basing
Iran has different types of silos:
• Conventional designed (missile in vertical position on alert)
• Underground “missile city” – tunnels and TEL’s
• Coffin type silo
© 2016 by Tal Inbar
31. Iran’s Silo basing
© 2016 by Tal Inbar
Shahab 3
on alert –
vertically
mounted
Blast doors
to the silo
Doors on
ground level
39. North Korean ballistic missiles
• The NK arsenal of ballistic missiles consist of former Soviet Union
technologies and origin: Scud, SS-21(KN-02) and BM-25 (aka Musudan,
BK-1)
• Original design: Nodong, HS-13 – two versions
Soviet Origin Original NK design
© 2016 by Tal Inbar
40. HS-13 (KN 08) missile
• The missile was first shown on a military parade on April 15, 2012.
• Photographic materials indicated that the missile was under development
or production in Kim Jong Il time.
• It is described by North Korea as ICBM (Inter Continental Ballistic Missile).
• On October 2015, a second version of the missile was shown.
• No test flight was conducted for either type.
© 2016 by Tal Inbar
HS-13 HS-13 mod. 2
41. HS-13 (KN 08) missile
© 2016 by Tal Inbar
1st stage
2nd stage
3rd stage Re-entry
vehicle
44. © 2016 by Tal Inbar
Note the same
support
structure for
the missile
Kim Jong Un,
March 2016
Kim Jong Il,
Date UNKNOWN
When was the HS-13 built?
45. Nuclear equipped warhead (RV) of the
HS-13 missile
• On March 9, 2016, DPRK displayed, for the first time, a nuclear equipped
warhead for its HS-13 (KN-08) long range ballistic missile.
HS-13 (KN-08) RV on its cradle
© 2016 by Tal Inbar
• Triconic RV configuration
• Blunt Nose-Tip
• Low ballistic coefficient (b)
46. Cut out of HS-13(KN 08) RV armed
with Nuclear Warhead
Electronic package
for the nuclear bomb
or ballast weight
Nuclear
explosive
device
© 2016 by Tal Inbar
Aft Skirt
(for stabilization)
Nose
Tip
47. Cut out of HS-13(KN 08) RV armed
with Nuclear Warhead
© 2016 by Tal Inbar
Electronic package
for the nuclear bomb
or ballast weight
Nuclear
explosive
device
Aft Skirt
(for stabilization)
Nose
Tip
48. Cut out of HS-13(KN 08) RV armed
with Nuclear Warhead
© 2016 by Tal Inbar
49. Cut out of HS-13(KN 08) RV armed
with Nuclear Warhead
© 2016 by Tal Inbar
50. Cut out of HS-13(KN 08) RV armed
with Nuclear Warhead
© 2016 by Tal Inbar
51. Cut out of HS-13(KN 08) RV armed
with Nuclear Warhead
© 2016 by Tal Inbar
52. Cut out of HS-13(KN 08) RV armed
with Nuclear Warhead
© 2016 by Tal Inbar
53. Cut out of HS-13(KN 08) RV armed
with Nuclear Warhead
© 2016 by Tal Inbar
54. Nuclear equipped warhead of the
HS-13 missile
• DPRK leader Kim Jong Un was shown the nuclear bomb that was
designed to fit inside the re-entry vehicle of the HS-13 missile. Note the
missile in the background.
© 2016 by Tal Inbar
55. Nuclear equipped warhead of the
HS-13 missile
© 2016 by Tal Inbar
HS-13 missile
first stage
HS-13 missile second
stage
57. Nuclear Bomb for HS-13
Electrical cords for
explosive lens
activation
© 2016 by Tal Inbar
58. Geometry of the nuclear explosive
device
Nuclear bomb with some
pentagons and hexagons
superimposed
Probable geometry of the
nuclear device (minus
external features)
© 2016 by Tal Inbar
59. Nuclear equipped warhead of the
HS-13 missile
Inside view of the re-
entry vehicle of the HS-
13 ballistic missile
Electronic package
for the nuclear bomb
OR ballast
© 2016 by Tal Inbar
Aft Squirt
Mounting
point
Location of the
Nuclear payload
60. The strategic significance
• It is a devastating combination of long range ballistic missile AND a
nuclear warhead.
• North Korea never tested a missile to a range exciding 1100 km –
the HS-13 family is a quantum leap in it’s capabilities.
• The unveiling of the miniaturized nuclear bomb is a direct response to the
west’s claims that NK lack the capability to produce them.
© 2016 by Tal Inbar
61. Re-entry simulation for the nose tip
of the HS-13 (mod. 2) missile
• On March 15, 2016, NK published detailed view of a ground test of the
nose tip of the HS-13 mod. 2 ballistic missile.
• The simulated atmospheric re-entry was conducted by using a static test
stand and exposure of the nose tip to the exhaust gases of a Scud missile.
Front page of the Rodong Sinmun revealing the test
© 2016 by Tal Inbar
• The test aim was to evaluate and prove of the
nose tip in heat loads and heat fluxes typical to
the critical phase of atmospheric reentry.
62. Erosion and Ablation test of the
Nose tip for HS-13 mod. 2
Nose tip – probably
made of ceramics
Ablative
material
Electrical
connectors
Attachment
Bolts
(to the missile)
© 2016 by Tal Inbar
Note the cover
up design
63. Erosion and Ablation test of the
Nose tip for HS-13 mod. 2
Nose tip
poised for
test
Scud engine
Exhaust
from the
scud engine
Nose tip
© 2016 by Tal Inbar
Scud engine
64. Schematic drawing
of the nose tip
© 2016 by Tal Inbar
Gauge to measure
the curve of the
nose tip: note that
very little material
has been ablated
Post test Nose tip for HS-13 mod. 2
65. Nose tip for HS-13 mod. 2
© 2016 by Tal Inbar
Electronic package
used for the nuclear
explosive device OR
ballast
Electrical
connectors
66. Post test Nose tip for HS-13 mod. 2
Charred nose
tip
Thermal
blankets
(possible use
of Asbestos
Phenolic )
Ablative material.
Note that MOST
of the material
withstand the
heat during the
test
© 2016 by Tal Inbar
67. Electronic equipment –
probably related to the
nuclear bomb. Some may be
avionics.Antenna
Bolts
unaffected by
the heat
© 2016 by Tal Inbar
Post test Nose tip for HS-13 mod. 2
69. HS-13 mod. 2
Nose tip (as was tested
on March 15, 2016)
Large compartment for nuclear bomb
(Larger than the one shown on march 9, hence
larger yield possible)
70. Technological assessments
• The HS-13 missile shown with the nuclear warhead looks authentic.
• The 6 HS-13 (mod. 2) missiles shown looks authentic.
• The design of the nuclear bomb looks authentic.
• The nose tip used for simulated re-entry is authentic in every aspect.
© 2016 by Tal Inbar
71. Solid propelled rocket motor
• On March 2016, DPRK performed a static test of a new, large diameter
(probably 1.25 meters) solid rocket motor.
• DPRK leader Ki Jong Un attended the test.
© 2016 by Tal Inbar
72. Solid fuel engine test
© 2016 by Tal Inbar, FOUO, UNCLASSIFIED
Rails
Engine’s
exhaust
Jet vane
mount
73. Solid fuel engine test
© 2016 by Tal Inbar, FOUO, UNCLASSIFIED
Electrical
Connector
Nozzle
Jet Vane
80. Solid fuel engine test
© 2016 by Tal Inbar
Burning time
of the rocket
engine in
seconds (?)
82. Solid fuel engine test
© 2016 by Tal Inbar, FOUO, UNCLASSIFIED
Welding
Jet vane
mount
85. Static test fire of HS-13 engines
• On April 2016, DPRK performed a static test of the engines which are
installed in the HS-13 missile.
• Kim Jong Un attended the test.
© 2016 by Tal Inbar
86. Static test of a cluster of engines for
HS-13 ballistic missile
© 2016 by Tal Inbar
87. Static test of a cluster of engines for
HS-13 ballistic missile
© 2016 by Tal Inbar
88. Static test of a cluster of engines for
HS-13 ballistic missile
© 2016 by Tal Inbar
89. Static test of a cluster of engines for
HS-13 ballistic missile
© 2016 by Tal Inbar
90. Static test of a cluster of engines for
HS-13 ballistic missile
© 2016 by Tal Inbar
91. Static test of a cluster of engines for
HS-13 ballistic missile
© 2016 by Tal Inbar
92. Static test of a cluster of engines for
HS-13 ballistic missile
© 2016 by Tal Inbar
93. Static test of a cluster of engines for
HS-13 ballistic missile
© 2016 by Tal Inbar
94. Static test of a cluster of engines for
HS-13 ballistic missile
© 2016 by Tal Inbar, FOUO, UNCLASSIFIED
95. Static test of a cluster of engines for
HS-13 ballistic missile
© 2016 by Tal Inbar, FOUO, UNCLASSIFIED
96. Static test of dual-combustion chamber
rocket engine for HS-13 ballistic missile
© 2016 by Tal Inbar
Flame from
engine 2
Flame from
engine 1
Truss –
connecting
the engines
to the
missile
Cables for
measurements
during the test
Probable
location of
turbo-
pumps
assembly
97. Solid propelled SLBM
• On April 23, 2016, DPRK conducted a test flight of a SOLID PROPELLED
SLBM, from under the sea.
• DPRK state run television claimed it was launched from a submarine.
© 2016 by Tal Inbar
98. Solid propelled SLBM
© 2016 by Tal Inbar
Protective
cover of the
launch tube
Hand grips
Outer cover
of the
launch
tube. Note
the DPRK
submarine
color
100. Solid propelled SLBM
© 2016 by Tal Inbar
Missile’s
nose tip
Cables Duct
Protective
cover of the
launch tube
103. Preliminary conclusions
• DPRK has finished the design of two versions of the HS-13 ballistic
missile.
• DPRK has succeeded to built a miniaturized nuclear bomb to fit its large
ballistic missiles.
• DPRK has the technology to design, manufacture and test of re-entry
vehicles for ballistic missiles.
• Transfer of DPRK missile technologies is conformed in regard to Iran and
Pakistan, among other countries.
© 2016 by Tal Inbar
104. Future prospects
• Static tests of both versions of the HS-13 must be conducted (including
separation tests – for stages of the missiles, AND the re-entry vehicles
must be conducted). NOTE – This might have been partially achieved
through launches of the UNHA satellite launch vehicle.
• Nuclear test with the miniaturized bomb must be conducted (this MAY
HAVE been done already, with reduced yield).
• Dynamic tests (launches) of both versions of the HS-13 missile must be
conducted to test the design and build reliability.
© 2016 by Tal Inbar
105. Future prospects
• NK might develop even smaller nuclear warheads, to fit its arsenal of
Nodong missiles.
• If they will, it will have a profound influence on all assessments
regarding Iran – since Iranian Shahab 3, Ghader 110 are Nodong
derivatives.
© 2016 by Tal Inbar
109. © 2016 by Tal Inbar
First presentation of a space
launcher to Iran’s supreme leader
Half section
of the fairing
Launcher
forward section
Satellite
110. © 2016 by Tal Inbar
The satellite launcher – integral part
of Iran’s missiles arsenal
Shahab
missile
Sajil
missile
Safir satellite
launch vehicle