1. MSc in Policing
A Thematic Review of the UK Approach to
International Policing: Peace Support Operations
Cover Page
Anthony Michael Sheridan
SHE97D52066
being a Dissertation submitted in part fulfilment of the requirements for the
Degree of Master of Science of Canterbury Christ Church University
Canterbury Christ Church University February 2009

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“I, Anthony Michael Sheridan, hereby declare that this dissertation is my own
original work and that all source material used has been clearly identified and
acknowledged. No part of this dissertation contains material previously
submitted to the examiners of this or any other University, or any material
previously submitted for any other examination.”
………………………..

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Abstract
This paper addresses the UK approach to Peace Support Operations (PSOs) i.e.
post-conflict environments overseas that require an organised intervention and to
which the UK contributes civilian police officers. It identifies how critical the role
of police is in assisting with such work, whilst at the same time acknowledging
some of the challenges for the UK in the face of a growing expectation for
increased and more highly skilled police resources.
A review of the UK approach is offered, arguing that the current system in place
is flawed, with a lack of response to the key issues, even though in some cases
these issues have been highlighted in various reports and reviews. The paper
exposes the lack of strategic priority for PSOs, which has had an impact on
police resourcing, leading to a less than cohesive response. The inability to
market PSOs effectively is identified as a core aspect of recruitment that has not
been proactively managed, leading to lack of recognition by organisations. This
has resulted in forces failing to capitalise on the skills and abilities that are
developed through involvement overseas. Coupled with this is the limited UK
police involvement in military planning activity, demonstrating a critical gap in the
UK approach to the Security Sector Reform process, which manifested itself in
recent interventions such as Iraq. The argument is made for a more cohesive
approach to reinforce the UK contribution through the provision of appropriately
skilled and available police personnel who can fortify the UK provision and hence
reinforce UK foreign policy as it relates to PSOs.

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Acknowledgements
Thanks are extended to Assistant Chief Constable Robert Chidley of the Ministry
of Defence Police for permitting this research and providing his support for and
contributions to this work. Also the support of the MDPGA for providing access to
their data analysis systems and staff.
Thanks also to all the police officers, the Association of Police Authorities, the
National Policing Improvement Agency, the MOD, Home Office, FCO and
Scottish Police College, Tulliallan, who provided access and data for the
research study.
Special thanks are extended to the following:
Dr. Dominic Wood, supervisor at Canterbury Christ Church University, without
whose advice, guidance and assistance this work could not have been
completed. His ability to take my experience and mélange of ideas helped
crystallise them into a cohesive dissertation.
Mr. Stephen Chambers – Head of International Policing Policy within the Conflict
Issues Group at the FCO.
Chief Inspector Cliff Sharp – Deputy Head of the IST at the FCO.
Hilary, without who’s perseverance I would not have had the volume of material I
needed for my literature review.
In particular I would like to thank my wife Vivienne, who has provided me with
constant support and encouragement both during my studies and more widely for
my police work.

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Table of Contents
Cover Page...........................................................................................................1
Abstract.................................................................................................................3
Acknowledgements...............................................................................................4
Tables and Figures ...............................................................................................8
Glossary of Terms.................................................................................................9
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................14
Approach to the research................................................................................16
Identifying a general or initial idea...................................................................17
Fact finding......................................................................................................18
Taking the first action step ..............................................................................19
CHAPTER 1 - LITERATURE REVIEW ...............................................................20
1.1. THE IMPACT OF GLOBALIZATION ........................................................20
1.1.1. International Standards.....................................................................22
1.1.2. The Benefits of International Contribution.........................................22
1.2. UK INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK........................................................26
1.2.1. UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO) .....................................26
1.2.2. Other Whitehall Departments............................................................28
1.2.3. The Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) ................................29
1.3. THE UK POLICE SERVICE .....................................................................30
1.3.1. Home Office/Scottish Office forces ...................................................30
1.3.2. The Ministry of Defence Police .........................................................32
1.4. STRATEGIC PLANNING FOR PSOs ......................................................33
1.4.1. A Comprehensive Approach .............................................................34
1.4.2. Resourcing a dedicated capability ....................................................38
1.5. LOCAL POLICE PLANNING FOR PSOs .................................................42
1.6. SKILLS AND ABILITIES FOR PSOs........................................................45
1.6.1. Preparation .......................................................................................45
1.6.2. Pre-deployment training....................................................................45
CHAPTER 2 - RESEARCH STUDY....................................................................49
2.1. KEY THEMES..........................................................................................49

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2.2. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY................................................................50
2.2.1. Quantitative research........................................................................50
2.2.2. Qualitative Research.........................................................................51
2.2.3. Types of sampling.............................................................................52
2.2.4. Sampling procedures for the study ...................................................53
CHAPTER 3 - ANALYSIS OF THE DATA ..........................................................54
3.1. QUESTIONNAIRES .................................................................................54
3.1.1. Combining quantitative and qualitative analysis................................54
3.1.2. Final questions..................................................................................65
3.2. QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS .......................................................................67
3.2.1. One to one semi-structured interviews..............................................67
3.2.2. Combining qualitative results ............................................................78
CHAPTER 4 - CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS.................................82
4.1. CONCLUSIONS FROM THE FINDINGS .................................................82
4.1.1. Institutional structure.........................................................................82
4.1.2. Operational support ..........................................................................83
4.1.3. Marketing ..........................................................................................84
4.1.4. Recruitment and Selection................................................................85
4.1.5. A Dedicated Policing Capability ........................................................86
4.1.6. Training.............................................................................................86
4.1.7. Career development..........................................................................87
4.1.8. Funding.............................................................................................87
4.2. RECOMMENDATIONS............................................................................88
REFERENCES ...................................................................................................92
APPENDICES...................................................................................................102
Appendix A....................................................................................................103
Mindmap – Initial ideas ..............................................................................103
Appendix B....................................................................................................104
Home Office Police Force Planning...........................................................104
Appendix C....................................................................................................110
Generic skills identified for police officers undertaking PSOs ....................110

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Appendix D....................................................................................................112
MDPGA/FCO International Policing Programme .......................................112
Appendix E....................................................................................................113
Initial Crime Investigators Development Programme.................................113
Appendix F ....................................................................................................115
NPIA Strategic Command Course .............................................................115
Appendix G ...................................................................................................119
Covering Letter - Questionnaire.................................................................119
Questionnaire ............................................................................................121
Appendix H....................................................................................................125
One to one interviews................................................................................125
Appendix I .....................................................................................................127
Letter of Consent - Interview......................................................................127
Appendix J ....................................................................................................130
Statistical Results from Questionnaires .....................................................130
Appendix J (cont.) .........................................................................................131
Appendix K....................................................................................................132
Research Questionnaire: Qualitative Responses ......................................132
Appendix L ....................................................................................................159
Stakeholder Core Themes (Interviews) .....................................................159
Appendix M ...................................................................................................205
Ethics Approval..........................................................................................205

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Tables and Figures
Table 1 – Qualitative Comparative Themes........................................................78
Figure 1 – Action Research Spiral ......................................................................17
Figure 2 – Responses to Question 2...................................................................55
Figure 3 – Responses to Question 3...................................................................59
Figure 4 – Responses to Question 4...................................................................60
Figure 5 – Responses to Question 5...................................................................61
Figure 6 – Responses to Question 6...................................................................62
Figure 7 – Responses to Question 7...................................................................63
Figure 8 – Responses to Question 8...................................................................64
Figure 9 – Areas for development.......................................................................66
Figure 10 – Positive Indicators............................................................................66

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Glossary of Terms
ACPO Association of Chief Police Officers – Lead on behalf
of Chief Officers of the police forces of England,
Wales and Northern Ireland
ACPOS Association of Chief Police Officers (Scotland) – Lead
on behalf of Chief Officers of the Scottish police
forces
ACPO(S) Term used in this paper to describe ACPO and
ACPOS combined
AFG Afghanistan
APA Association of Police Authorities
APG Assessment Planning Group
CIG Conflict Issues Group of the FCO
CIVPOL Civilian Policing – Term adopted to describe a United
Nations International Police Officer
DFID Department for International Development –
Governmental department responsible for promoting
sustainable development and reducing poverty

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ESDP European Security and Defence Policy – Part of the
Common Foreign and Security Pillar of the European
Union
EU European Union – An economic and political union
established in 1993 after the ratification of the
Maastricht Treaty by members of the European
Community
EULEX The European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo
FCO Foreign & Commonwealth Office – Governmental
department responsible for implementing UK foreign
policy
HMG Her Majesty’s Government
HMIC Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary –
Governmental department responsible for inspecting
the UK police service against defined standards
HO Home Office – Governmental department in charge of
domestic affairs
HR Human Resources
ICF Integrated Competency Framework
IPCPT International Policing & Civilian Placements Team – a
department within the FCO that has been succeeded
by the IST

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ICIDP Initial Crime Investigators Development Programme –
National programme of training for criminal
investigation officers
IPLDP Initial Police Leadership and Development
Programme – National programme of training for
newly recruited police officers
IPSO International Policing & Secondments Office – the
MDPGA partner organisation of the FCO in the
provision of logistical and training support for officers
undertaking PSOs
IPU International Policing Unit – a department within the
FCO that has been succeeded by the IST
IST International Secondments Team – the team within
the FCO that provides administrative support for
PSOs and sources staff for overseas missions upon
request
MDP Ministry of Defence Police – A civilian policing agency
within the Ministry of Defence responsible for policing
the Defence estate
MDPGA Ministry of Defence Police & Guarding Agency – The
MDP and the Ministry of Defence Guard Service, a
civilian guarding organisation that provides guarding
capability for the Defence estate, is considered a joint
Agency (MDPGA) under the MoD when they work
together

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MOD Ministry of Defence – A governmental department that
incorporates the three military services as well as a
significant civilian support capability in support of UK
Defence interests both at home and abroad
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation
NPIA National Policing Improvement Agency
NPP National Policing Plan
OSCE Organisation for Security & Co-operation in Europe
PCR Post Conflict Reconstruction
PCRU Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit (now called the
Stabilisation Unit)
PJT Police & Justice Team of the FCO
PSO Peace Support Operation
PSA Public Service Agreement
SU Stabilisation Unit (formerly Post Conflict
Reconstruction Unit)
TNA Training Needs Analysis

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UK United Kingdom
UN United Nations – International organisation founded in
1945 to facilitate world peace, currently consisting of
192 Member States
UNAMET United Nations Mission in East Timor
UNAMIR United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda
UNAMSIL United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNFICYP United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
UNMIBH United Nations Mission in Bosnia Herzegovina
UNMIK United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo
UNMIS United Nations Mission in Sudan
UNSAS United Nations Standby Arrangements System -
Based on conditional commitments by Member States
of specified resources within the agreed response
times for UN peacekeeping operations
UNTAC United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
UNTAG United Nations Transitional Authority Group

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INTRODUCTION
i. This dissertation, although making reference to approaches by other
countries as a comparison, focuses on the UK deployment of police officers to
Peace Support Operations (PSOs) (other forms of UK investigative and
operational policing assistance abroad, as well as humanitarian aid, fall outside
the scope of this work).
ii. UN and EU member states are expected to work together to maintain
international standards, rebuilding communities and respect for the Rule of Law
through the provision of suitably skilled staff, a component of that approach is the
provision of police officers to PSOs. The EU expectation is that the UK will
contribute up to 475 police officers overseas at any one time (FCO, 2004). This
reflects just over 0.25% of a current police complement in England and Wales
alone of 141,731 police officers (Bullock, 2007). The impact on specific UK police
forces, particularly the larger metropolitan forces, is therefore arguably relatively
small, but the ability of the UK to meet demand has been tested. There is
undoubtedly an acknowledged shift, particularly by the EU, towards provision of
more senior officers skilled in management, command and negotiation, which the
UK appears to be struggling to respond to. There is growing awareness that only
staff with specific rank, skills and abilities, matched to roles within an EU mission
structure, will be selected for specific missions. This contrasts somewhat with the
UN approach, where international police officers could find themselves in roles
they were unprepared for.1
iii. I discussed this change with the Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO)
during the selection process for the new EULEX mission in Kosovo. UK police
officers had found themselves competing for posts with other EU Member States
1
Interviews with CIVPOL colleagues revealed that in order to keep a balance of different nations
in a mission staff, particularly from under-represented UN member states, could be placed in
specific posts, regardless of their actual skills and abilities.

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and being unsuccessful; they were considered too low in rank or more generalist
in terms of their skills and abilities, regardless of the positions they previously
held in the UNMIK mission.2
Certainly, difficulty was experienced matching rank
or skills and abilities to specific job profiles outlined in the EULEX CONOPS
(classified document) and produced by the EU Planning Team for Kosovo
(working out of Brussels and to the European Security and Defence Policy
requirements); this resulted in the UK footprint in Kosovo reducing significantly.
iv. Added to this is that the pool of volunteers at Superintending ranks has
remained very small, at one point no officers at that level were coming forward:
“I believe that no substantive Superintendent has ever volunteered for
secondment in that rank. I suggest this speaks eloquently of the perceived lack of
attractiveness of international missions for officers with a proven record of
achievement.”
Kernaghan (2004, Para. 4.2.8)
v. The difficulty in providing senior police officers has been acknowledged to
me by the FCO. This shortage may reflect perceptions that overseas policing is
not ‘career enhancing’, particularly at ACPO(S) rank where local Police
Authorities appoint ACC and above.
vi. At the heart of the UK government’s police reform programme is the
desire to create a more responsive and customer-focussed police service and
that for this to be achieved it is critical there is:
“… the right national infrastructure in place with the appropriate organisation,
resources and policing methods to address national and international threats
more effectively and in a more cohesive way.”
Beating Communities, Beating Crime (2004, p.42)
2
The majority of UK overseas provision is drawn from Constable to Inspecting ranks.

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vii. I had experience in managing overseas deployments but was not fully
sighted on the institutional and structural difficulties, particularly the view from
key stakeholders in addressing any perceived inefficiency; whether the current
infrastructure in place was efficient, if planning capability was falling short,
whether provision of UK police to PSOs was viewed positively and supported
appropriately and whether the system in place to recruit candidates for PSOs
was proving effective. This research focuses on those points to establish if action
needed to be taken institutionally within government and more widely across the
UK police service to enhance the UK’s contribution; in doing so providing a timely
analysis of that contribution so key stakeholders can consider any identified
recommendations.
Approach to the research
viii. Being a reflective practitioner (Schön, 1983) it was felt that an ‘action-
research’ approach (Lewin, 1946) was appropriate for the study. Bell (2006, p.8)
refers to action research as an approach when “specific knowledge is required for a
specific problem in a specific situation, or when a new approach is to be grafted on to an
existing system”. The intention was to identify through participative research
whether the current UK approach was sufficient and to recommend new
approaches, if appropriate, to key stakeholders involved with PSOs, so that they
could consider the findings and establish new ways of doing things if necessary.
The subject matter therefore leant itself to this approach, the model for which is
outlined in brief below.3
3
Action Research Spiral available from http://www.psicopolis.com/Kurt/kltutto.htm

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Figure 1 – Action Research Spiral
Identifying a general or initial idea
ix. The initial idea for this work was:
“To conduct a thematic review in order to establish if International Policing, in the
context of Peace Support Operations, requires a change of approach by the UK
in order to meet its international obligations.”
x. I was aware of the view from police colleagues that the UK could be doing
more. The aim of the research was therefore to establish whether this view was
bounded in fact or is a misrepresentation of the true picture. In order to achieve
the aim, the work focussed on the following objectives:

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 To establish through research the nature of PSOs
 To determine any gaps in UK support institutionally and systemically affecting
the current provision of UK police officers
 To provide recommendations that would enhance the UK contribution to
PSOs
xi. In achieving these objectives the following research questions were
addressed:
 What benefits does contributing to PSOs actually bring?
 What is being done to ensure that people with the right skills and experience
are provided for PSOs?
 What are key stakeholders doing to assist in meeting the UK’s international
obligations?
 What do people see as the main obstacles or challenges to enhancing the UK
contribution to PSOs?
Fact finding
xii. Having identified the original idea, a fact-finding problem-oriented
literature review was undertaken. The literature review was conducted to aid
context and to develop a broad understanding of the subject through describing,
summarising and analysing existing primary work, drawing from multiple
empirical sources. This integrative approach, reviewing results from various
sources to establish common effects (effect size) helped inform conclusions and
drove further research through identifying study characteristics. It was
understood that the conclusions from the literature review could be imprecise

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(specifically because not all research studies are published on the subject).
However, it was felt that findings should provide a higher probability of accuracy
on which to formulate further research questions than simply relying on single
sources for authority.
xiii. There has been some criticism of action research in that there can be a
tendency to slavishly follow the action research spiral, assuming that it is a
research methodology when it is about observation and proposing problems
(Smith, 2007). To counter this, research included collecting data through a mix of
quantitative and qualitative methodological approaches. Quantitative research
focussed on distribution of over 100 questionnaires to police, military and
government staff involved in some way with PSOs. In addition, key stakeholders
and police officers with experience of PSOs were interviewed to establish
qualitative views on the effectiveness of the UK’s contribution.
Taking the first action step
xiv. Recommendations include the development of an international policing
strategy; closer working relationships between the police and military, a
restructuring of governmental support to PSOs; a more robust marketing
strategy, inclusion of core skills for PSOs in the police Integrated Competency
Framework, a review of training and the provision of a dedicated capability.

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CHAPTER 1 - LITERATURE REVIEW
The literature on Peace Support Operations (PSOs) is broad and varied;
encompassing UN and EU approaches, current stabilisation activities, historical
interventions overseas, as well as the work of the Member States involved. To
maintain a sense of focus, this review highlights literature that explains police
involvement in PSOs, although to aid context a general review of literature
relating to more global processes was also undertaken. To help demonstrate the
current UK approach to PSOs, literature on the structure of government
departments was examined. To assess current capability, the UK police service,
as well as UK planning processes, was reviewed by reading local policing plans
and national plans. Finally, previous studies and analyses are highlighted where
they describe the expectation concerning skills and experience, in order to inform
thinking concerning the current UK approach.
1.1. THE IMPACT OF GLOBALIZATION
“Globalization is a process that encompasses the causes, course, and
consequences of transnational and transcultural integration of human and non-
human activities.”
Al-Rodhan & Stoudman (2006, p.2)
In establishing the empirical foundation for this work, it is relevant to first
understand the impact of globalization (sic) on world affairs and how PSOs fit
within that framework. The term ‘globalization’ has multiple interpretations; the
Global Policy Forum website (2008) revealed 23 references alone. Nevertheless,
the above definition provides a relatively accurate starting point. The expansion
of human society and the increasing demand for goods and services creates
natural links between nation states and cultures. This is evident geo-politically
but also physically, with more accessible transport routes, as well as

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technologically through improved communications (Liew, C. 2005). This process
has resulted in increased wealth for nation states and individuals, but conversely
has had negative impacts. As an example, the reduction in EU border controls
post-Schengen4
is on the one hand a positive and natural component of the
globalisation process but conversely has led to increases in the illegal movement
of people and goods, with an associated rise in transnational crime (Cabinet
Office, 2008). This has been referred to as the ‘dark side’ of globalisation, where
traffickers exploit regional conflicts such as in the Balkans to ply their trade
across borders, capitalising on improved transportation structures and
technology (O’Neill, 2002).
There has been significant work within Europe to harmonise Member State
approaches to accurately assessing levels of organised crime (Transcrime,
2005). The UK’s own Threat Assessment points towards organised gangs from
overseas capitalising on opportunities to target the UK (UKTA, 2008), which is
seen as lucrative, particularly in relation to drugs trafficking and prostitution (Ibid.
2008). However, an intensive literature search failed to reveal any statistical data
on the volume of crime affecting the UK from post conflict environments. This
immediately demonstrates one of the difficulties in establishing the benefits of
PSOs. But with criminal activity being seen as increasingly transnational, the
correlation with conflict in other countries is certainly hard to ignore. Supporting
this, Caparini and Marenin (2004, p.325), in discussing the Western Balkans
group of states, propose that they are a prime example where:
“… criminal networks that have emerged from the wars now use the states as
transit corridors for the trafficking of humans, and smuggling of drugs, arms and
other contraband.”
4 The movement of people from one country to another is not in itself an offence and in fact freedom of
movement has been legitimised since 1985 through the implementation of the Schengen Agreement
(Schengen Convention). Europa [online] (2008)

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Organised criminal groups are also becoming a greater threat to peace and
stability, helping to fuel conflicts in the Balkans and Africa (Soderholm 2002).
Crisis situations inevitably lead to a lack of public order, and one of the main
problems is the first signs of transnational organised crime, with local criminal
elements taking advantage of easily corruptible officials and the lack of control at
borders (Timmermans, 2002).
1.1.1. International Standards
Many policing models and concepts of what ‘policing’ is exist, and will reflect the
nature of the community from which a particular police officer is drawn (SQA,
2008). There is no consensus on a policing model that translates across different
and diverse societies and provides a one-stop shop of policing ideals that will be
palatable to all cultures (Davis et al. 2003). It is also important to recognise that
the imposition of a particular policing model on to a post-conflict society may be
counter-productive. Rather the objective should always be, in acknowledging that
policing is in part a function of the state, to work collaboratively with that society
to develop policing standards commensurate with the local culture and customs
and that respect human rights and the Rule of Law (UNDP, 2008). It follows that
a Westernised community-policing model may not always be appropriate, but
there will be certain policing principles that will run through any democratically
policed country and these are enshrined in key literature such as the OSCE
Guidebook on Democratic Policing (OSCE, 2008), reflecting internationally
adopted standards. In establishing this central tenet, this paper will not dwell on
it. It is acknowledged that UK police officers continue to be highly regarded for
what they can bring to post-conflict environments in terms of a democratic
policing model.
1.1.2. The Benefits of International Contribution
Although the UK may have a moral and humanitarian responsibility to address
the problems emanating from other areas of the world, it also has an economic
interest. The UK has historical relationships with other countries that precede

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colonial times. As a country the UK can directly influence how other countries are
developed, which can have positive benefits in terms of domestic protection (e.g.
trade/tackling crime). Caparini and Marenin (2004, p.337) make the point when
referring to security sector reform and foreign investment that:
“Establishing a secure environment, including the rule of law, helps build
business confidence and ultimately promotes economic development.”
The contribution of police officers overseas can therefore present a range of
potential benefits in terms of the impact officers have in those environments. Also
there is potential increase in support from the public for initiatives that result in
economic development or a reduction in transnational crime that impacts on local
communities. Walker (1996, p.276), states that:
“Reference to the international agenda could enhance the public’s acceptability
of domestic proposals where those proposals address matters that have an
impact on the public.”
1.1.3. The Rise of Peace Support Operations
There is a distinction between Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding, although there
can be a tendency to use them in the same context (Snow, 2003). Peacekeeping
is predominantly military in its approach, using troops as observers or to uphold a
cease-fire, or to ensure the safe delivery of humanitarian relief, normally with the
consent of the conflicting parties (UN [Online] 2008). Peacebuilding relates to:
“… action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and
solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.”
Botes, J. (2003, p.278)
The term Peace Support Operation is arguably a more flexible generic term that
covers all these aspects when referring to an organised intervention into a
country affected by conflict. The Charter of the UN (the treaty and legal authority

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from the UN Security Council) provides some clarity, mandating intervention
under Chapter VI (peaceful settlement of disputes) or Chapter VII (peace
enforcement, including economic sanctions), using a variety of resources to carry
out a range of Peacebuilding tasks (UN, 1945). This can be a mix of political,
military, humanitarian and mission support activities designed to assist creating a
stable environment. The police component would be just one aspect of the whole
operation.
International civilian police officers (CIVPOL) from around the world have been
contributing to UN assistance programmes since 1964, when officers provided
non-combatant support to military monitoring in the Congo. Historically this was
to assist in propping up unstable regimes or strengthening insurgency groups.
However, police support was progressively tempered by contributing
governments as links to Human Rights abuses by such regimes and groups
became evident (Hansen 2002).
The PSOs of today are focussed on more intrusive intervention as it is
increasingly perceived that reform of internal security structures provides the
safeguard against the threat of continued instability, refugee flows and organised
crime that emanates from conflict areas (Hansen 2002). Police officers have
specifically been part of PSOs since March 1997, when the first contingent of
thirty civilian police officers (CIVPOL) was deployed under the command of the
United Nations in Bosnia (Ellis, 2004). Hartz (2000) describes the SMART
concept, providing a simple acronym which explains the core tasks that a
CIVPOL performed in such environments, introduced by the Department of
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in 1995:
 Supporting human rights and humanitarian assistance
 Monitoring the performance of law enforcement agencies, prisons, courts and
implementing agreements

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 Advising the local police on humane effective law enforcement, according to
international standards, laid down in the instruments (conventions, covenants
and treaties on human rights)
 Reporting on situations and incidents
 Training the local law enforcement in the best practice for policing and human
rights
The role in international policing has expanded rapidly as the initial UN
Peacekeeping missions such as Cyprus (UNFICYP) have expanded into different
mandates, specifically in response to the post-Westphalian shift away from
cross-border (inter-state) conflict to internal (intrastate) conflict (Call and Barnett,
2000). Since the 1990s PSOs have included UN missions in Namibia (UNTAG),
Cambodia (UNTAC), Rwanda (UNAMIR), East Timor (UNAMET), Sudan
(UNMIS), Bosnia Herzegovina (UNMIBH) and Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). These
missions have developed from a predominantly non-executive observing and
reporting (monitoring) role in accord with the DPKO SMART concept into both
non-executive and executive policing roles i.e. carrying out full policing functions,
sometimes in an armed capacity.
“While military force continues to be a formidable presence in the current
international security environment…the relative decline in inter-state warfare and
the rise of…internal conflict has brought International Relations ‘realists’ to
emphasise the crucial importance of the ability to project police, rather than
military, force.”
Goldsmith & Sheptycki (2007, p.9)
One of the most significant UK commitments to a PSO was the United Nations
Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). Since the Serbian invasion of
1999, which resulted in a 78-day NATO campaign, police have assisted in post-
conflict reconstruction activity. UK police officers have acted in both a mentoring
and executive capacity throughout the life of UNMIK. This has included

26. 26
supplementing the policing function during the development of the Kosovo Police
Service, with the UK contributing approximately 70 police officers at any one time
in support of a total UN police officer number in Kosovo of 1499 police officers
from 31 countries (in addition to a further 462 International UN staff, 1892
National UN staff and 999 OSCE staff). With a combined budget for 2007/8 that
was US$210,676,800.00, this made UNMIK one of the biggest missions of its
kind (UNMIK fact sheet, 2008). Of note is that the most senior positions were
consistently occupied by UK personnel. For instance the Police Commissioner
for Kosovo from 2007 to 2008 was Richard Monk, UK national and co-author of
the UN Report on Peacekeeping Reform (2000), commonly referred to as the
Brahimi Report.
UNMIK completed in 2008, with the EU actively engaging and supporting Kosovo
through its replacement EULEX mission, providing the oversight activity
necessary to help maintain stability.
1.2. UK INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
1.2.1. UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO)
The FCO is the lead government department responsible for implementing UK
global foreign policy goals (FCO [Online] 2008). The FCO’s Departmental Report
(FCO, 2008) outlines its Strategic Objectives until 2011, which include the
following policy goals:
1. countering terrorism and weapons proliferation, and their causes
2. preventing and resolve conflict
3. developing effective international institutions, in particular the UN and EU
These priorities extend to support in post-conflict environments to assist with
rebuilding and stabilisation programmes, normally led by the UN or the EU, in

27. 27
conjunction with other key stakeholders such as the African Union and the Office
for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). UK funding is drawn from the
annual Peacekeeping Budget, held by the FCO on behalf of the FCO,
Department for International Development (DFID) and Ministry of Defence (MOD)
(FCO [Online], 2009). Additional funding comes from the ‘Conflict Prevention
Pool’ (£112 million for 2008/9), set up in April 2008 to replace the ‘Global’ and
‘Africa’ Conflict Prevention Pools, established in 2001 to draw together the
interests, resources, and expertise of the FCO, DFID and MOD (Bell, 2003).
UK PSO contributions are overseen within the FCO by the Conflict Issues Group
(CIG). Within the CIG are the Peacebuilding & Rule of Law Team (PRLT) and the
International Secondments Team (IST). The PRLT works alongside the IST and
contributes to policy on international civilian missions, ensuring that policing and
justice issues are fully taken into account.
The IST deploys police and civilian specialists in support of PSOs. This includes
areas such as training, contract management, debriefing and duty of care.
Candidates for PSOs (both serving and retired police officers) are recruited
through an annual campaign, which includes liaison with key partners e.g. Home
Office, UK Chief Officers and the MOD. It also recruits throughout the year on a
case by case basis for specific identified senior roles abroad.
The IST has gone through a number of transformations. In 2004 it was
recognised that, as the International Policing Unit (IPU), it was suffering from
significant under-resourcing. Stephen Chambers, currently Head of International
Policing Policy in the FCO, worked with the IPU at that time. He confirmed that
the IPU had just two people managing PSOs in 2004. Certainly resourcing was
considered a problem in 2005, when it was explicitly identified by the Strategic
Task Force (STF) on International Policing (Curtis, 2005)5
. An injection of
5
The STF was set up to review the UK approach to PSOs

28. 28
personnel and a name change to the ‘International Policing & Civilian
Placements Team’ (IPCPT) saw a change of focus, combining the policy and
operational aspects of international policing. Chambers acknowledged that
“…putting policy & operations together provided a lot of advantages but also
disadvantage in that you were trying to do policy but kept being sucked into the
operational work.” So a year later the IST was formed to look after operational
aspects, working alongside a ‘Policing and Justice’ team which looked after the
policy aspects. The final transformation was when the Police & Justice team
became the Peacebuilding & Rule of Law Team, which has less focus on policing
and an even wider focus on peacebuilding and Rule of Law issues. Throughout
this time there has been a noticeable increase in police staff within the IST.
Civilians continue to assist, but the majority rotate in and out of the department
regularly, approximately every two years, with arguably the loss of corporate
knowledge and inevitable gaps in continuity.
A recommendation of the STF was the formation of the Assessment Planning
Group (APG). The APG mandate is to investigate, assess, comment and make
recommendations concerning future UK civilian police contributions to
international peacekeeping missions on behalf of the FCO, the Home Office and
ACPO(S). However, the APG has had limited opportunity since its inception in
2006 to undertake assessment activity due to a lack of resources, therefore
arguably having little impact on the overall global planning process. Examples of
existing missions that have not involved the APG include Kosovo (EULEX) and
Afghanistan.
1.2.2. Other Whitehall Departments
A brief synopsis of other departments involved with PSOs must extend to the
Home Office, which leads on policing matters but cannot speak authoritatively on
behalf of the FCO or the MOD. The Home Office is necessarily internal affairs
focussed and consequently does not directly extend support to PSOs, although it
actively participates in cross-Whitehall discussions on the subject. Also DFID,

29. 29
which leads the UK government’s fight against world poverty, working to achieve
the UN’s eight ‘millennium development goals’ including building global
development partnerships; the MOD, which assists in the cross-Whitehall
process through membership on various groups and finally the Stabilisation Unit
(formerly the Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit), located at DFID, set up in 2005
upon recommendation of the STF. The Stabilisation Unit is a tripartite
organisation combining FCO, MOD and DFID representatives, the role of which
is to support countries emerging from violent conflict. It assists with assessment
and planning, rapid deployment of civilian experts, captures lessons learned and
helps manage the MOD’s Stabilisation Aid Fund (£269 million), announced by
UK government to support stabilisation activities (Stabilisation Unit [Online]
2009).
The SU has developed a ‘Stabilisation Tasks Matrix’ which suggests the tasks
required to achieve stabilisation, lead departments for those tasks i.e. civilians,
police or military, and the skills required to complete the tasks specified. This
matrix is not policy, but it does provide clear guidance to assist with PSO
planning activity (Stabilisation Unit [Online] 2008).
The SU is increasing in capacity and capability at a time of economic downturn
(Times [Online] 2009). It maintains a list of 400 civilian experts who can deploy
overseas, including a policing capability, although it does not conduct ‘policing
missions’. There is however no reason why such missions could not be included
provided the appropriate support was in place.
1.2.3. The Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA)
SOCA was focussed on to establish how it might provide support to PSOs.
SOCA is an Executive Non-Departmental Public Body of 4000 officers with law
enforcement powers, set up by the Labour Government in 2006 to counter
damage caused to people, communities, society and the UK as a whole by UK
and international serious organised crime. A combination of four previous bodies:

30. 30
the National Crime Squad, the National Criminal Intelligence Service, and the
investigative sections of the Immigration Service and HM Revenue and Customs,
its functions are set out in Chapter 15 of the Serious Organised Crime and Police
Act 2005. Its focus is targeted interventions against key criminal figures rather
than providing resources for PSOs.
The SOCA Annual Plan (2008, p.7) states that SOCA has an international arm,
operating in forty sites overseas, which is considered:
“… a particularly important element of the business because most of the
organised crime threats affecting the UK involve activity in other jurisdictions.”
But the SOCA Chair, Sir Stephen Lander, and the Director General of SOCA,
William Hughes, recognise that SOCA lacks the critical mass to make a lasting
impact without collaborating with UK and overseas partners (Ibid. 2008).
The SOCA UK Control Strategy for Organised Crime (2008) demonstrates that
there needs to be a cohesive approach. It follows that SOCA alone, although
likely to create significant impact and having a broad remit that includes fraud
and human and drugs trafficking, is not likely to be the sole answer to UK
problems surfacing from post-conflict environments.
1.3. THE UK POLICE SERVICE
1.3.1. Home Office/Scottish Office forces
The UK has had a police service with a localised structure for approximately 200
years. The architects of the first modern British police force were Home
Secretary Sir Robert Peel, Colonel Charles Rowan and Sir Richard Mayne QC
(Sheptycki 2007). The Metropolitan Police was founded in 1829 in accordance
with the Metropolitan Police Act. Promoting the preventative role of ‘police’ as a
deterrent to urban crime and disorder, officers were unarmed and equipped with

31. 31
a modicum of other defensive measures. Built on a consensual policing model
developed as a consequence of public opposition to the institution of police
(Sheptycki, 2007), this served to reflect the notion that police officers were “mere
citizens in uniform” (Long & Cullen, 2008).
With the relative success of the Metropolitan Police consensual policing model,
attempts were made to encourage counties to establish their own police forces,
but this met with limited success. In order to address this, police forces were
made compulsory nationally through the introduction of the County and Borough
Police Act 1856. In 1964 the Police Act was introduced, which saw the then 122
police forces reduced to 43 Home Office forces. At the same time a tripartite
power-sharing arrangement was introduced between central government (via the
Home Secretary), Police Authorities (responsible for securing an adequate and
efficient police force for its local area) and Chief Constables of each force (Long
& Cullen, 2008). At a local level, a Chief Constable controls each force. At a
national level, each Chief Constable represents their force on various ACPO(S)
committees.
A consequence of the existing structure is that the management of policing is
relatively localised. Chief Officers, in consultation with their appropriate Police
Authority, have autonomy to set the local policing agenda provided it accords
with governmental objectives. Each Force can therefore assess and implement
its own policing priorities.
“Key stakeholders agree that there is a problem over the ad-hoc way in which the
majority of international policing assistance is currently arranged which is in part
a consequence of the police service consisting of individual forces.”
(Meaklim, 2008, p.7)
This current format has remained relatively unchanged, although the
Government did consider the prospect of further amalgamation as a result of Her

32. 32
Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary Thematic Report ‘Closing the Gap’ (O’
Connor, 2005). This report concluded that the current 30-year-old, 43-force
structure [of the Home Office forces] of “widely differing capabilities” does not have
the capability or capacity to deliver the required Protective Services6
.
In addition to the Home Office forces, there are 8 Scottish forces, the Police
Service for Northern Ireland, as well as a number of non-Home Office forces,
such as the British Transport Police, the Civil Nuclear Constabulary and the
Ministry of Defence Police (MDP).
1.3.2. The Ministry of Defence Police
The MDP is a national civilian police organisation funded by the MOD. The
MDP’s principal function is to combat crime and disorder faced by the MOD. It
has approximately 3500 officers with full constabulary powers deployed at
around 120 MOD sites across the UK. At any one time 70% of its officers are
armed; this capability has led to MDP performing policing duties in PSOs,
predominantly in an executive armed capacity. MDP works in partnership with
the FCO via the MDP’s International Policing and Secondments Office (IPSO)
and is the only police force in the UK to have international policing as a key
target (MDPGA Corporate Strategy towards 2010 (2007)).
The demand for expert policing support from the UK is growing against the
backdrop of a rising number of peacekeeping and policing missions. As a
consequence, opportunities for MDP officers to carry out more specialist roles
has increased, particularly as international policing missions have progressively
been seen to be in the UK Defence interest. MDP deployments have included
Iraq, a joint FCO/DFID-sponsored mission to Sierra Leone (election monitoring),
a joint FCO/MOD-sponsored mission to Afghanistan (Afghan National Police
mentoring), and providing the majority of UK police officers for Kosovo. The
6
Protective Services includes counter-terrorism and extremism and serious organised and cross-border
crime. Home Office [Online]. (2008)

33. 33
MDP’s work overseas reflects the MOD’s Public Service Agreement (PSA)
targets for 2005 – 2008, which are the primary activities required of the MOD by
the centre of Government.
“By 2008, deliver improved effectiveness of UK and international support for
conflict prevention by addressing long-term structural causes of conflict,
managing regional and national tension and violence, and supporting post-
conflict reconstruction, where the UK can make a significant contribution, in
particular Africa, Asia, Balkans and the Middle East.”
MOD PSA (2007)
Consequently, in addition to acting as the training and logistics department of the
FCO, the MDP has consistently provided the lion’s share of the overall UK
policing contribution to PSOs for a number of years (Hicks, 2008).
1.4. STRATEGIC PLANNING FOR PSOs
The UK is not the lead on PSOs. In fact international organisations such as the
UN and EU, with their own policies, have driven the deployment of police through
pressure to commit to stabilisation initiatives and priorities.
The UK, having provided policing assistance overseas for many years, has
consequently been subject to a number of studies, reports and conferences that
served to highlight strengths and weaknesses in the UK response to PSOs,
particularly how planning is addressed in terms of the timing of intervention in its
broadest sense, both militarily and from a criminal justice perspective.
The FCO handbook on PSOs (2007, p.14) suggests that:
“… if the UK intends to make a substantial contribution to a PSO…planning takes
place across relevant Governmental departments.”

34. 34
Joint planning may be the aspiration, but the number of government departments
involved suggests that PSOs have been approached in a less than cohesive
manner. The dangers of not linking academia, policy, activists, and NGOs
together are reinforced by Pino and Wiatrowski (2006, p.6) when, in order to
promote democratic policing around the world, they suggest the need for a more
expansive approach through the development of a:
“… comprehensive model that links different forms of analysis and the factors
associated with crime, policing, human, social and economic development, and
democratisation, in order to promote the development of social justice and
human rights.”
1.4.1. A Comprehensive Approach
Chief Constable Paul Kernaghan, the UK’s ACPO(S) lead on international
policing until his retirement in 2008, identified weaknesses in the provision of UK
police personnel in his ‘Blueprint Paper’. This was a response to the Home
Secretary’s invitation for suggestions for inclusion in a new Police Bill. The paper
was a strong call for a fundamental shift of policy to a more cohesive domestic
and international strategic effort, with clear preparation and planning, and the
provision of officers recognised as career enhancing. Kernaghan asserted that
the UK’s contribution to international policing was:
“…not consistent with our economic strength, or in line with the proportion of
national police strength contributed to international missions by other countries,
such as Australia or Canada.”
Kernaghan (2004, p.2)
Kernaghan (Ibid.) argued that other countries such as Australia and Canada see
international policing as an integral component of their domestic policing strategy
and that the key area of international police work requiring the most urgent
attention by the UK is PSOs. He also stressed that various UK initiatives were ‘ad

35. 35
hoc’ in nature and that there was no overall joined up FCO/DFID/Home Office
strategy.
Bailes (2004, p.8) supported this view, contending that, in terms of strategic
planning and preparation for PSOs, there was an urgent need to review existing
arrangements for international intervention, arrangements that were ‘almost
exclusively focused on military forces’.
A police component undoubtedly contributes to Security Sector Reform and,
although only one aspect, is nevertheless fundamental to the law and order triad
i.e. police officers serving the public, with independent judiciaries and penal
systems (Hoblin, 2005). The importance of a police component is reinforced by
Goldsmith and Sheptycki (2007), who emphasise that the military, by its very
nature, does not conduct activities with the understanding and endorsement of
the population whose territory it occupies, if it did so it would be a police force.
Certainly evidence suggests there would have been more immediate benefit after
the conflict phase of the 2003 Iraq War (the second Gulf War) if there had been
more active application of the Comprehensive Approach7
to pre-intervention
planning across Whitehall that included the police as well as military
components.
Kernaghan (2005), whilst giving evidence to the Commons Defence Select
Committee, criticised the lack of cohesive UK planning for a post-war Iraq. He
said the UK's police was not consulted about the role they could play in
rebuilding the war torn country. No one in Whitehall had addressed the
importance of policing as part of the post-conflict stage and how it could assist in
the stabilisation process. Mullick & Nusrat (2007) are similarly vocal with
7
The Comprehensive Approach refers to harmonisation and coordination of cross-governmental
processes and is a natural extension of the UK Military Effects-Based Approach (EBA); Joint
Concepts & Doctrine Centre (2006).

36. 36
reference to Iraq. They highlight that the precedent for post-conflict
reconstruction in the context of policing and institution building was set after
World War II, therefore “the failure [of the US and its allies] to plan for a similar
responsibility in Iraq is inexcusable”. Hence, international military forces continue
many years after intervention to try and maintain an unsteady peace at a time
when the Iraqi Police is just starting to function properly (thus legitimately) and
trying to deal with the problem caused by insurgents who filled the security
vacuum that was created immediately after the conflict.
This state of affairs is not just limited to the UK. Hansen (2002, p.44) argues that
all international civilian police deployments to PSOs are insufficient.
“There is a lack of common understanding between the police and the military
with regard to doctrine, international police operations are accompanied by
confusion and exaggerated expectations among contributing governments, the
deployed police staff, the media and the population in war-torn societies. Political
decision-makers often do not provide an over-arching strategy, preferring instead
to micro-manage.”
Bronson (2002) focused on this weakness when discussing the conflicts in
Bosnia and Kosovo in her article ‘When Soldiers Become Cops’. She argued
from the perspective that there was a need for a post-conflict exit strategy
coming out of Washington that included civilian security elements, particularly
policing. Further, that with no single department with a coherent view responsible
for stabilisation and reconstruction it remained unclear who was in charge.
Bronson stressed that the inability to pass responsibility from U.S. combat forces
to constabulary units (and ultimately to indigenous police forces), in a timely and
well-planned manner, resulted in an over-commitment of U.S. military on low-
level security tasks they were ill-suited to or trained for.
The UN has responded by implementing UN Resolutions 60/180 and 1645
(2005), creating the UN Peacebuilding Commission, the role of which is:

37. 37
“…(1) bringing together all of the relevant actors, including international donors,
the international financial institutions, national governments, troop contributing
countries; (2) marshalling resources and (3) advising on and proposing
integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery and where
appropriate, highlighting any gaps that threaten to undermine peace.”
UN [Online] 2008
The FCO has since instigated a cross-Whitehall Working Group for
representatives from DFID, the Stabilisation Unit, MOD, Home Office and the
FCO to come together and adopt a more Comprehensive Approach (JCDC,
2006). The Stabilisation Unit has also implemented its own Stabilisation Course,
led by experienced officials from relevant Departments, in order to address how
those Departments currently plan for stabilisation, cross-Whitehall decision-
making processes and the challenges involved, lessons learned from
stabilisation efforts as well as recommended planning methods (DFID, 2009).
However, there was no documentary evidence of a cohesive international
policing ‘doctrine’, i.e. an overarching framework upon which all these meetings,
courses, plans and policies can be built into a cohesive whole.
The foregoing suggests that UK planning for PSOs still needs more work if it is to
embrace a more Comprehensive Approach. But there is a note of caution. In
implementing a more Comprehensive Approach, planners will need to guard
against an over-emphasis on joint civilian police/military operations. Supporting
this, Eide and Holm (eds.) (2000) argue that the distinction between the military
component as a coercive external apparatus and the civilian police component,
which is a coercive internal apparatus providing law and order, should remain
explicit. This argument is reinforced by Barakat (2006), when giving evidence
before the Commons Select Committee on International Development, where
she urged against too close a relationship between civilians and the military.
“I am aware that the PCRU [Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit] plans to develop
the civilian capacity to engage in reconstruction in locations where British forces

38. 38
are engaged. While this approach has gained popularity in recent years, overt
co-operation between the military and civilians engaged in reconstruction poses
severe security risks. British … personnel … will be viewed as collaborators and,
hence, subject to attack... Their security and overall programmatic effectiveness
will be drastically limited as a result when frightened communities refuse to co-
operate with reconstruction and peace building initiatives… all efforts must be
made to differentiate between the military presence and reconstruction efforts.”
1.4.2. Resourcing a dedicated capability
Hansen (2002) highlighted that lack of sufficient policing skills, joint planning
arrangements and guidelines by all the key actors is often crippling to a mission.
But arguably worse is the lack of political will amongst contributing governments
at the international level, with a reluctance to engage in planning and
implementation of police missions and to provide the necessary resources for the
job.
The Brahimi Report (UN, 2000) reflects the need for a dedicated pool,
recommending that the UN Standby Arrangements System (UNSAS) be
enhanced through the provision of on-call lists of pre-trained specialists in
sufficient numbers to facilitate the strengthening of rule of law institutions. It
would be fair to say however that UNSAS has had only limited success. Member
States are required to commit to UNSAS through a Memorandum of
Understanding; the UK was a signatory up until 2005, but there was no evidence
that the UK had committed to the concept since then (UN DPKO [Online] 2005).
Even if the UK has agreed to the obligation to provide specialists (which includes
police) the ability of the UK to respond as required is questionable. The FCO
continues to rely on volunteers rather than a dedicated UK ‘pool’, undermining
the whole approach recommended by the Brahimi Report. Ellis (2004, p.88)
supports this when he identifies that the FCO has little influence over Chief
Officer decisions as to whether officers from particular forces would or would not
be released for PSOs, concluding that:

39. 39
“Supply from one force to another for mission personnel can be intermittent at
best, and at worst, non-existent.”
Bailes (2004) argues for the creation of a co-ordinated approach that in part
addresses this; incorporating a UK-wide police resource capacity and deployable
capability for future international operations. He postulates that a rapid
deployment capability, coupled with the appropriate database of skill sets, would
provide a more adequate response in support of UK international Peacekeeping
efforts. Further, that the formation of a dedicated central planning and crisis
management section could manage staff (whether in the public or private sector)
who:
“… will require to be appropriately identified, vetted, recruited, trained, equipped
and co-ordinated into a flexible state of readiness, as well as managed in
different ways through the period prior to deployment, during engagement and
upon return – prior to further deployment.”
Kernaghan (2004, p.11) echoes Bailes’ call for a dedicated body outside of
existing police structures to oversee the provision of policing expertise overseas,
also recommending the provision of national inspection standards, stating that
“HMIC would police the commitment of local forces as part of their general inspection
remit.”
The Brahimi approach has met with success in Australia, where the creation of
an ‘International Deployment Group’ in 2004 now provides a reserve of some 350
officers within the Australian Federal Police capable of deploying overseas to a
multitude of environments, including international peacekeeping missions
(McLeod & Dinnen, 2007). Others argue however that a ‘dedicated body’ within
the UN could provide for a more consistent and coherent international response.
Call & Barnett (2000) suggest that a dedicated body would provide a timely
response and use of CIVPOL that would contribute to long-term mission success.
They argue that such personnel would be able to achieve this because they

40. 40
would be knowledgeable and quickly adaptable, comprising a mix of highly
skilled, quality individuals from various cultures with collective mission
experience. Such a body would not replace military capability, but would be able
to relieve the pressure on stretched military resources that carry out civilian
policing tasks they are not wholly trained for. Certainly it is contended that the
additional benefit of adopting a dedicated approach is the collective institutional
memory this generates. This would overcome the current arrangement whereby
individual officers rotate in and out of different mission areas before they have
had the opportunity to develop their corpus of knowledge sufficiently to make a
significant difference.
“The gaping hole in the supply of civpol staff is exacerbated by frequent rotations
that keep demand at a continuously high level.”
Hansen (2002, p.49)
Hoblin (2005, p.106) focussed on how the provision of UK police officers
overseas might accelerate the process of post-conflict reconstruction. He
specifically looked at the recruiting process, training provision, career
development opportunities, the recognition of individual skills, and reintegration
of staff. Hoblin suggests, citing the FCO’s own strategy document, that there is:
“… a new impetus within Her Majesty’s government to provide a UK executive
policing capability which will meet the demands of the FCO.”
Hoblin also noted that the FCO’s 2005 strategy included radical proposals for the
generation of police personnel to fulfil the international task. He provides a
suggestion that reflects Kernaghan and Bailes’ proposals i.e. a dedicated policing
capability separate from the current police service structure, naming it the UK
International Policing Agency (UKIPA), an organisation that would be staffed by
600 seconded police officers, approximately 0.12% of the police service at the
time. However, it is contended that the main practical and political difficulties in

41. 41
establishing such an organisation will at least include clarity of ‘ownership’ and
funding streams and that this presents such difficulties, from a governance
perspective, that little progress has been made to implement such a capability.
As examples, the MOD has responsibility for overseas military operations, the
Home Office has ‘ownership’ of Home Office police resources in England and
Wales and the FCO has the lead on foreign policy. The ‘customer’ however is
generally the EU or the UN. It follows that ownership of such an organisation
would need to be clearly established at ministerial and no doubt cross-
governmental level and the long-term funding streams would also need to be
agreed.
Sir Ronnie Flanagan, Her Majesty’s Inspector of Constabulary, submitted a
proposal to the Home Office in July 2007 assessing the UK contribution to
international policing, which in itself demonstrates high-level recognition that
there is a systemic problem in terms of how the UK contributes. Two principal
recommendations were identified:
i. To set up an International Police Assistance Board (IPAB) to provide an
overarching mechanism to consider all requests for non-investigative
assistance
ii. Creation of an International Police Assistance Group (IPAG) which will
provide logistical support to the IPAB and act as a central recruitment
agency
As a consequence the National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA) was tasked
with evaluating the viability of these recommendations. This evaluation
concluded that the IPAB should be formed to consider, among other aspects,
police deployments to PSOs, with the IPAG providing the link between
demanders and stakeholders for operational deployments overseas. These
conclusions were summarised in a concept paper submitted to the Home
Secretary in August 2008. At time of writing, the IPAB has been formed with

42. 42
ministerial approval; however decisions on an IPAG and how that might be
managed and resourced have yet to be taken.
1.5. LOCAL POLICE PLANNING FOR PSOs
The foregoing strongly suggests that UK police involvement in PSOs is
hampered by a lack of cohesive strategic planning (Curtis, 2005). But what
remained unclear was how this was impacting at a more local level. This next
section addresses that by reviewing policing plans to see how they fit with the
FCO’s strategic priorities.
The Police Reform Act (2002) requires all Police Authorities and Home Office
Forces to produce a three-year Strategic Policing Plan and an annual Local
Policing Plan that compliments the three-year Strategic Plan. This ensures that
plans and priorities tie in with the round of funding settlements agreed at
governmental level.
The Home Secretary has key strategic priorities for the police service for
2008/09. These include reducing crime and working jointly with, for example,
other Police Authorities and non-governmental organisations, to ensure that
adequate capability and capacity exists across England and Wales to deliver
effective policing to tackle serious and organised crime and to deter extremism.
The National Policing Plan for 2005 to 2008 (2005, p.1) provides direction on the
five national policing priorities, and in particular identifies that forces are to focus
on the reduction of crime and the provision of a citizen-focussed police service.
These priorities broadly reflect the Home Secretary’s Strategic Priorities but
introduce another dimension, that of “combat[ing] serious and organised crime within
and across force boundaries.”

43. 43
However the plan also states that:
“… it is for individual forces and authorities to determine the weight to be given to
the other priorities in their area on the basis of local needs”.
To demonstrate any contrast with UK international priorities, the Strategic/Local
Policing Plans of a number of the police forces of England and Wales were
reviewed. The key point in analysing these plans was to determine if they
provided support to PSOs in some form. A selection reflecting the overall trend is
outlined at Appendix B.
In reviewing Force strategies and plans a number of common themes emerged:
 Clear reference to Home Office national plans
 Reducing local crime and disorder through achieving national targets
 Local community focussed – improving trust and confidence in the police
 Improving organisational capability re risk to local communities and
individuals
 Collaboration on tackling serious and organised crime at local and regional
levels when there are clear operational and service benefits to the Force
concerned and to their local communities
 No reference to FCO objectives or international policing and its links to local
policing
What was evident was that local plans and strategies were focussed on
responses that dealt with local crime but did not specifically address the
objectives outlined by the FCO. This is not to suggest that local plans are
deficient in their approaches, nor indeed that they do not reflect the National
Policing Plan. Rather that the links between international priorities, national
priorities and local priorities are not readily apparent.

44. 44
“There often appears to be insufficient thought given to the linkage between local
or national policing objectives and the activities of police officers overseas. There
is a need for the [UK] police service to be clear on the professional benefit of
international assistance.”
(Meaklim, 2008, p.7)
Coupled with this is how resources are then subsequently secured for PSOs in
the face of priorities that are focussed on the deployment of policing resources
locally. The potential benefit a police force and its community might gain through
the reduction in specific types of crime through overseas policing work, for
example drugs trafficking, is neither readily apparent nor deemed to be a priority
within the plans that were reviewed.
The foregoing suggests that police forces and Police Authorities are working
together when assessing local priorities, but government and police forces are
not when assessing international priorities, and as a consequence international
policing is not a key target for police forces, notwithstanding MDP’s involvement.
With police resources being prioritised locally, this suggests an inevitable
outcome, the shortage of appropriately skilled and supported police officers for
PSOs. This may go some way to reinforcing the assertion that the UK is under
performing in terms of its contribution. One can naturally conclude from this that
leaving the determination of ‘other priorities’ to local agreement, when
international policing has not in itself been made a specific priority as part of
national planning, undermines a cohesive approach to PSOs. In addition, there is
potential to lose the initiative when dealing with internationally-based crime
passing through post-conflict environments, specifically in terms of its impact on
local UK communities.

45. 45
1.6. SKILLS AND ABILITIES FOR PSOs
To fully assess the UK contribution to PSOs it was felt relevant to compare the
UK’s approach to PSO training with that provided elsewhere. The following draws
together these points for the final aspect of the literature review.
1.6.1. Preparation
Generally, there have been poor briefings on cultural and sociological distinctions
and a lack of clarity on roles to be performed in mission (Hartz, 2000). In
addition, lack of preparation through inappropriately focussed training
interventions and a general deficit of credibility, not least because of a lack of
basic skills such as driving (Call and Barnett, 2000) or more advanced skills such
as police trainer (Holm, 2000). Evidence to support this extends as far back as
the mission in Cambodia. Allen (1999), citing McAuley (1993) explains that the
civilian police element in UNTAC was unclear on what they should do. Although
they were briefed on their role they were not given specific targets, and the task
of supervising the local police was open to any number of interpretations. Even
worse has been the impact on the legitimacy of an operation when the local
police appear more qualified than their mentors (Linden et al, 2007).
1.6.2. Pre-deployment training
The UN does not provide pre-deployment training for police; contributing
countries therefore provide their own. Ellis (2004) conducted an examination of
UN peace-building missions involving multinational police forces and how UK
police officers integrate culturally and professionally, as well as welfare
orientation. He highlights the consequence of the UN approach, arguing that the
training for UN civilian police officers prior to deployment is uncoordinated, which
leads to different standards and expectations of international police officers when
they arrive in mission. This can be particularly critical for executive missions such
as Kosovo, where the pre-deployment training should be of a standard that

46. 46
reflects the additional tasks required in a mission over and above mentoring,
such as report writing, investigation and use of legitimate force.
Notwithstanding Ellis’ view, there have been success stories. The Australian
Federal Police (AFP) provides significant input as part of a standard training
curriculum for PSOs. The AFP International Deployment Pre-Deployment
Training (IDPT) programme is a highly-regarded 35-day scenario-based course
which, in addition to instilling an understanding of PSOs, provides participants
with the skills to live and work in a foreign environment. Elements include
remote-area living, driving, navigation, and a series of physical and team building
exercises (McLeod & Dinnen, 2007).
Stepping outside pre-deployment training, Atraghji (2006) identified in his
comparative study of the UK, Austria and Norway that both the Austrian and
Norwegian police take international policing very seriously in their training
programmes. As an example it is mandatory for Norwegian police probationers to
be trained on that country’s contribution to PSOs during their initial training.
1.6.3. UK approach
An intensive literature search revealed only a limited amount of research
undertaken to address specific skills and abilities required by UK police officers
undertaking PSOs. Ellis’ (Ibid.) study is notable in that he addressed whether UK
police officers are appropriate and fit for purpose in areas of recent armed
conflict. Ellis recognised disparities in UK training and preparation for overseas
deployment pre and post mission as well as a lack of capitalising on the skills
and experience gained whilst overseas. The study was limited in scope
concerning what training is required, but Ellis does go on to recommend that a
central training school be run by the police in the UK for officers undertaking
PSOs. This was not deemed feasible by the FCO due to ‘political, financial and
cultural factors’ (Ibid. p.89).

47. 47
In 2005 the FCO, recognising the need to ensure that UK police officers were
adequately trained in various skills for PSOs, commissioned the Scottish Police
College at Tulliallan, Scotland to undertake a Training Needs Analysis (TNA).
The TNA (Tulliallan, 2005, p.4) was conducted to:
“…establish the skills, knowledge and tasks required of deployed officers and
identify any gaps that could be filled by a training programme.”
These ranged from administrative skills, through communication, to personnel
and management capability. Interestingly, the TNA did not focus on existing
national training programmes and how these might be adapted to incorporate
gaps identified, in fact remaining focussed only on pre-deployment training rather
than broader general police training. That is not to say that the TNA was flawed,
but it does demonstrate the rather parochial view that was taken in determining
the parameters of the TNA. The authors did acknowledge the issue:
“It was clear very early in the analysis that compiling a single training course that
covered all eventualities is not feasible.”
Tulliallan (2005, p. 29)
In addition to recommending improvements to the existing pre-deployment
training course, which were subsequently implemented, the report (Ibid. 2005,
p.29) also recommended that:
“… a suite of training interventions is developed in relation to preparing and
ensuring officers deployed to international policing are effective in the roles that
they are required to undertake.”
Although indeed comprehensive in terms of its breadth and depth, it is argued
that this TNA stopped short of broaching broader issues related to officer skills
and abilities, focussing its conclusions on the task in hand i.e. pre-deployment
training. The generic roles and role-specific skills for PSOs identified in the report

48. 48
(Appendix C) undoubtedly require a significant period of training to provide
officers with the skills required, much more than the allotted five days for the
current (2008) FCO-sponsored pre-deployment course delivered by MDP
(Appendix D). There is clearly a balance to be had in providing sufficient training
at point of deployment and the cost involved in extending a pre-deployment
programme to cover all the areas identified in the report. The question therefore
is one of sufficiency i.e. does the current UK programme meet the needs of
officers deploying overseas and, where this is not possible, within what training
programmes should such material feature?
A review of core training programmes revealed that input on PSOs does not
currently feature in the Initial Police Leadership and Development Programme
(IPLDP) which forms the basis for all Home Office police recruit training (NPIA,
2005). Neither is it addressed in specialist training such as the Initial Crime
Investigators Development Programme (Appendix E) or leadership training such
as the Strategic Command Course for senior police officers (Appendix F). The
apparent lack of PSO information in key police training presented the opportunity
to explore whether PSO familiarisation was considered appropriate for such
courses.

49. 49
CHAPTER 2 - RESEARCH STUDY
2.1. KEY THEMES
The literature review revealed limited specific analysis of UK involvement with
PSOs after 2005. Furthermore, although the NPIA had recently assessed
international policing assistance this was not focussed exclusively on PSOs
(Meaklim, 2008). This presented the opportunity to conduct further research on
three themes that had emerged from the review:
i. Support for PSOs
 Whether the benefits of providing UK police officers to PSOs were
acknowledged by stakeholders
 Whether UK police Chief Officers consider PSOs a priority
 Whether Police Authorities consider PSOs a priority
 Whether the UK provision of officers to PSOs is a barrier to career
progression
 Whether there was consistent support for PSOs across government and
within police forces
ii. Planning for PSOs
 Whether Governmental departments approach PSOs in a less than cohesive
manner
 Whether contributing factors include lack of joint doctrine or domestic strategy
for PSOs
 What work was being done to establish links between FCO objectives and
local policing

50. 50
iii. Capability
 Whether lack of clarity on roles to be performed in theatre had been resolved
 Views concerning a dedicated pool and the benefits of such a capability
 Whether a lack of general training on PSOs was influencing the UK
contribution
 Whether the skills and experience gained whilst overseas on PSOs was being
capitalised on by Forces
These themes formed the basis for further research, which was carried out using
methods to generate data that included both quantitative and qualitative (i.e.
naturalistic) approaches in order to establish interconnections.
“Quantitative research consists of those studies in which data concerned can be
analysed in terms of numbers…Qualitative research is more open and
responsive to its subject. Both types of research are valid and useful. They are
not mutually exclusive.”
Best and Kahn (1989, pp.89 - 90)
2.2. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
2.2.1. Quantitative research
The purpose of conducting quantitative research was to collect facts and study
the relationship of one set of facts to another (Bell, 2006). Quantitative research
was based on a survey of police officers, as well as government representatives,
using a standard questionnaire based around the key themes that emerged from
the literature review (Appendix G). Likert items were utilised for the
questionnaire; Likert is a commonly used psychometric approach, which relies on
positive and negative responses to questions, based on ‘ranked’ answers, in
order to establish views and strength of feeling or attitude (Likert, 1932). Answers
would be collated using this bipolar scaling method before being analysed within

51. 51
their groups. Because of the potential for simplistic responses using this method,
free text fields were included which enabled respondents to provide qualitative
(written) views to reinforce any comparative analysis. Finally, the questionnaire
was piloted with six volunteers, reflecting the demographic of the sample, to
confirm validity and relevance to the research.
2.2.2. Qualitative Research
In order to assist in triangulating the research findings, 12 one to one explorative
semi-structured interviews were arranged with people who had experience of
PSOs. Interviewees included police and key stakeholders who could or had
directly influenced the provision of police resources to PSOs. The emphasis on
conducting one to one interviews was on the stated experiences of the
participants and the meanings that they attached to those experiences. Although
a subjective exercise, this was expected to present opportunities for associations
to emerge that could provide valid and meaningful data.
Prior to interviews taking place, an interview guide with core questions was
developed which could be used as a prompt (Appendix H). The questions
reflected findings from the literature review as a basis for the questioning. The
questions were piloted with volunteers that reflected the demographic of the
sample to confirm validity and reliability as well as relevance to the research.
One question on European strategy was dispensed with after the first interview,
as it was not considered sufficiently focussed and relevant. Interviewees were
able to provide broad and spontaneous answers. This qualitative research was
time consuming from a planning as well as ethical standpoint, in that each
interview needed to be arranged, consent forms had to be developed (Appendix
I) and distributed to interviewees, and the interviews themselves took 90 minutes
in each case. This was followed by significantly more time to accurately
transcribe the taped interviews so that the material could be analysed and
incorporated into the research findings as appropriate. To verify the transcripts

52. 52
and confirm reliability, each interviewee was given the opportunity to review the
content of the transcriptions and to add, amend or alter anything they wished.
2.2.3. Types of sampling
Participants were selected on the basis of their involvement in PSOs.
Questionnaires were sent to 100 serving police officers and were restricted to
those people who had been part of a PSO in the preceding twelve months in
order that the survey would be sufficiently representative of the current UK
contribution. The Deputy Head of the IST at the FCO, Cliff Sharp, confirmed that
101 police officers were on PSOs as of January 2009, with approximately 150
police officers having been on PSOs in the twelve months between 1st
January
2008 and 1st
January 2009. This sample was therefore highly likely to capture a
significant proportion of those serving overseas during the survey and in any
case reflected 66% of the overall UK commitment for the period focussed on. It
was acknowledged that there would be a margin of error in the sample in that
people who were not included may have different views from those that were
included. Consideration was given to increasing the sample size to increase the
confidence level8
, but it was felt that a general consensus would likely be
achieved with the sample because all police undertook the same process
through the same department (FCO) before deployment and upon return.
Therefore, it was felt that an increase in sample size was unlikely to generate
significant differences in findings. 6 questionnaires were also sent to government
representatives. Out of 49 responses to the survey, 46 were from police officers
(equivalent to 46% data capture from the police sample), with the other 3
responses being submitted by government representatives (equivalent to 50%
data capture from the government sample).
Those interviewed had significant involvement with PSOs and, although the
results would be indicative rather than definitive i.e. couldn’t be taken to
8
Confidence level refers to the degree of confidence in the findings, in that they are
representative of the group

53. 53
represent all involved with PSOs, nevertheless should provide meaningful
qualitative data that would tend to confirm or disprove findings from the literature
review and questionnaires.
2.2.4. Sampling procedures for the study
It was not considered appropriate due to timescales, cost and location of
respondents’ i.e. in most cases overseas in difficult to reach places, to undertake
a complete census. The aim was to survey sufficient numbers of people so that
responses were representative of the total number of people who had been
actively involved with PSOs in the preceding twelve months, therefore a sample
was felt sufficient. Options considered were random, quota and judgement
sampling (Crouch & Housden, 2003). To ensure confidentiality and ethics, an
independent person had agreed to manage the distribution of questionnaires, but
it was felt the only way to establish randomness would be to review responses
and determine how the sample had been selected. It would therefore be difficult
to establish the randomness of the survey without compromising confidentiality
and therefore ‘random’ sampling was discounted. ‘Quota’ sampling was also
discounted, predominantly because it was felt that this would require more
stratified targeting of individuals e.g. only surveying those on PSOs who were
male or only those in certain age groups. Therefore quota sampling would not
provide the representative sample sought. ‘Judgement’ sampling was felt to be
the most appropriate because the research was targeting a specific group of
people who were likely to have the skills and experience to provide accurate
judgements in response to the data sought. Variables for the judgement sampling
were that the individual was involved in PSOs in some way, that the individual
was undertaking a PSO, or that the individual was influencing the provision of
PSOs.

54. 54
CHAPTER 3 - ANALYSIS OF THE DATA
3.1. QUESTIONNAIRES
3.1.1. Combining quantitative and qualitative analysis
The quantitative responses in the questionnaires were collated using standard
Excel software (Appendix J). Consideration was given to utilising SPSS
(Statistical Package for the Social Sciences) to assist analysis (SPSS [Online]
2009), but the results using the Excel software provided clear statistical data
upon which to draw conclusions and therefore SPSS was not considered
necessary for this study.
The questionnaire was designed to incorporate both quantitative and qualitative
responses. In order to adequately capture data sets and to ensure that the
integrity of findings was maintained, care was taken during the content analysis
of the questionnaires to maintain objectivity when collating qualitative responses.
This was achieved by separating out clear statements into their own groups i.e.
where a response related specifically to resourcing then this created a group of
‘resourcing’. These groups of statements were then reviewed again to look for
discreet items that should be in their own group or obvious items that were
clearly relevant to various groups. Where that occurred, such statements were
included in all groups to indicate increasing commonality and thus reliability.
This presented the opportunity to focus initially on the questionnaires and then
incorporate qualitative statements to either challenge or support the quantitative
results. Thus throughout the analysis, reference is made to qualitative responses
drawn from the survey.

55. 55
 Question 1
Question 1 established whether the respondent represented the UK Police
Service or a Government department. 46 respondents were police, with a further
3 respondents being government representatives. This was not unanticipated, as
the ratios represented reasonably closely the ratios of police to government
representatives that had been surveyed, so was not considered to provide
meaningful indications upon which to base conclusions, other than responses
were reasonably representative of the sample groups. Both groups were
combined for the purpose of analysis, although care was taken to draw out
appropriate points where questions related specifically to police or government
departments.
 Question 2: “How do you see the UK contribution to PSOs having a
positive benefit? Please mark all those that apply:”
Figure 2 – Responses to Question 2
21
38
27
31
46
1
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
2a 2b 2c 2d 2e 2f
Improves Policing of local communities in the
UK
Raises the political influence the UK has
overseas
Helps reduce transnational
crime
Benefits host Force contributing officers to
PSOs
Improves policing skills for officers involved in
PSO's
No Benefit

56. 56
Only 21 respondents (42%) chose to answer Question 2a, implying that the
majority view was PSOs did not improve policing of local communities. Because
5 respondents had not responded to this statement but chose to add further
comment, a review of their written responses was conducted to establish any
contradictions to 2a, however none provided supportive information, with one
responder stating:
Various comments in response to later questions in the questionnaire strongly
suggested PSOs do have a positive impact in terms of reinforcing policing
objectives through enhanced individual policing skills, enhanced cultural
understanding as well as impacting on local organised crime:
Question 2b of the graph indicates that the vast majority of respondents (77.55%)
felt that PSOs raised the political influence the UK has overseas. This was
supported by qualitative responses from the questionnaires, which included:
“ … improve our understanding of the cultures of those who come to our
shores...”
“There is also the diversity element which also delivers considerable benefits…”
“… particularly in relation to organized crime involving drug/human trafficking,
money laundering and stolen vehicles.”
“It is hard for UK police forces to capture the experience of returning officers
and put it to positive effect... they do not make any great effort to use the
additional skills acquired overseas.”

57. 57
Question 2c shows that 27 out of 49 responders, over 50%, felt that PSOs
helped reduce transnational crime, however a significant proportion chose not to
comment on this statement. Reflecting possible reasons for this, common
themes explored later are:
 poor marketing of PSOs
 lack of understanding of the reasons for a PSO
 lack of communication of the core aims of a PSO
Certainly it could reasonably be concluded that respondents did not have
sufficient information upon which to make a judgement. This is supported by the
following statement:
In answering Question 2d, the greater proportion of respondents (63%) agreed
that PSOs benefit their Force. Contrast this positive view with a strong perception
that any benefits a Force might gain were being lost through lack of recognition:
“The British Police Service has re-established itself as a world leader in this
field…”
“…seen as the benchmark police service… giving us a greater and significantly
more influential stage.”
“Whether it reduces transnational crime is hard to quantify. It should do this, but
it is difficult to say that sending a police advisor to Helmand Province will lead
to a reduction in the heroin supply in the UK.”

58. 58
Qualitative responses from the semi-structured interviews included
acknowledgement of the value officers returning from PSOs can bring to their
home Force (Para. 3.2.1). However, those actively undertaking PSOs during the
survey evidently didn’t share this view. Links explored later are:
 lack of national priority
 insufficient career development processes
In answering Question 2e, the overwhelming majority of respondents (93%) felt
PSOs improved policing skills. In considering how this relates to benefits to local
communities (Question 2a), this response helps to build a clearer picture. With
such strong agreement that policing skills were improved, the policing of local UK
communities should improve provided enhanced policing skills are utilised
appropriately and in a timely manner. Similarly, there should be benefits for
Forces through an increased skills-base, again if utilised appropriately.
Qualitative responses supported this:
“People very rarely … are given an opportunity back in the UK to put skills into
place.”
“Within my force I have seen little evidence that any skills learned on a PSO
have been transferred into force or local working practices...”
“…sadly nothing is done by my home dept to utilise those experiences in a
positive and practical manner."
“There is little or no professional recognition for the role.”

59. 59
Question 2f reflects that 48 out of 49 respondents (98%) could not agree with the
suggestion that PSOs were of ‘no benefit’.
 Question 3: “In your view, where should more information on PSOs be
provided? Please mark all those that apply:”
35
24 16
3a Within initial police training
3b Within specialist crime-
related training
3c Within strategic, leadership
and management training
Figure 3 – Responses to Question 3
24 respondents agreed that more information on PSOs should be included in
initial police training. 16 respondents felt that PSOs should be included as part of
specialist crime-related training, but overwhelmingly the view was that
“…will have significantly broadened their experience … which develops
leadership and broader understanding of some cultural, international law
issues.”
“… benefits include increased skills and experience … should benefit their
home force and the communities they police.”

60. 60
information should be included in strategic, leadership and management training,
with 35 people (75%) supporting this option. One respondent, in agreeing that
information on PSOs should be included in all three types of training, stated:
Questions 4 to 8 invited respondents to indicate the extent to which they agreed
or disagreed with a series of statements.
 Question 4: “The UK’s commitment to PSOs is very important.”
1
29
17
2
0
4a Strongly Agree
4b Agree
4c Disagree
4d Strongly Disagree
4e Neither agree nor
Disagree
Figure 4 – Responses to Question 4
Almost all respondents (94%) agreed or strongly agreed with this statement.
Additional qualitative responses reinforced the importance of UK involvement,
more importantly this revealed a lack of understanding:
“The earlier officers are exposed to the potential opportunities and advantages
of international policing benefits the better. This would ensure … a broad
understanding of the potential benefits of international service. If this message
is reinforced during leadership and management training then perceptions of
management could be changed...”