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Networked Home Appliances and
Vulnerabilities.
Panasonic Corporation Analysis Center
Yukihisa Horibe
Profile
堀部 千壽(Yukihisa Horibe)
2
Panasonic Corporation Analysis Center
Panasonic-PSIRT Member
Focusing on improving security for networked
home appliances
Vulnerability assessment of house hold appliances
and embedded systems
Vulnerability assessment of home service servers
Table top analysis of networks including house hold
appliances.
Over 10 years of experience in security evaluation
related work
Agenda
3
Changes in the feature of connected CE
products
The risks to connect
Performance and trends in the Vulnerability
Assessment for connected CE products
Security functions required for CE products in
the time of IoT
Closing
Agenda
4
Changes in the feature of connected CE
products
The risks to connect
Performance and trends in the Vulnerability
Assessment for connected CE products
Security functions required for CE products in
the time of IoT
Closing
Evolving Home Appliances.
5
 Remote Control
 Media Server
HDD Recorder
 Image Upload
 Wifi Data Transfer
Digital Camera/Video Cam
 CDDB
Audio System
 Browser
 Media Player
 Smartphone like apps
 Browser
 Media Player
 Smartphone like apps
Digital TVDigital TV
 Browser
 Media Player
 Smartphone like apps
Digital TV
Door Chimes
 Notification
 Communications
 Measurements
data transfer
Scales
Device
Integration
Smartphone
Integration
Cloud
Integration
 Monitoring
 Power Control
 On Demand
Control
HEMS
 Monitorin
 Remote Control
Air Conditioner
Historical Overview of Function and Data Information of Networked Home
Appliances(~2005:Growth Period)
6
Internet(Household)
Cellphones
Digital TV
Recorders
Cooking Appliances
201220102008200620042002
ADSL
mova
3G
Browser
Remote operations
Status Notifications
Historical Overview of Function and Data Information of Networked Home
Appliances(~2005:Growth Period)
7
Internet (Household)
Cellphones
Digital TV
Recorders
Cooking Appliances
201220102008200620042002
ADSL
mova
3G
Browsers
Remote Operation
Status Notifications
ID/Password
Recording
Information
email address
Status Info on
operations
Access History
Most of the functions are contained within each appliance and
the information they handle is limited.
Historical Overview of Function and Data Information of Networked Home
Appliances(2005~2010:Evolution Phase)
8
Internet(Household)
Cellphone
Digital TV
Recorder
Audio System/Music
Digital
Camera/Camcorders
Cooking Appliances
Home Related
201220102008200620042002
ADSL
FTTH(Optical Fiber)
mova
3G
Browser
Remote Operations
CDDB
Appliance Integration
(DLNA)
VOD
Status notifications
Security: Status Monitoring
Door Chime:Visitor Notification
HEMS
Image Upload
Historical Overview of Function and Data Information of Networked Home
Appliances(2005~2010:Evolution Phase)
9
Internet (Household)
Cellphones
Digital TV
Recorder
Audio
Systems/Music
Digital
Camera/Camcorder
Cooking Appliance
Home Related
201220102008200620042002
ADSL
FTTH(Fiber Optic)
mova
3G
ブラウザ
宅外操作
CDDB
Device Integration
(DLNA)
VOD
状態通知
Security Status Monitoring
Door Chime Visitor Notifications
HEMS
Image upload
CD Ownership
List
Payment Info
Viewing History
“at home” info
Operational Info of
each appliance
Image Information
Blog/UL Service
Account
Visitor Info
email Address
Content Ownership Info
Device Ownership Info
Operational Info
of each device
Power usage info
With the increase in server/inter-device integration
the importance of information also grew
Historical Overview of Function and Data Information of Networked Home
Appliances(2010~:Mature Phase)
10
Internet(Household)
Cellphone
DigitalTV
Recorder
Audio System/Music
Digital
Camera/Cammcorder
Health Care
Appliances
Cooking Appliances
Home Related
201220102008200620042002
ADSL
FTTH(Fiber Optic)
mova
3G
smartphone
Browser
Remote Operations
CDDB
Device Integration
(DLNA)
VOD
Status Notifications
Security Status Monitoring
Door Chimes Visitor Notification
applications
HEMS
Smartphone
Integration
AC
Remote
Operations
Image Upload
Historical Overview of Function and Data Information of Networked Home
Appliances(2010~:Mature Phase)
11
Internet(Household)
Cellphone
Digital TV
Recorder
Audio System/Music
Digital
Camera/Cammcorder
Health Care
Appliances
Cooking Appliances
Home related
201220102008200620042002
ADSL
FTTH(Fiber Optic)
mova
3G
Smart Phones
Browser
Remote Operation
CDDB
機器連携
(DLNA)
VOD
Status Notification
Security Status Monitoring
ドアホン 来客通知
Apps
HEMS
Smartphone
Integration
AC
Remote
Operation
Image Upload
Payment Info
Purchase History
Address/Name
Blog/SNS Account
Physical Info
Service Account
Operation Info
Service Account
Historical Overview of Function and Data Information of Networked Home
Appliances(2010~:Mature Phase)
12
Internet(Household)
Cellphones
Digital TV
Recorder
Audio System/Music
Digital
Camera/Camcorder
Health Care Appliances
Cooking Appliance
Home Related
201220102008200620042002
ADSL
FTTH(光回線)
GSM(cHTML)
広帯域CDMA(HTML/Java)
Smartphone
ブラウザ
宅外操作
CDDB
機器連携
(DLNA)
VOD
状態通知
Security Operational Info
ドアホン 来客通知
Apps
HEMS
スマホ
連携
エアコン
遠隔操作
画像アップロード
Cloud Integration allows the information linkage to include
everything including smartphones.
ID/Passworr
Recording history
Email Address
Device Operation Info
Access History
CD Ownership
List
Payment Info
Viewing History
Vacancy Info
Operational Info
of each device
Image Info
Blog/UL Service
account info
Visitor Info
Email address
Content Ownership
Device Ownership
Operational Info of
each device.
Power Usage Info
Payment Info
Purchase History
住所氏名
ブログ/SNSアカウント
Physical
Information
Service Account
Operation Info
Service Account
Cloud
Integration
Address Book
Video/Image
Account info
The Evolution of Networked Home Appliances Functionality and Information
(Near Future)
House hold(Audio Visual, Home , Cosmetic)
PC, Game terminal,Information
terminal
Smartphone, Cellphones, Land lines
Housing Equipment(Single Family,complexes)
13
Inside the
home
connecting
The Evolution of Networked Home Appliances Functionality and Information
(Near Future)
Home Appliances(Audio Visual,House hold,Cosmetic)
PC,Game Terminal,Information Terminals
Smartphone,Cellphones,Landlines
Housing Equipment( Single Family, Complexes)
Medical Devices (Individual , Institutional)
Public Services(Municipal offices, schools)
Public Transportations(Bus、Trains)
Cars/Automotive equipment
Infrastructure(Power、Gas、Water)
Retail(Large scale, individual)
14
Is the era when household appliances , home and
public,commercial services are all connected near?
Everything
is
connected
Inside the
home
connecting
Agenda
15
Changes in the feature of connected CE
products
The risks to connect
Performance and trends in the Vulnerability
Assessment for connected CE products
Security functions required for CE products in
the time of IoT
Closing
Risks of Home Appliances Having Network Capabilities
The possibility of unauthorized access via the
network
Many devices have global IPs assigned.
Possibility of attacks leveraging
vulnerabilities in home appliances.
Attack by forcing a download of malware
Targeted attacks leveraging XSS/CSRF
16
Using search engines you
can find sites that hint they
are home appliances.
Fake Firmware or
Contents
CVE-2008-3482 (2008)
Network Camera made by Panasonic , Reflected XSS vulnerability
Defect in escaping routine of the display on the error page
Defcon17 (2009)
CSRF vulnerability in household network camera by Panasonic
Many vulnerabilities were disclosed for household routers and
other embedded web systems.
Reported vulnerabilities on CE category: Panasonic case
17
http://jvndb.jvn.jp/ja/contents/2008/JVNDB-2008-000037.html
http://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-usa-09/BOJINOV/BHUSA09-Bojinov-EmbeddedMgmt-PAPER.pdf
Reported vulnerabilities on CE category: example of other case
18
Year Product Outline Manufacturer
2004 Video recorder Accessible without authentication (springboard) Japan
2008 NAS CSRF (remote data deletion) Japan
2010 Digital camera Arbitrary code execution from SD card Japan
2011 MFP Authentication bypass and more Japan & overseas
2012 Digital TV DoS Japan
2012 Many Devices Arbitrary code execution by UPnP vulnerability Japan & overseas
2013 Digital TV DoS & restart by malformed packets Japan & overseas
2013 Smart phone Intrusion of malware through power cable Japan & overseas
2013 Digital TV Authority seizure & remote control by illegal application Overseas
2013 Lighting system Force unable to turn on Overseas
2013 Home GW
Vulnerability in authentication, CSRF and more (electric lock
unlock by malicious third party)
Overseas
2013 Toilet Hard-Coded Bluetooth PIN Vulnerability Japan
With the advancement of function, the reports of vulnerability have
been increasing after 2012
Agenda
19
Changes in the feature of connected CE
products
The risks to connect
Performance and trends in the
Vulnerability Assessment for connected
CE products
Security functions required for CE products in
the time of IoT
Closing
Vulnerability Eradication Efforts at Panasonic
20
Base Knowledge
(Awareness/Education)
Base foundation of knowledge regarding product security
Two pillars supporting Product Security
Minimize Risk
Incident Response
Minimize Risk Incident Response
Product Security
Improving security of products including house hold appliances
is an important requirement for Panasonic
Network Home Appliances,
Embedded Systems, Services
Response based on product lifecycles.
21
ShippingProduct Lifecycle
Contamination Prevention
(Avoid building vulnerabilities into)
Inspection/Removal
(Detect vulnerability and
remove)
Maintain/Improve
(Response after
shipping)
Response
Table
Top Risk
Analysis
(Vulnerability
Analysis)
Security Design
・Secure
Coding
・Static
Analysis
・Vulnerability analysis
(Security Inspection)
・Incident response
The need to respond throughout the product lifecycles
Sale/ServiceTestImplementDesignPlan
Disposal
Minimize Risks Incident Response
Response based on product lifecycles.
22
ShippingProduct Lifecycle
Contamination Prevention
(Avoid building vulnerabilities into)
Inspection/Removal
(Detect vulnerability and
remove)
Maintain/Improve
(Response after
shipping)
Response
Table
Top Risk
Analysis
(Vulnerability
Analysis)
Security Design
・Secure
Coding
・Static
Analysis
・Vulnerability analysis
(Security Inspection)
・Incident response
The need to respond throughout the product lifecycles
Sale/ServiceTestImplementDesignPlan
Disposal
Minimize Risks Incident Response
Vulnerability Analysis for Panasonic House hold appliances and embedded
systems
23
The number and details for the vulnerability are for
vulnerabilities found “pre shipping”
The detected vulnerabilities were patched prior to
shipping
These vulnerabilities do not exist in current
products available in the general market.
Actual results I will present
Vulnerability assessments for Panasonic house hold appliances and embedded
systems
24
Vulnerability assessments for Panasonic house hold appliances and embedded
systems
25
Trend of vulnerability : Rise period(2003-05) of Connected CE products
26
Trend of vulnerability : Early progressive period(2006-08)of Connected CE products
27
Trend of vulnerability : late progressive period(2009-10)of Connected CE products
28
Trend of vulnerability : Mature stage(2011-13)of Connected CE products
29
Agenda
30
Changes in the feature of connected CE
products
The risks to connect
Performance and trends in the Vulnerability
Assessment for connected CE products
Security functions required for CE
products in the time of IoT
Closing
Historical Overview of Function and Data Information of Networked Home
Appliances(2010~:Mature Phase)
31
Internet(Household)
Cellphones
Digital TV
Recorder
Audio System/Music
Digital
Camera/Camcorder
Health Care Appliances
Cooking Appliance
Home Related
201220102008200620042002
ADSL
FTTH(光回線)
GSM(cHTML)
広帯域CDMA(HTML/Java)
Smartphone
ブラウザ
宅外操作
CDDB
機器連携
(DLNA)
VOD
状態通知
Security Operational Info
ドアホン 来客通知
Apps
HEMS
スマホ
連携
エアコン
遠隔操作
画像アップロード
Cloud Integration allows the information linkage to include
everything including smartphones.
ID/Passworr
Recording history
Email Address
Device Operation Info
Access History
CD Ownership
List
Payment Info
Viewing History
Vacancy Info
Operational Info
of each device
Image Info
Blog/UL Service
account info
Visitor Info
Email address
Content Ownership
Device Ownership
Operational Info of
each device.
Power Usage Info
Payment Info
Purchase History
住所氏名
ブログ/SNSアカウント
Physical
Information
Service Account
Operation Info
Service Account
Cloud
Integration
Address Book
Video/Image
Account info
The Evolution of Networked Home Appliances Functionality and Information
(Near Future)
Home Appliances(Audio Visual,House hold,Cosmetic)
PC,Game Terminal,Information Terminals
Smartphone,Cellphones,Landlines
Housing Equipment( Single Family, Complexes)
Medical Devices (Individual , Institutional)
Public Services(Municipal offices, schools)
Public Transportations(Bus、Trains)
Cars/Automotive equipment
Infrastructure(Power、Gas、Water)
Retail(Large scale, individual)
32
Is the era when household appliances , home and
public,commercial services are all connected near?
Everything
is
connected
Inside the
home
connecting
Future prediction
Spread to the whole of human life
Rapid increase of device
Connect to the various industries
33
Spread to the whole of human life
34
Risk of Serious accident Higher reliability
Fire due to incorrect control of CE product
Invalidation of electric lock security
Accident and runaway of automotive
Connect to various device of various manufacturer
We want to guarantee at least minimum level security
Will you need the standard like Industry standard ?
it is not the problem of one company
Entire House, Linkage to automotive, home security and gas app…
Information assets = life of customer
The minimum level security ?
Spread to the whole of human life
35
The risk due to share of authentication information
Adoption of SSO is also being investigated in CE products
Influence of vulnerability will spread to other services that share
authentication information
it is not the problem of one provider or one vendor
Constantly connected communications, share of authentication
information Useful …
Authentication
provider
CE
Smart
phone
application
Web
service
Automotive
HEMS
game
CE
Share of
authentication
information
What must we do to make product secure ?
SNS
application
Rapid increase of device
36
Lighting, switch, sensor, electric socket, etc.
Maintenance of various and huge amount of devices
After vulnerability is reported, software must be updated
Lighting, sensor, electric socket…update all ?
How to update ?
Service engineers ?
Automatic update ?
Disclaimer of firmware update
Lifetime of CE product is long (over 10 years)
Up to when ?
The update method, the period to continue to care security ?
Connect to the various industries
37
Diversification of I/F, protocol
ECHONET Lite, CAN, DLNA…
Bluetooth, NFC, TransferJet, ZigBee, Z-Wave…
Original communication protocol, 920MHz…
Security verification technology must catch up
Only knowledge of the IP network is not enough
Knowledge other than the IP network is necessary
Knowledge of Non-IT engineers will be needed
Think tank beyond the type of industry?
Diversification of I/F of the linkage to infrastructure, automotive
and healthcare, security technology catch up
The structure which takes in knowledge of various fields?
Agenda
38
Changes in the feature of connected CE
products
The risks to connect
Performance and trends in the Vulnerability
Assessment for connected CE products
Security functions required for CE products in
the time of IoT
Closing
Closing
39
Several billion of IoT(Internet of Things) will be connected
It is difficult to guarantee security by one company
The approach beyond the industry/type of industry
/position must be needed
Unite for the IoT security !
Internet
Store
Social
infrastructure
Public Service Housing
equipment
Automotive
in-car device
Smart phone
Information device
PC
Connected
CE product
Contact
41
Analysis Center Panasonic Corporation
http://www2.panasonic.co.jp/aec/ns/index.html
Sorry, Japanese Only…
Panasonic-PSIRT
http://panasonic.co.jp/info/psirt/en/
product-security@gg.jp.panasonic.com

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Networked Home Appliances and Vulnerabilities.  by Yukihisa Horibe

  • 1. Networked Home Appliances and Vulnerabilities. Panasonic Corporation Analysis Center Yukihisa Horibe
  • 2. Profile 堀部 千壽(Yukihisa Horibe) 2 Panasonic Corporation Analysis Center Panasonic-PSIRT Member Focusing on improving security for networked home appliances Vulnerability assessment of house hold appliances and embedded systems Vulnerability assessment of home service servers Table top analysis of networks including house hold appliances. Over 10 years of experience in security evaluation related work
  • 3. Agenda 3 Changes in the feature of connected CE products The risks to connect Performance and trends in the Vulnerability Assessment for connected CE products Security functions required for CE products in the time of IoT Closing
  • 4. Agenda 4 Changes in the feature of connected CE products The risks to connect Performance and trends in the Vulnerability Assessment for connected CE products Security functions required for CE products in the time of IoT Closing
  • 5. Evolving Home Appliances. 5  Remote Control  Media Server HDD Recorder  Image Upload  Wifi Data Transfer Digital Camera/Video Cam  CDDB Audio System  Browser  Media Player  Smartphone like apps  Browser  Media Player  Smartphone like apps Digital TVDigital TV  Browser  Media Player  Smartphone like apps Digital TV Door Chimes  Notification  Communications  Measurements data transfer Scales Device Integration Smartphone Integration Cloud Integration  Monitoring  Power Control  On Demand Control HEMS  Monitorin  Remote Control Air Conditioner
  • 6. Historical Overview of Function and Data Information of Networked Home Appliances(~2005:Growth Period) 6 Internet(Household) Cellphones Digital TV Recorders Cooking Appliances 201220102008200620042002 ADSL mova 3G Browser Remote operations Status Notifications
  • 7. Historical Overview of Function and Data Information of Networked Home Appliances(~2005:Growth Period) 7 Internet (Household) Cellphones Digital TV Recorders Cooking Appliances 201220102008200620042002 ADSL mova 3G Browsers Remote Operation Status Notifications ID/Password Recording Information email address Status Info on operations Access History Most of the functions are contained within each appliance and the information they handle is limited.
  • 8. Historical Overview of Function and Data Information of Networked Home Appliances(2005~2010:Evolution Phase) 8 Internet(Household) Cellphone Digital TV Recorder Audio System/Music Digital Camera/Camcorders Cooking Appliances Home Related 201220102008200620042002 ADSL FTTH(Optical Fiber) mova 3G Browser Remote Operations CDDB Appliance Integration (DLNA) VOD Status notifications Security: Status Monitoring Door Chime:Visitor Notification HEMS Image Upload
  • 9. Historical Overview of Function and Data Information of Networked Home Appliances(2005~2010:Evolution Phase) 9 Internet (Household) Cellphones Digital TV Recorder Audio Systems/Music Digital Camera/Camcorder Cooking Appliance Home Related 201220102008200620042002 ADSL FTTH(Fiber Optic) mova 3G ブラウザ 宅外操作 CDDB Device Integration (DLNA) VOD 状態通知 Security Status Monitoring Door Chime Visitor Notifications HEMS Image upload CD Ownership List Payment Info Viewing History “at home” info Operational Info of each appliance Image Information Blog/UL Service Account Visitor Info email Address Content Ownership Info Device Ownership Info Operational Info of each device Power usage info With the increase in server/inter-device integration the importance of information also grew
  • 10. Historical Overview of Function and Data Information of Networked Home Appliances(2010~:Mature Phase) 10 Internet(Household) Cellphone DigitalTV Recorder Audio System/Music Digital Camera/Cammcorder Health Care Appliances Cooking Appliances Home Related 201220102008200620042002 ADSL FTTH(Fiber Optic) mova 3G smartphone Browser Remote Operations CDDB Device Integration (DLNA) VOD Status Notifications Security Status Monitoring Door Chimes Visitor Notification applications HEMS Smartphone Integration AC Remote Operations Image Upload
  • 11. Historical Overview of Function and Data Information of Networked Home Appliances(2010~:Mature Phase) 11 Internet(Household) Cellphone Digital TV Recorder Audio System/Music Digital Camera/Cammcorder Health Care Appliances Cooking Appliances Home related 201220102008200620042002 ADSL FTTH(Fiber Optic) mova 3G Smart Phones Browser Remote Operation CDDB 機器連携 (DLNA) VOD Status Notification Security Status Monitoring ドアホン 来客通知 Apps HEMS Smartphone Integration AC Remote Operation Image Upload Payment Info Purchase History Address/Name Blog/SNS Account Physical Info Service Account Operation Info Service Account
  • 12. Historical Overview of Function and Data Information of Networked Home Appliances(2010~:Mature Phase) 12 Internet(Household) Cellphones Digital TV Recorder Audio System/Music Digital Camera/Camcorder Health Care Appliances Cooking Appliance Home Related 201220102008200620042002 ADSL FTTH(光回線) GSM(cHTML) 広帯域CDMA(HTML/Java) Smartphone ブラウザ 宅外操作 CDDB 機器連携 (DLNA) VOD 状態通知 Security Operational Info ドアホン 来客通知 Apps HEMS スマホ 連携 エアコン 遠隔操作 画像アップロード Cloud Integration allows the information linkage to include everything including smartphones. ID/Passworr Recording history Email Address Device Operation Info Access History CD Ownership List Payment Info Viewing History Vacancy Info Operational Info of each device Image Info Blog/UL Service account info Visitor Info Email address Content Ownership Device Ownership Operational Info of each device. Power Usage Info Payment Info Purchase History 住所氏名 ブログ/SNSアカウント Physical Information Service Account Operation Info Service Account Cloud Integration Address Book Video/Image Account info
  • 13. The Evolution of Networked Home Appliances Functionality and Information (Near Future) House hold(Audio Visual, Home , Cosmetic) PC, Game terminal,Information terminal Smartphone, Cellphones, Land lines Housing Equipment(Single Family,complexes) 13 Inside the home connecting
  • 14. The Evolution of Networked Home Appliances Functionality and Information (Near Future) Home Appliances(Audio Visual,House hold,Cosmetic) PC,Game Terminal,Information Terminals Smartphone,Cellphones,Landlines Housing Equipment( Single Family, Complexes) Medical Devices (Individual , Institutional) Public Services(Municipal offices, schools) Public Transportations(Bus、Trains) Cars/Automotive equipment Infrastructure(Power、Gas、Water) Retail(Large scale, individual) 14 Is the era when household appliances , home and public,commercial services are all connected near? Everything is connected Inside the home connecting
  • 15. Agenda 15 Changes in the feature of connected CE products The risks to connect Performance and trends in the Vulnerability Assessment for connected CE products Security functions required for CE products in the time of IoT Closing
  • 16. Risks of Home Appliances Having Network Capabilities The possibility of unauthorized access via the network Many devices have global IPs assigned. Possibility of attacks leveraging vulnerabilities in home appliances. Attack by forcing a download of malware Targeted attacks leveraging XSS/CSRF 16 Using search engines you can find sites that hint they are home appliances. Fake Firmware or Contents
  • 17. CVE-2008-3482 (2008) Network Camera made by Panasonic , Reflected XSS vulnerability Defect in escaping routine of the display on the error page Defcon17 (2009) CSRF vulnerability in household network camera by Panasonic Many vulnerabilities were disclosed for household routers and other embedded web systems. Reported vulnerabilities on CE category: Panasonic case 17 http://jvndb.jvn.jp/ja/contents/2008/JVNDB-2008-000037.html http://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-usa-09/BOJINOV/BHUSA09-Bojinov-EmbeddedMgmt-PAPER.pdf
  • 18. Reported vulnerabilities on CE category: example of other case 18 Year Product Outline Manufacturer 2004 Video recorder Accessible without authentication (springboard) Japan 2008 NAS CSRF (remote data deletion) Japan 2010 Digital camera Arbitrary code execution from SD card Japan 2011 MFP Authentication bypass and more Japan & overseas 2012 Digital TV DoS Japan 2012 Many Devices Arbitrary code execution by UPnP vulnerability Japan & overseas 2013 Digital TV DoS & restart by malformed packets Japan & overseas 2013 Smart phone Intrusion of malware through power cable Japan & overseas 2013 Digital TV Authority seizure & remote control by illegal application Overseas 2013 Lighting system Force unable to turn on Overseas 2013 Home GW Vulnerability in authentication, CSRF and more (electric lock unlock by malicious third party) Overseas 2013 Toilet Hard-Coded Bluetooth PIN Vulnerability Japan With the advancement of function, the reports of vulnerability have been increasing after 2012
  • 19. Agenda 19 Changes in the feature of connected CE products The risks to connect Performance and trends in the Vulnerability Assessment for connected CE products Security functions required for CE products in the time of IoT Closing
  • 20. Vulnerability Eradication Efforts at Panasonic 20 Base Knowledge (Awareness/Education) Base foundation of knowledge regarding product security Two pillars supporting Product Security Minimize Risk Incident Response Minimize Risk Incident Response Product Security Improving security of products including house hold appliances is an important requirement for Panasonic Network Home Appliances, Embedded Systems, Services
  • 21. Response based on product lifecycles. 21 ShippingProduct Lifecycle Contamination Prevention (Avoid building vulnerabilities into) Inspection/Removal (Detect vulnerability and remove) Maintain/Improve (Response after shipping) Response Table Top Risk Analysis (Vulnerability Analysis) Security Design ・Secure Coding ・Static Analysis ・Vulnerability analysis (Security Inspection) ・Incident response The need to respond throughout the product lifecycles Sale/ServiceTestImplementDesignPlan Disposal Minimize Risks Incident Response
  • 22. Response based on product lifecycles. 22 ShippingProduct Lifecycle Contamination Prevention (Avoid building vulnerabilities into) Inspection/Removal (Detect vulnerability and remove) Maintain/Improve (Response after shipping) Response Table Top Risk Analysis (Vulnerability Analysis) Security Design ・Secure Coding ・Static Analysis ・Vulnerability analysis (Security Inspection) ・Incident response The need to respond throughout the product lifecycles Sale/ServiceTestImplementDesignPlan Disposal Minimize Risks Incident Response
  • 23. Vulnerability Analysis for Panasonic House hold appliances and embedded systems 23 The number and details for the vulnerability are for vulnerabilities found “pre shipping” The detected vulnerabilities were patched prior to shipping These vulnerabilities do not exist in current products available in the general market. Actual results I will present
  • 24. Vulnerability assessments for Panasonic house hold appliances and embedded systems 24
  • 25. Vulnerability assessments for Panasonic house hold appliances and embedded systems 25
  • 26. Trend of vulnerability : Rise period(2003-05) of Connected CE products 26
  • 27. Trend of vulnerability : Early progressive period(2006-08)of Connected CE products 27
  • 28. Trend of vulnerability : late progressive period(2009-10)of Connected CE products 28
  • 29. Trend of vulnerability : Mature stage(2011-13)of Connected CE products 29
  • 30. Agenda 30 Changes in the feature of connected CE products The risks to connect Performance and trends in the Vulnerability Assessment for connected CE products Security functions required for CE products in the time of IoT Closing
  • 31. Historical Overview of Function and Data Information of Networked Home Appliances(2010~:Mature Phase) 31 Internet(Household) Cellphones Digital TV Recorder Audio System/Music Digital Camera/Camcorder Health Care Appliances Cooking Appliance Home Related 201220102008200620042002 ADSL FTTH(光回線) GSM(cHTML) 広帯域CDMA(HTML/Java) Smartphone ブラウザ 宅外操作 CDDB 機器連携 (DLNA) VOD 状態通知 Security Operational Info ドアホン 来客通知 Apps HEMS スマホ 連携 エアコン 遠隔操作 画像アップロード Cloud Integration allows the information linkage to include everything including smartphones. ID/Passworr Recording history Email Address Device Operation Info Access History CD Ownership List Payment Info Viewing History Vacancy Info Operational Info of each device Image Info Blog/UL Service account info Visitor Info Email address Content Ownership Device Ownership Operational Info of each device. Power Usage Info Payment Info Purchase History 住所氏名 ブログ/SNSアカウント Physical Information Service Account Operation Info Service Account Cloud Integration Address Book Video/Image Account info
  • 32. The Evolution of Networked Home Appliances Functionality and Information (Near Future) Home Appliances(Audio Visual,House hold,Cosmetic) PC,Game Terminal,Information Terminals Smartphone,Cellphones,Landlines Housing Equipment( Single Family, Complexes) Medical Devices (Individual , Institutional) Public Services(Municipal offices, schools) Public Transportations(Bus、Trains) Cars/Automotive equipment Infrastructure(Power、Gas、Water) Retail(Large scale, individual) 32 Is the era when household appliances , home and public,commercial services are all connected near? Everything is connected Inside the home connecting
  • 33. Future prediction Spread to the whole of human life Rapid increase of device Connect to the various industries 33
  • 34. Spread to the whole of human life 34 Risk of Serious accident Higher reliability Fire due to incorrect control of CE product Invalidation of electric lock security Accident and runaway of automotive Connect to various device of various manufacturer We want to guarantee at least minimum level security Will you need the standard like Industry standard ? it is not the problem of one company Entire House, Linkage to automotive, home security and gas app… Information assets = life of customer The minimum level security ?
  • 35. Spread to the whole of human life 35 The risk due to share of authentication information Adoption of SSO is also being investigated in CE products Influence of vulnerability will spread to other services that share authentication information it is not the problem of one provider or one vendor Constantly connected communications, share of authentication information Useful … Authentication provider CE Smart phone application Web service Automotive HEMS game CE Share of authentication information What must we do to make product secure ? SNS application
  • 36. Rapid increase of device 36 Lighting, switch, sensor, electric socket, etc. Maintenance of various and huge amount of devices After vulnerability is reported, software must be updated Lighting, sensor, electric socket…update all ? How to update ? Service engineers ? Automatic update ? Disclaimer of firmware update Lifetime of CE product is long (over 10 years) Up to when ? The update method, the period to continue to care security ?
  • 37. Connect to the various industries 37 Diversification of I/F, protocol ECHONET Lite, CAN, DLNA… Bluetooth, NFC, TransferJet, ZigBee, Z-Wave… Original communication protocol, 920MHz… Security verification technology must catch up Only knowledge of the IP network is not enough Knowledge other than the IP network is necessary Knowledge of Non-IT engineers will be needed Think tank beyond the type of industry? Diversification of I/F of the linkage to infrastructure, automotive and healthcare, security technology catch up The structure which takes in knowledge of various fields?
  • 38. Agenda 38 Changes in the feature of connected CE products The risks to connect Performance and trends in the Vulnerability Assessment for connected CE products Security functions required for CE products in the time of IoT Closing
  • 39. Closing 39 Several billion of IoT(Internet of Things) will be connected It is difficult to guarantee security by one company The approach beyond the industry/type of industry /position must be needed Unite for the IoT security ! Internet Store Social infrastructure Public Service Housing equipment Automotive in-car device Smart phone Information device PC Connected CE product
  • 40.
  • 41. Contact 41 Analysis Center Panasonic Corporation http://www2.panasonic.co.jp/aec/ns/index.html Sorry, Japanese Only… Panasonic-PSIRT http://panasonic.co.jp/info/psirt/en/ product-security@gg.jp.panasonic.com