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What someone said about “junk hacking”
Yes, we get it. Cars, boats, buses, and those singing fish plaques are
all hackable and have no security. Most conferences these days have a
whole track called "Junk I found around my house and how I am going to
scare you by hacking it". That stuff is always going to be hackable
whetherornotyouarethecalvalry.org.
So in any case, enough with the Junk Hacking, and enough with being
amazed when people hack their junk.
…
IoT Attack Surface Mapping
Seeking a universal, surface-area approach to IoT testing
Daniel Miessler
IoT Village, DEFCON 23
August 2015
Junk Hacking and Vuln Shaming
Yes, we get it. Cars, boats, buses, and those singing fish plaques are
all hackable and have no security. Most conferences these days have a
whole track called "Junk I found around my house and how I am going to
scare you by hacking it". That stuff is always going to be hackable
whetherornotyouarethecalvalry.org.
So in any case, enough with the Junk Hacking, and enough with being
amazed when people hack their junk.
…
What’s in a name?
! Universal Daemonization
! Universal Object Interaction
! Programmable Object Interfaces (POIs)
! Transfurigated Phase Inversion
Defining IoT ๏ [ WIKIPEDIA ] The Internet of Things (IoT)
is the network of physical objects or "things"
embedded with electronics, software,
sensors and connectivity to enable it to
achieve greater value and service by
exchanging data with the manufacturer,
operator and/or other connected devices.
๏ [ OXFORD ] A proposed development of the
Internet in which everyday objects have
network connectivity, allowing them to send
and receive data.

๏ [ MY PREFERRED ] The interface between
the physical and digital world that allows
one to gather information from—and
control—everyday objects.
What to do?
What to do?
What to do?
What to do?
What to do?
IoT Security != Device Security
IoT Device
Existing approaches…
๏ Look at a collection of common
vulnerabilities, risks, etc.

๏ Pull up your go-to list

๏ Consider some bad scenarios
๏ Check for what others have found
on other devices
OWASP
The Previous Version
๏ Used the Top 10 name

๏ Mixed surfaces with
vulnerability types
New OWASP IoT Project Structure
IoT Project
Attack Surface Areas
Testing Guide Top Vulnerabilities
Subtle differences in approach
Different approaches to finding vulns
1. Let me check against this list
of vulns
Different approaches
1. Let me check against this list
of vulns.

2. Let me check my favorite go-
to issues

Different approaches
1. Let me check against this list of
vulns.

2. Let me check my favorite go-to
issues

3. What common surface areas do
IoT systems share that I need
to make sure I don’t miss?
The IoT Attack Surfaces
Ecosystem Access Control
Ecosystem
Access Control
✓ Authentication
✓ Session management
✓ Implicit trust between 

components
✓ Enrollment security
✓ Decomissioning system
✓ Lost access procedures
Device Memory
Device Memory
✓ Cleartext usernames
✓ Cleartext passwords
✓ Third-party credentials
✓ Encryption keys
Device Physical Interfaces
Device Physical
Interfaces
✓ Firmware extraction
✓ User CLI
✓ Admin CLI
✓ Privilege escalation
✓ Reset to insecure state
Device Web Interface
Device Web
Interface
✓ SQL injection
✓ Cross-site scripting
✓ Username enumeration
✓ Weak passwords
✓ Account lockout
✓ Known credentials
Device Firmware
Device Firmware
✓ Hardcoded passwords
✓ Sensitive URL disclosure
✓ Encryption keys
Device Network Services
Device Network
Services
✓ Information disclosure
✓ User CLI
✓ Administrative CLI
✓ Injection
✓ Denial of Service
Administrative Interface
Administrative
Interface
✓ SQL injection
✓ Cross-site scripting
✓ Username enumeration
✓ Weak passwords
✓ Account lockout
✓ Known credentials
Local Data Storage
Local Data
Storage
✓ Unencrypted data
✓ Data encrypted with

discovered keys
✓ Lack of data integrity

checks
Cloud Web Interface
Cloud Web
Interface
✓ SQL injection
✓ Cross-site scripting
✓ Username enumeration
✓ Weak passwords
✓ Account lockout
✓ Known credentials
Third-party Backend APIs
Third-party
Backend APIs
✓ Unencrypted PII sent
✓ Encrypted PII sent
✓ Device information leaked
✓ Location leaked
Update Mechanism
Update
Mechanism
✓ Update sent without 

encryption
✓ Updates not signed
✓ Update location 

writable
Mobile Application
Mobile
Application
✓ Implicitly trusted 

by device or cloud
✓ Known credentials
✓ Insecure data storage
✓ Lack of transport 

encryption
Vendor Backend APIs
Vendor Backend
APIs
✓ Inherent trust of cloud 

or mobile application
✓ Weak authentication
✓ Weak access control
✓ Injection attacks
Ecosystem Communication
Ecosystem
Communication
✓ Health checks
✓ Heartbeats
✓ Ecosystem commands
✓ Deprovisioning
✓ Update pushes
Network Traffic
Network Traffic
✓ LAN
✓ LAN to Internet
✓ Short range
✓ Non-standard
IoT Attack Surface Areas
Device Network
Services
Cloud Web
Interface
Administrative
Interface
Device Firmware
Local Data
Storage
Vendor Backend
APIs
Third-party
Backend APIs
Device Web
Interface
Device Physical
Interfaces
Device Memory
Ecosystem
Access Control
Update
Mechanism
Mobile
Application
Vendor Backend
APIs
Network Traffic
Ecosystem
Communication
The OWASP IoT Attack Surfaces Project
https://www.owasp.org/index.php/
OWASP_IoT_Attack_Surface_Areas
Surfaces → vulns → data
Attack Surface Vulnerability Data Type
• Administrative interface
• Weak password policy
• Lack of account lockout

• Credentials
• Local data storage • Data stored without encryption • PII
• Web Cloud Interface • SQLi
• PII
• Account data
• Device Firmware
• Sent over HTTP
• Hardcoded passwords
• Hardcoded encryption keys
• Credentials
• Application data
• Vendor Backend APIs • Permissive API Data Extraction
• PII
• Account data
• Device Physical Interfaces • Unauthenticated root access • ***
Back to the network…
Network Traffic
✓ LAN
✓ LAN to Internet
✓ Short range
✓ Non-standard
What people think they have
What people actually have
cleartext honeytoken
cleartext sensitive data
cleartext sensitive data
What I like to look for in pcaps
1. How many connections were made?

2. To how many destinations?

3. Was the sensitive data I entered

into the ecosystem seen in the

network traffic?

4. If so, that’s bad
Getting your capz
The OWASP IoT Attack Surfaces Project
https://www.owasp.org/index.php/
OWASP_IoT_Attack_Surface_Areas
Sister projects
This is a Craig Smith Slide
Craig Smith
Takeaways and Goodies
1. IoT testing is the same as any other testing
Takeaways and Goodies
1. IoT testing is the same as any other testing
2. IoT security is NOT device security
Takeaways and Goodies
1. IoT testing is the same as any other testing
2. IoT security is NOT device security
3. The IoT Attack Surface area project is

proposing a universal attack strategy for any

kind of device
Takeaways and Goodies
1. IoT testing is the same as any other testing
2. IoT security is NOT device security
3. The IoT Attack Surface area project is

proposing a universal attack strategy for any

kind of device
4. A big part of that is the network piece
Takeaways and Goodies
1. IoT testing is the same as any other testing
2. IoT security is NOT device security
3. The IoT Attack Surface area project is

proposing a universal attack strategy for any

kind of device
4. A big part of that is the network piece
5. Caparser is a tool that can do that analysis

for you
Takeaways and Goodies
1. IoT testing is the same as any other testing
2. IoT security is NOT device security
3. The IoT Attack Surface area project is

proposing a universal attack strategy for any

kind of device
4. A big part of that is the network piece
5. Caparser is a tool that can do that analysis

for you
6. Caparser is free, released today, and will

be improved in the near future
Takeaways and Goodies
1. IoT testing is the same as any other testing
2. IoT security is NOT device security
3. The IoT Attack Surface area project is

proposing a universal attack strategy for any

kind of device
4. A big part of that is the network piece
5. Caparser is a tool that can do that analysis

for you
6. Caparser is free, released today, and will

be improved in the near future
7. Craig Smith is awesome
Takeaways and Goodies
1. IoT testing is the same as any other testing
2. IoT security is NOT device security
3. The IoT Attack Surface area project is

proposing a universal attack strategy for any

kind of device
4. A big part of that is the network piece
5. Caparser is a tool that can do that analysis

for you
6. Caparser is free, released today, and will

be improved in the near future
7. Craig Smith is awesome
8. There’s a handout!
Thank you!
The OWASP IoT Attack Surfaces Project

https://www.owasp.org/index.php/
OWASP_Internet_of_Things_Project
Caparser

https://github.com/danielmiessler/caparser
@danielmiessler
@craigz28
TX to HP Fortify on Demand

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IoT Attack Surfaces -- DEFCON 2015

  • 1. What someone said about “junk hacking” Yes, we get it. Cars, boats, buses, and those singing fish plaques are all hackable and have no security. Most conferences these days have a whole track called "Junk I found around my house and how I am going to scare you by hacking it". That stuff is always going to be hackable whetherornotyouarethecalvalry.org. So in any case, enough with the Junk Hacking, and enough with being amazed when people hack their junk. …
  • 2. IoT Attack Surface Mapping Seeking a universal, surface-area approach to IoT testing Daniel Miessler IoT Village, DEFCON 23 August 2015
  • 3. Junk Hacking and Vuln Shaming Yes, we get it. Cars, boats, buses, and those singing fish plaques are all hackable and have no security. Most conferences these days have a whole track called "Junk I found around my house and how I am going to scare you by hacking it". That stuff is always going to be hackable whetherornotyouarethecalvalry.org. So in any case, enough with the Junk Hacking, and enough with being amazed when people hack their junk. …
  • 4. What’s in a name? ! Universal Daemonization ! Universal Object Interaction ! Programmable Object Interfaces (POIs) ! Transfurigated Phase Inversion
  • 5. Defining IoT ๏ [ WIKIPEDIA ] The Internet of Things (IoT) is the network of physical objects or "things" embedded with electronics, software, sensors and connectivity to enable it to achieve greater value and service by exchanging data with the manufacturer, operator and/or other connected devices. ๏ [ OXFORD ] A proposed development of the Internet in which everyday objects have network connectivity, allowing them to send and receive data.
 ๏ [ MY PREFERRED ] The interface between the physical and digital world that allows one to gather information from—and control—everyday objects.
  • 11. IoT Security != Device Security IoT Device
  • 12. Existing approaches… ๏ Look at a collection of common vulnerabilities, risks, etc.
 ๏ Pull up your go-to list
 ๏ Consider some bad scenarios ๏ Check for what others have found on other devices
  • 13. OWASP
  • 14. The Previous Version ๏ Used the Top 10 name
 ๏ Mixed surfaces with vulnerability types
  • 15. New OWASP IoT Project Structure IoT Project Attack Surface Areas Testing Guide Top Vulnerabilities
  • 17. Different approaches to finding vulns 1. Let me check against this list of vulns
  • 18. Different approaches 1. Let me check against this list of vulns.
 2. Let me check my favorite go- to issues

  • 19. Different approaches 1. Let me check against this list of vulns.
 2. Let me check my favorite go-to issues
 3. What common surface areas do IoT systems share that I need to make sure I don’t miss?
  • 20. The IoT Attack Surfaces
  • 21. Ecosystem Access Control Ecosystem Access Control ✓ Authentication ✓ Session management ✓ Implicit trust between 
 components ✓ Enrollment security ✓ Decomissioning system ✓ Lost access procedures
  • 22. Device Memory Device Memory ✓ Cleartext usernames ✓ Cleartext passwords ✓ Third-party credentials ✓ Encryption keys
  • 23. Device Physical Interfaces Device Physical Interfaces ✓ Firmware extraction ✓ User CLI ✓ Admin CLI ✓ Privilege escalation ✓ Reset to insecure state
  • 24. Device Web Interface Device Web Interface ✓ SQL injection ✓ Cross-site scripting ✓ Username enumeration ✓ Weak passwords ✓ Account lockout ✓ Known credentials
  • 25. Device Firmware Device Firmware ✓ Hardcoded passwords ✓ Sensitive URL disclosure ✓ Encryption keys
  • 26. Device Network Services Device Network Services ✓ Information disclosure ✓ User CLI ✓ Administrative CLI ✓ Injection ✓ Denial of Service
  • 27. Administrative Interface Administrative Interface ✓ SQL injection ✓ Cross-site scripting ✓ Username enumeration ✓ Weak passwords ✓ Account lockout ✓ Known credentials
  • 28. Local Data Storage Local Data Storage ✓ Unencrypted data ✓ Data encrypted with
 discovered keys ✓ Lack of data integrity
 checks
  • 29. Cloud Web Interface Cloud Web Interface ✓ SQL injection ✓ Cross-site scripting ✓ Username enumeration ✓ Weak passwords ✓ Account lockout ✓ Known credentials
  • 30. Third-party Backend APIs Third-party Backend APIs ✓ Unencrypted PII sent ✓ Encrypted PII sent ✓ Device information leaked ✓ Location leaked
  • 31. Update Mechanism Update Mechanism ✓ Update sent without 
 encryption ✓ Updates not signed ✓ Update location 
 writable
  • 32. Mobile Application Mobile Application ✓ Implicitly trusted 
 by device or cloud ✓ Known credentials ✓ Insecure data storage ✓ Lack of transport 
 encryption
  • 33. Vendor Backend APIs Vendor Backend APIs ✓ Inherent trust of cloud 
 or mobile application ✓ Weak authentication ✓ Weak access control ✓ Injection attacks
  • 34. Ecosystem Communication Ecosystem Communication ✓ Health checks ✓ Heartbeats ✓ Ecosystem commands ✓ Deprovisioning ✓ Update pushes
  • 35. Network Traffic Network Traffic ✓ LAN ✓ LAN to Internet ✓ Short range ✓ Non-standard
  • 36. IoT Attack Surface Areas Device Network Services Cloud Web Interface Administrative Interface Device Firmware Local Data Storage Vendor Backend APIs Third-party Backend APIs Device Web Interface Device Physical Interfaces Device Memory Ecosystem Access Control Update Mechanism Mobile Application Vendor Backend APIs Network Traffic Ecosystem Communication
  • 37. The OWASP IoT Attack Surfaces Project https://www.owasp.org/index.php/ OWASP_IoT_Attack_Surface_Areas
  • 38. Surfaces → vulns → data Attack Surface Vulnerability Data Type • Administrative interface • Weak password policy • Lack of account lockout
 • Credentials • Local data storage • Data stored without encryption • PII • Web Cloud Interface • SQLi • PII • Account data • Device Firmware • Sent over HTTP • Hardcoded passwords • Hardcoded encryption keys • Credentials • Application data • Vendor Backend APIs • Permissive API Data Extraction • PII • Account data • Device Physical Interfaces • Unauthenticated root access • ***
  • 39. Back to the network… Network Traffic ✓ LAN ✓ LAN to Internet ✓ Short range ✓ Non-standard
  • 40. What people think they have
  • 41. What people actually have cleartext honeytoken cleartext sensitive data cleartext sensitive data
  • 42. What I like to look for in pcaps 1. How many connections were made?
 2. To how many destinations?
 3. Was the sensitive data I entered
 into the ecosystem seen in the
 network traffic?
 4. If so, that’s bad
  • 43.
  • 45.
  • 46.
  • 47. The OWASP IoT Attack Surfaces Project https://www.owasp.org/index.php/ OWASP_IoT_Attack_Surface_Areas
  • 48.
  • 50. This is a Craig Smith Slide Craig Smith
  • 51. Takeaways and Goodies 1. IoT testing is the same as any other testing
  • 52. Takeaways and Goodies 1. IoT testing is the same as any other testing 2. IoT security is NOT device security
  • 53. Takeaways and Goodies 1. IoT testing is the same as any other testing 2. IoT security is NOT device security 3. The IoT Attack Surface area project is
 proposing a universal attack strategy for any
 kind of device
  • 54. Takeaways and Goodies 1. IoT testing is the same as any other testing 2. IoT security is NOT device security 3. The IoT Attack Surface area project is
 proposing a universal attack strategy for any
 kind of device 4. A big part of that is the network piece
  • 55. Takeaways and Goodies 1. IoT testing is the same as any other testing 2. IoT security is NOT device security 3. The IoT Attack Surface area project is
 proposing a universal attack strategy for any
 kind of device 4. A big part of that is the network piece 5. Caparser is a tool that can do that analysis
 for you
  • 56. Takeaways and Goodies 1. IoT testing is the same as any other testing 2. IoT security is NOT device security 3. The IoT Attack Surface area project is
 proposing a universal attack strategy for any
 kind of device 4. A big part of that is the network piece 5. Caparser is a tool that can do that analysis
 for you 6. Caparser is free, released today, and will
 be improved in the near future
  • 57. Takeaways and Goodies 1. IoT testing is the same as any other testing 2. IoT security is NOT device security 3. The IoT Attack Surface area project is
 proposing a universal attack strategy for any
 kind of device 4. A big part of that is the network piece 5. Caparser is a tool that can do that analysis
 for you 6. Caparser is free, released today, and will
 be improved in the near future 7. Craig Smith is awesome
  • 58. Takeaways and Goodies 1. IoT testing is the same as any other testing 2. IoT security is NOT device security 3. The IoT Attack Surface area project is
 proposing a universal attack strategy for any
 kind of device 4. A big part of that is the network piece 5. Caparser is a tool that can do that analysis
 for you 6. Caparser is free, released today, and will
 be improved in the near future 7. Craig Smith is awesome 8. There’s a handout!
  • 59.
  • 60. Thank you! The OWASP IoT Attack Surfaces Project
 https://www.owasp.org/index.php/ OWASP_Internet_of_Things_Project Caparser
 https://github.com/danielmiessler/caparser @danielmiessler @craigz28 TX to HP Fortify on Demand