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Confidential ©ARM 2016
Proportional security
to meet the business needs of
IoT
mbed Connect Asia / Shenzhen, China
Dec 5, 2016
Nick Zhou / Senior Field Application Engineer /
ARM
Confidential ©ARM 20162
Invest in IoT security according to business
needs
Protection/
authenticatio
n of
transmitted
information
Protection of
device from
software
vulnerabilities
Protection
from
physical
interventionDeployment
integrity
requirements
Local asset value
requirements
Communication
trust/privacy
requirements
Confidential ©ARM 20163
Diversity
Confidential ©ARM 20164
End node device and deployment conditions
 Connected to a network
 May have a long lifetime
 May be physically inaccessible for manual updates
 Must be able to be managed remotely
 May be physically accessible to third parties
 Must protect against physical access
 Deployed in enormous numbers
 Represents a significant investment to protect/maintain
Confidential ©ARM 20165
Learn from internet security best practices
 Internet security evolving for decades
 Leverage this heritage for IoT end nodes
 Low cost, long battery life nodes are capable
 Think about agility post deployment – security is not a fixed thing
 Security is about the weakest link
 Look for flaws in protocol and security architecture
 Avoid deployment mistakes and mismanagement
 Learning applicable to both IP and non-IP IoT communication
 Find ways to work with existing deployments/technology
 Drive the future direction of relevant standards
Confidential ©ARM 20166
IoT use cases
Bluetooth headset linked to cloud
service via Smartphone App
Building Automation System OEM
covers many client buildings using
a diverse set of device types with
live connectivity to a cloud service
Confidential ©ARM 20167
A few security technology choices
 Protection/authentication of transmitted information
 Use standard BLE relationship between
Smartphone and headset to pair devices
and setup link security
 Protection of device from software vulnerabilities
 Device is not directly addressable on
the internet
 Direct attack unlikely if paired device
runs trusted SW
 Protection from (local) physical intervention
 Limited local threats
 Limited device asset value
 Treat network as untrusted and use DTLS to
establish secure connections based on
certified device identities
 Strong security to establish/authenticate
DTLS sessions (ECC) limits device access
 Additional device partitioning can vastly
reduce local SW attack surface
 Device identity and (device unique) service
keys must be protected
 Need security in supply chain to prevent
installation of cloned devices
Confidential ©ARM 20168
Security profiles
Lab attacks
• Local attack on an end node device
Network attacks
• Remote attacks across the network
• May scale to many devices; accounts; services
Minimum
cost/effort
to attack
Per-device
HW
cost/effort
to secure
 Where possible devices should not store valuable secrets
 Local attacks must not enable network attacks on other
devices
 Some applications require tamper resistant
devices
 ARM SecurCore and related technology
Confidential ©ARM 20169
Proportional security
 Threat-models should be informed by business requirements
 Technology applied and cost expended varies according to application needs
 For example
 Risk environment of application
 Value of assets to be protected
 Trust and control over firmware
 Supply chain structure
 Lifetime of the device
Application Security
Short life node mbed TLS + Connect
Long life node + uVisor + Provision
+ Update
High value asset
protection
+ Anti-tamper hardware
(ARM SecurCore)
Confidential ©ARM 201610
Ultra-constrained Constrained Mainstream IOT
BBC micro:bit
BT Smart beacon
Rich BT Smart
Thread node
Low BW WiFi node
Border router
BT Smart
Device SW capabilities
IP + TLS
uVisor
Lifecycle Security
IP + TLS
uVisor
Lifecycle Security
Firmware over-the-air
Architecture
Acceleration
ARMv6-M
ARMv8-M Baseline
TRNG + Crypto TRNG + Crypto
Device HW resources
ARMv8-M Mainline or ARMv7-M with
MPU
Unconstrained
High BW WiFi node
Gateway
A-Class
TRNG + Crypto +
GPU + VPU
IP + TLS
OP-TEE
Lifecycle Security
Firmware over-the-air
Rich UI/Multimedia
mbed OS A-Class + mbed
Client
Confidential ©ARM 201611
mbed security architecture
Cloud application platforms
Lifecycle
security
Communication
security
Device
security
mbed TLS
Connectivit
y Client
Provisionin
g Client
Update
Client
Connectivit
y
Service
Provisionin
g
Service
Update
Service
Device Hardware
mbed uVisor
mbed TLS
Prov TLCrypto TL Update TLConn TL
Deployment ManagementData Flow Management
mbed Cloud
Service
mbed OS
Confidential ©ARM 201612
Call to action: Better security value
proposition
 Avoid selling via FUD
 Generally unquantifiable: What is value of security investment? What is the ROI?
 Enable reasoning: What security is for, the value it brings
 Understand threats to business and what key assets are?
 Measure complete deployment lifecycle value not just BOM cost
 Do not treat Security Technology as a “One Size Fits All”
 Deploy technology according to business needs
 Proportional security response according to defined threats/value
 Factor in agility to cope with evolving security context
 Deliver scalable security choices for IoT driven by clear need/value
The trademarks featured in this presentation are registered and/or unregistered trademarks of ARM
Limited (or its subsidiaries) in the EU and/or elsewhere. All rights reserved. All other marks
featured may be trademarks of their respective owners.
Copyright © 2016 ARM Limited
Confidential ©ARM 2016

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mbed Connect Asia 2016 Security requirements for IoT

  • 1. Confidential ©ARM 2016 Proportional security to meet the business needs of IoT mbed Connect Asia / Shenzhen, China Dec 5, 2016 Nick Zhou / Senior Field Application Engineer / ARM
  • 2. Confidential ©ARM 20162 Invest in IoT security according to business needs Protection/ authenticatio n of transmitted information Protection of device from software vulnerabilities Protection from physical interventionDeployment integrity requirements Local asset value requirements Communication trust/privacy requirements
  • 4. Confidential ©ARM 20164 End node device and deployment conditions  Connected to a network  May have a long lifetime  May be physically inaccessible for manual updates  Must be able to be managed remotely  May be physically accessible to third parties  Must protect against physical access  Deployed in enormous numbers  Represents a significant investment to protect/maintain
  • 5. Confidential ©ARM 20165 Learn from internet security best practices  Internet security evolving for decades  Leverage this heritage for IoT end nodes  Low cost, long battery life nodes are capable  Think about agility post deployment – security is not a fixed thing  Security is about the weakest link  Look for flaws in protocol and security architecture  Avoid deployment mistakes and mismanagement  Learning applicable to both IP and non-IP IoT communication  Find ways to work with existing deployments/technology  Drive the future direction of relevant standards
  • 6. Confidential ©ARM 20166 IoT use cases Bluetooth headset linked to cloud service via Smartphone App Building Automation System OEM covers many client buildings using a diverse set of device types with live connectivity to a cloud service
  • 7. Confidential ©ARM 20167 A few security technology choices  Protection/authentication of transmitted information  Use standard BLE relationship between Smartphone and headset to pair devices and setup link security  Protection of device from software vulnerabilities  Device is not directly addressable on the internet  Direct attack unlikely if paired device runs trusted SW  Protection from (local) physical intervention  Limited local threats  Limited device asset value  Treat network as untrusted and use DTLS to establish secure connections based on certified device identities  Strong security to establish/authenticate DTLS sessions (ECC) limits device access  Additional device partitioning can vastly reduce local SW attack surface  Device identity and (device unique) service keys must be protected  Need security in supply chain to prevent installation of cloned devices
  • 8. Confidential ©ARM 20168 Security profiles Lab attacks • Local attack on an end node device Network attacks • Remote attacks across the network • May scale to many devices; accounts; services Minimum cost/effort to attack Per-device HW cost/effort to secure  Where possible devices should not store valuable secrets  Local attacks must not enable network attacks on other devices  Some applications require tamper resistant devices  ARM SecurCore and related technology
  • 9. Confidential ©ARM 20169 Proportional security  Threat-models should be informed by business requirements  Technology applied and cost expended varies according to application needs  For example  Risk environment of application  Value of assets to be protected  Trust and control over firmware  Supply chain structure  Lifetime of the device Application Security Short life node mbed TLS + Connect Long life node + uVisor + Provision + Update High value asset protection + Anti-tamper hardware (ARM SecurCore)
  • 10. Confidential ©ARM 201610 Ultra-constrained Constrained Mainstream IOT BBC micro:bit BT Smart beacon Rich BT Smart Thread node Low BW WiFi node Border router BT Smart Device SW capabilities IP + TLS uVisor Lifecycle Security IP + TLS uVisor Lifecycle Security Firmware over-the-air Architecture Acceleration ARMv6-M ARMv8-M Baseline TRNG + Crypto TRNG + Crypto Device HW resources ARMv8-M Mainline or ARMv7-M with MPU Unconstrained High BW WiFi node Gateway A-Class TRNG + Crypto + GPU + VPU IP + TLS OP-TEE Lifecycle Security Firmware over-the-air Rich UI/Multimedia mbed OS A-Class + mbed Client
  • 11. Confidential ©ARM 201611 mbed security architecture Cloud application platforms Lifecycle security Communication security Device security mbed TLS Connectivit y Client Provisionin g Client Update Client Connectivit y Service Provisionin g Service Update Service Device Hardware mbed uVisor mbed TLS Prov TLCrypto TL Update TLConn TL Deployment ManagementData Flow Management mbed Cloud Service mbed OS
  • 12. Confidential ©ARM 201612 Call to action: Better security value proposition  Avoid selling via FUD  Generally unquantifiable: What is value of security investment? What is the ROI?  Enable reasoning: What security is for, the value it brings  Understand threats to business and what key assets are?  Measure complete deployment lifecycle value not just BOM cost  Do not treat Security Technology as a “One Size Fits All”  Deploy technology according to business needs  Proportional security response according to defined threats/value  Factor in agility to cope with evolving security context  Deliver scalable security choices for IoT driven by clear need/value
  • 13. The trademarks featured in this presentation are registered and/or unregistered trademarks of ARM Limited (or its subsidiaries) in the EU and/or elsewhere. All rights reserved. All other marks featured may be trademarks of their respective owners. Copyright © 2016 ARM Limited Confidential ©ARM 2016

Editor's Notes

  1. Our motivation is generating IoT business Trust is a key. In the past several multi-billion dollar industries, such as e-commerce, have been built on this foundation of trust between cloud, desktop and mobile systems. An IoT Big Data provider needs to trust the device, its identity, the accuracy of its data etc. In the Internet of Things we need trust to establish secure relationships and communication across large device deployments, supply chains and the cloud.    When we establish trust securely and reliably, we enable many additional benefits including data protection, new business models and lifecycle management all the way from chip production to device deployment in the field.  Our goal here is to embed this trust into the security systems of IoT providing the foundation of new multi-billion dollar industries which will be built on the IoT.
  2. Deploying security technology has an NRE cost (and failing to deploy appropriate technology may have a large lifecycle/business cost). The correct choices need to be made up front when creating the IoT based service/application/deployment. Business needs should determine trust requirements Trust requirements (or threat models) determine where investment in security technology will be most effective for the business
  3. IoT applications are incredibly diverse. This is not a “one size fits all” problem. You can not only implement the “lowest common denominator solution”. IoT needs a flexible security framework that can be configured according to each businesses needs. The requirements are vastly different across devices, applications and markets. Later we will show more details on how security capabilities vary for these example devices.
  4. (may have) a long lifetime (may be) physically inaccessible If you want to be able to handle IoT devices generically you DO need to be able to cope with the case where devices are physically inaccessible. In particular the device generally has no physical UI (for config) or a button to trigger device reset. If you want to power cycle the thing you can't go find it and pull the battery out. If it gets infected with malware then you can't take the HDD our and reformat it. etc. etc Even if a device is physically accessible then you don't want users to have to do that sort of thing and you don't want to pay field/installation engineers to go to each IoT end node and do these things. remote management is a must & remotely updatable/recoverable too
  5. Internet Security has been constantly evolving for decades Opportunity to leverage this heritage for IoT end nodes Key security mechanisms that must be used Don’t underestimate the capabilities of low cost, long battery life end nodes Not a good idea to reinvent the wheel (non-IP) for end nodes – easy to repeat past mistakes Security is about the weakest link Flaws in protocol and security architecture Deployment mistakes and mismanagement
  6. Explain "network attack" vs "lab attack” Introduce the idea that in some applications it is not necessary to store valuable secrets on an end node (and in fact it is desirable to avoid it in these cases) then a successful lab attack on one device should gain nothing and not enable general attacks on other devices [Another aspect to highlight: The benefit that the secret brings should be smaller than the effort to get hold of that secret] The mbed offering (e.g. the SW itself) is focused on security related to network attacks Some apps will need to store valuable secrets on a device In these cases we need to deploy tamper resistant techniques in the Si and technology such as ARM SecureCore enables this. Further notes: If you have a private key stored on a device then that private key really should be specific to that device. So if an attacker gets hold of that private key then they can only pretend to be that device. The attacker gains no information that would enable it to hack the entire network of all of the devices (keys or access control info etc). Also refer to "other secrets" e.g. your bank account details, your credit card numbers and the PIN for your card etc. Clearly some apps need to hold "valuable secrets" on a device (in which case tamper resistant techniques should be employed). However, the security architecture should be designed such that the "value" of the secrets that need to be stored on the device should be minimized (ideally to the point where there is really no point spending extra $$$ to implement tamper resistance of the device [for some applications]).
  7. Security is not a black and white thing. It is not either on or off. It must be deployed in proportion to the need for security. Before security thread-models are defined it is important to have a holistic view of business requirements. Then appropriate security choices can be made (the cost and effort to be expended on a security solution is a factor here). Even the most basic application which has static service session information determined at the time of manufacture (e.g. a fixed symmetric key) need fairly sophisticated security functionality. Communication security (as implemented by mbed TLS) enables the device to have basic authentication, confidentiality and integrity for data sent to and from it over the internet. The mbed Cloud Connect service is also provides the security required to use a specific device with a particular cloud application. Many IoT platforms don’t provide much more security than this but at this level it is impossible to securely provision new keys/certificates onto the device or update its firmware. This severely limits the useful lifetime of the device (or risks relying on a device deployment investment with little security protection). Also this limited device security means that valuable secrets can’t safely be stored on the device. As a result this level of security is best suited to disposable devices where the value of device deployment does not need to be maintained and the secrets on the device are low value. Many applications will demand a larger investment in security. Adding mbed OS uVisor capability enables greater protection of secrets scored on the device and provides greater trust for device identity, integrity. This in combination with mbed Cloud Provision and mbed Cloud Update allows deployed device to flexibly connect to new services and form new secure relationships over its lifetime while keeping pace with changes to security standards and newly discovered protocol vulnrabilites. This protects business investment in large device deployments. At this stage the device can be trusted to implement most common IoT applications and to store important secrets with adequate protection. Beyond this some specialist applications may require higher levels of security such as resistance to LAB attacks while storing very valluable secrets. This would required the addition of more expensive hardware counter measures and anti-tamper features. This can be supported alongside mbed OS security features.
  8. The future mbed roadmap will deliver pervasive security across all of our device services (mbed Cloud) and device software (mbed OS; mbed TLS; mbed for X). This security covers many different aspects and exists in may different layers of our mbed IoT Device Platform. Broadly speaking we can categorize all these security aspects into three distinct areas: Device Security: This comprises of all security aspects implemented in mbed Device Sofware running on IoT end nodes. Our roadmap for this includes SW functionality to implement security related to connectivity, provisioning and device update. These higher level rich protocol/functionality modules will be supported by basic security components that include secure boot; secure storage primitives; low level key management; device identity and cryptographic libraries supporting both full SW implementations and secure interfaces to hardware crypto accelerators. These basic security components can, optionally, reside within and be protected by Trusted Execution Environments (TEE) or secure supervisory kernels such as the mbed OS uVisor when this is supported by the device hardware. This adds additional protection by providing secure isolation of system resources for each software component. Communication Security: Based on widely deployed and most thoroughly tested security available for internet communication today. mbed Communication Security is implemented by the mbed TLS library which provides all the functionality required to implement the full TLS and DTLS protocols. The mbed TLS library is use in the device software and within the mbed Cloud services. This provide end-to-end communication security from each end node into mbed Cloud across the internet. Management Security: Implemented within our mbed Cloud services this enables secure lifecycle management for large deployments of end nodes. This will encompass secure device connectivity; secure device provisioning and secure device update services. This is vital to enable IoT deployments to scale. Critically our update service will enable agile security to be implemented across the entire mbed IoT Device Platform. This protects investment in large deployments and enables our IoT security to evolve alongside state of the art internet security. It will also provide secure links into Cloud Application Platforms so that entire IoT applications can be fully secured.
  9. FUD: Fear, Uncertainty, Doubt