This document is the contents page and introduction for a book on Competition Law in India published by Taxmann Publications Pvt. Ltd. It provides an overview of the book's organization, outlines the various divisions covering the Competition Act of 2002 and associated rules and regulations, and includes standard copyright and disclaimer information for publications.

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3. Contents
PAGE
DIVISION ONE : COMPETITION ACT, 2002
1.1 A CHART SHOWING ENFORCEMENT OF PROVISIONS OF
COMPETITION ACT, 2002 FROM DIFFERENT DATES 1.3
1.2 TEXT OF COMPETITION ACT, 2002 AS AMENDED UP TO DATE 1.9
DIVISION TWO : NOTIFICATIONS
2.1 NOTIFICATIONS 2.3
DIVISION THREE : RULES & REGULATIONS
UNDER COMPETITION LAW
3.1 COMPETITION COMMISSION OF INDIA (GENERAL) REGULA-
TIONS, 2009 3.3
3.2 COMPETITION COMMISSION OF INDIA (DETERMINATION
OF COST OF PRODUCTION) REGULATIONS, 2009 3.31
3.3 COMPETITION COMMISSION OF INDIA (RETURN ON MEA-
SURES FOR THE PROMOTION OF COMPETITION ADVOCACY,
AWARENESS AND TRAINING ON COMPETITION ISSUES)
RULES, 2008 3.33
3.4 COMPETITION COMMISSION OF INDIA (LESSER PENALTY)
REGULATIONS, 2009 3.36
3.5 COMPETITION COMMISSION OF INDIA (MANNER OF RECO-
VERY OF MONETARY PENALTY) REGULATIONS, 2011 3.43
3.6 COMPETITION APPELLATE TRIBUNAL (FORM AND FEE FOR
FILING AN APPEAL AND FEE FOR FILING COMPENSATION
APPLICATIONS) RULES, 2009 3.54
3.7 COMPETITION COMMISSION OF INDIA (MEETING FOR
TRANSACTION OF BUSINESS) REGULATIONS, 2009 3.60
3.8 COMPETITION COMMISSION OF INDIA (PROCEDURE FOR
ENGAGEMENT OF EXPERTS AND PROFESSIONALS) REGU-
LATIONS, 2009 3.64
I-5

4. 3.9 COMPETITION COMMISSION OF INDIA (FORM OF ANNUAL
STATEMENT OF ACCOUNTS) RULES, 2009 3.71
3.10 COMPETITION COMMISSION OF INDIA (FORM AND TIME OF
PREPARATION OF ANNUAL REPORT) RULES, 2008 3.90
3.11 COMPETITION APPELLATE TRIBUNAL (TERM OF THE
SELECTION COMMITTEE AND THE MANNER OF SELECTION
OF PANEL OF NAMES) RULES, 2008 3.98
3.12 COMPETITION APPELLATE TRIBUNAL (SALARIES AND
ALLOWANCES AND OTHER TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF
SERVICE OF THE CHAIRPERSON AND OTHER MEMBERS)
RULES, 2009 3.100
3.13 COMPETITION APPELLATE TRIBUNAL (RECRUITMENT,
SALARIES AND OTHER TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF SER-
VICE OF OFFICERS AND OTHER EMPLOYEES) RULES, 2010 3.107
3.14 COMPETITION COMMISSION OF INDIA (TERM OF THE
SELECTION COMMITTEE AND THE MANNER OF SELECTION
OF PANEL OF NAMES) RULES, 2008 3.117
3.15 COMPETITION COMMISSION OF INDIA (SELECTION OF
CHAIRPERSON AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COMMIS-
SION) RULES, 2003 3.119
3.16 COMPETITION COMMISSION OF INDIA (SALARY, ALLOW-
ANCES AND OTHER TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF SERVICE
OF CHAIRPERSON AND OTHER MEMBERS) RULES, 2003 3.121
3.17 COMPETITION COMMISSION OF INDIA (DIRECTOR GEN-
ERAL) RECRUITMENT RULES, 2009 3.124
3.18 COMPETITION COMMISSION OF INDIA (OATH OF OFFICE
AND OF SECRECY FOR CHAIRPERSON AND OTHER MEM-
BERS) RULES, 2003 3.127
3.19 COMPETITION COMMISSION OF INDIA (SALARY, ALLOW-
ANCES, OTHER TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF SERVICE OF
THE SECRETARY AND OFFICERS AND OTHER EMPLOYEES
OF THE COMMISSION AND THE NUMBER OF SUCH
OFFICERS AND OTHER EMPLOYEES) RULES, 2009 3.129
3.20 COMPETITION COMMISSION OF INDIA (NUMBER OF ADDI-
TIONAL, JOINT, DEPUTY OR ASSISTANT DIRECTOR-GENE-
RAL, OTHER OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES, THEIR MANNER
OF APPOINTMENT, QUALIFICATION, SALARY, ALLOWANCES
AND OTHER TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF SERVICE) RULES,
2009 3.156
3.21 COMPETITION COMMISSION OF INDIA (PROCEDURE IN
REGARD TO THE TRANSACTION OF BUSINESS RELATING
TO COMBINATIONS) REGULATIONS, 2011 3.169
PAGE
CONTENTS I-6

5. 3.22 COMPETITION APPELLATE TRIBUNAL (PROCEDURE) REGU-
LATIONS, 2011 3.208
3.23 COMPETITION COMMISSION OF INDIA (COMPETITION
ASSESSMENT OF ECONOMIC LEGISLATIONS AND POLICIES)
GUIDELINES, 2017 3.212
DIVISION FOUR : CONDITIONS OF SERVICE
OF CHAIRPERSON AND MEMBERS OF
TRIBUNALS, APPELLATE TRIBUNALS AND
OTHER AUTHORITIES
4.1 CONDITIONS OF SERVICE OF CHAIRPERSON AND MEM-
BERS OF TRIBUNALS, APPELLATE TRIBUNALS AND OTHER
AUTHORITIES 4.3
I-7 CONTENTS
PAGE

6. SAMPLE CHAPTER
Section 2(t) - In Belaire Owners Association v. DLF Ltd. (2011) 109 SCL 655 = 14 taxmann.com
90 (CCI), DLF was market leader in high end residential accommodation in Gurgaon. It was
market leader in real estate sector in general and in relevant market in particular. It was held
that DLF has dominance in relevant market - followed in Magnolia Flat Owners Association
v. DLF Universal Ltd. (2012) 112 SCL 538 = 19 taxmann.com 278 (CCI). [That way, the scope
can be limited to any extent. Can we say that a shop keeper has dominant position in Lane
No. 3 as that is the only shop in that lane?]
Section 2(u) - Construction is service - In Belaire Owners Association v. DLF Ltd. (2011) 109
SCL 655 = 14 taxmann.com 90 (CCI), it was held that construction of housing is service -
followed in Magnolia Flat Owners Association v. DLF Universal Ltd. (2012) 112 SCL 538 = 19
taxmann.com 278 (CCI).
Selling lottery ticket - Selling of lottery tickets is service - Jupiter Gaming Solutions v.
Government of Goa (2011) 110 SCL 340 = 15 taxmann.com 161 (CCI).
Education is Service - The definition specifically includes education as service. Thus,
education is service and will be covered under the Act. - - In TMA Pai Foundation v. State of
Karnataka 2002 AIR SCW 4957 = AIR 2003 SC 355 = (2002) 8 SCC 481 (SC 11 member
Constitution Bench Majority decision delivered by Hon. B N Kirpal, CJI), it was held that
education has so far not been regarded as a trade or business where profit is the motive. Even
if there is any doubt about whether education is a profession or not, it does appear that
education will fall within the meaning of expression occupation.
Education, accepted as a useful activity, whether for charity or for profit, is an occupation.
Nevertheless, it does not cease to be a service to the society. And even though an occupation,
it cannot be equated to a trade or a business. In short, education is national wealth essential
for the nations progress and prosperity P A Inamdar v. State of Maharashtra AIR 2005 SC
3226 = (2005) 6 SCC 537 (SC 7 member constitution bench).
Education is more a mission and avocation rather than a profession or trade or business -
University of Delhi v. Ram Nath AIR 1963 SC 1873.
CHAPTER II
PROHIBITION OF CERTAIN AGREEMENTS, ABUSE OF DOMINANT
POSITION AND REGULATION OF COMBINATIONS
Prohibition of agreements
10
Anti-competitive agreements.11
3. (1) No enterprise or association of enterprises or person or association of persons
shall enter into any agreement in respect of production, supply, distribution,
storage, acquisition or control of goods or provision of services, which causes or is
likely to cause an appreciable adverse effect on competition within India.
(2) Any agreement entered into in contravention of the provisions contained in sub-
section (1) shall be void.
(3) Any agreement entered into between enterprises or associations of enterprises
or persons or associations of persons or between any person and enterprise or
practice carried on, or decision taken by, any association of enterprises or associa-
tion of persons, including cartels, engaged in identical or similar trade of goods or
provision of services, which—
(a) directly or indirectly determines purchase or sale prices;
10. Enforced with effect from 20-5-2009.
11. For exemptions, see Division Two.
1.21 COMPETITION ACT, 2002 S. 3

7. (b) limits or controls production, supply, markets, technical development, invest-
ment or provision of services;
(c) shares the market or source of production or provision of services by way of
allocation of geographical area of market, or type of goods or services, or
number of customers in the market or any other similar way;
(d) directly or indirectly results in bid rigging or collusive bidding,
shall be presumed to have an appreciable adverse effect on competition:
Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall apply to any agreement
entered into by way of joint ventures if such agreement increases efficiency in
production, supply, distribution, storage, acquisition or control of goods or provi-
sion of services.
Explanation.—For the purposes of this sub-section, “bid rigging” means any agree-
ment, between enterprises or persons referred to in sub-section (3) engaged in
identical or similar production or trading of goods or provision of services, which
has the effect of eliminating or reducing competition for bids or adversely affecting
or manipulating the process for bidding;
(4)Anyagreementamongstenterprisesorpersonsatdifferentstagesorlevelsofthe
productionchainindifferentmarkets,inrespectofproduction,supply,distribution,
storage, sale or price of, or trade in goods or provision of services, including—
(a) tie-in arrangement;
(b) exclusive supply agreement;
(c) exclusive distribution agreement;
(d) refusal to deal;
(e) resale price maintenance,
shall be an agreement in contravention of sub-section (1) if such agreement causes
or is likely to cause an appreciable adverse effect on competition in India.
Explanation.—For the purposes of this sub-section,—
(a) “tie-in arrangements” includes any agreement requiring a purchaser of goods,
as a condition of such purchase, to purchase some other goods;
(b) “exclusive supply agreement” includes any agreement restricting in any
manner the purchaser in the course of his trade from acquiring or otherwise
dealing in any goods other than those of the seller or any other person;
(c) “exclusive distribution agreement” includes any agreement to limit, restrict or
withhold the output or supply of any goods or allocate any area or market for
the disposal or sale of the goods;
(d) “refusal to deal” includes any agreement which restricts, or is likely to restrict,
by any method the persons or classes of persons to whom goods are sold or
from whom goods are bought;
(e) “resale price maintenance” includes any agreement to sell goods on condition
that the prices to be charged on the resale by the purchaser shall be the prices
stipulated by the seller unless it is clearly stated that prices lower than those
prices may be charged;
(5) Nothing contained in this section shall restrict—
(i) the right of any person to restrain any infringement of, or to impose reason-
able conditions, as may be necessary for protecting any of his rights which
have been or may be conferred upon him under—
S. 3 COMPETITION ACT, 2002 1.22

8. (a) the Copyright Act, 1957 (14 of 1957);
(b) the Patents Act, 1970 (39 of 1970);
(c) the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 (43 of 1958) or the Trade
Marks Act, 1999 (47 of 1999);
(d) theGeographicalIndicationsofGoods(RegistrationandProtection)Act,
1999 (48 of 1999);
(e) the Designs Act, 2000 (16 of 2000);
(f) the Semi-conductor Integrated Circuits Layout-Design Act, 2000 (37 of
2000).
(ii) the right of any person to export goods from India to the extent to which the
agreement relates exclusively to the production, supply, distribution or
control of goods or provision of services for such export.
COMMENTS
Sub-section (2) - Entering into specified agreement itself is not an offense Though the
actions/agreements as specified in sections 3 and 4 are void, no penalty has been provided for
entering into such agreement. Breach of sections 3 and 4 by itself is not punishable under the
Act. Thus, entering into such agreement itself is not an offense. What is made punishable is
disobedience of order passed by CCI and its non-compliance - Kingfisher Airlines Ltd. v. CCI
(2011) 108 SCL 621 = 12 taxmann.com 285 (Bom HC DB).
Sub-section (3) - Restrictions on production, distribution or exhibition of films by non-
members - In Reliance Big Entertainment Ltd. v. Karnataka Film Chamber of Commerce
(2012) 112 SCL 159 = 18 taxmann.com 301 (CCI), the association was indulging in following
- (a) placing restrictions not to deal with non-members (b) imposing restrictions on number
of screens for non-regional films (c) enforcing restrictions by banning films, collective
boycott, withholding share etc. It was held that this resulted in limit on supply and distribution
of films in market. It created barriers to entry into market by non-members. Penalty was
imposed on the association and they were asked to desist from such practices. The order has
been upheld in Motion Pictures Association v. Reliance Big Entertainment P Ltd. (2014) 123
SCL 55 = 35 taxmann.com 237 (CAT).
In Reliance Big Entertainment Ltd. v. Tamil Film Exhibitors Association (2014) 123 SCL 294
= 40 taxmann.com 476 (CCI), the association had issued instructions to its members to ban
one film. It was held that this act is anti-competitive.
In Sajjan Khaitan v. Eastern India Motion Picture Association (EIMPA) (2012) 115 SCL 383 =
25 taxmann.com 275 (CCI), EIMPA and Coordination Committee of various associations of
Cine Artists, workers and Technicians raised objections about telecast of dubbed version of
Hindi serial (Mahabharat) in Bengali and issued instructions to stop its telecast to the TV
channel. It was held that this is anti-competitive practice. Cease and desist orders were issued
the view has been confirmed in CCI v. Coordination Committee of Artists (2017) 5 SCC 17
= 140 SCL 655 = 79 taxmann.com 136 (SC).
In Mrs. Manju Tharad v. Eastern India Motion Picture Association (EIMPA) (2012) 114 SCL 20
= 22 taxmann.com 87 (CCI), the practice of EIMPA restricting its members not to deal with
non-members, making compulsory registration of each film before release in their territory
were held as anti-competitive.
Notsubmittingabid-Makingcollectivedecisionboycottingauctionisviolationofprovisions
of section 3(3)(d) of the Act - Coal India v. Gulf Oil Corpn (2013) 29 taxmann.com 36 (CCI) -
confirmed in Gulf Oil Corporation v. CCI (2013) 34 taxmann.com 153 (CAT).
Collective Bidding - Collusive bidding is also bid rigging - Excel Crop Care v. CCI (2017) 8 SCC
47 = 141 SCL 480 = 81 taxmann.com 173 (SC).
1.23 COMPETITION ACT, 2002 S. 3

9. Sub-section (4) - Agreement between Indian Railways and SAIL for exclusive supply of
rails - In Jindal Steel v. Steel Authority of India Ltd. (2012) 111 SCL 382 = 17 taxmann.com
154 (CCI), Steel Authority of India Ltd. (SAIL) had MOU with Indian Railways (IR) for
exclusive supply of rails on a continuous basis. It was held that generally Buyers choice is not
a competition issue. However, here buyer is in dominant position and hence can raise
competition concerns. However, considering the background, it was held that the agreement
was not anti-competitive and did not lead to foreclosure of market.
Prohibition of abuse of dominant position
12
Abuse of dominant position.
4. 13
[(1) No enterprise or group shall abuse its dominant position.]
(2) There shall be an abuse of dominant position under sub-section (1), if an
enterprise 14
[or a group],—
(a) directly or indirectly, imposes unfair or discriminatory—
(i) condition in purchase or sale of goods or services; or
(ii) price in purchase or sale (including predatory price) of goods or service;
or
Explanation.—For the purposes of this clause, the unfair or discriminatory
condition in purchase or sale of goods or services referred to in sub-clause (i)
and unfair or discriminatory price in purchase or sale of goods (including
predatory price) or service referred to in sub-clause (ii) shall not include such
discriminatory conditions or prices which may be adopted to meet the
competition; or
(b) limits or restricts—
(i) production of goods or provision of services or market therefor; or
(ii) technical or scientific development relating to goods or services to the
prejudice of consumers; or
(c) indulges in practice or practices resulting in denial of market access 14
[in any
manner]; or
(d) makes conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by other parties of
supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial
usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts; or
(e) uses its dominant position in one relevant market to enter into, or protect,
other relevant market.
Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, the expression—
(a) “dominant position” means a position of strength, enjoyed by an enterprise, in
the relevant market, in India, which enables it to—
(i) operate independently of competitive forces prevailing in the relevant
market; or
(ii) affect its competitors or consumers or the relevant market in its favour;
12. Enforced with effect from 20-5-2009.
13. Substituted by the Competition (Amendment) Act, 2007, w.e.f. 20-5-2009. Prior to its substi-
tution, it read as under :
“(1) No enterprise shall abuse its dominant position.”
14. Inserted, ibid.
S. 4 COMPETITION ACT, 2002 1.24

10. (b) “predatory price” means the sale of goods or provision of services, at a price
which is below the cost, as may be determined by regulations, of production
of the goods or provision of services, with a view to reduce competition or
eliminate the competitors.
14a
[(c)“group” shall have the same meaning as assigned to it in clause (b) of the
Explanation to section 5.]
COMMENTS
Sub-section (2) - Resale Price Maintenance - Union not allowing direct negotiations of rates
with truck owners and fixing rates is abuse of dominant position Shivam Enterprises v.
Kiratpur Sahib Truck Operators Coop Transport Society Ltd. (2015) 130 SCL 685 = 55
taxmann.com 481 (CCI).
Pre-payment charges levied by Housing Finance Companies - Pre-payment charges levied
by Housing Finance Companies (if the housing loan is pre-paid before due date), is neither
anti-competitive nor amount to abuse of the dominant position S Malhotra v. Deutsche Post
Bank Finance Ltd. (2011) 106 SCL 62 = 9 taxmann.com 108 (CCI) - similar view in Mohammed
Tariq Sultan v. Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Ltd. (2012) 111 SCL 157 = 16
taxmann.com 389 (CCI)
Abuse of dominant position by NSE - In MCX Stock Exchange Ltd. v. National Stock
Exchange of India Ltd. (NSE) (2011) 109 SCL 222 = 13 taxmann.com 110 (CCI), NSE had used
its dominant position in non-CD (i.e. other than Currency Derivatives) segment (where NSE
had virtual monopoly) to protect its position in CD (Currency Derivatives) section by cross
subsidising this segment of business from other segments where NSE had virtual monopoly.
It had waived transaction fee and admission fee for memberships in CD market. It was held
by CCI that this is predatory pricing. It was also held that there was clear intention of NSE to
eliminate competitors in relevant market. A penalty of Rs. 55.5 crores (5% of turnover) was
imposed on NSE the order has been confirmed in National Stock Exchange of India Ltd. v.
Competition Commission of India (2014) 128 SCL 236 = 48 taxmann.com 100 (CAT).
AbuseofdominantpositionbyBCCI -InSurinderSinghBarmiv.BoardforControlofCricket
in India (BCCI) (2013) 118 SCL 226 = 31 taxmann.com 61 (CCI), it was held that BCCI used
its dominant position by explicitly agreeing not to sanction any competitive league during
currency of IPL media rights agreement. A penalty of Rs. 52.24 crores (6% of average gross
turnover) was imposed.
One sided agreement is abuse of dominant position - In Belaire Owners Association v. DLF
Ltd. (2011) 109 SCL 655 = 14 taxmann.com 90 (CCI), DLF was market leader in high end
residential accommodation in Gurgaon. It had dominance in relevant market. It was market
leader in real estate sector in general and in relevant market in particular. DLF had entered
into contract with allottees of flats in group housing complex The Belaire. DLF had added
many floors to those announced earlier. Number of apartments were increased by 53%,
without obtaining views of earlier customers. DLF had put one sided unfair conditions with
the allottees who had become captive consumers. DLF was ordered to remove such unfair
conditions in the agreements. Penalty of 7% of turnover (Rs. 630 crores) was imposed on DLF
- followed in Magnolia Flat Owners Association v. DLF Universal Ltd. (2012) 112 SCL 538 =
19 taxmann.com 278 (CCI).
Similarorderaboutabuseofdominantpositionhasbeenpassedin Ashutosh Bhardwajv. DLF
Ltd. (2017) 139 SCL 381 = 77 taxmann.com 292 (CCI).
The decision in case of Belaire Owners Association has been confirmed in DLF Ltd. v. CCI
(2014) 127 SCL 68 = 45 taxmann.com 300 (CAT).
Explanation (a) to sub-section (2) - If the TV programme viewership is not very high, it
cannot be said to be in dominant position and hence complaint against such TV programme
1.25 COMPETITION ACT, 2002 S. 4
14a. Inserted by the Competition (Amendment) Act, 2007, w.e.f. 20-5-2009.

11. (Kaun Banega Crorepati - KBC - in this case) is not maintainable - Anuj Kumar Bhari v. Sony
Entertainment TV (2011) 110 SCL 2 = 14 taxmann.com 170 (Delhi-HC).
In Surinder Bhakoo v. HDFC Bank Ltd. (2011) 110 SCL 17 = 14 taxmann.com 63 (CCI), it was
found that the Bank is not in dominant position in housing finance loan and hence it was held
that the complaint is not maintainable.
In Arshiya Rail Infrastructure Ltd. v. Ministry of Railways (2012) 116 SCL 417 = 27
taxmann.com 25 (CCI), it has been held that in transportation of containers within India,
railways are not having dominant position as major transportation is by road.
Regulation of combinations
15
Combination16
.
5. The acquisition of one or more enterprises by one or more persons or merger or
amalgamation of enterprises shall be a combination of such enterprises and
persons or enterprises, if—
(a) any acquisition where—
(i) the parties to the acquisition, being the acquirer and the enterprise,
whose control, shares, voting rights or assets have been acquired or are
being acquired jointly have,—
(A) either, in India, the assets of the value of more than rupees one
thousand crores or turnover more than rupees three thousand
crores; or
17
[(B) in India or outside India, in aggregate, the assets of the value of
more than five hundred million US dollars, including at least
rupees five hundred crores in India, or turnover more than fifteen
hundred million US dollars, including at least rupees fifteen hun-
dred crores in India; or]
(ii) the group, to which the enterprise whose control, shares, assets or voting
rights have been acquired or are being acquired, would belong after the
acquisition, jointly have or would jointly have,—
(A) either in India, the assets of the value of more than rupees four
thousand crores or turnover more than rupees twelve thousand
crores; or
18
[(B) in India or outside India, in aggregate, the assets of the value of
more than two billion US dollars, including at least rupees five
hundred crores in India, or turnover more than six billion US
dollars,includingatleastrupeesfifteenhundredcroresinIndia;or]
15. Enforced with effect from 1-6-2011.
16. For exemptions, see Division Two.
17. Substituted by the Competition (Amendment) Act, 2007, w.e.f. 1-6-2011. Prior to its substitu-
tion, it read as under :
“(B) in India or outside India, in aggregate, the assets of the value of more than five hundred
million US dollars or turnover more than fifteen hundred million US dollars; or”
18. Substituted, ibid. Prior to its substitution, it read as under :
“(B) in India or outside India, in aggregate, the assets of the value of more than two billion
US dollars or turnover more than six billion US dollars; or”
S. 5 COMPETITION ACT, 2002 1.26

12. (b) acquiring of control by a person over an enterprise when such person has
already direct or indirect control over another enterprise engaged in produc-
tion, distribution or trading of a similar or identical or substitutable goods or
provision of a similar or identical or substitutable service, if—
(i) the enterprise over which control has been acquired along with the
enterprise over which the acquirer already has direct or indirect control
jointly have,—
(A) either in India, the assets of the value of more than rupees one
thousand crores or turnover more than rupees three thousand
crores; or
19
[(B) in India or outside India, in aggregate, the assets of the value of
more than five hundred million US dollars, including at least
rupees five hundred crores in India, or turnover more than fifteen
hundred million US dollars, including at least rupees fifteen hun-
dred crores in India; or]
(ii) the group, to which enterprise whose control has been acquired, or is
being acquired, would belong after the acquisition, jointly have or would
jointly have,—
(A) either in India, the assets of the value of more than rupees four
thousand crores or turnover more than rupees twelve thousand
crores; or
20
[(B) in India or outside India, in aggregate, the assets of the value of
more than two billion US dollars, including at least rupees five
hundred crores in India, or turnover more than six billion US
dollars,includingatleastrupeesfifteenhundredcroresinIndia;or]
(c) any merger or amalgamation in which—
(i) the enterprise remaining after merger or the enterprise created as a
result of the amalgamation, as the case may be, have,—
(A) either in India, the assets of the value of more than rupees one
thousand crores or turnover more than rupees three thousand
crores; or
21
[(B) in India or outside India, in aggregate, the assets of the value of
more than five hundred million US dollars, including at least
rupees five hundred crores in India, or turnover more than fifteen
1.27 COMPETITION ACT, 2002 S. 5
19. Substituted by the Competition (Amendment) Act, 2007, w.e.f. 1-6-2011. Prior to its substitu-
tion, it read as under :
“(B) in India or outside India, in aggregate, the assets of the value of more than five hundred
million US dollars or turnover more than fifteen hundred million US dollars; or”
20. Substituted, ibid. Prior to its substitution, it read as under :
“(B) in India or outside India, in aggregate, the assets of the value of more than two billion
US dollars or turnover more than six billion US dollars; or”
21. Substituted, ibid. Prior to its substitution, it read as under :
“(B) in India or outside India, in aggregate, the assets of the value of more than five hundred
million US dollars or turnover more than fifteen hundred million US dollars; or”

13. hundred million US dollars, including at least rupees fifteen hun-
dred crores in India; or]
(ii) the group, to which the enterprise remaining after the merger or the
enterprise created as a result of the amalgamation, would belong after
the merger or the amalgamation, as the case may be, have or would
have,—
(A) either in India, the assets of the value of more than rupees four
thousand crores or turnover more than rupees twelve thousand
crores; or
22
[(B) in India or outside India, in aggregate, the assets of the value of
more than two billion US dollars, including at least rupees five
hundred crores in India, or turnover more than six billion US
dollars, including at least rupees fifteen hundred crores in India.]
Explanation.—For the purposes of this section,—
(a) “control” includes controlling the affairs or management by—
(i) one or more enterprises, either jointly or singly, over another enterprise
or group;
(ii) one or more groups, either jointly or singly, over another group or
enterprise;
(b) “group” means two or more enterprises which, directly or indirectly, are in a
position to—
(i) exercise twenty-six per cent or more of the voting rights in the other
enterprise; or
(ii) appointmorethanfiftypercentofthemembersoftheboardofdirectors
in the other enterprise; or
(iii) control the management or affairs of the other enterprise;
(c) the value of assets shall be determined by taking the book value of the assets
as shown, in the audited books of account of the enterprise, in the financial
year immediately preceding the financial year in which the date of proposed
merger falls, as reduced by any depreciation, and the value of assets shall
include the brand value, value of goodwill, or value of copyright, patent,
permitted use, collective mark, registered proprietor, registered trade mark,
registered user, homonymous geographical indication, geographical indica-
tions, design or layout-design or similar other commercial rights, if any,
referred to in sub-section (5) of section 3.
23
Regulation of combinations.24
6. (1) No person or enterprise shall enter into a combination which causes or is likely
to cause an appreciable adverse effect on competition within the relevant market
in India and such a combination shall be void.
S. 6 COMPETITION ACT, 2002 1.28
22. Substituted by the Competition (Amendment) Act, 2007, w.e.f. 1-6-2011. Prior to its substitu-
tion, it read as under :
“(B) in India or outside India, the assets of the value of more than two billion US dollars or
turnover more than six billion US dollars.”
23. Enforced with effect from 1-6-2011.
24. For exemptions, see Division Two.

14. (2) Subject to the provisions contained in sub-section (1), any person or enterprise,
who or which proposes to enter into a combination, 25
[shall] give notice to the
Commission, in the form as may be specified, and the fee which may be determined,
by regulations, disclosing the details of the proposed combination, within 26
[thirty]
days of—
(a) approval of the proposal relating to merger or amalgamation, referred to in
clause (c) of section 5 by the board of directors of the enterprises concerned
with such merger or amalgamation, as the case may be;
(b) execution of any agreement or other document for acquisition referred to in
clause (a) of section 5 or acquiring of control referred to in clause (b) of that
section.
27
[(2A) No combination shall come into effect until two hundred and ten days have
passed from the day on which the notice has been given to the Commission under
sub-section (2) or the Commission has passed orders under section 31, whichever
is earlier.]
(3) The Commission shall, after receipt of notice under sub-section (2), deal with
such notice in accordance with the provisions contained in sections 29, 30 and 31.
(4) The provisions of this section shall not apply to share subscription or financing
facility or any acquisition, by a public financial institution, foreign institutional
investor, bank or venture capital fund, pursuant to any covenant of a loan
agreement or investment agreement.
(5) The public financial institution, foreign institutional investor, bank or venture
capital fund, referred to in sub-section (4), shall, within seven days from the date of
the acquisition, file, in the form as may be specified by regulations, with the
Commission the details of the acquisition including the details of control, the
circumstances for exercise of such control and the consequences of default arising
out of such loan agreement or investment agreement, as the case may be.
Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, the expression—
(a) “foreigninstitutionalinvestor”hasthesamemeaningasassignedtoitinclause
(a) of the Explanation to section 115AD of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (43 of
1961);
(b) “venture capital fund” has the same meaning as assigned to it in clause (b) of
the Explanation to clause (23FB) of section 10 of the Income-tax Act, 1961
(43 of 1961).
CHAPTER III
COMPETITION COMMISSION OF INDIA
28
Establishment of Commission.29
7. (1) With effect from such date as the Central Government may, by notification,
appoint, there shall be established, for the purposes of this Act, a Commission to be
called the “Competition Commission of India”.
1.29 COMPETITION ACT, 2002 S. 7
25. Substituted for “may, at his or its option,” by the Competition (Amendment) Act, 2007, w.e.f.
1-6-2011.
26. Substituted for “seven”, ibid.
27. Inserted, ibid.
28. For relevant notifications, see Division Two.
29. Enforced with effect from 19-6-2003.

15. ORDER NOW
COMPETITION
LAWS MANUAL
Rs. 575 | USD 39
Author : TAXMANN
Publisher: TAXMANN
Edition : 8th Edition
ISBN No.: 9788195371488
Date of Publication: July 2021
No. oF Pages: 344
Description:
Taxmann's Competition Law Manual is a compendium of Competition Act, 2013
[amended up to date] along with Relevant Rules Regulations, Circulars, and
Notifications.
What sets this book apart is the unique way of presenting the Annotated, Amended
Updated text of the Competition Act and relevant Rules Regulations mapped with the
relevant Section of the Act.
The Present Publication is the Latest Edition, authored by Taxmann's Editorial Board,
amended up to 5th July 2021. This book is divided into four divisions:
The Competition Act, 2002
Notifications
20+ Rules Regulations issued under the Competition Law
Conditions of Service of Chairperson and Members of Tribunals, Appellate Tribunals
and Other Authorities