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WeirdAAL
(AWS Attack Library)
Chris Gates, Ken Johnson
whoami
whoami
Chris Gates - Sr. Security Engineer - Uber
Twitter: @carnal0wnage
Blog: carnal0wnage.attackresearch.com
Talks: slideshare.net/chrisgates
whoami
whoami
Ken Johnson - AppSec - GitHub
Twitter: @cktricky
Talks: slideshare.net/KenJohnson61/
We’ve been talking about this...
LasCon 2014 - DevOops, I did it Again
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i8SnLXwlBWM
… and talking...
DevOpsDays DC 2015
https://vimeo.com/137691444
...and talking some more...
DevOops Redux - AppSec USA 2016
https://bit.ly/2qYe29y
… still going...
RSA Conference 2017
https://bit.ly/2HOZ0N4
OKAY, WE GET IT ALREADY! (do you, though?)
DevOops Redux - CERN 2017 &
InsomniaHack 2017
https://cds.cern.ch/record/2256987
So what has happened during this time?
2014 - Code Spaces
… le sigh (horrorshow is right)
2015 - Systema Software
Come on!
2016 - Datadog
… surely its getting better? Nope
2017 - Deep Root Analytics / America?
This is why we drink
2018 - MBM Company, Tesla
So what did we decide to do about it?
Join the party of course :-)
Vaporware
WeirdAAL
● WeirdAAL (AWS Attack Library)
● https://github.com/carnal0wnage/
weirdAAL
● Python3
● Relies heavily on boto3 library
WeirdAAL
Two Goals:
1. Answer what can I do with this AWS Keypair [blackbox]
1. Be a repository of useful functions (offensive & defensive) to
interact with AWS services.
WeirdAAL
Prior work
1. CG’s aws_interrogate (vaporware)
2. https://github.com/dagrz/aws_pwn & his medium posts
3. https://github.com/bchew/dynamodump
4. https://github.com/ThreatResponse/aws_ir
5. https://github.com/nccgroup/Scout2
Setup / Usage / Boto3
● Supports boto3 and aws credentials format
○ Using boto3 allows us to natively support STS tokens
○ Put your creds in .env folder in WeirdAAL home
Setup / Usage / Boto3
● Targets
○ Passes a -t (target) value to track your work
○ Can have multiple AWS keys in a target
● Modules
○ Modules passed via -m to do various tasks
○ python3 weirdAAL.py -m dynamodb_list_tables -t demo
○ Coverage for many services but not all (so far)
■ EC2, Lambda, s3, dynamodb, iam, etc
● Built in proxy support via boto3
What Can I Do With This AWS Key Pair?
AWS offers no easy way (blackbox)
If you have IAM you can look at running services manually or check billing.
Tedious & No Fun
(135 services in boto3 1.7.4)
What Can I Do With This AWS Key Pair?
Our solution, ask every service if we have permission to use it (recon_all)
What Can I Do With This AWS Key Pair?
Recon_all demo
What Can I Do With This AWS Key Pair?
Recon_all demo
What Can I Do With This AWS Key Pair?
What Can I Do With This AWS Key Pair?
Recon_all demo (recap)
Hit up every AWS service we can ask a **generic** question to
** required no args or specifics about that account
Log to DB for use later and automation
Todo: Evasion? Timing? Does anyone look or care?
What Can I Do With This AWS Key Pair?
Recon_all demo (gotchas)
● Root keys that have invalid billing info give you:
“SubscriptionRequiredException” or “OptInRequired” boto3 errors
● Root keys that are in good standing give you everything available :-/
F**king Stuff Up
What Can I Do With This AWS Key Pair?
In previous talks, we discussed
monitoring. Now we show you
how to burn all that to the
ground.
What Can I Do With This AWS Key Pair?
Starting with SNS…
List topics
What Can I Do With This AWS Key Pair?
List subscribers to a
topic
What Can I Do With This AWS Key Pair?
Or… just delete the
Topic. Now nobody
knows what you’re
doing :-)
What Can I Do With This AWS Key Pair?
Config service has rules.
You’ll see why cloudtrail
is important
What Can I Do With This AWS Key Pair?
We can list the config rules of course (for every region):
What Can I Do With This AWS Key Pair?
But what about deleting rules? Yeah, we’ve got that too :-)
What Can I Do With This AWS Key Pair?
Or just delete the whole recording altogether - BEFORE
What Can I Do With This AWS Key Pair?
Let’s go ahead and just delete Config’s recorder altogether, shall we? First list them...
What Can I Do With This AWS Key Pair?
Now, delete it :-)
What Can I Do With This AWS Key Pair?
Welp, no more Config alerts… or Config at all, really
What Can I Do With This AWS Key Pair?
IAM_Pwn
Found a key with IAM/Root?
Let’s automate the takeover / make
backdoor accounts
What Can I Do With This AWS Key Pair?
IAM_Pwn demo
What Can I Do With This AWS Key Pair?
IAM_Pwn demo - List users
What Can I Do With This AWS Key Pair?
IAM_Pwn demo - User details IAM console
What Can I Do With This AWS Key Pair?
IAM_Pwn demo - delete MFA device
What Can I Do With This AWS Key Pair?
IAM_Pwn demo - change console password
What Can I Do With This AWS Key Pair?
IAM_Pwn demo - create access/secret key
What Can I Do With This AWS Key Pair?
IAM_Pwn demo - delete access/secret key
What Can I Do With This AWS Key Pair?
IAM_Pwn demo - make backdoor account
What Can I Do With This AWS Key Pair?
IAM_Pwn (recap)
Deleted 2FA
Add console user / add new keys
Backdoor admin user
Hack all the thingz
What Can I Do With This AWS Key Pair?
IAM_Pwn (story time)
Made backdoor account in pentest, proved lack of logging and policy
enforcement
What Can I Do With This AWS Key Pair?
Logging / IR
What Can I Do With This AWS Key Pair?
Lambda -
list_functions
What Can I Do With This AWS Key Pair?
Lambda - get_function
What Can I Do With This AWS Key Pair?
Thankfully, lambda serverless arch and KMS means no more creds in code right?
What Can I Do With This AWS Key Pair?
Nope :-)
What Can I Do With This AWS Key Pair?
Lambda
http://boto3.readthedocs.io/en/latest/reference/services/lambda.html#Lambda.Client.update_function_code
It’s cool I have cloudtrail configured….
What Can I Do With This AWS Key Pair?
Stop Cloudtrail logging (ref: https://danielgrzelak.com/disrupting-aws-logging-a42e437d6594)
Identify existing CloudTrail trails
What Can I Do With This AWS Key Pair?
Stop Cloudtrail logging
Use TrailARN to stop CloudTrail with stop_logging function
What Can I Do With This AWS Key Pair?
Delete Cloudtrail Trail
Use TrailARN to stop CloudTrail with delete_trail function
What Can I Do With This AWS Key Pair?
Delete Cloudtrail Trail
What Can I Do With This AWS Key Pair?
Logging / IR
What Can I Do With This AWS Key Pair?
EC2 get_console_screenshot
What Can I Do With This AWS Key Pair?
EC2 get_console_screenshot
What Can I Do With This AWS Key Pair?
EC2 get_console_output
What Can I Do With This AWS Key Pair?
EC2 get_console_output
What Can I Do With This AWS Key Pair?
EC2 get_console_output_all
What Can I Do With This AWS Key Pair?
EC2 & Lucidcharts
What Can I Do With This AWS Key Pair?
EC2 & Lucidcharts
What Can I Do With This AWS Key Pair?
Just plain mean…. ec2_stop_instances
Useful Functions &
Libs
Grew tired of stackoverflowing
everything
Ideally, grab useful functions and
throw together quick python script
to knock out your task
Uses libs for actions that need more
control/finesse/data passed
Example of a Module
Useful Functions &
Libs
Used WeirdAAL at work to get public EC2 instances quickly so we can do
external pentesting
-impossible to know given the large range of AWS IP space
Useful Functions & Libs
Pydoc friendly (work in progress)
Questions?
Contact Info
Chris Gates
Slides
Twitter: @carnal0wnage https://www.slideshare.net/chrisgates
Ken Johnson
Code:
Twitter: @cktricky
https://github.com/carnal0wnage/weirdAAL

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WeirdAAL (AWS Attack Library)

  • 4. whoami Chris Gates - Sr. Security Engineer - Uber Twitter: @carnal0wnage Blog: carnal0wnage.attackresearch.com Talks: slideshare.net/chrisgates
  • 6. whoami Ken Johnson - AppSec - GitHub Twitter: @cktricky Talks: slideshare.net/KenJohnson61/
  • 7. We’ve been talking about this... LasCon 2014 - DevOops, I did it Again https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i8SnLXwlBWM
  • 8. … and talking... DevOpsDays DC 2015 https://vimeo.com/137691444
  • 9. ...and talking some more... DevOops Redux - AppSec USA 2016 https://bit.ly/2qYe29y
  • 10. … still going... RSA Conference 2017 https://bit.ly/2HOZ0N4
  • 11. OKAY, WE GET IT ALREADY! (do you, though?) DevOops Redux - CERN 2017 & InsomniaHack 2017 https://cds.cern.ch/record/2256987
  • 12. So what has happened during this time? 2014 - Code Spaces
  • 13. … le sigh (horrorshow is right) 2015 - Systema Software
  • 14. Come on! 2016 - Datadog
  • 15. … surely its getting better? Nope 2017 - Deep Root Analytics / America?
  • 16. This is why we drink 2018 - MBM Company, Tesla
  • 17. So what did we decide to do about it?
  • 18. Join the party of course :-)
  • 20. WeirdAAL ● WeirdAAL (AWS Attack Library) ● https://github.com/carnal0wnage/ weirdAAL ● Python3 ● Relies heavily on boto3 library
  • 21. WeirdAAL Two Goals: 1. Answer what can I do with this AWS Keypair [blackbox] 1. Be a repository of useful functions (offensive & defensive) to interact with AWS services.
  • 22. WeirdAAL Prior work 1. CG’s aws_interrogate (vaporware) 2. https://github.com/dagrz/aws_pwn & his medium posts 3. https://github.com/bchew/dynamodump 4. https://github.com/ThreatResponse/aws_ir 5. https://github.com/nccgroup/Scout2
  • 23. Setup / Usage / Boto3 ● Supports boto3 and aws credentials format ○ Using boto3 allows us to natively support STS tokens ○ Put your creds in .env folder in WeirdAAL home
  • 24. Setup / Usage / Boto3 ● Targets ○ Passes a -t (target) value to track your work ○ Can have multiple AWS keys in a target ● Modules ○ Modules passed via -m to do various tasks ○ python3 weirdAAL.py -m dynamodb_list_tables -t demo ○ Coverage for many services but not all (so far) ■ EC2, Lambda, s3, dynamodb, iam, etc ● Built in proxy support via boto3
  • 25. What Can I Do With This AWS Key Pair? AWS offers no easy way (blackbox) If you have IAM you can look at running services manually or check billing. Tedious & No Fun (135 services in boto3 1.7.4)
  • 26. What Can I Do With This AWS Key Pair? Our solution, ask every service if we have permission to use it (recon_all)
  • 27. What Can I Do With This AWS Key Pair? Recon_all demo
  • 28. What Can I Do With This AWS Key Pair? Recon_all demo
  • 29. What Can I Do With This AWS Key Pair?
  • 30. What Can I Do With This AWS Key Pair? Recon_all demo (recap) Hit up every AWS service we can ask a **generic** question to ** required no args or specifics about that account Log to DB for use later and automation Todo: Evasion? Timing? Does anyone look or care?
  • 31. What Can I Do With This AWS Key Pair? Recon_all demo (gotchas) ● Root keys that have invalid billing info give you: “SubscriptionRequiredException” or “OptInRequired” boto3 errors ● Root keys that are in good standing give you everything available :-/
  • 33. What Can I Do With This AWS Key Pair? In previous talks, we discussed monitoring. Now we show you how to burn all that to the ground.
  • 34. What Can I Do With This AWS Key Pair? Starting with SNS… List topics
  • 35. What Can I Do With This AWS Key Pair? List subscribers to a topic
  • 36. What Can I Do With This AWS Key Pair? Or… just delete the Topic. Now nobody knows what you’re doing :-)
  • 37. What Can I Do With This AWS Key Pair? Config service has rules. You’ll see why cloudtrail is important
  • 38. What Can I Do With This AWS Key Pair? We can list the config rules of course (for every region):
  • 39. What Can I Do With This AWS Key Pair? But what about deleting rules? Yeah, we’ve got that too :-)
  • 40. What Can I Do With This AWS Key Pair? Or just delete the whole recording altogether - BEFORE
  • 41. What Can I Do With This AWS Key Pair? Let’s go ahead and just delete Config’s recorder altogether, shall we? First list them...
  • 42. What Can I Do With This AWS Key Pair? Now, delete it :-)
  • 43. What Can I Do With This AWS Key Pair? Welp, no more Config alerts… or Config at all, really
  • 44. What Can I Do With This AWS Key Pair? IAM_Pwn Found a key with IAM/Root? Let’s automate the takeover / make backdoor accounts
  • 45. What Can I Do With This AWS Key Pair? IAM_Pwn demo
  • 46. What Can I Do With This AWS Key Pair? IAM_Pwn demo - List users
  • 47. What Can I Do With This AWS Key Pair? IAM_Pwn demo - User details IAM console
  • 48. What Can I Do With This AWS Key Pair? IAM_Pwn demo - delete MFA device
  • 49. What Can I Do With This AWS Key Pair? IAM_Pwn demo - change console password
  • 50. What Can I Do With This AWS Key Pair? IAM_Pwn demo - create access/secret key
  • 51. What Can I Do With This AWS Key Pair? IAM_Pwn demo - delete access/secret key
  • 52. What Can I Do With This AWS Key Pair? IAM_Pwn demo - make backdoor account
  • 53. What Can I Do With This AWS Key Pair? IAM_Pwn (recap) Deleted 2FA Add console user / add new keys Backdoor admin user Hack all the thingz
  • 54. What Can I Do With This AWS Key Pair? IAM_Pwn (story time) Made backdoor account in pentest, proved lack of logging and policy enforcement
  • 55. What Can I Do With This AWS Key Pair? Logging / IR
  • 56. What Can I Do With This AWS Key Pair? Lambda - list_functions
  • 57. What Can I Do With This AWS Key Pair? Lambda - get_function
  • 58. What Can I Do With This AWS Key Pair? Thankfully, lambda serverless arch and KMS means no more creds in code right?
  • 59. What Can I Do With This AWS Key Pair? Nope :-)
  • 60. What Can I Do With This AWS Key Pair? Lambda http://boto3.readthedocs.io/en/latest/reference/services/lambda.html#Lambda.Client.update_function_code
  • 61. It’s cool I have cloudtrail configured….
  • 62. What Can I Do With This AWS Key Pair? Stop Cloudtrail logging (ref: https://danielgrzelak.com/disrupting-aws-logging-a42e437d6594) Identify existing CloudTrail trails
  • 63. What Can I Do With This AWS Key Pair? Stop Cloudtrail logging Use TrailARN to stop CloudTrail with stop_logging function
  • 64. What Can I Do With This AWS Key Pair? Delete Cloudtrail Trail Use TrailARN to stop CloudTrail with delete_trail function
  • 65. What Can I Do With This AWS Key Pair? Delete Cloudtrail Trail
  • 66. What Can I Do With This AWS Key Pair? Logging / IR
  • 67. What Can I Do With This AWS Key Pair? EC2 get_console_screenshot
  • 68. What Can I Do With This AWS Key Pair? EC2 get_console_screenshot
  • 69. What Can I Do With This AWS Key Pair? EC2 get_console_output
  • 70. What Can I Do With This AWS Key Pair? EC2 get_console_output
  • 71. What Can I Do With This AWS Key Pair? EC2 get_console_output_all
  • 72. What Can I Do With This AWS Key Pair? EC2 & Lucidcharts
  • 73. What Can I Do With This AWS Key Pair? EC2 & Lucidcharts
  • 74. What Can I Do With This AWS Key Pair? Just plain mean…. ec2_stop_instances
  • 75. Useful Functions & Libs Grew tired of stackoverflowing everything Ideally, grab useful functions and throw together quick python script to knock out your task Uses libs for actions that need more control/finesse/data passed
  • 76. Example of a Module
  • 77. Useful Functions & Libs Used WeirdAAL at work to get public EC2 instances quickly so we can do external pentesting -impossible to know given the large range of AWS IP space
  • 78. Useful Functions & Libs Pydoc friendly (work in progress)
  • 80. Contact Info Chris Gates Slides Twitter: @carnal0wnage https://www.slideshare.net/chrisgates Ken Johnson Code: Twitter: @cktricky https://github.com/carnal0wnage/weirdAAL