SlideShare a Scribd company logo
1 of 146
Global Affairs and Politics

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

1
Levels

Descriptor

0

No other level achieved.

1

Response is provided but does not show an understanding of the prompt.
Response does not meet expected length given time limit. Response does
not make connection to prior learning.

2

Response shows an understanding of prompt but is not addressed.
Response does not meet expected length given time limit. Response does
not make connection to prior learning.

3

Response begins to address prompt. Response nearly meets expected
length given time limit. Response does not make connection to prior
learning.

4

Response addresses prompt. Response meets expected length given time
limit. Response attempts connections to prior knowledge.

5

Response clearly addresses prompt. Response exceeds expected length
given time limit. Response clearly makes connection to prior knowledge.
Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

2
 Introduction
 Nation States – What is a Country?
 Types of Governments
 Asking the Right Questions
 Thinking About World Politics Strategically
 Evolution of World Politics – Introduction to Political Theories
 Nationalism
 Globalization and Transnationalism
 International Organizations
 National Power and Diplomacy
 International Law and Morality
 National and International Security
 International Political Economy and Cooperation
 Human Rights and the Environment and Technology
Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

3
International Relations Unit 1

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

4
“The world is a stage and all the men and women
merely players”
 ~ William Shakespeare, As You Like It

The Actors:
 States
 International Organizations (IGOs)
 Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)
 Multinational Corporations (MNCs)
 Individuals
Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

5
Anarchical International System
One in which there is no central authority to set and
enforce rules and resolve disputes.
This remains the main thrust of world politics, but
increasingly there is an alternative approach in
evidence

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

6
• Society, Interest, Interaction, Safety, Prosperity, Authority,
Dispute Resolution
Dimension
Human organization
Interests
Interaction
Basis of safety
Basis of prosperity
Ultimate authority
Dispute resolution

Traditional Approach
National societies
National/self-interests
Competition
Self-protection
Self-help
Sovereign states
Power prevails

Alternative Approach
Global society
Global/mutual interests
Cooperation
Collective security
Mutual assistance
International organizations
Law prevails
Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

7
Q. Is the globalization approach pure fantasy?
Think of the individual in a society and how we
interact.
There is a sense of common good in a domestic
society.
A century ago the UN, the WTO, the EU, the ICC
would have been considered science fiction!

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

8
Q1. How many countries are there in the world?
Q2. Are all countries equal?
Q3. What are the three biggest MNCs in the world?
What is their annual earnings?
Q4. Name three people who have changed the way
we look at the world through individual effort.
Why?
Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

9
Country= State
Sovereign
 The monopoly on the use of legitimate force within a
territory

A “state” is the sovereign entity of a territory
Please note:
 Public violence is an illegitimate use of force
 National Governments might delegate power
 Police, Military
 But the authority to use force originates from the state’s
permission
Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

10
 Sovereign entities are not supposed to meddle in the internal
affairs of other sovereign entities.
 This is mostly true today but was not always the case.
 A trivial analogy – Parents and Children and Kingdom A and B

 Where did it all start?
 Treaty of Westphalia
 Signed in 1648
 Ended the 30 Years War
 Established the principle of sovereignty (Westphalia Sovereignty)

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

11
 Definition: the monopoly on the legitimate use of force
within a territory
 Dispute resolution between two or more sub-state actors
occurs through the sovereign states.
 Sovereigns are expected to ensure their sub-state actors do
not use force against foreign actors.
 Sovereign states control their own domestic affairs.
 Sovereign states do not meddle with internal issues in other
states.
 But states violate this rule all the time!
 US incursion into Pakistan to kill Bin Laden
 US in Libya
 Russia protecting South Ossetia from Georgia

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

12
 Why do states violate the sovereign rule?
 Strong actors can violate sovereignty and get away with it.
 They can do this because there is no punishment.

 Why is there no punishment?
 Anarchy!

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

13
 Who is sovereign over the sovereigns?
 No one!

 Domestic analogy: In Kodi
 A man kills his neighbor
 A bank robber steals millions in gold
 The party last night got a little too crazy – Project X

 Solution?
 The police come take care of it – provided there is strong domestic
policy

 In weak systems this might not be true.
 A mafia boss kills a rival
 A drug lord assassinates a rival cartel leader
 The local police is too weak to handle this situation
Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

14
 No one comes to arrest:
 US going into Pakistan
 NATO going into Libya
 USSR in Czechoslovakia
 USSR in Afganistan

 Life in International Relations is closer to the Mafia world
 World Police (United Nations ad-hoc military force) is either
too weak or non-existent to bring justice.

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

15
 Definition: The lack of overall political authority
 In international relations, no one is sovereign over the
sovereign
 Anarchy is a world of “self-help”
 Solve it on your own
 Convince a friend to come help you
 The government isn’t going to come to your rescue

 Anarchy is NOT chaos
 Most states are not fighting
 Anarchy permits many different outcomes
Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

16
 If anything can happen, how do we predict or explain
outcomes?
 Anarchy is a trivial explanation – explains everything and nothing
 We need more precise predictions and explanations

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

17
Q1. What were the key aspects of the Treaty of
Westphalia?
Q2. Other examples of states violating the idea of
Westphalian sovereignty. Why can states get away
with it?

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

18
International Relations Unit 2

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

19
 Autocracy
 Monarchy
 Theocracy
 Democracy
 Republic
 “Democratic Republic”
 Communism

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

20
 Despotism
 Rule by one individual with absolute power.
 Dictatorship
 Rule by individual with full power over country. Usually
militaristic control.
 Fascism
 Rule by leader base only. Focuses heavily on patriotism
and nationalism.

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

21
 Absolute Monarchy/Emirate
 A king or a non-elected “royal” is in power. Rule by
inheritance. Ultimate governing body.
 Constitutional Monarchy
 Variant of monarchy where there is a monarch but with
powers limited by a constitution.

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

22
 A religious institute or “God” as the head of state.
 Religious institute enforce law and policy in the state.

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

23
 Rule by government chosen by an enfranchised population.
 No discrimination on who can vote (except for an minimum
age barrier)

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

24
 Similar to a democracy but the there is a system of elected
representatives.
 Q – Identify the qualities that distinguish democracy from a
republic.

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

25
 Usually a country that describes itself as “democratic
republic” in modern history is neither democratic nor
republic.
 They are usually some form of autocratic government.

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

26
 Built on the economic foundations created by Karl Marx
and Fredrich Engels.
 A form of Oligarchy.
 Although the system should have the public’s best interest
in mind, historically they have devolved into autocratic
systems.

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

27
 For your given country. Describe your ideal system of
government. Create your own system. You can research
other types of governments apart from the ones covered in
this course. Why is your government better than democracy?

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

28
 Using what you have learnt about different systems of
governments, defend your assigned form of government in
terms of sustainability, equity, and moral superiority. Each
person has 3 minutes to speak and 2 minutes for rebuttal.

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

29
International Relations Unit 4

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

30
 Two types of explanations:
 Proximate Cause: Why did this happen the way it happened?
 Underlying Cause: Why was this thing asking to happen?

 We prefer “underlying cause” to “proximate cause” because:
 Proximate gives us silly policy ideas
 Underlying cause tells us how to solve the problem.

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

31
 Proximate Cause:
 The driver died because he went
through the wind shield of his
vehicle.

 What have we learnt?
 Don’t fly through the wind shield
of your vehicle. Don’t get into
car accidents.

 Underlying Cause:
 The driver died because he
wasn’t wearing his seatbelt.

 What have we learnt?
 Wear your seatbelt.

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

32
 Proximate Cause:
 They lost because of poor
fielding.

 What have we learnt?
 Don’t field badly.

 Underlying Cause:
 They were bad fielders because
everyone was drunk.

 What have we learnt?
 Don’t drink and dive.

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

33
 Proximate Cause:
 Archduke Franz Ferdinand was
assassinated.

 What have we learnt?
 Don’t let assassinations of dukes
happen.

 Underlying Cause:
 Military
technology
gave
countries a huge first strike
advantage.

 What have we learnt?
 First strike advantages cause
war. Build defensive weapons
not offensive.

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

34
 Proximate Cause:
 Hitler was a bad person.

 Underlying Cause:
 Reparations from WW 1
bankrupted Germany, allowing
domestic institutions to fail.

 What have we learnt?
 Let all aspiring Austrian artists
into art school.

 What have we learnt?
 Be magnanimous in victory.

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

35
 Proximate causes are shortsighted.
 Discovering underlying causes allows us to connect dissimilar
situations and make sensible recommendations about today’s
world.
 The process is difficult.

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

36
 Watch the 2008 German Film “Die Welle” (The Wave) and
analyze the conditions that lead to a autocratic setup in a
nation state. Do you think it is possible that it might happen
in the world again?
 Consider the fact that this is based on a true story about the life of Ron
Jones and his experiment The Third Wave.
 Keep your answer to under 500 words. The homework grading rubric
applies.

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

37
 The international realm is anarchic so how can we predict
what’s going to happen? How can we narrow down our
expectations?
 Solution: Analyze actor’s abilities and desires and find
plausible outcomes…
 We need to develop tools of strategy to understand how the
international world works.
 Narrow down and eliminate choices
 US will not bomb itself

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

38
 There are about 200 odd states in the world
 How State 1 acts affects State 2’s outcomes
 How State 2 acts affects State 1’s outcomes
 How State 1 acts affects State 3’s outcomes
 Etc…
 States are strategically interdependent.

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

39
 States are strategically inter-dependent.
 States know they are so.
 Intelligence is power.
 US spends so much money on intelligence. Why?

 Is there a way to scientifically study strategic interdependence?
 Game Theory!

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

40
 Originally developed in the 1950s by Neuman and Nash to
study economic interactions.
 Applies very well to state level behavior.
 Note:
 Game theory is not black magic
 Does not capture all elements of reality
 It helps us model the world in simpler terms
 Cannot tell us anything new that good research will not unearth
 It maps assumptions to logically valid conclusions

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

41
 Create some assumptions using research
 Conduct some analysis of those assumptions
 Reach logically valid conclusions

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

42
 If your assumptions are silly, then your conclusions will also
be silly even though they might be logically valid conclusions.
 Results are only as good as our assumptions
 Assumptions need to be narrow in focus and concrete, too
open ended assumptions will lead to vagueness and nonconclusions.

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

43
 If your assumptions are silly, then your conclusions will also
be silly even though they might be logically valid conclusions.
 Results are only as good as our assumptions
 Assumptions need to be narrow in focus and concrete, too
open ended assumptions will lead to vagueness and nonconclusions.

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

44
 Big Question:
 Under what conditions can two parties play nice with one another?
 Remember there is no authority figure!

 Incentive to cheat
 Example: Your roommate leaves Rs. 2000 outside.

 Disincentive to cheat – consequences
 If you steal the money you go to jail.

 But in the International World…
 Anarchy – no world police
 No laws forcing two states to play nice

 Is cooperation under these circumstances?
Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

45
 How can individually rational behavior lead to collectively bad
outcomes for all?
 Can the shadow of future interaction induce two states to
play nice with one another?
 No, if we know when the period of play ends.
 Yes, if we do not know when the period of play ends.

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

46
The situation:
 Two students are caught by the Dean
 The Dean think that they were both smoking
 But the Dean can only smell smoke, he can’t prove it.
 Thus the Dean needs one of the students to rat out the
other.

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

47
 The deal:
 If no one confesses to the smoking, the Dean can only punish
them for being out late.
 Punishment – Dorm pounding

 If one confesses and the other does not.
 The confessor gets off
 The other one gets expelled

 If both confess
 Both get suspended

 [DIAGRAM]
Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

48
 Imagine that they are working in their best interest.
 How will they react?
 Nash Equilibrium is for both to Confess even though it is
socially the worst possible outcome.

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

49
 “Cult of the Offensive” and the Origins of World War I
 Tariffs and free trade policy
 Arms races and arms treaties (Cold War)
 “The Evolution of Cooperation” (Trench Warfare)

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

50
 Reflection on Autocracy – “The Wave” due on 12-08-2013 by
midnight on Turnitin and hardcopy in your folder.
 Read up on World War I – Causes.

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

51
International Relations Unit 3a

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

52
Why did World War I start?

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

53
 Serbia wanted a
united Yugoslavia
 June 28 – FF killed
 July 28 – AH
declares war on
Serbia
 July 28 – Russia
declares war on AH
 Aug 1 – Germany
declares war on
Russia
Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

54
 Aug 2 – Germany
invades Luxemborg
 Aug 3 – Germany
declares war on
France and Belgium
 Aug 4 – United
Kingdom
declares
war on Germany
 Aug 6 – AH declares
war on Russia
 Serbia declares war
on AH
Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

55
 Aug 11 – France
declares war on AH
 Aug 12 – UK
declares war on AH
 Aug 22 – AH
declares war on
Belgium
 Aug 23 – Japan
declares war on
Germany
 Aug 25 – Japan
declares war on AH
Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

56
 Nov 1 – Russia
declares war on the
Ottoman Empire
 Nov 5 – UK and
France declare war
on OE.

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

57
 Archduke Franz Ferdinand
was assassinated by Serbian
Nationalists on 28 June 1914.
 The war started because a dude
with a funny mustache died

 Why are these states
preemptively declaring war
on one another?

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

58
Offense is the best defense?
Military and political leaders at that time believed
that the offense had an enormous advantage – first
mover advantage.
 New technology: machine guns, chemical weapons,
railroads
 Believed that this technology favors the first mover.

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

59
 Consider a world with 2 states
 Two strategies: Preemptive attack, Defend
 Outcomes – ranked by benefits
 I preempt, you defend. (Surprise attack! – I win!) - 3
 We both defend. (Peace) - 2
 We both preempt. (War) - 1
 I defend, you preempt. (I lose, I’m a sucker) - 0

 What do these assumptions mean?
 [DIAGRAM]
Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

60
 Regardless of Germany’s move, France is always better of
preempting.
 Therefore France preempts.

 Similarly, regardless of France’s move, Germany is always
better of preempting.
 Therefore Germany preempts.

 The PEACE outcome is inherently unstable even though this is
an overall more beneficial outcome for all.

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

61
Country

Total
Mobilized

Russia
France
British Empire
Italy
USA
Japan
Romania
Serbia
Belgium
Greece
Portugal
Montenegro
Total

12,000,000
8,410,000
8,904,467
5,615,000
4,355,000
800,000
750,000
707,343
267,000
230,000
100,000
50,000
42,188,810

Germany
Austria-Hungary
Turkey
Bulgaria
Total
Grand Total

11,000,000
7,800,000
2,850,000
1,200,000
22,850,000
65,038,810

Dead

Wounded

Allies
1,700,000
4,950,000
1,357,800
4,266,000
908,371
2,090,212
650,000
947,000
126,000
234,300
300
907
335,706
120,000
45,000
133,148
13,716
44,686
5,000
21,000
7,222
13,751
3,000
10,000
5,152,115 12,831,004
Central Powers
1,773,700
4,216,058
1,200,000
3,620,000
325,000
400,000
87,500
152,390
3,386,200
8,388,448
8,538,315 21,219,452

POW or
Missing

Total
Casualties

Casualty as %
of Mobilized

2,500,000
537,000
191,652
600,000
4,500
3
80,000
152,958
34,659
1,000
12,318
7,000
4,121,090

9,150,000
6,160,800
3,190,235
2,197,000
364,800
1,210
535,706
331,106
93,061
27,000
33,291
20,000
22,104,209

76%
73%
36%
39%
8%
0%
71%
47%
35%
12%
33%
40%
52%

1,152,800
2,200,000
250,000
27,029
3,629,829
7,750,919

7,142,558
7,020,000
975,000
266,919
15,404,477
37,508,686

65%
90%
34%
22%
67%
58%

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

62
BARON VON RICHTHOFEN

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

63
International Relations Unit 35b

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

64
Big Question: Why is it so hard to implement free
trade?

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

65
 Free trade is a historically new phenomenon.
 In the past, states used to set up high tariffs (import taxes) on
imported goods.
 Taxes are not fun – but taxes are good for bolstering domestic
companies.
 Recall from micro and macro that taxes raise consumer prices
and that generally leads to inefficiency.

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

66
Mexico doesn’t have the best grape-producing
climate
 Thus El Vino Nacional must spend more money to produce
quality grapes.
 The company must pass on the additional costs to the
consumer or go out of business.

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

67
California has great climate for grapes and makes
wine with ease.
 California companies can flood the Mexican market and put
El Vino Nacional out of business.
 But this funnels Mexican money out of Mexico and into
California.

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

68
 If Mexico taxes the imported wine, los precios del Vino
Nacional will become competitive
 El dinero stays within Mexico

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

69
California doesn’t have the best agave-producing
climate.
 Thus, California tequila companies must spend more money
to make good quality tequila.
 The company must pass on this cost to consumers.

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

70
Mexico has great climate for agave and makes great
tequila.
 Mexican companies can flood the Californian markets put
the California tequila makers out of business.
 But this funnels American money out of the US and into
Mexico.

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

71
 If USA taxes the imported tequila, California tequila makers
are competitive.
 Dollars stays within USA

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

72
Tariffs everywhere
Mexico taxes imports from California
USA taxes imports from Mexico
Everyone loses.
[Strategic Model Diagram]

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

73
New puzzle:
 The prisoner’s dilemma predicts that we have high tariffs
for both sides.
 This was true before WW2, but not true any longer, why?
 How have states managed free trade agreements recently?

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

74
Test – 29 AUG
Essay type, short answers, and objective.

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

75
International Relations Unit 3c

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

76
In a world of anarchy what is the most important
force?
Having a powerful military allows you to have your
way.
But military power is relative not absolute:
The Roman Empire is more powerful than Italy is
today
So a state only makes a relative gain against a rival
if it builds and the rival does not.
Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

77
Making weapons costs money – opportunity cost
[DIAGRAM]
Outcome is to build for both states.

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

78
If the outcome always states build weapons then
why do we have so many arms treaties?
Why are arms treaties sustainable?

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

79
Can future interaction inspire cooperation today?
One shot – No, because players prefer to act
aggressively as it is in your best interest.
Some interactions are one shot – preemptive war
Some interactions are repeated – trade and arms
races.

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

80
[DIAGRAM] – Moves from first round will be
disclosed publicly.
Question – Can the players cooperate in the first
round under threat of punishment in the second
round.
 Is “I will cooperate today, and if you cooperate today as
well, then I will cooperate tomorrow” a viable strategy?

Stage 1:
 Defect

Stage 2: Must optimize in this turn as it is the last.
 Defect
Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

81
 Stage 1
 Stage 2
…
…
…
 Stage N-2
 Stage N-1
 Stage N
 Defect – must optimize as it is the last period of play
Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

82
Cooperation is not possible in repeated games if the
length of the game is finite.
Endgame sabotages cooperation in earlier stages.
How much is $100,000 worth if the world ends:
 Tomorrow
 At the end of the year
 Ten years from now

What if the shadow of the future is indefinite?
 We do not know when the interaction is going to end
Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

83
The shadow of future fails to inspire cooperation if
the game has a definite end.
But interactions in the real world seem to be unlikely
to end.
 Can the states maintain cooperation?

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

84
The Model:
 Play the Prisoner’s Dilemma repeatedly between two
states.
 After every period, they will play again with probability p.
 Note p is fairly large.

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

85
“Tough Love” strategy:
 Begin by cooperating
 If at any point in the game a player defects, then defect for
the duration of the game…

So, would two grim trigger players have an incentive
to defect on one another?
[DIAGRAM]

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

86
Today’s payoff: 1
Tomorrow’s payoff: (p)(1)
The day after’s payoff: (p)2(1)
…
The sum of this infinite geometric series is going to
be 1/(1-p)

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

87
Today’s payoff: 2
Tomorrow’s payoff: (p)(0)
The day after’s payoff: (p)2(0)
…
The sum of this infinite geometric series is going to
be 2.

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

88
Cooperate: 1/(1-p)
Betray: 2 (Technically could be slightly more if the
betrayal happens after n rounds.)
However, if p> ½ then cooperating is in my best
interest.

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

89
As long as we are likely to keep interacting with each
other indefinitely, then cooperation is possible as it
is in the best interest of both states.
Threat of future loss of gain (i.e. punishment) keeps
states in line even without a world police.
States must not know when the game is going to
end.

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

90
International Relations Unit 6

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

91
Repeated play assumption was not sensible when
we were talking about war mobilization.
But most states most of the time are not in a state of
war. Why?
“Cooperate” and “Defect” are very restrictive
strategies.
 We need to allow states to bargain with one another.

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

92
Why do states fight costly wars?

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

93
If war is detrimental to both sides, why do you think
we have wars?
 Limit your answer to 300 words.

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

94
A man falls over a wet floor and sues you for
negligence.
Your lawyer and his lawyer agree on the following:
 There is a 60% chance of the lawsuit will be successful.
 If he wins you have to pay him $40,000
 Going to court will cost each of you $10,000 in fees
regardless of outcome.

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

95
Either you or him concede immediately
 Your payoff: -$40,000
 His payoff: 0

You reach an out of court settlement
 A settlement of less than $34,000 is better for you.
 A settlement of more than $14,000 is better for him.

You let the court decide the matter
 Your payoff: (-40,000)(0.6) – 10,000 = -$34,000
 His payoff: (40,000)(0.6) – 10,000 = $14,000
 How should we expect the matter to be resolved?
Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

96
War produces a winner and a loser – unless the
power is very skewed, it is probabilistic.
Fighting is costly because it kills people and destroys
things.
So why can’t two states settle the matter of the
battlefield?
 Rationalist’s Explanation of War

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

97
 Part 1: The Research
Question
 Assumptions
 War’s Inefficiency Puzzle

 Part 2: The Answers
 Preventive War
 Misinterpretation
Information
 Issue Indivisibility
 Preemptive War

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

of

98
 BIG QUESTION: Can two perfectly intelligent, perfectly
unbiased leaders fight a war against each other?
 Let’s name some major wars in the last 100 years.

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

99
Assume that states are a single entity, and their
leader is only interested in maximizing the overall
welfare of the state.
 Is this always true? NO
 Is this true some of the time? MAYBE

Leaders often justify wars using the unitary actor
assumption.

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

100
I really suck at running our domestic economy.
Everything is terrible so I will start a war to distract
you from that. You’ll see I am a war hero and then
you will reelect me.
The media is too involved in a scandal about an
intern and me so I am going to bomb some country
in Africa that you’ve never heard of to distract them.

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

101
This war is in the best interest of our national
security.
Fight them there so you don’t have to fight them at
home.
We have a moral obligation to intervene.
Stabilizing the region will secure our economic
interests.
 It’s about WE not ME.
Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

102
 The unitary actor assumption allows us to analyze the validity
of these explanations.
 The war dynamics we will discuss also affect states that are
not unitary actors.
 Although even with non-unitary actors we can extend the same
assumptions, but we will not cover that.

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

103
Can wars be mutually beneficial?

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

104
Let us assume a scenario:
Venezuela discovers an oil deposit worth $80 billion
Columbia declares the deposit is actually in their
side of the border.
The sides call in their military and prepare for war.

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

105
Venezuela will win the war
60% of the time – which
means they have 60%
chance of winning the $80
billion in the oil.
Cost of death, destruction,
and lost oil is about $15
billion, regardless of the
outcome.
Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

106
Columbia will win the war
40% of the time – which
means they have 40%
chance of winning the $80
billion in the oil.
Cost of death, destruction,
and lost oil is about $12
billion, regardless of the
outcome.
Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

107
Is war inevitable for these two countries?

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

108
Expected Payoff from the
war:
(80)(0.6) – 15 = $33b
Venezuela must receive at
least $33 billion to be
satisfied.

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

109
Expected payoff from the
war:
(80)(0.4) – 12 = 20
Columbia must receive at
least $20 billion to be
satisfied.

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

110
Both countries have positive expected payoffs from
fighting.
 So war can be a rational choice for both parties.

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

111
War is not rational here!
Venezuela and Columbia’s demands sum up to $53
billion.
The revenue from the oil is $80 billion to go around.
Where did the other $27 billion go?
 Cost of war - $15b + $12b

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

112
Let x be Venezuela’s share of the settlement.
Then if x > 33 it satisfies Venezuela.
And if 80 – x > 20 then x also satisfies Columbia. Or
if x < 60.
Think of this as terms of trade.
Then x is mutually satisfactory when 33 < x < 60

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

113
Any settlement that gives Venezuela $33 billion but
no more than $60 billion is preferable to war.
 Such a settlement exists
 Bargaining is mutually preferable to war. Say 50-50 split.

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

114
Why do states sometimes choose to resolve their
differences through the inefficient means of war
when bargaining, in theory, leaves both parties
better off.
 Maybe the assumptions are not agreeable. Maybe there is
a mathematical quirk to the numbers?
 We are going to study this in more detail.

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

115
Using your understanding of the recent Syrian
situation, and what we have learnt about the
rationality for war, argue a case for President Obama
requesting the Congress to approve military action
against Syria.
The homework rubric will apply
Keep your essay to under 750 words.

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

116
Preemptive war
Preventative war
War from misinformation

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

117
To prevent a shift in the balance of power
A war to prevent an inevitable war
 Self fulfilling expectations

Examples:
 Pearl Harbor
 The 1967 6-Day War
 The 2003 Gulf War II

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

118
Preventive war without the permission of the UN is
illegal.
 The Bush Doctrine declared that these expectations are
unrealistic

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

119
International Relations Unit 4

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

120
A hypothetical situation:
 Consider two tribes Og and Ug
 Og has game, and Ug does not
 What happens?

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

121
System-Level Causes
The distribution of power
The anarchial nature of the system
System-level economic factors
System-level biosphere stress

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

122
State-Level Causes of War
Militarism
Externalization of Internal Conflict

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

123
Individual-Level Causes of War
Human Characteristics
Individual Leaders’ Characteristics

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

124
Terrorism and Humanitarian Intervention
Social Justice

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

125
The nature and limits of terrorism
Distinguish between domestic and international
Terrorism:
 Violent
 Carried out by individuals, non-government, covert
government
 Target civilians
 Uses clandestine methods
 Attempts to influence politics
Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

126
State Terrorism
Transnational Terrorist Groups

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

127
Between 1968 and 2006, more than 10,000
international terror attacks and over 14,000 deaths
Domestic terrorism is more common
Middle East leads the terror charts with more than
60% of all attacks

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

128
Conventional weapons
Radiological weapons
Chemical and biological weapons

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

129
System-level
 Global imbalance

State-level
 US support of Israel

Individual-level
 Psychological drivers?

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

130
“War on terror”?
Unconventional Force
 Arms Transfers
 Special Operations

Conventional Force
Diplomacy
Avoid unchecked escalation
Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

131
Biological Weapons
Chemical Weapons
Nuclear Weapons

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

132
 Choose a terrorist organization listed below and research the
causes and rationality behind their formation and
motivations of the organization and identify potential
resolutions.
 United Liberation Front of Assam
 Hamas
 Hezbollah
 Hizbul Mujahideen
 Jaish-e-Mohammed
 Lakshar-e-Taiba
 Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

133
International Relations Unit 5

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

134
Chanakya and Machiavelli
 Chandragupta Maurya and The Medici
 Arthashastra and The Prince

Sun Tzu’s The Art of War
Development of political theory from the medieval
times.

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

135
Realist (Realpolitik) – a zero sum game.
Classic and Neo Realism
 Difference in root of conflict
 Inherent distrust v. anarchy
 No place for morality or ideology in foreign policy

Realism – Emphasis on power
 Secure your own country’s interest
 Establish a balance of power
 “Peace through strength” ~ Ronald Reagan
 Do not waste power on peripheral goals
Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

136
Human Nature
 Pessimistic, self interest
and competitive

Core Concepts
 Power, conflict

Reality
 Largely objective

Political Stakes
 Zero-sum

Conflict in System
 Central and Inevitable

International System
 Anarchic

Cause of Conflicts
 Pursuing self Interest

Best Path to Peace
 Balance of Power

Key Organizations
 States

Morality
 None

Policy Prescriptions
 Self Interest
Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

137
People and countries are capable of finding mutual
interests and cooperating to achieve them by
working
through
and
with
international
organizations and international law.
 Shutting down of Guantanamo Bay

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

138
Liberals reject the realists’ contention that politics is
inherently and exclusively a struggle for power.
Unlike realists, for liberals, morality plays a large role
in the play for power.
Altruism is a weapon for realists.
Non-zero sum game.

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

139
Classical is a direct descendant of idealism.
Unlike realists, classic liberals are optimistic about
human nature.
 Jean-jacques Rousseau – “The Social Contract”
 Humans join together in society because it is easier to survive.

Neoliberalism developed in the 1970s and 80s.
Competition between states in the anarchic world
causes conflict – parallel to Neorealism.
However, unlike the Neorealists, Neoliberals believe in a
complex interdependency of states in the anarchic world
which may help promote internationalism.
Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

140
Cooperation does not mean that they are unwilling
to use military power.
However, place emphasis of legitimacy on the UN
and IGOs.
Surrender some sovereignty to improve themselves
 European Union

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

141
“There is nothing good or bad, but thinking makes it
so” ~ Hamlet
Political realities are mindsets
Politics is driven by class warfare – Marx and Engels
… or by structures such as states and organized
religion – Feminists
States are held together by means of force for the
structure, not the people.
Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

142
International Relations Unit 6

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

143
Is nationalism a good thing?
Why do we feel patriotic? Is it for the land or for the
people living in it?
How would the world be different if we did not
enforce patriotic emotions?

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

144
International Relations Unit 10

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

145
International Relations Unit 13

Abhishek Maity 2013
11/6/2013

146

More Related Content

What's hot

Liberalism in global politics
Liberalism in global politicsLiberalism in global politics
Liberalism in global politicsbentogo
 
International relations(Introduction and its Theories)
International relations(Introduction and its Theories)International relations(Introduction and its Theories)
International relations(Introduction and its Theories)Wathan Lin
 
Lecture1. Realism and Liberalism
Lecture1. Realism and LiberalismLecture1. Realism and Liberalism
Lecture1. Realism and LiberalismAnna Dekaltchouk
 
Theories of International Relations-Introduction
Theories of International Relations-IntroductionTheories of International Relations-Introduction
Theories of International Relations-IntroductionKeshab Giri
 
The history and evolution of foreign policy analysis
The history and evolution of foreign policy analysisThe history and evolution of foreign policy analysis
The history and evolution of foreign policy analysisibrahimkoncak
 
Balance of power by md sharif hussain
Balance of power by  md sharif hussainBalance of power by  md sharif hussain
Balance of power by md sharif hussainMDSharifHussain
 
SECURITY: DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY: DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONALSECURITY: DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY: DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONALFaHaD .H. NooR
 
Constructivism
Constructivism Constructivism
Constructivism Aidar312kg
 
7 foreign policy process (1)
7 foreign policy process (1)7 foreign policy process (1)
7 foreign policy process (1)Ayesha Bhatti
 
Non-State Actors and Global Governance
Non-State Actors and Global GovernanceNon-State Actors and Global Governance
Non-State Actors and Global GovernanceSedat Yüzücü
 
Introduction to National Interest, it's Nature, Definition, and Types.
Introduction to National Interest, it's Nature, Definition, and Types.Introduction to National Interest, it's Nature, Definition, and Types.
Introduction to National Interest, it's Nature, Definition, and Types.Muhammad Saad
 

What's hot (20)

Diplomacy defined
Diplomacy definedDiplomacy defined
Diplomacy defined
 
Liberalism in global politics
Liberalism in global politicsLiberalism in global politics
Liberalism in global politics
 
International relations(Introduction and its Theories)
International relations(Introduction and its Theories)International relations(Introduction and its Theories)
International relations(Introduction and its Theories)
 
Lecture1. Realism and Liberalism
Lecture1. Realism and LiberalismLecture1. Realism and Liberalism
Lecture1. Realism and Liberalism
 
FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS
FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSISFOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS
FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS
 
National Interest
National InterestNational Interest
National Interest
 
Power in ir
Power in irPower in ir
Power in ir
 
DIPLOMACY
DIPLOMACYDIPLOMACY
DIPLOMACY
 
Theories of International Relations-Introduction
Theories of International Relations-IntroductionTheories of International Relations-Introduction
Theories of International Relations-Introduction
 
The history and evolution of foreign policy analysis
The history and evolution of foreign policy analysisThe history and evolution of foreign policy analysis
The history and evolution of foreign policy analysis
 
NATIONAL POWER.pdf
NATIONAL POWER.pdfNATIONAL POWER.pdf
NATIONAL POWER.pdf
 
Balance of power by md sharif hussain
Balance of power by  md sharif hussainBalance of power by  md sharif hussain
Balance of power by md sharif hussain
 
Liberalism
LiberalismLiberalism
Liberalism
 
SECURITY: DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY: DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONALSECURITY: DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY: DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL
 
Constructivism
Constructivism Constructivism
Constructivism
 
7 foreign policy process (1)
7 foreign policy process (1)7 foreign policy process (1)
7 foreign policy process (1)
 
Liberalism
LiberalismLiberalism
Liberalism
 
Liberalism
LiberalismLiberalism
Liberalism
 
Non-State Actors and Global Governance
Non-State Actors and Global GovernanceNon-State Actors and Global Governance
Non-State Actors and Global Governance
 
Introduction to National Interest, it's Nature, Definition, and Types.
Introduction to National Interest, it's Nature, Definition, and Types.Introduction to National Interest, it's Nature, Definition, and Types.
Introduction to National Interest, it's Nature, Definition, and Types.
 

Viewers also liked

Introduciton to international relation
Introduciton to international relationIntroduciton to international relation
Introduciton to international relationAnjan Kumar Dahal
 
Theories of International Relations
Theories of International RelationsTheories of International Relations
Theories of International RelationsJeffrey Hart
 
03 the main theories in international relations
03 the main theories in international relations03 the main theories in international relations
03 the main theories in international relationsfatima d
 
01 basic concepts in international relations
01 basic concepts in international relations01 basic concepts in international relations
01 basic concepts in international relationsfatima d
 
Ir meaning, nature and importance
Ir  meaning, nature and importanceIr  meaning, nature and importance
Ir meaning, nature and importanceAsad Ali
 
Theories of international relations
Theories of international relationsTheories of international relations
Theories of international relationsgravy503
 
Theories of international relations ppt
Theories of international relations pptTheories of international relations ppt
Theories of international relations pptVivek Hind
 
3 Approaches in International Relations
3 Approaches in International Relations3 Approaches in International Relations
3 Approaches in International RelationsWai-Kwok Wong
 
Actors of international relations
Actors of international relationsActors of international relations
Actors of international relationsSayotters
 
international relation
international relation international relation
international relation Julien Mort
 
Political Science 7 – International Relations - Power Point #4
Political Science 7 – International Relations - Power Point #4Political Science 7 – International Relations - Power Point #4
Political Science 7 – International Relations - Power Point #4John Paul Tabakian
 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND WORLD POLITICS (Theories)
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND WORLD POLITICS (Theories)INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND WORLD POLITICS (Theories)
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND WORLD POLITICS (Theories)Muhammad Syukhri Shafee
 
Foreign Policy and Level of Analysis Problem
Foreign Policy and Level of Analysis ProblemForeign Policy and Level of Analysis Problem
Foreign Policy and Level of Analysis ProblemAbdul Basit Adeel
 
Realism Theory of IR
Realism Theory of IRRealism Theory of IR
Realism Theory of IRTallat Satti
 
Elements of National Power
Elements of National PowerElements of National Power
Elements of National PowerZawer Michael
 
Liberalism theory,Types of liberalism,and criticism
Liberalism theory,Types of liberalism,and criticismLiberalism theory,Types of liberalism,and criticism
Liberalism theory,Types of liberalism,and criticismTallat Satti
 

Viewers also liked (20)

Introduciton to international relation
Introduciton to international relationIntroduciton to international relation
Introduciton to international relation
 
International relations
International relationsInternational relations
International relations
 
Theories of International Relations
Theories of International RelationsTheories of International Relations
Theories of International Relations
 
03 the main theories in international relations
03 the main theories in international relations03 the main theories in international relations
03 the main theories in international relations
 
01 basic concepts in international relations
01 basic concepts in international relations01 basic concepts in international relations
01 basic concepts in international relations
 
Origin and evolution of international relations
Origin and evolution of international relationsOrigin and evolution of international relations
Origin and evolution of international relations
 
Ir meaning, nature and importance
Ir  meaning, nature and importanceIr  meaning, nature and importance
Ir meaning, nature and importance
 
Theories of international relations
Theories of international relationsTheories of international relations
Theories of international relations
 
Theories of international relations ppt
Theories of international relations pptTheories of international relations ppt
Theories of international relations ppt
 
3 Approaches in International Relations
3 Approaches in International Relations3 Approaches in International Relations
3 Approaches in International Relations
 
Actors of international relations
Actors of international relationsActors of international relations
Actors of international relations
 
international relation
international relation international relation
international relation
 
Political Science 7 – International Relations - Power Point #4
Political Science 7 – International Relations - Power Point #4Political Science 7 – International Relations - Power Point #4
Political Science 7 – International Relations - Power Point #4
 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND WORLD POLITICS (Theories)
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND WORLD POLITICS (Theories)INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND WORLD POLITICS (Theories)
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND WORLD POLITICS (Theories)
 
Foreign Policy and Level of Analysis Problem
Foreign Policy and Level of Analysis ProblemForeign Policy and Level of Analysis Problem
Foreign Policy and Level of Analysis Problem
 
Realism Theory of IR
Realism Theory of IRRealism Theory of IR
Realism Theory of IR
 
Realism (Part 2)
Realism (Part 2) Realism (Part 2)
Realism (Part 2)
 
Elements of National Power
Elements of National PowerElements of National Power
Elements of National Power
 
Globalization and ir
Globalization and irGlobalization and ir
Globalization and ir
 
Liberalism theory,Types of liberalism,and criticism
Liberalism theory,Types of liberalism,and criticismLiberalism theory,Types of liberalism,and criticism
Liberalism theory,Types of liberalism,and criticism
 

Similar to 2013-2014 International Relations Lecture Slides

Similar to 2013-2014 International Relations Lecture Slides (16)

Political research paper
Political research paperPolitical research paper
Political research paper
 
TheoriesofInternationalRelations
TheoriesofInternationalRelationsTheoriesofInternationalRelations
TheoriesofInternationalRelations
 
Political Essays
Political EssaysPolitical Essays
Political Essays
 
Tabakian Pols 7 Fall/Spring 2014 Power 3
Tabakian Pols 7 Fall/Spring 2014 Power 3Tabakian Pols 7 Fall/Spring 2014 Power 3
Tabakian Pols 7 Fall/Spring 2014 Power 3
 
Who and What Ought Government RepresentWith the close of anot.docx
Who and What Ought Government RepresentWith the close of anot.docxWho and What Ought Government RepresentWith the close of anot.docx
Who and What Ought Government RepresentWith the close of anot.docx
 
Essay On People
Essay On PeopleEssay On People
Essay On People
 
Political Science 7 – International Relations - Power Point #3
Political Science 7 – International Relations - Power Point #3Political Science 7 – International Relations - Power Point #3
Political Science 7 – International Relations - Power Point #3
 
Tabakian Pols 7 Fall/Spring 2014 Power 2
Tabakian Pols 7 Fall/Spring 2014 Power 2Tabakian Pols 7 Fall/Spring 2014 Power 2
Tabakian Pols 7 Fall/Spring 2014 Power 2
 
Political Science 7 – International Relations - Power Point #2
Political Science 7 – International Relations - Power Point #2Political Science 7 – International Relations - Power Point #2
Political Science 7 – International Relations - Power Point #2
 
Fys paper
Fys paperFys paper
Fys paper
 
A Democratic Government
A Democratic GovernmentA Democratic Government
A Democratic Government
 
1.pptx
1.pptx1.pptx
1.pptx
 
Boss2 ppt ch13
Boss2 ppt ch13Boss2 ppt ch13
Boss2 ppt ch13
 
Democratic Theory and American Political Culture
Democratic Theory and American Political CultureDemocratic Theory and American Political Culture
Democratic Theory and American Political Culture
 
An Essay On Politics
An Essay On PoliticsAn Essay On Politics
An Essay On Politics
 
An Essay On Politics
An Essay On PoliticsAn Essay On Politics
An Essay On Politics
 

Recently uploaded

Concurrency Control in Database Management system
Concurrency Control in Database Management systemConcurrency Control in Database Management system
Concurrency Control in Database Management systemChristalin Nelson
 
4.11.24 Poverty and Inequality in America.pptx
4.11.24 Poverty and Inequality in America.pptx4.11.24 Poverty and Inequality in America.pptx
4.11.24 Poverty and Inequality in America.pptxmary850239
 
BIOCHEMISTRY-CARBOHYDRATE METABOLISM CHAPTER 2.pptx
BIOCHEMISTRY-CARBOHYDRATE METABOLISM CHAPTER 2.pptxBIOCHEMISTRY-CARBOHYDRATE METABOLISM CHAPTER 2.pptx
BIOCHEMISTRY-CARBOHYDRATE METABOLISM CHAPTER 2.pptxSayali Powar
 
Team Lead Succeed – Helping you and your team achieve high-performance teamwo...
Team Lead Succeed – Helping you and your team achieve high-performance teamwo...Team Lead Succeed – Helping you and your team achieve high-performance teamwo...
Team Lead Succeed – Helping you and your team achieve high-performance teamwo...Association for Project Management
 
Blowin' in the Wind of Caste_ Bob Dylan's Song as a Catalyst for Social Justi...
Blowin' in the Wind of Caste_ Bob Dylan's Song as a Catalyst for Social Justi...Blowin' in the Wind of Caste_ Bob Dylan's Song as a Catalyst for Social Justi...
Blowin' in the Wind of Caste_ Bob Dylan's Song as a Catalyst for Social Justi...DhatriParmar
 
Textual Evidence in Reading and Writing of SHS
Textual Evidence in Reading and Writing of SHSTextual Evidence in Reading and Writing of SHS
Textual Evidence in Reading and Writing of SHSMae Pangan
 
Narcotic and Non Narcotic Analgesic..pdf
Narcotic and Non Narcotic Analgesic..pdfNarcotic and Non Narcotic Analgesic..pdf
Narcotic and Non Narcotic Analgesic..pdfPrerana Jadhav
 
week 1 cookery 8 fourth - quarter .pptx
week 1 cookery 8  fourth  -  quarter .pptxweek 1 cookery 8  fourth  -  quarter .pptx
week 1 cookery 8 fourth - quarter .pptxJonalynLegaspi2
 
Man or Manufactured_ Redefining Humanity Through Biopunk Narratives.pptx
Man or Manufactured_ Redefining Humanity Through Biopunk Narratives.pptxMan or Manufactured_ Redefining Humanity Through Biopunk Narratives.pptx
Man or Manufactured_ Redefining Humanity Through Biopunk Narratives.pptxDhatriParmar
 
4.11.24 Mass Incarceration and the New Jim Crow.pptx
4.11.24 Mass Incarceration and the New Jim Crow.pptx4.11.24 Mass Incarceration and the New Jim Crow.pptx
4.11.24 Mass Incarceration and the New Jim Crow.pptxmary850239
 
Oppenheimer Film Discussion for Philosophy and Film
Oppenheimer Film Discussion for Philosophy and FilmOppenheimer Film Discussion for Philosophy and Film
Oppenheimer Film Discussion for Philosophy and FilmStan Meyer
 
MS4 level being good citizen -imperative- (1) (1).pdf
MS4 level   being good citizen -imperative- (1) (1).pdfMS4 level   being good citizen -imperative- (1) (1).pdf
MS4 level being good citizen -imperative- (1) (1).pdfMr Bounab Samir
 
Reading and Writing Skills 11 quarter 4 melc 1
Reading and Writing Skills 11 quarter 4 melc 1Reading and Writing Skills 11 quarter 4 melc 1
Reading and Writing Skills 11 quarter 4 melc 1GloryAnnCastre1
 
Mythology Quiz-4th April 2024, Quiz Club NITW
Mythology Quiz-4th April 2024, Quiz Club NITWMythology Quiz-4th April 2024, Quiz Club NITW
Mythology Quiz-4th April 2024, Quiz Club NITWQuiz Club NITW
 
Beauty Amidst the Bytes_ Unearthing Unexpected Advantages of the Digital Wast...
Beauty Amidst the Bytes_ Unearthing Unexpected Advantages of the Digital Wast...Beauty Amidst the Bytes_ Unearthing Unexpected Advantages of the Digital Wast...
Beauty Amidst the Bytes_ Unearthing Unexpected Advantages of the Digital Wast...DhatriParmar
 
Mental Health Awareness - a toolkit for supporting young minds
Mental Health Awareness - a toolkit for supporting young mindsMental Health Awareness - a toolkit for supporting young minds
Mental Health Awareness - a toolkit for supporting young mindsPooky Knightsmith
 
Decoding the Tweet _ Practical Criticism in the Age of Hashtag.pptx
Decoding the Tweet _ Practical Criticism in the Age of Hashtag.pptxDecoding the Tweet _ Practical Criticism in the Age of Hashtag.pptx
Decoding the Tweet _ Practical Criticism in the Age of Hashtag.pptxDhatriParmar
 

Recently uploaded (20)

Concurrency Control in Database Management system
Concurrency Control in Database Management systemConcurrency Control in Database Management system
Concurrency Control in Database Management system
 
4.11.24 Poverty and Inequality in America.pptx
4.11.24 Poverty and Inequality in America.pptx4.11.24 Poverty and Inequality in America.pptx
4.11.24 Poverty and Inequality in America.pptx
 
BIOCHEMISTRY-CARBOHYDRATE METABOLISM CHAPTER 2.pptx
BIOCHEMISTRY-CARBOHYDRATE METABOLISM CHAPTER 2.pptxBIOCHEMISTRY-CARBOHYDRATE METABOLISM CHAPTER 2.pptx
BIOCHEMISTRY-CARBOHYDRATE METABOLISM CHAPTER 2.pptx
 
Team Lead Succeed – Helping you and your team achieve high-performance teamwo...
Team Lead Succeed – Helping you and your team achieve high-performance teamwo...Team Lead Succeed – Helping you and your team achieve high-performance teamwo...
Team Lead Succeed – Helping you and your team achieve high-performance teamwo...
 
Paradigm shift in nursing research by RS MEHTA
Paradigm shift in nursing research by RS MEHTAParadigm shift in nursing research by RS MEHTA
Paradigm shift in nursing research by RS MEHTA
 
Blowin' in the Wind of Caste_ Bob Dylan's Song as a Catalyst for Social Justi...
Blowin' in the Wind of Caste_ Bob Dylan's Song as a Catalyst for Social Justi...Blowin' in the Wind of Caste_ Bob Dylan's Song as a Catalyst for Social Justi...
Blowin' in the Wind of Caste_ Bob Dylan's Song as a Catalyst for Social Justi...
 
Textual Evidence in Reading and Writing of SHS
Textual Evidence in Reading and Writing of SHSTextual Evidence in Reading and Writing of SHS
Textual Evidence in Reading and Writing of SHS
 
Narcotic and Non Narcotic Analgesic..pdf
Narcotic and Non Narcotic Analgesic..pdfNarcotic and Non Narcotic Analgesic..pdf
Narcotic and Non Narcotic Analgesic..pdf
 
week 1 cookery 8 fourth - quarter .pptx
week 1 cookery 8  fourth  -  quarter .pptxweek 1 cookery 8  fourth  -  quarter .pptx
week 1 cookery 8 fourth - quarter .pptx
 
Man or Manufactured_ Redefining Humanity Through Biopunk Narratives.pptx
Man or Manufactured_ Redefining Humanity Through Biopunk Narratives.pptxMan or Manufactured_ Redefining Humanity Through Biopunk Narratives.pptx
Man or Manufactured_ Redefining Humanity Through Biopunk Narratives.pptx
 
4.11.24 Mass Incarceration and the New Jim Crow.pptx
4.11.24 Mass Incarceration and the New Jim Crow.pptx4.11.24 Mass Incarceration and the New Jim Crow.pptx
4.11.24 Mass Incarceration and the New Jim Crow.pptx
 
prashanth updated resume 2024 for Teaching Profession
prashanth updated resume 2024 for Teaching Professionprashanth updated resume 2024 for Teaching Profession
prashanth updated resume 2024 for Teaching Profession
 
Faculty Profile prashantha K EEE dept Sri Sairam college of Engineering
Faculty Profile prashantha K EEE dept Sri Sairam college of EngineeringFaculty Profile prashantha K EEE dept Sri Sairam college of Engineering
Faculty Profile prashantha K EEE dept Sri Sairam college of Engineering
 
Oppenheimer Film Discussion for Philosophy and Film
Oppenheimer Film Discussion for Philosophy and FilmOppenheimer Film Discussion for Philosophy and Film
Oppenheimer Film Discussion for Philosophy and Film
 
MS4 level being good citizen -imperative- (1) (1).pdf
MS4 level   being good citizen -imperative- (1) (1).pdfMS4 level   being good citizen -imperative- (1) (1).pdf
MS4 level being good citizen -imperative- (1) (1).pdf
 
Reading and Writing Skills 11 quarter 4 melc 1
Reading and Writing Skills 11 quarter 4 melc 1Reading and Writing Skills 11 quarter 4 melc 1
Reading and Writing Skills 11 quarter 4 melc 1
 
Mythology Quiz-4th April 2024, Quiz Club NITW
Mythology Quiz-4th April 2024, Quiz Club NITWMythology Quiz-4th April 2024, Quiz Club NITW
Mythology Quiz-4th April 2024, Quiz Club NITW
 
Beauty Amidst the Bytes_ Unearthing Unexpected Advantages of the Digital Wast...
Beauty Amidst the Bytes_ Unearthing Unexpected Advantages of the Digital Wast...Beauty Amidst the Bytes_ Unearthing Unexpected Advantages of the Digital Wast...
Beauty Amidst the Bytes_ Unearthing Unexpected Advantages of the Digital Wast...
 
Mental Health Awareness - a toolkit for supporting young minds
Mental Health Awareness - a toolkit for supporting young mindsMental Health Awareness - a toolkit for supporting young minds
Mental Health Awareness - a toolkit for supporting young minds
 
Decoding the Tweet _ Practical Criticism in the Age of Hashtag.pptx
Decoding the Tweet _ Practical Criticism in the Age of Hashtag.pptxDecoding the Tweet _ Practical Criticism in the Age of Hashtag.pptx
Decoding the Tweet _ Practical Criticism in the Age of Hashtag.pptx
 

2013-2014 International Relations Lecture Slides

  • 1. Global Affairs and Politics Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 1
  • 2. Levels Descriptor 0 No other level achieved. 1 Response is provided but does not show an understanding of the prompt. Response does not meet expected length given time limit. Response does not make connection to prior learning. 2 Response shows an understanding of prompt but is not addressed. Response does not meet expected length given time limit. Response does not make connection to prior learning. 3 Response begins to address prompt. Response nearly meets expected length given time limit. Response does not make connection to prior learning. 4 Response addresses prompt. Response meets expected length given time limit. Response attempts connections to prior knowledge. 5 Response clearly addresses prompt. Response exceeds expected length given time limit. Response clearly makes connection to prior knowledge. Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 2
  • 3.  Introduction  Nation States – What is a Country?  Types of Governments  Asking the Right Questions  Thinking About World Politics Strategically  Evolution of World Politics – Introduction to Political Theories  Nationalism  Globalization and Transnationalism  International Organizations  National Power and Diplomacy  International Law and Morality  National and International Security  International Political Economy and Cooperation  Human Rights and the Environment and Technology Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 3
  • 4. International Relations Unit 1 Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 4
  • 5. “The world is a stage and all the men and women merely players”  ~ William Shakespeare, As You Like It The Actors:  States  International Organizations (IGOs)  Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)  Multinational Corporations (MNCs)  Individuals Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 5
  • 6. Anarchical International System One in which there is no central authority to set and enforce rules and resolve disputes. This remains the main thrust of world politics, but increasingly there is an alternative approach in evidence Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 6
  • 7. • Society, Interest, Interaction, Safety, Prosperity, Authority, Dispute Resolution Dimension Human organization Interests Interaction Basis of safety Basis of prosperity Ultimate authority Dispute resolution Traditional Approach National societies National/self-interests Competition Self-protection Self-help Sovereign states Power prevails Alternative Approach Global society Global/mutual interests Cooperation Collective security Mutual assistance International organizations Law prevails Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 7
  • 8. Q. Is the globalization approach pure fantasy? Think of the individual in a society and how we interact. There is a sense of common good in a domestic society. A century ago the UN, the WTO, the EU, the ICC would have been considered science fiction! Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 8
  • 9. Q1. How many countries are there in the world? Q2. Are all countries equal? Q3. What are the three biggest MNCs in the world? What is their annual earnings? Q4. Name three people who have changed the way we look at the world through individual effort. Why? Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 9
  • 10. Country= State Sovereign  The monopoly on the use of legitimate force within a territory A “state” is the sovereign entity of a territory Please note:  Public violence is an illegitimate use of force  National Governments might delegate power  Police, Military  But the authority to use force originates from the state’s permission Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 10
  • 11.  Sovereign entities are not supposed to meddle in the internal affairs of other sovereign entities.  This is mostly true today but was not always the case.  A trivial analogy – Parents and Children and Kingdom A and B  Where did it all start?  Treaty of Westphalia  Signed in 1648  Ended the 30 Years War  Established the principle of sovereignty (Westphalia Sovereignty) Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 11
  • 12.  Definition: the monopoly on the legitimate use of force within a territory  Dispute resolution between two or more sub-state actors occurs through the sovereign states.  Sovereigns are expected to ensure their sub-state actors do not use force against foreign actors.  Sovereign states control their own domestic affairs.  Sovereign states do not meddle with internal issues in other states.  But states violate this rule all the time!  US incursion into Pakistan to kill Bin Laden  US in Libya  Russia protecting South Ossetia from Georgia Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 12
  • 13.  Why do states violate the sovereign rule?  Strong actors can violate sovereignty and get away with it.  They can do this because there is no punishment.  Why is there no punishment?  Anarchy! Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 13
  • 14.  Who is sovereign over the sovereigns?  No one!  Domestic analogy: In Kodi  A man kills his neighbor  A bank robber steals millions in gold  The party last night got a little too crazy – Project X  Solution?  The police come take care of it – provided there is strong domestic policy  In weak systems this might not be true.  A mafia boss kills a rival  A drug lord assassinates a rival cartel leader  The local police is too weak to handle this situation Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 14
  • 15.  No one comes to arrest:  US going into Pakistan  NATO going into Libya  USSR in Czechoslovakia  USSR in Afganistan  Life in International Relations is closer to the Mafia world  World Police (United Nations ad-hoc military force) is either too weak or non-existent to bring justice. Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 15
  • 16.  Definition: The lack of overall political authority  In international relations, no one is sovereign over the sovereign  Anarchy is a world of “self-help”  Solve it on your own  Convince a friend to come help you  The government isn’t going to come to your rescue  Anarchy is NOT chaos  Most states are not fighting  Anarchy permits many different outcomes Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 16
  • 17.  If anything can happen, how do we predict or explain outcomes?  Anarchy is a trivial explanation – explains everything and nothing  We need more precise predictions and explanations Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 17
  • 18. Q1. What were the key aspects of the Treaty of Westphalia? Q2. Other examples of states violating the idea of Westphalian sovereignty. Why can states get away with it? Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 18
  • 19. International Relations Unit 2 Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 19
  • 20.  Autocracy  Monarchy  Theocracy  Democracy  Republic  “Democratic Republic”  Communism Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 20
  • 21.  Despotism  Rule by one individual with absolute power.  Dictatorship  Rule by individual with full power over country. Usually militaristic control.  Fascism  Rule by leader base only. Focuses heavily on patriotism and nationalism. Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 21
  • 22.  Absolute Monarchy/Emirate  A king or a non-elected “royal” is in power. Rule by inheritance. Ultimate governing body.  Constitutional Monarchy  Variant of monarchy where there is a monarch but with powers limited by a constitution. Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 22
  • 23.  A religious institute or “God” as the head of state.  Religious institute enforce law and policy in the state. Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 23
  • 24.  Rule by government chosen by an enfranchised population.  No discrimination on who can vote (except for an minimum age barrier) Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 24
  • 25.  Similar to a democracy but the there is a system of elected representatives.  Q – Identify the qualities that distinguish democracy from a republic. Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 25
  • 26.  Usually a country that describes itself as “democratic republic” in modern history is neither democratic nor republic.  They are usually some form of autocratic government. Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 26
  • 27.  Built on the economic foundations created by Karl Marx and Fredrich Engels.  A form of Oligarchy.  Although the system should have the public’s best interest in mind, historically they have devolved into autocratic systems. Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 27
  • 28.  For your given country. Describe your ideal system of government. Create your own system. You can research other types of governments apart from the ones covered in this course. Why is your government better than democracy? Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 28
  • 29.  Using what you have learnt about different systems of governments, defend your assigned form of government in terms of sustainability, equity, and moral superiority. Each person has 3 minutes to speak and 2 minutes for rebuttal. Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 29
  • 30. International Relations Unit 4 Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 30
  • 31.  Two types of explanations:  Proximate Cause: Why did this happen the way it happened?  Underlying Cause: Why was this thing asking to happen?  We prefer “underlying cause” to “proximate cause” because:  Proximate gives us silly policy ideas  Underlying cause tells us how to solve the problem. Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 31
  • 32.  Proximate Cause:  The driver died because he went through the wind shield of his vehicle.  What have we learnt?  Don’t fly through the wind shield of your vehicle. Don’t get into car accidents.  Underlying Cause:  The driver died because he wasn’t wearing his seatbelt.  What have we learnt?  Wear your seatbelt. Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 32
  • 33.  Proximate Cause:  They lost because of poor fielding.  What have we learnt?  Don’t field badly.  Underlying Cause:  They were bad fielders because everyone was drunk.  What have we learnt?  Don’t drink and dive. Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 33
  • 34.  Proximate Cause:  Archduke Franz Ferdinand was assassinated.  What have we learnt?  Don’t let assassinations of dukes happen.  Underlying Cause:  Military technology gave countries a huge first strike advantage.  What have we learnt?  First strike advantages cause war. Build defensive weapons not offensive. Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 34
  • 35.  Proximate Cause:  Hitler was a bad person.  Underlying Cause:  Reparations from WW 1 bankrupted Germany, allowing domestic institutions to fail.  What have we learnt?  Let all aspiring Austrian artists into art school.  What have we learnt?  Be magnanimous in victory. Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 35
  • 36.  Proximate causes are shortsighted.  Discovering underlying causes allows us to connect dissimilar situations and make sensible recommendations about today’s world.  The process is difficult. Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 36
  • 37.  Watch the 2008 German Film “Die Welle” (The Wave) and analyze the conditions that lead to a autocratic setup in a nation state. Do you think it is possible that it might happen in the world again?  Consider the fact that this is based on a true story about the life of Ron Jones and his experiment The Third Wave.  Keep your answer to under 500 words. The homework grading rubric applies. Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 37
  • 38.  The international realm is anarchic so how can we predict what’s going to happen? How can we narrow down our expectations?  Solution: Analyze actor’s abilities and desires and find plausible outcomes…  We need to develop tools of strategy to understand how the international world works.  Narrow down and eliminate choices  US will not bomb itself Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 38
  • 39.  There are about 200 odd states in the world  How State 1 acts affects State 2’s outcomes  How State 2 acts affects State 1’s outcomes  How State 1 acts affects State 3’s outcomes  Etc…  States are strategically interdependent. Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 39
  • 40.  States are strategically inter-dependent.  States know they are so.  Intelligence is power.  US spends so much money on intelligence. Why?  Is there a way to scientifically study strategic interdependence?  Game Theory! Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 40
  • 41.  Originally developed in the 1950s by Neuman and Nash to study economic interactions.  Applies very well to state level behavior.  Note:  Game theory is not black magic  Does not capture all elements of reality  It helps us model the world in simpler terms  Cannot tell us anything new that good research will not unearth  It maps assumptions to logically valid conclusions Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 41
  • 42.  Create some assumptions using research  Conduct some analysis of those assumptions  Reach logically valid conclusions Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 42
  • 43.  If your assumptions are silly, then your conclusions will also be silly even though they might be logically valid conclusions.  Results are only as good as our assumptions  Assumptions need to be narrow in focus and concrete, too open ended assumptions will lead to vagueness and nonconclusions. Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 43
  • 44.  If your assumptions are silly, then your conclusions will also be silly even though they might be logically valid conclusions.  Results are only as good as our assumptions  Assumptions need to be narrow in focus and concrete, too open ended assumptions will lead to vagueness and nonconclusions. Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 44
  • 45.  Big Question:  Under what conditions can two parties play nice with one another?  Remember there is no authority figure!  Incentive to cheat  Example: Your roommate leaves Rs. 2000 outside.  Disincentive to cheat – consequences  If you steal the money you go to jail.  But in the International World…  Anarchy – no world police  No laws forcing two states to play nice  Is cooperation under these circumstances? Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 45
  • 46.  How can individually rational behavior lead to collectively bad outcomes for all?  Can the shadow of future interaction induce two states to play nice with one another?  No, if we know when the period of play ends.  Yes, if we do not know when the period of play ends. Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 46
  • 47. The situation:  Two students are caught by the Dean  The Dean think that they were both smoking  But the Dean can only smell smoke, he can’t prove it.  Thus the Dean needs one of the students to rat out the other. Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 47
  • 48.  The deal:  If no one confesses to the smoking, the Dean can only punish them for being out late.  Punishment – Dorm pounding  If one confesses and the other does not.  The confessor gets off  The other one gets expelled  If both confess  Both get suspended  [DIAGRAM] Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 48
  • 49.  Imagine that they are working in their best interest.  How will they react?  Nash Equilibrium is for both to Confess even though it is socially the worst possible outcome. Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 49
  • 50.  “Cult of the Offensive” and the Origins of World War I  Tariffs and free trade policy  Arms races and arms treaties (Cold War)  “The Evolution of Cooperation” (Trench Warfare) Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 50
  • 51.  Reflection on Autocracy – “The Wave” due on 12-08-2013 by midnight on Turnitin and hardcopy in your folder.  Read up on World War I – Causes. Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 51
  • 52. International Relations Unit 3a Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 52
  • 53. Why did World War I start? Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 53
  • 54.  Serbia wanted a united Yugoslavia  June 28 – FF killed  July 28 – AH declares war on Serbia  July 28 – Russia declares war on AH  Aug 1 – Germany declares war on Russia Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 54
  • 55.  Aug 2 – Germany invades Luxemborg  Aug 3 – Germany declares war on France and Belgium  Aug 4 – United Kingdom declares war on Germany  Aug 6 – AH declares war on Russia  Serbia declares war on AH Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 55
  • 56.  Aug 11 – France declares war on AH  Aug 12 – UK declares war on AH  Aug 22 – AH declares war on Belgium  Aug 23 – Japan declares war on Germany  Aug 25 – Japan declares war on AH Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 56
  • 57.  Nov 1 – Russia declares war on the Ottoman Empire  Nov 5 – UK and France declare war on OE. Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 57
  • 58.  Archduke Franz Ferdinand was assassinated by Serbian Nationalists on 28 June 1914.  The war started because a dude with a funny mustache died  Why are these states preemptively declaring war on one another? Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 58
  • 59. Offense is the best defense? Military and political leaders at that time believed that the offense had an enormous advantage – first mover advantage.  New technology: machine guns, chemical weapons, railroads  Believed that this technology favors the first mover. Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 59
  • 60.  Consider a world with 2 states  Two strategies: Preemptive attack, Defend  Outcomes – ranked by benefits  I preempt, you defend. (Surprise attack! – I win!) - 3  We both defend. (Peace) - 2  We both preempt. (War) - 1  I defend, you preempt. (I lose, I’m a sucker) - 0  What do these assumptions mean?  [DIAGRAM] Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 60
  • 61.  Regardless of Germany’s move, France is always better of preempting.  Therefore France preempts.  Similarly, regardless of France’s move, Germany is always better of preempting.  Therefore Germany preempts.  The PEACE outcome is inherently unstable even though this is an overall more beneficial outcome for all. Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 61
  • 62. Country Total Mobilized Russia France British Empire Italy USA Japan Romania Serbia Belgium Greece Portugal Montenegro Total 12,000,000 8,410,000 8,904,467 5,615,000 4,355,000 800,000 750,000 707,343 267,000 230,000 100,000 50,000 42,188,810 Germany Austria-Hungary Turkey Bulgaria Total Grand Total 11,000,000 7,800,000 2,850,000 1,200,000 22,850,000 65,038,810 Dead Wounded Allies 1,700,000 4,950,000 1,357,800 4,266,000 908,371 2,090,212 650,000 947,000 126,000 234,300 300 907 335,706 120,000 45,000 133,148 13,716 44,686 5,000 21,000 7,222 13,751 3,000 10,000 5,152,115 12,831,004 Central Powers 1,773,700 4,216,058 1,200,000 3,620,000 325,000 400,000 87,500 152,390 3,386,200 8,388,448 8,538,315 21,219,452 POW or Missing Total Casualties Casualty as % of Mobilized 2,500,000 537,000 191,652 600,000 4,500 3 80,000 152,958 34,659 1,000 12,318 7,000 4,121,090 9,150,000 6,160,800 3,190,235 2,197,000 364,800 1,210 535,706 331,106 93,061 27,000 33,291 20,000 22,104,209 76% 73% 36% 39% 8% 0% 71% 47% 35% 12% 33% 40% 52% 1,152,800 2,200,000 250,000 27,029 3,629,829 7,750,919 7,142,558 7,020,000 975,000 266,919 15,404,477 37,508,686 65% 90% 34% 22% 67% 58% Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 62
  • 63. BARON VON RICHTHOFEN Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 63
  • 64. International Relations Unit 35b Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 64
  • 65. Big Question: Why is it so hard to implement free trade? Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 65
  • 66.  Free trade is a historically new phenomenon.  In the past, states used to set up high tariffs (import taxes) on imported goods.  Taxes are not fun – but taxes are good for bolstering domestic companies.  Recall from micro and macro that taxes raise consumer prices and that generally leads to inefficiency. Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 66
  • 67. Mexico doesn’t have the best grape-producing climate  Thus El Vino Nacional must spend more money to produce quality grapes.  The company must pass on the additional costs to the consumer or go out of business. Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 67
  • 68. California has great climate for grapes and makes wine with ease.  California companies can flood the Mexican market and put El Vino Nacional out of business.  But this funnels Mexican money out of Mexico and into California. Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 68
  • 69.  If Mexico taxes the imported wine, los precios del Vino Nacional will become competitive  El dinero stays within Mexico Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 69
  • 70. California doesn’t have the best agave-producing climate.  Thus, California tequila companies must spend more money to make good quality tequila.  The company must pass on this cost to consumers. Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 70
  • 71. Mexico has great climate for agave and makes great tequila.  Mexican companies can flood the Californian markets put the California tequila makers out of business.  But this funnels American money out of the US and into Mexico. Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 71
  • 72.  If USA taxes the imported tequila, California tequila makers are competitive.  Dollars stays within USA Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 72
  • 73. Tariffs everywhere Mexico taxes imports from California USA taxes imports from Mexico Everyone loses. [Strategic Model Diagram] Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 73
  • 74. New puzzle:  The prisoner’s dilemma predicts that we have high tariffs for both sides.  This was true before WW2, but not true any longer, why?  How have states managed free trade agreements recently? Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 74
  • 75. Test – 29 AUG Essay type, short answers, and objective. Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 75
  • 76. International Relations Unit 3c Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 76
  • 77. In a world of anarchy what is the most important force? Having a powerful military allows you to have your way. But military power is relative not absolute: The Roman Empire is more powerful than Italy is today So a state only makes a relative gain against a rival if it builds and the rival does not. Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 77
  • 78. Making weapons costs money – opportunity cost [DIAGRAM] Outcome is to build for both states. Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 78
  • 79. If the outcome always states build weapons then why do we have so many arms treaties? Why are arms treaties sustainable? Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 79
  • 80. Can future interaction inspire cooperation today? One shot – No, because players prefer to act aggressively as it is in your best interest. Some interactions are one shot – preemptive war Some interactions are repeated – trade and arms races. Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 80
  • 81. [DIAGRAM] – Moves from first round will be disclosed publicly. Question – Can the players cooperate in the first round under threat of punishment in the second round.  Is “I will cooperate today, and if you cooperate today as well, then I will cooperate tomorrow” a viable strategy? Stage 1:  Defect Stage 2: Must optimize in this turn as it is the last.  Defect Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 81
  • 82.  Stage 1  Stage 2 … … …  Stage N-2  Stage N-1  Stage N  Defect – must optimize as it is the last period of play Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 82
  • 83. Cooperation is not possible in repeated games if the length of the game is finite. Endgame sabotages cooperation in earlier stages. How much is $100,000 worth if the world ends:  Tomorrow  At the end of the year  Ten years from now What if the shadow of the future is indefinite?  We do not know when the interaction is going to end Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 83
  • 84. The shadow of future fails to inspire cooperation if the game has a definite end. But interactions in the real world seem to be unlikely to end.  Can the states maintain cooperation? Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 84
  • 85. The Model:  Play the Prisoner’s Dilemma repeatedly between two states.  After every period, they will play again with probability p.  Note p is fairly large. Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 85
  • 86. “Tough Love” strategy:  Begin by cooperating  If at any point in the game a player defects, then defect for the duration of the game… So, would two grim trigger players have an incentive to defect on one another? [DIAGRAM] Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 86
  • 87. Today’s payoff: 1 Tomorrow’s payoff: (p)(1) The day after’s payoff: (p)2(1) … The sum of this infinite geometric series is going to be 1/(1-p) Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 87
  • 88. Today’s payoff: 2 Tomorrow’s payoff: (p)(0) The day after’s payoff: (p)2(0) … The sum of this infinite geometric series is going to be 2. Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 88
  • 89. Cooperate: 1/(1-p) Betray: 2 (Technically could be slightly more if the betrayal happens after n rounds.) However, if p> ½ then cooperating is in my best interest. Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 89
  • 90. As long as we are likely to keep interacting with each other indefinitely, then cooperation is possible as it is in the best interest of both states. Threat of future loss of gain (i.e. punishment) keeps states in line even without a world police. States must not know when the game is going to end. Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 90
  • 91. International Relations Unit 6 Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 91
  • 92. Repeated play assumption was not sensible when we were talking about war mobilization. But most states most of the time are not in a state of war. Why? “Cooperate” and “Defect” are very restrictive strategies.  We need to allow states to bargain with one another. Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 92
  • 93. Why do states fight costly wars? Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 93
  • 94. If war is detrimental to both sides, why do you think we have wars?  Limit your answer to 300 words. Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 94
  • 95. A man falls over a wet floor and sues you for negligence. Your lawyer and his lawyer agree on the following:  There is a 60% chance of the lawsuit will be successful.  If he wins you have to pay him $40,000  Going to court will cost each of you $10,000 in fees regardless of outcome. Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 95
  • 96. Either you or him concede immediately  Your payoff: -$40,000  His payoff: 0 You reach an out of court settlement  A settlement of less than $34,000 is better for you.  A settlement of more than $14,000 is better for him. You let the court decide the matter  Your payoff: (-40,000)(0.6) – 10,000 = -$34,000  His payoff: (40,000)(0.6) – 10,000 = $14,000  How should we expect the matter to be resolved? Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 96
  • 97. War produces a winner and a loser – unless the power is very skewed, it is probabilistic. Fighting is costly because it kills people and destroys things. So why can’t two states settle the matter of the battlefield?  Rationalist’s Explanation of War Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 97
  • 98.  Part 1: The Research Question  Assumptions  War’s Inefficiency Puzzle  Part 2: The Answers  Preventive War  Misinterpretation Information  Issue Indivisibility  Preemptive War Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 of 98
  • 99.  BIG QUESTION: Can two perfectly intelligent, perfectly unbiased leaders fight a war against each other?  Let’s name some major wars in the last 100 years. Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 99
  • 100. Assume that states are a single entity, and their leader is only interested in maximizing the overall welfare of the state.  Is this always true? NO  Is this true some of the time? MAYBE Leaders often justify wars using the unitary actor assumption. Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 100
  • 101. I really suck at running our domestic economy. Everything is terrible so I will start a war to distract you from that. You’ll see I am a war hero and then you will reelect me. The media is too involved in a scandal about an intern and me so I am going to bomb some country in Africa that you’ve never heard of to distract them. Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 101
  • 102. This war is in the best interest of our national security. Fight them there so you don’t have to fight them at home. We have a moral obligation to intervene. Stabilizing the region will secure our economic interests.  It’s about WE not ME. Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 102
  • 103.  The unitary actor assumption allows us to analyze the validity of these explanations.  The war dynamics we will discuss also affect states that are not unitary actors.  Although even with non-unitary actors we can extend the same assumptions, but we will not cover that. Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 103
  • 104. Can wars be mutually beneficial? Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 104
  • 105. Let us assume a scenario: Venezuela discovers an oil deposit worth $80 billion Columbia declares the deposit is actually in their side of the border. The sides call in their military and prepare for war. Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 105
  • 106. Venezuela will win the war 60% of the time – which means they have 60% chance of winning the $80 billion in the oil. Cost of death, destruction, and lost oil is about $15 billion, regardless of the outcome. Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 106
  • 107. Columbia will win the war 40% of the time – which means they have 40% chance of winning the $80 billion in the oil. Cost of death, destruction, and lost oil is about $12 billion, regardless of the outcome. Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 107
  • 108. Is war inevitable for these two countries? Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 108
  • 109. Expected Payoff from the war: (80)(0.6) – 15 = $33b Venezuela must receive at least $33 billion to be satisfied. Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 109
  • 110. Expected payoff from the war: (80)(0.4) – 12 = 20 Columbia must receive at least $20 billion to be satisfied. Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 110
  • 111. Both countries have positive expected payoffs from fighting.  So war can be a rational choice for both parties. Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 111
  • 112. War is not rational here! Venezuela and Columbia’s demands sum up to $53 billion. The revenue from the oil is $80 billion to go around. Where did the other $27 billion go?  Cost of war - $15b + $12b Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 112
  • 113. Let x be Venezuela’s share of the settlement. Then if x > 33 it satisfies Venezuela. And if 80 – x > 20 then x also satisfies Columbia. Or if x < 60. Think of this as terms of trade. Then x is mutually satisfactory when 33 < x < 60 Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 113
  • 114. Any settlement that gives Venezuela $33 billion but no more than $60 billion is preferable to war.  Such a settlement exists  Bargaining is mutually preferable to war. Say 50-50 split. Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 114
  • 115. Why do states sometimes choose to resolve their differences through the inefficient means of war when bargaining, in theory, leaves both parties better off.  Maybe the assumptions are not agreeable. Maybe there is a mathematical quirk to the numbers?  We are going to study this in more detail. Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 115
  • 116. Using your understanding of the recent Syrian situation, and what we have learnt about the rationality for war, argue a case for President Obama requesting the Congress to approve military action against Syria. The homework rubric will apply Keep your essay to under 750 words. Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 116
  • 117. Preemptive war Preventative war War from misinformation Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 117
  • 118. To prevent a shift in the balance of power A war to prevent an inevitable war  Self fulfilling expectations Examples:  Pearl Harbor  The 1967 6-Day War  The 2003 Gulf War II Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 118
  • 119. Preventive war without the permission of the UN is illegal.  The Bush Doctrine declared that these expectations are unrealistic Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 119
  • 120. International Relations Unit 4 Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 120
  • 121. A hypothetical situation:  Consider two tribes Og and Ug  Og has game, and Ug does not  What happens? Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 121
  • 122. System-Level Causes The distribution of power The anarchial nature of the system System-level economic factors System-level biosphere stress Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 122
  • 123. State-Level Causes of War Militarism Externalization of Internal Conflict Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 123
  • 124. Individual-Level Causes of War Human Characteristics Individual Leaders’ Characteristics Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 124
  • 125. Terrorism and Humanitarian Intervention Social Justice Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 125
  • 126. The nature and limits of terrorism Distinguish between domestic and international Terrorism:  Violent  Carried out by individuals, non-government, covert government  Target civilians  Uses clandestine methods  Attempts to influence politics Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 126
  • 127. State Terrorism Transnational Terrorist Groups Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 127
  • 128. Between 1968 and 2006, more than 10,000 international terror attacks and over 14,000 deaths Domestic terrorism is more common Middle East leads the terror charts with more than 60% of all attacks Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 128
  • 129. Conventional weapons Radiological weapons Chemical and biological weapons Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 129
  • 130. System-level  Global imbalance State-level  US support of Israel Individual-level  Psychological drivers? Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 130
  • 131. “War on terror”? Unconventional Force  Arms Transfers  Special Operations Conventional Force Diplomacy Avoid unchecked escalation Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 131
  • 132. Biological Weapons Chemical Weapons Nuclear Weapons Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 132
  • 133.  Choose a terrorist organization listed below and research the causes and rationality behind their formation and motivations of the organization and identify potential resolutions.  United Liberation Front of Assam  Hamas  Hezbollah  Hizbul Mujahideen  Jaish-e-Mohammed  Lakshar-e-Taiba  Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 133
  • 134. International Relations Unit 5 Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 134
  • 135. Chanakya and Machiavelli  Chandragupta Maurya and The Medici  Arthashastra and The Prince Sun Tzu’s The Art of War Development of political theory from the medieval times. Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 135
  • 136. Realist (Realpolitik) – a zero sum game. Classic and Neo Realism  Difference in root of conflict  Inherent distrust v. anarchy  No place for morality or ideology in foreign policy Realism – Emphasis on power  Secure your own country’s interest  Establish a balance of power  “Peace through strength” ~ Ronald Reagan  Do not waste power on peripheral goals Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 136
  • 137. Human Nature  Pessimistic, self interest and competitive Core Concepts  Power, conflict Reality  Largely objective Political Stakes  Zero-sum Conflict in System  Central and Inevitable International System  Anarchic Cause of Conflicts  Pursuing self Interest Best Path to Peace  Balance of Power Key Organizations  States Morality  None Policy Prescriptions  Self Interest Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 137
  • 138. People and countries are capable of finding mutual interests and cooperating to achieve them by working through and with international organizations and international law.  Shutting down of Guantanamo Bay Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 138
  • 139. Liberals reject the realists’ contention that politics is inherently and exclusively a struggle for power. Unlike realists, for liberals, morality plays a large role in the play for power. Altruism is a weapon for realists. Non-zero sum game. Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 139
  • 140. Classical is a direct descendant of idealism. Unlike realists, classic liberals are optimistic about human nature.  Jean-jacques Rousseau – “The Social Contract”  Humans join together in society because it is easier to survive. Neoliberalism developed in the 1970s and 80s. Competition between states in the anarchic world causes conflict – parallel to Neorealism. However, unlike the Neorealists, Neoliberals believe in a complex interdependency of states in the anarchic world which may help promote internationalism. Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 140
  • 141. Cooperation does not mean that they are unwilling to use military power. However, place emphasis of legitimacy on the UN and IGOs. Surrender some sovereignty to improve themselves  European Union Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 141
  • 142. “There is nothing good or bad, but thinking makes it so” ~ Hamlet Political realities are mindsets Politics is driven by class warfare – Marx and Engels … or by structures such as states and organized religion – Feminists States are held together by means of force for the structure, not the people. Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 142
  • 143. International Relations Unit 6 Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 143
  • 144. Is nationalism a good thing? Why do we feel patriotic? Is it for the land or for the people living in it? How would the world be different if we did not enforce patriotic emotions? Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 144
  • 145. International Relations Unit 10 Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 145
  • 146. International Relations Unit 13 Abhishek Maity 2013 11/6/2013 146