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1
Why Resource Public Key Infrastructure
Matters
George Michaelson, APNIC
ggm@apnic.net
2
2
Whats RPKI?
3
3
Whats RPKI?
• RPKI is the R(esource) PKI
– OK. So whats PKI…
4
4
Whats RPKI?
• RPKI is the R(esource) PKI
– OK. So whats PKI…
• PKI is Public Key Infrastructure
– Public, Private keypairs, X509 Certificates (sometimes)
• Use of cryptography for identity, privacy and trust
– RPKI is a PKI for Internet Number Resources
• Trust the delegate of the INR has said how they want them used (BGP)
• Trust the delegate has control of the specific INR being discussed
• Here’s two PKI you’re using all the time:
5
Some PKI you know
• Web server names
– Secured by a PKI which confirms
the holder of the domain is the
entity you can trust on the DNS
name
– Trust embedded in the browser
• But you can manage it
independently
– Governance by (semi) closed
committee
6
Some PKI you know
• Web server names
– Secured by a PKI which confirms
the holder of the domain is the
entity you can trust on the DNS
name
– Trust embedded in the browser
• But you can manage it
independently
– Governance by (semi) closed
committee
• Exposes as certificates
– Websites run with private keys
7
Some PKI you know
• DNSSEC
– Secured by a PKI which confirms
the DNS delegation is trusted
– Trust configured into the DNS
software of your platform and
provider(s)
– Governance in ICANN/ccTLD
8
Some PKI you know
• DNSSEC
– Secured by a PKI which confirms
the DNS delegation is trusted
– Trust configured into the DNS
software of your platform and
provider(s)
– Governance in ICANN/ccTLD
• Exposes as Public Keys and
signatures
– DNS Authorities run with private
keys signing DNS records
9
The 3 legged stool
10
The 3 legged stool
• The Internet is often described as a
“three legged stool”
11
The 3 legged stool
DNS BGP
Addresses
• The Internet is often described as a
“three legged stool”
– Names to find the addresses (DNS)
– Unique Addresses (RIR)
– A routing model (BGP)
12
The 3 legged stool grew a leg (web)
13
The 3 legged stool grew a leg (web)
DNS BGP
Addresses
14
The 3 legged stool grew a leg (web)
DNS BGP
Addresses
Addresses
DNS
BGP
Web
15
The 3 legged stool grew a leg (web)
DNS
BGP
Web
DNSSEC
Addresses
Web PKI
• DNSSEC and web are
secured by PKI
Certificates themselves.
16
The 3 legged stool grew a leg (web)
DNS
BGP
Web
DNSSEC
RPKI
Addresses
Web PKI
• DNSSEC and web are
secured by PKI
Certificates themselves.
• RPKI adds a PKI to both
address management
and routing.
• Addresses in PKI
certificates
• Routing is secured
by a signed “object”
called a ROA
17
The 3 legged stool grew a leg (web)
DNS
BGP
Web
DNSSEC
RPKI
Addresses
Web PKI
• All the legs of the stool
now have PKI
• A four legged stool is
more stable than a three
legged stool…
• RPKI secures two legs
in a common
governance structure
18
Securing the stool
• DNSSEC and Web Certificates
widely deployed
• Higher layer services, trust in
names, and websites is now high
• Web protocol has moved to
“secure by default”
• Semi-automatic certificate
issuance now normal
(letsencrypt)
• Routing and Addressing needed
attention
• RIR and Operations community
and IETF process led to RPKI
– SIDR and subsequently SIDROPS
WG in IETF
– Governance process aligns to
address policy governance in the
RIR system
– Deployment is a work in progress
19
19
RPKI: The Internet’s PKI for routing
• Routing is secured by RPKI, which is managed by the RIR
– Delegation of addresses ties ownership of the PKI private key to the
listed resources in the certificate
– Use of the certificate to sign Routing origination secures BGP
• origin-AS only at this time (BGP Path is work-in-progress)
• How are we doing?
RIR IPv4 IPv6
LACNIC 28% 36%
RIPENCC 47% 30%
AFRINIC 11% 05%
APNIC 20% 14%
ARIN 19% 10%
https://www.nro.net/about/rirs/statistics/
https://stats.labs.apnic.net/
20
20
RPKI: The Internet’s PKI for routing
• Routing is secured by RPKI, which is managed by the RIR
– Delegation of addresses ties ownership of the PKI private key to the
listed resources in the certificate
– Use of the certificate to sign Routing origination secures BGP
• origin-AS only at this time (BGP Path is work-in-progress)
• How are we doing?
RIR IPv4 IPv6
LACNIC 28% 36%
RIPENCC 47% 30%
AFRINIC 11% 05%
APNIC 20% 14%
ARIN 19% 10%
IPv4 IPv6
TW 98% 93%
RPKI services delegated through TWNIC
https://www.nro.net/about/rirs/statistics/
https://stats.labs.apnic.net/
21
RPKI in APNIC Region
• CNNIC, IDNIC, JPNIC, TWNIC operate delegated RPKI
– VNNIC planned for 2021/2022
– IRINN/KRNIC provide service in MyAPNIC portal to their members
• APNIC Routing Security SIG has oversight/engagement
– We present RPKI statistics, uptake reports, operations reports
– APNIC Policy guidance on operation of RPKI
• use of AS0 (undelegated) RPKI ROA for unallocated/reserved APNIC INR
22
22
23
Thank You

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2nd ICANN APAC-TWNIC Engagement Forum: Why RPKI Matters

  • 1. 1 Why Resource Public Key Infrastructure Matters George Michaelson, APNIC ggm@apnic.net
  • 3. 3 3 Whats RPKI? • RPKI is the R(esource) PKI – OK. So whats PKI…
  • 4. 4 4 Whats RPKI? • RPKI is the R(esource) PKI – OK. So whats PKI… • PKI is Public Key Infrastructure – Public, Private keypairs, X509 Certificates (sometimes) • Use of cryptography for identity, privacy and trust – RPKI is a PKI for Internet Number Resources • Trust the delegate of the INR has said how they want them used (BGP) • Trust the delegate has control of the specific INR being discussed • Here’s two PKI you’re using all the time:
  • 5. 5 Some PKI you know • Web server names – Secured by a PKI which confirms the holder of the domain is the entity you can trust on the DNS name – Trust embedded in the browser • But you can manage it independently – Governance by (semi) closed committee
  • 6. 6 Some PKI you know • Web server names – Secured by a PKI which confirms the holder of the domain is the entity you can trust on the DNS name – Trust embedded in the browser • But you can manage it independently – Governance by (semi) closed committee • Exposes as certificates – Websites run with private keys
  • 7. 7 Some PKI you know • DNSSEC – Secured by a PKI which confirms the DNS delegation is trusted – Trust configured into the DNS software of your platform and provider(s) – Governance in ICANN/ccTLD
  • 8. 8 Some PKI you know • DNSSEC – Secured by a PKI which confirms the DNS delegation is trusted – Trust configured into the DNS software of your platform and provider(s) – Governance in ICANN/ccTLD • Exposes as Public Keys and signatures – DNS Authorities run with private keys signing DNS records
  • 10. 10 The 3 legged stool • The Internet is often described as a “three legged stool”
  • 11. 11 The 3 legged stool DNS BGP Addresses • The Internet is often described as a “three legged stool” – Names to find the addresses (DNS) – Unique Addresses (RIR) – A routing model (BGP)
  • 12. 12 The 3 legged stool grew a leg (web)
  • 13. 13 The 3 legged stool grew a leg (web) DNS BGP Addresses
  • 14. 14 The 3 legged stool grew a leg (web) DNS BGP Addresses Addresses DNS BGP Web
  • 15. 15 The 3 legged stool grew a leg (web) DNS BGP Web DNSSEC Addresses Web PKI • DNSSEC and web are secured by PKI Certificates themselves.
  • 16. 16 The 3 legged stool grew a leg (web) DNS BGP Web DNSSEC RPKI Addresses Web PKI • DNSSEC and web are secured by PKI Certificates themselves. • RPKI adds a PKI to both address management and routing. • Addresses in PKI certificates • Routing is secured by a signed “object” called a ROA
  • 17. 17 The 3 legged stool grew a leg (web) DNS BGP Web DNSSEC RPKI Addresses Web PKI • All the legs of the stool now have PKI • A four legged stool is more stable than a three legged stool… • RPKI secures two legs in a common governance structure
  • 18. 18 Securing the stool • DNSSEC and Web Certificates widely deployed • Higher layer services, trust in names, and websites is now high • Web protocol has moved to “secure by default” • Semi-automatic certificate issuance now normal (letsencrypt) • Routing and Addressing needed attention • RIR and Operations community and IETF process led to RPKI – SIDR and subsequently SIDROPS WG in IETF – Governance process aligns to address policy governance in the RIR system – Deployment is a work in progress
  • 19. 19 19 RPKI: The Internet’s PKI for routing • Routing is secured by RPKI, which is managed by the RIR – Delegation of addresses ties ownership of the PKI private key to the listed resources in the certificate – Use of the certificate to sign Routing origination secures BGP • origin-AS only at this time (BGP Path is work-in-progress) • How are we doing? RIR IPv4 IPv6 LACNIC 28% 36% RIPENCC 47% 30% AFRINIC 11% 05% APNIC 20% 14% ARIN 19% 10% https://www.nro.net/about/rirs/statistics/ https://stats.labs.apnic.net/
  • 20. 20 20 RPKI: The Internet’s PKI for routing • Routing is secured by RPKI, which is managed by the RIR – Delegation of addresses ties ownership of the PKI private key to the listed resources in the certificate – Use of the certificate to sign Routing origination secures BGP • origin-AS only at this time (BGP Path is work-in-progress) • How are we doing? RIR IPv4 IPv6 LACNIC 28% 36% RIPENCC 47% 30% AFRINIC 11% 05% APNIC 20% 14% ARIN 19% 10% IPv4 IPv6 TW 98% 93% RPKI services delegated through TWNIC https://www.nro.net/about/rirs/statistics/ https://stats.labs.apnic.net/
  • 21. 21 RPKI in APNIC Region • CNNIC, IDNIC, JPNIC, TWNIC operate delegated RPKI – VNNIC planned for 2021/2022 – IRINN/KRNIC provide service in MyAPNIC portal to their members • APNIC Routing Security SIG has oversight/engagement – We present RPKI statistics, uptake reports, operations reports – APNIC Policy guidance on operation of RPKI • use of AS0 (undelegated) RPKI ROA for unallocated/reserved APNIC INR
  • 22. 22 22