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DevOoops
DoJ Annual Cybersecurity Training
Symposium
May 2015
Who Ken
Ken Johnson (@cktricky)
● CTO (@nVisium)
● Railsgoat Co-Author
● (One) of the voices of SecCasts
● US Navy, SAIC, Charter Communications, FishNet Security,
LivingSocial
Who Chris
Chris Gates (CG) @carnal0wnage
● Security Engineer (Facebook)
● NoVA Hackers Co-Founder
● US Army, Army Red Team, Applied Security, Rapid7,
Lares
● http://carnal0wnage.attackresearch.com
Disclaimer (Chris)
The opinions expressed herein are my
own personal opinions and do not
represent my employer's view in any way.
Why This Talk
Increase awareness around DevOps infra security
Provide solutions
Demonstrate impact, regardless of where the infrastructure
is deployed (internal, external, cloud)
What is DevOps
• DevOps – Culture, Tools, Processes
• Agile – Type of development methodology,
actually abused
Agenda
● SearchCode
● GitHub
● Revision Control Tools
● Continuous Integration Tools
● AWS Config Files
● Client Provisioning Tools
● Elasticsearch
● In-Memory Databases
SearchCode
- Searches for code on the following
providers:
- GitHub - Current Leader
- BitBucket - The peasant’s GitHub
- Google Code - Your dad’s provider
- SourceForge - Your grandfather’s provider
- CodePlex - ¯_(ツ)_/¯
- FedoraProject - Hats Project
SearchCode
SearchCode
Rails
SearchCode
Django
SearchCode
Has an API
SearchCode
SearchCode
Learned:
● Indexing has some issues
● Calling individual APIs works better for now
● There is a need for it, people want this…
reasons unknown
SearchCode (Takeaways)
This tool can be used for defensive purposes
as well!
GitHub
GitHub Search
GitHub Advanced Search
● GitHub supports advanced search operators
● Google hacking for GitHub
o http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2013/Jun/15
o http://blog.conviso.com.br/2013/06/github-hacking-for-fun-and-sensitive.html
GitHub OSINT
● Check $company employee repos for uh ohs
o internal project commits, passwords, etc
GitHub Search
Real World Example (March 2015)
http://arstechnica.com/security/2015/03/in-major-goof-uber-stored-sensitive-database-key-on-public-github-page/
Git Fun
Can we impersonate other GitHub users?
Sort of.
Git Fun
Let’s be Linus...
Git Fun
Git Fun
Result: It appears Linus committed to our repo
Git Fun (Takeaways)
● Audit who has access to your repos
o Have a process to remove ex-employees
o Consider auditing their personal repos for leaks
● Be suspicious of Pull Requests
o From “trusted” authors (they can be spoofed)
o With massive code changes within the PR (can
potentially introduce vulns)
GitHub Org “To Do’s”
Forks need be deleted if a member leaves your org
● https://help.github.com/articles/deleting-a-private-fork-of-a-
private-organization-repository/
Audit organization members for 2 factor authentication
● https://developer.github.com/changes/2014-01-29-audit-org-
members-for-2fa/
Revision Control
.Git Exposed
Do you have your .git folder exposed on a webserver
outside?
● Or inside?
● Access to .git content can allow for full source
download.
● Use wget, DVCS-Pillage, or dvcs-ripper to archive and
recreate the repo locally.
https://github.com/evilpacket/DVCS-Pillage
https://github.com/kost/dvcs-ripper
.Git Exposed
If directory listings are enabled, it’s simple to get source
$ mkdir git-test
$ cd git-test
$ wget --mirror --include-directories=/.git
http://www.example.com/.git
Then
$ cd www.example.com
$ git reset --hard
HEAD is now at [...]
You now have the source of the site
.Git Exposed
.Git Exposed
If directory listings are NOT enabled
● Test by checking for .git/config
● Use DVCS-Pillage or dvcs-ripper to
download the source.
DVCS-Pillage also supports
Mercurial (HG) and Bazaar (BZR).
.Git Exposed
What can you get?
● Creds, config files, source code, dev names, public
keys, email addresses, etc
● repo history: vulns fixed, passwords/keys checked in
but removed later :-)
● wordpress config files common
● site/database backups in .git
● session generation keys
.Git Exposed
Internal GitHub Enterprise ties into
organization’s LDAP or Active Directory.
● Find devops/devpassword equivalent
● Download source code
● Log in and search for interesting things
.Git Exposed (Takeaways)
● Do not leave .git exposed
● Block access via:
o htaccess files
o apache configurations
o IIS configuration
Subversion
Subversion 1.6 (and earlier)
● Check for .entries files
● Walk svn chain to retrieve source
● Example:
o http://somedomain.com/.svn/text-base/index.php.svn-base
● Metasploit Auxiliary Module**
o auxiliary/scanner/http/svn_scanner
Reference: http://pen-testing.sans.org/blog/pen-testing/2012/12/06/all-your-svn-are-belong-to-us
Subversion
Subversion 1.7 and later
● Working copy and changes stored in a sqlite database
● Example:
o http://www.somedomain.com/.svn/wc.db
● Metasploit Auxiliary Module
o auxiliary/scanner/http/svn_wcdb_scanner
Reference: http://pen-testing.sans.org/blog/pen-testing/2012/12/06/all-your-svn-are-belong-to-us
Subversion (Takeaways)
● Do not leave .svn exposed
● Block access via:
o htaccess files
o apache configurations
o IIS configuration
● Require authentication to clone all svn
repositories
GitList
GitList
GitList
RCE: http://hatriot.github.io/blog/2014/06/29/gitlist-rce/
Affects: version 0.4.0 and below
GitList (Takeaways)
● Update to latest version of GitList
Continuous Integration
Hudson/Jenkins
“Hudson is a continuous integration (CI) tool written in
Java, which runs in a servlet container, such as Apache
Tomcat or the GlassFish application server”
Very popular
If you can’t pwn Jenkins then try
GlassFish or Tomcat :-)
Shodan search for X-Hudson
Hudson/Jenkins
Shodan search for X-Hudson with HTTP 200
Hudson/Jenkins
Hudson/Jenkins
Jenkins Issues
● Multiple RCE vulnerabilities over the years
● Advisories are not well publicized
o Weak coverage with Vulnerability Scanners
● API token same access as password
Hudson/Jenkins
Metasploit Aux Module
Hudson/Jenkins
If no authentication required
● Trivial to gain remote code execution via script console
● Metasploit Module
o exploit/multi/http/jenkins_script_console
o Exploit module will also use credentials
https://www.pentestgeek.com/2014/06/13/hacking-jenkins-servers-with-no-password/
http://www.labofapenetrationtester.com/2014/06/hacking-jenkins-servers.html
http://zeroknock.blogspot.com/search/label/Hacking%20Jenkins
Hudson/Jenkins
Script Console (Groovy Code to run whoami)
Hudson/Jenkins
Hudson/Jenkins
Metasploit exploit module for script console
Hudson/Jenkins
You can lock down script console access by
turning on authentication
● However, if it’s set to local auth, you can
register as a regular user :-)
● ...then get access to the /script
Hudson/Jenkins
If you have access to /view/All/newJob,
create a new build and run commands
Hudson/Jenkins
Hudson/Jenkins
Can you browse a workspace?
Hudson/Jenkins
Hudson/Jenkins
Hudson/Jenkins (Takeaways)
● If possible, require authentication for
everything on Hudson/Jenkins
● Monitor for security issues and updates
o Challenging b/c full impact of issues can be watered
down in the advisory
● Segment Hudson/Jenkins from Corp
● Logical separation by groups
o Either on single instance or multiple servers
● Monitor Jenkins slave activity/netconns
AWS Config Files
AWS - CLI Dev Tools
AWS stores creds in plaintext in **hidden files**
Typically privileged access
AWS - CLI Dev Tools
AWS - CLI Dev Tools + EB
AWS - Pivoting
Your best bet is to leverage the Amazon
provided libraries to get info you need:
http://aws.amazon.com/tools/
Nimbostratus can automate some tasks:
https://github.com/andresriancho/nimbostratus
AWS (Takeaways)
Think about deploying from a protected virtual
box that does is only used to deploy to AWS
Client Provisioning
Chef
Chef allows you to define the state your
servers (local or cloud) should be in and
enforces it.
Chef (Web Interface)
Default/Weak Creds
Chef (Web Interface)
Environment Leakage
Chef (Web Interface)
Databags
Chef/knife
knife is a Chef command line utility
● Credentials stored in data bags
● Can be encrypted
● Example:
$ knife data bag list
Chef/knife
Chef/knife (encrypted data bag)
Chef/knife
Chef (Takeaways)
● Be aware of what you put into chef recipes
● Protect secrets/passwords
Vagrant
Did you change your SSH keys?
Vagrant
● Default Credentials
o root/vagrant vagrant/vagrant
o No pass to sudo :-)
● Fixes!
o http://docs.vagrantup.com/v2/share/ssh.html
 SSH sharing
o https://github.com/mitchellh/vagrant/issues/2608
 Generate Random SSH key on `vagrant up`
Vagrant
Scan using the default private key
Vagrant
Scan using the default private key
Vagrant
Identify real from fake by ssh version scan
Vagrant
Log in with private key
Vagrant
Breaking into host from guest
http://finite.state.io/blog/2012/10/30/breaking-in-and-out-of-vagrant/
“Put evil things in /vagrant/.git/hooks/post-commit
and wait for the user to commit some code.
Since the /vagrant/ directory is mounted from the
host, my hook will persist even if the user
destroys the VM.”
Vagrant (Takeaways)
● Change the default private key
● Newer versions of Vagrant automatically
change this key
Kickstart Files
3 ways to set root password
1. Enter during installation
2. Crypted hash in the kickstart file
“rootpw --iscrypted”
3. Clear text in the kickstart file
“rootpw --plaintext”
Kickstart Files
Examples
Kickstart Files
Examples
Kickstart Files (Takeaways)
● Dont leave these files in open shares
● Use the crypted password option for files
● Have a process to change the password
after initialization
● Rotate the initial root password regularly
ElasticSearch
elasticsearch
Provides a distributed, multitenant-capable full-
text search engine with a RESTful web
interface and schema-free JSON documents.
● GET request to port 9200 will show version
"version" : {
"number" : "1.2.4",
elasticsearch
● No Authentication
● Can search stored data via HTTP API
● Update data with PUT request
● Join an open cluster and receive all data
● RCE prior to 1.2.0 (CVE-2014-3120)
● RCE prior to 1.5.0* (CVE-2015-1427)
elasticsearch
exploit/multi/elasticsearch/script_mvel_rce
elasticsearch
Searching via curl/browser is cumbersome
● Kibana FTW
o http://www.elasticsearch.org/overview/kibana/
● Edit config.js to point to open Elasticsearch
● Open index.html in local browser or host on
a server
elasticsearch (Kibana)
elasticsearch (Kibana)
elasticsearch (Kibana)
Viewing the content of the document
elasticsearch (Kibana)
Import your own data and visualize
elasticsearch (Takeaways)
● Apply authentication if possible
o https://www.elastic.co/products/shield
● Segment elasticsearch from Corp (and the
public in general)
● Be aware of the data you put in elasticsearch
In-Memory Databases
Redis
Defaults:
● No encrypted communication
o https://github.com/antirez/redis/issues/2178#issueco
mment-68573636 <- getting closer though
● No credentials
● Port 6379 (TCP)
● Binds to all interfaces
o Moral of the story? Keep off the interwebs!
Redis
How prevalent is this?
Redis
You can navigate the DB with the redis-cli
Redis
Or use the Redis Desktop Manager
Redis
Feel lucky?
Redis - Fun Commands
FLUSHALL
SCRIPT LOAD
EVAL / EVALSHA
o Also - Thanks Adam Baldwin:
o https://github.com/evilpacket/redis-sha-crack
memcache
Free & open source, high-performance,
distributed memory object caching system
No code exec, but fun things get put into
memcache
Examples
memcache
memcache
memcache
In-Memory Database (Takeaways)
● Apply authentication
● If possible, enable SSL/TLS
● Segment In-Memory Databases from Corp
(and the public in general)
● Be aware of the data you put in these
databases
o Don’t store keys, passwords, etc
What can we do about
this?
Actions you can take tomorrow
● If you have Jenkins, make sure it requires
authentication
● If you have elasticsearch, upgrade
● Search github/bitbucket/google code for your
sensitive information
● Change default vagrant private key
● Update to latest versions of your devops
tools
Actions you can take going forward
● Understand that most devops tools take the
approach of: “If you can talk to me I trust you”
● Understand which tools are deployed in your
environment and monitor for security updates
● Jenkins API key == password (protect them)
● Monitor/review code for stored passwords/api
keys
Thanks!
Ken Johnson ken.johnson [at] nvisium.com
Chris Gates chris [at] carnal0wnage.com

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Devoops: DoJ Annual Cybersecurity Training Symposium Edition 2015

Editor's Notes

  1. https://github.com/convisoappsec/research_github_hack http://www.covert.io/research-papers/security/gitDigger%20-%20Creating%20useful%20wordlists%20from%20GitHub.pdf Ken - twice in 2014 did some serious damage in our assessments using this technique Git’s tools like rebase, cherry pick, branching - lead to accidental
  2. https://github.com/convisoappsec/research_github_hack http://www.covert.io/research-papers/security/gitDigger%20-%20Creating%20useful%20wordlists%20from%20GitHub.pdf Ken - twice in 2014 did some serious damage in our assessments using this technique Git’s tools like rebase, cherry pick, branching - lead to accidental
  3. Rails & Django - Can lead to RCE or just impersonating another user
  4. In Subversion 1.6 (and earlier), you could view all the entries in Subversion by looking at the aptly named "entries" file. This file contains the names of the files and directories under source control. As each directory has its own .svn directory, you needed to walk the entire tree to access the files and all the entries files. Once armed with that information, you could access the source of the file in the text-base directory.
  5. In Subversion 1.6 (and earlier), you could view all the entries in Subversion by looking at the aptly named "entries" file. This file contains the names of the files and directories under source control. As each directory has its own .svn directory, you needed to walk the entire tree to access the files and all the entries files. Once armed with that information, you could access the source of the file in the text-base directory.
  6. In Subversion 1.6 (and earlier), you could view all the entries in Subversion by looking at the aptly named "entries" file. This file contains the names of the files and directories under source control. As each directory has its own .svn directory, you needed to walk the entire tree to access the files and all the entries files. Once armed with that information, you could access the source of the file in the text-base directory.
  7. Metasploit Module
  8. http://bxm-dev.blogspot.com/2013/07/decrypting-jenkins-passwords.html http://xn--thibaud-dya.fr/jenkins_credentials.html https://github.com/tweksteen/jenkins-decrypt/blob/master/decrypt.py
  9. because every Jenkins IS Hudson
  10. because every Jenkins IS Hudson
  11. /script Unauth Script console = Remote Code Exec /view/All/newJob = allows you to create a new build add build commands via shell /asynchPeople = the ability to see registered users /systemInfo = systeminfo → linux/windows, path info
  12. /script Unauth Script console = Remote Code Exec /view/All/newJob = allows you to create a new build add build commands via shell /asynchPeople = the ability to see registered users /systemInfo = systeminfo → linux/windows, path info
  13. make a script here to steal a master key and use it to decrypt the api token (*think* it is possible) def sout = new StringBuffer(), serr = new StringBuffer() def proc = 'whoami'.execute() proc.consumeProcessOutput(sout, serr) proc.waitForOrKill(1000) println "out> $sout err> $serr"
  14. because this is a build server it will usually have access to any development or production SQL or NoSQL servers it needs to in order to perform tests, so the juicy stuff is usually in the unit tests
  15. http://www.slideshare.net/MohitSethi2/chef-for-openstack
  16. If you gain access you can potentially deploy your own box called it QATEST as your own C2 server
  17. $knife data bag show drupal _default: admin_pass: admin admin_user: example_admin db_password: drupal db_user: drupal id: example_data
  18. $knife data bag show drupal _default: cipher: aes-256-cbc encrypted_data: zDE61IUD97ZK7O6Eq11lkJ+5EhBFv7g7vvWfi50hU3pGZPYGnZ35pIWFsdUEOFswlpoagRLNQFs0t4oQpdg== iv: 1w+bQ46evg8jZWBs0MZW6A== version: 1 id: example_data
  19. $knife data bag show drupal --secret-file path/to/file _default: admin_pass: admin admin_user: example_admin db_password: drupal db_user: drupal id: example_data
  20. $knife data bag show drupal --secret-file path/to/file _default: admin_pass: admin admin_user: example_admin db_password: drupal db_user: drupal id: example_data
  21. up to 1.5.2 with immunitysec canvas module
  22. example importing nmap data
  23. It is sandboxed, thus far no public RCE… but we’re working on it :-) There are some potential avenues where ByteCode can be used for RCE Additionally, there is a table that restricts functions that can be run, this can be overwritten in theory, again… still working on it
  24. http://www.slideshare.net/wallarm/us-14novikovthenewpageofinjectionsbookmemcachedinjectionswp