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Measuring DNS Flag
Day 2020
Geoff Huston
Joao Damas
APNIC Labs
1
DNS Flag Day 2020
2
DNS Flag Day 2020
3
DNS Flag Day 2020
4
What Happened?
We’d like to look at two aspects of this work:
• What happened on 1 October 2020 (and thereafter) in the DNS?
• Is that recommended value of 1,232 just right? Too small? Too large?
5
Looking at EDNS(0) Buffer Sizes
Jan 2020 – August 2020
• 4,096 used by queries from 80% - 95% of
users
• 512 (no size specified) used by 10% of users
• Weekday / Weekend profile suggesting a
difference between enterprise and access ISP
profiles
These results are from looking at queries
between recursive e resolvers and authoritative
servers
6
Flag Day 2020
Flag Day
August 2020 – December 2020
• Use of 4,096 buffer size dropped from ~84%
to 70% of users by December
• Rise in 1,400 buffer size to 8% of users
7
UDP Fragmentation
Flag Day
August 2020 – December 2020
• Fragmentation avoidance settings rose from
12% of users to ~22% of users
EDNS(0) UDP Buffer Size > MTU
EDNS(0) UDP Buffer Size < MTU
8
UDP Fragmentation Avoidance
Flag Day
August 2020 – December 2020
• 1,232 is now used by 5% of users
• 1,400 is now used by 7% of users
• 284 different sizes between 512 and 1472
observed in this data set
9
Pick a Size
• Is there a “right” size for this parameter?
• What are we attempting to achieve here when trying to select the
threshold point to get the DNS to switch to use TCP?
• Should we use a low value and switch “early”?
• Should we use a high value and switch “late”?
10
IP and Packet Sizes
IPv4 IPv6
Minimum IP Packet Size
20 40
Maximum Assurred
Unfragmented Packet
Size
68 1,280
Assured Host Packet
Size
<= 576 <= 1,500
Maximum Packet Size
65,535 65,575* *4,294,967,33
6 (Jumbogram)
11
Some Questions
• Why choose 1,232 octets as the threshold point to truncate a UDP
response in Flag Day 2020?
• How bad is UDP Fragmentation loss in the DNS?
• How bad is TCP in the DNS?
12
Mesurement Challenges
• How to perform a large scale measurement?
• We embed the measurement in an advertisement to distribute the
measurement script to a broad set of test cases
• How to detect DNS resolution success?
• We use a technique of “glueless” delegation to force a resolve to explicitly
resolve the name of a name server – a successful resolution is signalled by
the resumption of the original resolution task
• How to characterise DNS behaviour?
• We pad the response to create the desired response size. Each test uses a
response size selected at random from 11 pad sizes. We also use an
unpadded short response as a control
13
Limitations
• We are measuring the DNS path between recursive resolvers and the
authoritative name servers. This is a measurement of the “interior” of
the Internet. It is not a measurement of the stub-to-recursive paths at
the edge of the network.
• Some resolvers alter their behaviour when resolving name server
names
• In some 30% of cases the EDNS(0) Buffer Size is either dropped from the
query, or dropped below 1452 octets
14
Limitations
• In some 30% of cases the EDNS(0) Buffer Size is either dropped from
the query, or dropped below 1452 octets
15
“Base Test” September 2020
Size Tests Passed Failed Rate
1230 4,303,845 4,282,457 21,388 0.50%
1270 4,308,667 4,287,046 21,621 0.50%
1310 4,307,456 4,286,064 21,392 0.50%
1350 4,304,230 4,282,752 21,478 0.50%
1390 4,310,182 4,288,413 21,769 0.51%
1430 4,303,906 4,281,858 22,048 0.51%
1470 4,308,722 4,269,785 38,937 0.90%
1510 4,303,923 4,197,910 106,013 2.46%
1550 4,306,824 4,194,465 112,359 2.61%
1590 4,300,559 4,187,575 112,984 2.63%
1630 4,305,525 4,191,994 113,531 2.64%
Onset of server UDP
fragmentation
16
TCP behaviour
This selects the subset of cases where the recursive resolver was
passed a truncated UDP response, which should trigger the resolver to
use TCP
Responses which are larger
than 1,430 octets show a
higher loss rate
Size TCP Use Pass Fail NO TCP NO ACK TCP OK
1230 9% 98.7% 1.3% 11.4% 28.3% 60.3%
1270 13% 99.0% 1.0% 12.2% 27.7% 60.1%
1310 13% 99.0% 1.0% 13.2% 26.4% 60.4%
1350 13% 99.0% 1.0% 13.0% 27.9% 59.0%
1390 14% 99.0% 1.0% 15.2% 27.1% 57.7%
1430 14% 99.1% 0.9% 15.7% 25.9% 58.5%
1470 30% 98.5% 1.5% 9.2% 58.3% 32.5%
1510 36% 98.1% 1.9% 22.7% 47.2% 30.1%
1550 36% 98.1% 1.9% 23.2% 46.8% 30.0%
1590 36% 98.1% 1.9% 24.5% 45.7% 29.8%
1630 36% 98.1% 1.9% 25.6% 45.5% 28.9%
Truncated UDP response, no followup TCP
Stalled TCP session with missing ACK from data segment
Completed TCP session but no signal of resumption of original resolution
17
TCP behaviour
TCP shows a base failure rate of some 1% to 2% of tests
• For smaller responses this may be due to enthusiastic filtering of TCP
port 53 packets
• For larger responses TCP “Black Hole” factors may be involved, as the
server was configured to use a local 1,500 octet MTU and maximum
size TCP data segments may have triggered Path MTU pathologies
18
Forcing TCP
• Here we set the server’s max buffer size to 512, forcing all resolution
attempts to use TCP
DNS
Response
Size Tests
TCP Pass
Rate
TCP Fail
Rate IPv4 Failure Rate
IPv6 Failure
Rate
1150 1,104,539 98.5% 1.6% 1.9% 1.6%
1190 1,105,126 98.5% 1.6% 1.9% 1.6%
1230 1,105,601 98.5% 1.6% 1.9% 1.6%
1270 1,104,571 98.5% 1.6% 1.9% 1.6%
1310 1,104,521 98.5% 1.6% 1.9% 1.6%
1350 1,104,068 98.5% 1.6% 2.0% 1.6%
1390 1,105,080 98.5% 1.6% 1.9% 1.6%
1430 1,104,527 98.5% 1.6% 1.9% 1.6%
1470 1,103,423 98.3% 1.8% 2.1% 1.8%
1510 1,104,960 98.3% 1.8% 2.1% 1.8%
1550 1,105,566 98.3% 1.8% 2.1% 1.8%
1590 1,103,609 98.3% 1.8% 2.1% 1.8%
1630 1,106,284 98.3% 1.8% 2.1% 1.8%
IPv4 shows a slightly higher failure
rate than IPv6
19
UDP behaviour
This selects the subset of cases where the recursive resolver was not
passed a truncated UDP response and did not attempt a TCP
connection
Size UDP Use Pass Fail
1230 91% 99.6% 0.4%
1270 87% 99.6% 0.4%
1310 87% 99.6% 0.4%
1350 87% 99.6% 0.4%
1390 86% 99.6% 0.4%
1430 86% 99.6% 0.4%
1470 70% 99.4% 0.6%
1510 64% 97.2% 2.8%
1550 64% 97.0% 3.0%
1590 64% 97.0% 3.0%
1630 64% 97.0% 3.0%
Onset of server UDP
fragmentation
20
UDP behaviour
UDP shows a base failure rate of some 0.5% to 3% of tests
• For smaller responses this may be due to residual filtering of UDP
port 53 packets greater than 512 octets in size
• For larger responses UDP fragmentation is the likely factor where the
buffer size permits the server to transmit fragmented UDP packets,
but they appear not to reach the resolver client
21
Forcing UDP
• Here we alter the server to treat all queries as if they had signalled a
buffer size of 4,096 octets
DNS
Response
Size Tests
UDP Pass
Rate UDP Fail Rate
IPv4 Failure
Rate
IPv6 Failure
Rate
1150 1,140,192 99.6% 0.4% 0.6% 0.1%
1190 1,138,792 99.6% 0.4% 0.6% 0.1%
1230 1,273,730 99.6% 0.4% 0.6% 0.1%
1270 1,272,765 98.1% 1.9% 2.4% 1.2%
1310 1,275,436 98.2% 1.8% 2.4% 1.2%
1350 1,272,634 98.2% 1.8% 2.4% 1.2%
1390 1,273,332 98.1% 1.9% 2.4% 1.2%
1430 1,274,189 97.8% 2.2% 2.6% 1.6%
1470 1,274,581 96.9% 3.1% 3.7% 17.6%
1510 1,273,496 85.0% 15.0% 14.2% 17.6%
1550 1,274,776 85.0% 15.0% 14.4% 17.7%
1590 1,276,441 85.1% 14.9% 14.4% 17.6%
1630 1,275,233 85.1% 14.9% 14.5% 17.6%
Onset of server UDP
fragmentation
22
Forcing UDP
• A number of resolvers will discard a DNS response if it is larger than
the original buffer size
• This appears to occur in some 2% - 3% of cases
• A number of resolvers do not receive fragmented UDP packets
• This appears to occur in ~11% of cases in IPv4, and ~15% of cases in IPv6
23
DNS Flag Day 2020
We appear to have repurposed the EDNS(0) Buffer Size parameter
• It was originally designed as a signal from the client to the server of the
client’s capability to receive a DNS response over UDP
• Oddly enough no comparable signal was defined for TCP, even though, presumably, the
same client-side memory limitations for DNS payloads would exist
• It appears to have been intended as a UDP mechanism that “can help improve
the scalability of the DNS by avoiding widespread use of TCP for DNS
transport.” (RFC 6891)
• The Flag Day measures appear to repurpose this parameter as a UDP
fragmentation avoidance signal
24
DNS Transport Considerations
• Unfragmented UDP is relatively fast, stable and efficient
• There is a slight increase in drop rates above 512 octets to around 0.5%
• There is no visible change in drop rates in payloads up to 1500 octets in size
• Fragmented UDP has a very high drop rate
• Between 11% and 15% drop rate in IPv4 and IPv6 respectively
• It is more likely to be due to security filtering practice, although no specific
fragmentation measurement has been made
• TCP is less efficient and slower than unfragmented UDP, but far better
in performance terms than Fragmented UDP
• Base failure rate for TCP is between 1% to 2% of cases
25
DNS Transport Priorities
• Use unfragmented UDP as much as possible
• Avoid dynamic discovery of path MTU / fragmentation onset
• Prefer TCP over responding with fragmented UDP for larger responses
26
Buffer Size Considerations
• One size fits all?
• 1232 is a conservative value with a high assurance of fragmentation avoidance
• Early onset of TCP extracts a marginal cost in terms of efficiency and speed of
resolution
• Could we improve on this by tailoring the value to suit the context of the
query/response transaction?
• Customised settings
• Fragmentation onset occurs in different ways on different paths
• Our measurements suggest that in the “interior” of the Internet between recursive
resolvers and authoritative servers the prevailing MTU is at 1,500. There is no
measurable signal of use of smaller MTUs in this part of the Internet *
• Fragmentation onset occurs differently for IPv4 and IPv6
* The “edge” of the internet is likely to be different – no measurements were made for edge scenarios in this study
27
For Recursive to Authoritative
Our measurements suggest setting the EDNS(0) Buffer size to:
IPv4 1,472 octets
IPv6 1,452 octets
A small additional performance improvement can be made by using a lower TCP MSS setting – our
measurements of a 1,200 octets setting showed a small but visible improvement in TCP resilience
for large (multi-segment) payloads. In the TCP the marginal cost of a highly conservative setting for
the MSS is far lower than the cost of correcting MTU issues.
28
Thanks!
Full Report: https://www.potaroo.net/ispcol/2020-11/xldns.html (part 1)
https://www.potaroo.net/ispcol/2020-12/xldns2.html (part 2)
29

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DNS-OARC 34: Measuring DNS Flag Day 2020

  • 1. Measuring DNS Flag Day 2020 Geoff Huston Joao Damas APNIC Labs 1
  • 2. DNS Flag Day 2020 2
  • 3. DNS Flag Day 2020 3
  • 4. DNS Flag Day 2020 4
  • 5. What Happened? We’d like to look at two aspects of this work: • What happened on 1 October 2020 (and thereafter) in the DNS? • Is that recommended value of 1,232 just right? Too small? Too large? 5
  • 6. Looking at EDNS(0) Buffer Sizes Jan 2020 – August 2020 • 4,096 used by queries from 80% - 95% of users • 512 (no size specified) used by 10% of users • Weekday / Weekend profile suggesting a difference between enterprise and access ISP profiles These results are from looking at queries between recursive e resolvers and authoritative servers 6
  • 7. Flag Day 2020 Flag Day August 2020 – December 2020 • Use of 4,096 buffer size dropped from ~84% to 70% of users by December • Rise in 1,400 buffer size to 8% of users 7
  • 8. UDP Fragmentation Flag Day August 2020 – December 2020 • Fragmentation avoidance settings rose from 12% of users to ~22% of users EDNS(0) UDP Buffer Size > MTU EDNS(0) UDP Buffer Size < MTU 8
  • 9. UDP Fragmentation Avoidance Flag Day August 2020 – December 2020 • 1,232 is now used by 5% of users • 1,400 is now used by 7% of users • 284 different sizes between 512 and 1472 observed in this data set 9
  • 10. Pick a Size • Is there a “right” size for this parameter? • What are we attempting to achieve here when trying to select the threshold point to get the DNS to switch to use TCP? • Should we use a low value and switch “early”? • Should we use a high value and switch “late”? 10
  • 11. IP and Packet Sizes IPv4 IPv6 Minimum IP Packet Size 20 40 Maximum Assurred Unfragmented Packet Size 68 1,280 Assured Host Packet Size <= 576 <= 1,500 Maximum Packet Size 65,535 65,575* *4,294,967,33 6 (Jumbogram) 11
  • 12. Some Questions • Why choose 1,232 octets as the threshold point to truncate a UDP response in Flag Day 2020? • How bad is UDP Fragmentation loss in the DNS? • How bad is TCP in the DNS? 12
  • 13. Mesurement Challenges • How to perform a large scale measurement? • We embed the measurement in an advertisement to distribute the measurement script to a broad set of test cases • How to detect DNS resolution success? • We use a technique of “glueless” delegation to force a resolve to explicitly resolve the name of a name server – a successful resolution is signalled by the resumption of the original resolution task • How to characterise DNS behaviour? • We pad the response to create the desired response size. Each test uses a response size selected at random from 11 pad sizes. We also use an unpadded short response as a control 13
  • 14. Limitations • We are measuring the DNS path between recursive resolvers and the authoritative name servers. This is a measurement of the “interior” of the Internet. It is not a measurement of the stub-to-recursive paths at the edge of the network. • Some resolvers alter their behaviour when resolving name server names • In some 30% of cases the EDNS(0) Buffer Size is either dropped from the query, or dropped below 1452 octets 14
  • 15. Limitations • In some 30% of cases the EDNS(0) Buffer Size is either dropped from the query, or dropped below 1452 octets 15
  • 16. “Base Test” September 2020 Size Tests Passed Failed Rate 1230 4,303,845 4,282,457 21,388 0.50% 1270 4,308,667 4,287,046 21,621 0.50% 1310 4,307,456 4,286,064 21,392 0.50% 1350 4,304,230 4,282,752 21,478 0.50% 1390 4,310,182 4,288,413 21,769 0.51% 1430 4,303,906 4,281,858 22,048 0.51% 1470 4,308,722 4,269,785 38,937 0.90% 1510 4,303,923 4,197,910 106,013 2.46% 1550 4,306,824 4,194,465 112,359 2.61% 1590 4,300,559 4,187,575 112,984 2.63% 1630 4,305,525 4,191,994 113,531 2.64% Onset of server UDP fragmentation 16
  • 17. TCP behaviour This selects the subset of cases where the recursive resolver was passed a truncated UDP response, which should trigger the resolver to use TCP Responses which are larger than 1,430 octets show a higher loss rate Size TCP Use Pass Fail NO TCP NO ACK TCP OK 1230 9% 98.7% 1.3% 11.4% 28.3% 60.3% 1270 13% 99.0% 1.0% 12.2% 27.7% 60.1% 1310 13% 99.0% 1.0% 13.2% 26.4% 60.4% 1350 13% 99.0% 1.0% 13.0% 27.9% 59.0% 1390 14% 99.0% 1.0% 15.2% 27.1% 57.7% 1430 14% 99.1% 0.9% 15.7% 25.9% 58.5% 1470 30% 98.5% 1.5% 9.2% 58.3% 32.5% 1510 36% 98.1% 1.9% 22.7% 47.2% 30.1% 1550 36% 98.1% 1.9% 23.2% 46.8% 30.0% 1590 36% 98.1% 1.9% 24.5% 45.7% 29.8% 1630 36% 98.1% 1.9% 25.6% 45.5% 28.9% Truncated UDP response, no followup TCP Stalled TCP session with missing ACK from data segment Completed TCP session but no signal of resumption of original resolution 17
  • 18. TCP behaviour TCP shows a base failure rate of some 1% to 2% of tests • For smaller responses this may be due to enthusiastic filtering of TCP port 53 packets • For larger responses TCP “Black Hole” factors may be involved, as the server was configured to use a local 1,500 octet MTU and maximum size TCP data segments may have triggered Path MTU pathologies 18
  • 19. Forcing TCP • Here we set the server’s max buffer size to 512, forcing all resolution attempts to use TCP DNS Response Size Tests TCP Pass Rate TCP Fail Rate IPv4 Failure Rate IPv6 Failure Rate 1150 1,104,539 98.5% 1.6% 1.9% 1.6% 1190 1,105,126 98.5% 1.6% 1.9% 1.6% 1230 1,105,601 98.5% 1.6% 1.9% 1.6% 1270 1,104,571 98.5% 1.6% 1.9% 1.6% 1310 1,104,521 98.5% 1.6% 1.9% 1.6% 1350 1,104,068 98.5% 1.6% 2.0% 1.6% 1390 1,105,080 98.5% 1.6% 1.9% 1.6% 1430 1,104,527 98.5% 1.6% 1.9% 1.6% 1470 1,103,423 98.3% 1.8% 2.1% 1.8% 1510 1,104,960 98.3% 1.8% 2.1% 1.8% 1550 1,105,566 98.3% 1.8% 2.1% 1.8% 1590 1,103,609 98.3% 1.8% 2.1% 1.8% 1630 1,106,284 98.3% 1.8% 2.1% 1.8% IPv4 shows a slightly higher failure rate than IPv6 19
  • 20. UDP behaviour This selects the subset of cases where the recursive resolver was not passed a truncated UDP response and did not attempt a TCP connection Size UDP Use Pass Fail 1230 91% 99.6% 0.4% 1270 87% 99.6% 0.4% 1310 87% 99.6% 0.4% 1350 87% 99.6% 0.4% 1390 86% 99.6% 0.4% 1430 86% 99.6% 0.4% 1470 70% 99.4% 0.6% 1510 64% 97.2% 2.8% 1550 64% 97.0% 3.0% 1590 64% 97.0% 3.0% 1630 64% 97.0% 3.0% Onset of server UDP fragmentation 20
  • 21. UDP behaviour UDP shows a base failure rate of some 0.5% to 3% of tests • For smaller responses this may be due to residual filtering of UDP port 53 packets greater than 512 octets in size • For larger responses UDP fragmentation is the likely factor where the buffer size permits the server to transmit fragmented UDP packets, but they appear not to reach the resolver client 21
  • 22. Forcing UDP • Here we alter the server to treat all queries as if they had signalled a buffer size of 4,096 octets DNS Response Size Tests UDP Pass Rate UDP Fail Rate IPv4 Failure Rate IPv6 Failure Rate 1150 1,140,192 99.6% 0.4% 0.6% 0.1% 1190 1,138,792 99.6% 0.4% 0.6% 0.1% 1230 1,273,730 99.6% 0.4% 0.6% 0.1% 1270 1,272,765 98.1% 1.9% 2.4% 1.2% 1310 1,275,436 98.2% 1.8% 2.4% 1.2% 1350 1,272,634 98.2% 1.8% 2.4% 1.2% 1390 1,273,332 98.1% 1.9% 2.4% 1.2% 1430 1,274,189 97.8% 2.2% 2.6% 1.6% 1470 1,274,581 96.9% 3.1% 3.7% 17.6% 1510 1,273,496 85.0% 15.0% 14.2% 17.6% 1550 1,274,776 85.0% 15.0% 14.4% 17.7% 1590 1,276,441 85.1% 14.9% 14.4% 17.6% 1630 1,275,233 85.1% 14.9% 14.5% 17.6% Onset of server UDP fragmentation 22
  • 23. Forcing UDP • A number of resolvers will discard a DNS response if it is larger than the original buffer size • This appears to occur in some 2% - 3% of cases • A number of resolvers do not receive fragmented UDP packets • This appears to occur in ~11% of cases in IPv4, and ~15% of cases in IPv6 23
  • 24. DNS Flag Day 2020 We appear to have repurposed the EDNS(0) Buffer Size parameter • It was originally designed as a signal from the client to the server of the client’s capability to receive a DNS response over UDP • Oddly enough no comparable signal was defined for TCP, even though, presumably, the same client-side memory limitations for DNS payloads would exist • It appears to have been intended as a UDP mechanism that “can help improve the scalability of the DNS by avoiding widespread use of TCP for DNS transport.” (RFC 6891) • The Flag Day measures appear to repurpose this parameter as a UDP fragmentation avoidance signal 24
  • 25. DNS Transport Considerations • Unfragmented UDP is relatively fast, stable and efficient • There is a slight increase in drop rates above 512 octets to around 0.5% • There is no visible change in drop rates in payloads up to 1500 octets in size • Fragmented UDP has a very high drop rate • Between 11% and 15% drop rate in IPv4 and IPv6 respectively • It is more likely to be due to security filtering practice, although no specific fragmentation measurement has been made • TCP is less efficient and slower than unfragmented UDP, but far better in performance terms than Fragmented UDP • Base failure rate for TCP is between 1% to 2% of cases 25
  • 26. DNS Transport Priorities • Use unfragmented UDP as much as possible • Avoid dynamic discovery of path MTU / fragmentation onset • Prefer TCP over responding with fragmented UDP for larger responses 26
  • 27. Buffer Size Considerations • One size fits all? • 1232 is a conservative value with a high assurance of fragmentation avoidance • Early onset of TCP extracts a marginal cost in terms of efficiency and speed of resolution • Could we improve on this by tailoring the value to suit the context of the query/response transaction? • Customised settings • Fragmentation onset occurs in different ways on different paths • Our measurements suggest that in the “interior” of the Internet between recursive resolvers and authoritative servers the prevailing MTU is at 1,500. There is no measurable signal of use of smaller MTUs in this part of the Internet * • Fragmentation onset occurs differently for IPv4 and IPv6 * The “edge” of the internet is likely to be different – no measurements were made for edge scenarios in this study 27
  • 28. For Recursive to Authoritative Our measurements suggest setting the EDNS(0) Buffer size to: IPv4 1,472 octets IPv6 1,452 octets A small additional performance improvement can be made by using a lower TCP MSS setting – our measurements of a 1,200 octets setting showed a small but visible improvement in TCP resilience for large (multi-segment) payloads. In the TCP the marginal cost of a highly conservative setting for the MSS is far lower than the cost of correcting MTU issues. 28
  • 29. Thanks! Full Report: https://www.potaroo.net/ispcol/2020-11/xldns.html (part 1) https://www.potaroo.net/ispcol/2020-12/xldns2.html (part 2) 29