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Challenges of balancing
usability and security
in future voting systems

Dana Chisnell
@danachis
@ChadButterfly
How are the
votes counted?
How are the
votes counted?
Usability and security in future voting systems
If it’s not usable, it’s
not secure.
Now
Current design
demands much
of voters
Cataloged 147 election websites

Conducted 41 remote moderated
usability tests
Voters are
ballot-centric
they’re focused on that act,
not conscious of the overall process
What’s on the ballot?
?

    ?



    ?
?

    ?
?
!
    ?
Usability and security in future voting systems
If voters don’t know what
is on the ballot

   they are more likely to go to third-party
   sources
   they are less likely to show up at the right
   polling place
   they’re likely to undervote down-ballot
   they are less likely to turn out
Website design problems are
well understood
sites are hard to find      find other sources

navigation reflects
                           don’t know where to go
department
                           don’t know how to get to
labels are jargon
                           content
dates and deadlines
                           don’t know when to act
are vague
                           get distracted or lost in the
graphics are gratuitous
                           site, lose trust

sites are not accessible   disenfranchisement
San Francisco and Oakland,
December 2011

EVN, March 2012
Portland, Maine 2011
Alameda Co. demo ballot
Minneapolis 2011
New York state demo
Voter slate
How is my vote counted?
Usability and security in future voting systems
Usability and security in future voting systems
Ballot design problems are
well understood
split contests across columns   overvoting

there are responses on both
                                overvoting
sides of names

arrows rather than bubbles      marking incorrectly

formatting is inconsistent or
                                undervoting
too consistent
instructions are complicated
                                all kinds of crazy things
or lacking
voters don’t know how to
                                lost votes
correct their ballots
How RCV works
n=52
       Joe
Mental models



 People make inferences about how
 things work based on available
 information and context
Mental models

                This is what we
                teach people
Mental models




Sometimes it really is this simple -
but not in the US
Mental models




Sometimes it really is this simple -
but not in the US
Much more like signing for a mortgage
This is the ballot
we test
NIST medium complexity ballot
Mental models


 Point system
 Weighted
 Reversed
Point / weight system
Intent is loaded
 Preparing to vote

 Knowing what to
 expect

 Interacting with the
 ballot
What’s on the ballot?

           What are my options for voting?


  absentee              early voting        Election Day

what’s the               where do I vote?    where do I vote?
deadline to apply?



what do I have to
do to get one?



when is it due?
what’s the                  where do I vote?                where do I vote?
deadline to apply?



what do I have to
do to get one?



when is it due?




                            who is in office now?


                            do I need ID to vote?


                     what’s the deadline for registering?
1. Voters develop faulty
   mental models
2. Voters don’t understand the
   consequences of their actions
3. Voters vote counter to their
   intentions
Portland, Maine 2011
Usability and security in future voting systems
straight party voting
   + regular contests
               + RCV
   + multi-candidate
+ retention contests
         + measures

6 different models
We’re pretty sure there’s a problem
Future
Combinations add
complexity.
Complexity compromises
security.
Voters
bear a cognitive burden
that design can relieve.
Poor design and instructions
on ballots make
understanding, marking, and casting
difficult, time-consuming, and
complicated
Poor design and instructions
on ballots make
counting, verifying, and audits
difficult, time-consuming, and
complicated
Raises questions about what is being
secured.
complex ballots = lost votes
complex ballots
 + vote-by-mail

   = lost votes
complex ballots
+ multi-language

     = lost votes
RCV
           + VBM
+ multi-language

     = 1000s of
      lost votes
Lack of trust in elections

Lack of trust in officials

Recalls

Scrambling county boards
Security may add to the
cognitive burden
without thoughtful design.
Security = Counted as cast
Security = Cast as intended +
           counted as cast
This moment
Voter ed is not the answer.
If it’s not usable, it’s not valid.
If it’s not usable, it’s not countable.
If it’s not usable, it’s not verifiable.
If it’s not usable, it’s not auditable.
If it’s not usable, it’s not secure.
Thank you
Rick Bond         Jared Spool

Cyd Harrell       David Cary

Ethan Newby       Rebecca Sherrill

Callie Wheeler    Frank Castro

Chelsey Glasson   Sandy Olson

Sara Cambridge    Nancy Frishberg

Laura Paajanen    Yelena Nakhimovsky

Beth Lingard      Whitney Quesenbery

Beth Pickard
And...
Andrea Moed        Doug Hanke
Kristen Johansen   Karen McGrane
Boaz Gurdin        Krysta Chauncey
Ashley Pearlman    Karen Bachmann
Donald A. Cox      Rosa Moran
Kamaria Campbell   Josie Scott
Paul Schreiber     Rachel Goddard
Jenn Downs         Samantha LeVan
Jacqui Adams       Kate Aurigemma
Michelle Milla     Erin Liman
Josh Keyes         Alessandra Brophy
Josh Bright        Andrea Fineman
New tools.
Field Guides series




Research          Research          Usability and Civic   Research
commissioned by   commissioned by   Life Project          commissioned by
EAC               NIST                                    NIST
Coming soon

Designing             Writing voter         Guiding voters   Poll worker
election              education             through the      security best
department            materials             polling place    practices
websites




 Research partially    Research partially   From research    Research to be
 funded by             funded by            funded by EAC    funded by the
 MacArthur             MacArthur            and work by      National Science
 Foundation            Foundation           Design for       Foundation
                                            Democracy
Coming
soon
Anywhere
ballot
funded by ITIF
(EAC AVTI)
Field Guides
 To Ensuring
Voter Intent


civicdesigning.org
       /fieldguides
If it’s not usable,
it’s not secure.
Thank you.
Dana Chisnell
dana@usabilityworks.net
civicdesign@usabilityworks.net

civicdesigning.org

@danachis
@ChadButterfly

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Usability and security in future voting systems