2. PHILOSOPHY of POSITIVE
ACCOUNTING THEORY
Philosophy
• Teori positif dikeluarkan untuk memahami fenomena-fenomena
akuntansi dengan mengamati kejadian secara empiris dan hasil
pengamatan tersebut digunakan untuk membuat prediksi kejadian
di masa akan datang.
Milton Friedman:
• Tujuan teori positif adalah mengembangakan teori atau hipotesa
yang menghasilkan prediksi yang valid dan bermakna untuk
prediksi atau phenomena yang belum pernah diamati.
Watt & Zimmerma :
• Tujuan teori positif adalah memprediksi dan menjelaskan praktek
akuntansi
3. PHILOSOPHY of POSITIVE
ACCOUNTING THEORY
Asumsi mengenai perilaku individu :
Para manajer, investor dan lender merupakan orang-orang
yang rasional, menginginkan adanya keuntungan dari sisi
finansial
Manajer bisa memilih metode akuntansi yang secara langsung
memaksimalkan kepentingan pribadinya atau merubah
kebijakan yang berkaitan dengan pendanaan dan produksi
yang secara tidak langsung mensejahterakan dirinya sendiri
Manajer memaksimalkan nilai perusahaan
4. STRENGTHS of POSITIVE
THEORY
• Menghasilkan hipotesis melalui pengujian empiris
• Memberi pemahaman tentang bagaimana dunia ini bekerja
• Memberi pemahaman mengenai kaitan antara akuntansi dan
harga saham
• Berusaha memberi pemahaman mengenai kaitan antara
informasi akuntansi, manajer perusahaan dan pasar serta
menganalisa hubungannya
5. SCOPE of POSITIVE
ACCOUNTING THEORY
Penelitian dampak akuntansi dan perilaku
pasar modal.
Pengembangan
teori akuntansi
Menjelaskan dan memprediksi praktek akuntansi
dalam perusahaan.
• Usaha untuk menjelaskan apakah perusahaan menggunakan
metode akuntansi tertentu untuk alasan oportunistik. Contohnya
memindahkan kesejahteraan milik pemegang saham ke tangan
manajer. Perspektif mengenai oportunistik ini sering disebut ex
post.
• Mengasumsikan perusahaan memilih praktek akuntansi untuk
alasan efisiensi. Sehingga kebijakan akuntansi ditempatkan
sebagai ex ante untuk menurunkan biaya kontrak antara
perusahaan dan pemegang saham.
positif :
6. CAPITAL MARKET RESEARCH
and THE EFFICIENT MARKETS
HYPOTHESIS
• Studi yang berusaha menentukan dampak
perilisan informasi keuangan terhadap return
saham
• Studi yang memikirkan efek dari perubahan
kebijakan akuntansi terhadap harga saham
Penelitian pasar
modal yang secara
khusus penting
terhadap teori
akuntansi positif:
• – efficient markets hypothesis (EMH).
Sebagian besar
penelitian
mengenai hal ini
mengarah pada
satu paradigma
ekonomi
7. CAPITAL MARKET RESEARCH
and THE EFFICIENT MARKETS
HYPOTHESIS
Pasar efisien, asumsi:
Tidak ada biaya transaksi dalam
perdagangan sekuritas
Informasi disediakan secara cuma-cuma
bagi seluruh peserta pasar
Ada perjanjian mengenai dampak
informasi saat ini terhadap harga
sekarang dan pendistribusian harga
pada masa yang akan datang
8. CAPITAL MARKET RESEARCH
and THE EFFICIENT MARKETS
HYPOTHESIS
Macam
Informasi
Weak
Strong Semistrong
9. CAPITAL MARKET RESEARCH
and THE EFFICIENT MARKETS
HYPOTHESIS
Sementara EMH adalah teori
tentang mekanisme harga
pada pasar sekuritas,
VS
Capital market research
(CMR) adalah penelitian
empiris yang menggunakan
metode statistik untuk
menguji hipotesis yang
berkaitan dengan perilaku
pasar modal. Kebanyakan
CMR menggunakan market
model.
10. CAPITAL MARKET RESEARCH
and THE EFFICIENT MARKETS
HYPOTHESIS
Asumsi dalam market model:
• Investor merupakan risk-averse
• Return didistribusikan secara normal
dan para investor memilih portofolio
mereka sendiri
• Investor memiliki ekspektasi yang
sama
• Merupakan pasar sempurna
11. DAMPAK PENGUMUMAN LABA
AKUNTANSI TERHADAP HARGA SAHAM
Salah satu tujuan teori akuntansi positif adalah mempelajari
informasi yang dimiliki laba akuntansi terhadap harga saham.
Ball & Brown melakukan pengujian terhadap manfaat laba
historical cost bagi investor.
Peningkatan laba akuntansi yang tidak diestimasi sebelumnya
merupakan informasi baru bagi investor. Dalam pasar modal
efisien, setiap perubahan aliran kas dari yang diharapkan akan
mempengaruhi harga saham.
12. PENGARUH PENELITIAN INFORMASI
LABA TERHADAP HARGA SAHAM ( BALL
& BROWN’S)
Laba akuntansi
historis mengandung
informasi yang
cukup berarti.
Dari hasil penelitian
diketahui adanya
informasi yang
berkelanjutan di
pasar, jadi akuntansi
bukan satu-satunya
informasi mengenai
perusahaan.
Pasar secara
konsisten
mengantisipasi
informasi laporan
akuntansi.
13. KETIDAK SEIMBANGAN
INFORMASI DAN BESARNYA
PERUSAHAAN
Kandungan informasi pengumuman laba yang tidak diharapkan
mungkin berlawanan dengan ukuran perusahaan.
Semakin kecil perusahaan, semakin banyak informasi yang
terkandung pada perusahaan.
Argumentasi yang diberikan Freeman:
• Perusahaan memberikan informasi yang lebih bervariasi
• Perusahaan besar mempunyai tingkat informasi yang lebih besar yang
dilakukan oleh para peneliti dan pemberitaan.
Investor institusi umumnya lebih menyukai bertransaksi dengan
perusahaan besar, untuk alasan likuiditas dan masalah kontrak.
14. BEBERAPA FAKTOR YANG
MEMPENGARUHI EARNING RESPON
COEFICIENT
Risiko
dan
ketidak
pastian
Faktor
Kualitas
audit
Industri
Tingkat
Bunga
Laba
permanen
Tingkat
Pertumbu
Financial
Leverage
han
Perusaha
an
dan
temporer
15. STRATEGI PERDAGANGAN
• Perubahan
informasi setelah
pengumuman
• Winner-losser
strategies dan
sikap optimis
para analis
keuangan.
Berdasarkan
bukti empiris
ternyata
pasar dapat
dipengaruhi
data
akuntansi
16. MECHANISTIC OR BEHAVIOURAL
EFFECT
Cosmetic accounting
Leftwich
Two hypotheses
Market reacted mechanistically to changes in
accounting numbers, regardless whether they were
cosmetic or whether they had cash flow implications
Market ignored accounting changes which had no
cash flow consequences
20. BACKGROUND: EARLY DEMAND
FOR THEORY
Capital markets research
inconclusive
Observations of
accounting policy choice
• Why do managers prepare
financial reports?
• How are accounting policy
choices made?
Information hypothesis
could not explain all
observations
21. CONTRACTING THEORY
The firm as a legal ‘nexus’ of
contractual relationships
Organising economic activity
to reduce contracting costs
• management contracts
• debt contracts
22. AGENCY THEORY
Jensen & Meckling
(1976)
Contract where one
party (the principal)
engages another
(the agent) to act
on their behalf
e.g. where there is a
separation of
management and
control. Managers
have remuneration
contracts
Utility maximisation
by both parties
Agent may act on
her/his own behalf
(self-interest)
23. AGENCY THEORY
Firms can be characterised as a nexus of
contracts
• Between consumers of products and the suppliers of
factors of production
Firms exist because they reduce contracting
costs,
• Firms provide an efficient means of organising economic
activity
Contracts include all types of agreements
between two or more parties
24. AGENCY THEORY
Agency costs
Due to self interest, the agent might act in his/her own
interest rather than that of the principal (moral hazard)
Agents may undertake certain Divergent Behaviours
This agency problem gives rise to Agency Costs
(monitoring, bonding and residual loss)
25. AGENCY THEORY
Agency costs can be categorised into:
1. Monitoring Costs – the cost of observing the
agent’s behaviour
Auditing costs
2. Bonding Costs – Costs borne by the agent
(e.g. manager) as a result of aligning their
interests with the principal (e.g. owners)
Manager has to prepare financial reports (a cost to
the manager in terms of time and effort)
26. AGENCY THEORY
Agency costs can be categorised into
(continued):
3. Residual Loss – loss associated with not
being able to fully align the interests of the
principal with the agent
27. AGENCY THEORY
• The principal reduces the
remuneration paid to the agent in
anticipation of agency costs
• Cost of dysfunctional behaviour
built into remuneration
Price
Protection (ex
ante – up front)
• The principal reduces the
remuneration paid to the agent
• Remuneration based on observed
agent performance
Ex post settling
up (ex post –
after the fact
e.g. at the end
of each year)
28. MANAGER-SHAREHOLDER
AGENCY RELATIONSHIPS
Managers as
agents of
owners can
act in own
interest
The smaller
the manager
ownership in
the firm the
more likely
divergent
behaviours
Manager has
incentive to
contract with
firm to
reduce
divergent
behaviours
to reduce
price
protection
Manager
bear cost of
owner
monitoring
29. MANAGER-SHAREHOLDER
AGENCY RELATIONSHIPS
Agency
Costs of
Equity
Risk-Aversion
• – limited incentive to
increase value of
firm through
investment in risky
projects
Dividend
Retention
• – reduced incentive
to pay dividends or
take on optimal
levels of debt
Over-consumption
of
Perquisites
Horizon
Problem
• – short term focus on
performance of firm
30. MANAGER-SHAREHOLDER
AGENCY RELATIONSHIPS
Reducing the agency costs of equity
Bonuses are usually tied to firm
performance in some way to motivate
managers to act in the owners’ interest
Bonuses can be paid in cash and/or
shares/share options
Bonuses can be tied to:
1. Accounting numbers(such as net
income, sales, return on assets)
2. Share price (market based performance
measure)
31. SHAREHOLDER-DEBTHOLDER
AGENCY RELATIONSHIPS
• Excessive dividend payments-reducing
debtholder’s security
• Asset substitution-firm invests in
higher risk projects (no benefit to
debtholder)
• Under investment-where no
incentive to invest in positive NPV
projects
• Claim dilution-issuing higher
priority debt
Agency
costs
of debt
32. SHAREHOLDER-DEBTHOLDER
AGENCY RELATIONSHIPS
Debt-holders can Price Protect via
increased interest charges or reduced
amounts provided
The interests of shareholders can be
bonded to those of debtholders via
restrictions in lending agreements (Loan
Covenants)
Covenants often rely on numbers contained
in financial statements
Covenants usually restrict the behaviour of
managers acting on behalf of owners
33. EX POST OPPORTUNISM VERSUS
EX ANTE EFFICIENT
CONTRACTING
Contracts provide incentives for agents to
act against principals interest
Opportunistic perspective
ex post (after contracts finalised)
incomplete contracts
bonus plan hypothesis
debt-equity hypothesis
Efficient contracting perspective
34. EX POST OPPORTUNISM VERSUS
EX ANTE EFFICIENT
CONTRACTING
Efficient contracting perspective
Efficient
contracts
align
interests of
agent with
principal
Actions that
benefit agent
also benefit
firm
Ex ante –
before
contracts are
finalised
35. INFORMATION PERSPECTIVE
AND SIGNALLING
Holthausen
Derived
from
signalling
theory
Managers
provide
information
to investors
to assist in
their
decision
making
Similar to
efficient
contracting
Accounting
information
precedes
cash flows
36. INFORMATION PERSPECTIVE
AND SIGNALLING
Aligned with the information hypothesis
Managers use the accounts to signal
expectations and intentions regarding the future
Incentives to signal good, neutral and bad news
37. POLITICAL PROCESSES
The firm and parties interested
in the firm
Political market v. capital
market
• Less demand for information in political
market
• Less benefit from information gathering
• Heterogeneity of interests
38. POLITICAL PROCESSES
Political costs – wealth transfers
• Size hypothesis
Implications for firm behaviour
• e.g. banking sector in Australia
39. EMPIRICAL TESTS
Testing the opportunistic and
political cost hypothesis
Watts &
Zimmerman
Zmijewski &
Hagerman
provided little
insight
40. EMPIRICAL TESTS
Empirical tests – tests using contract details
(Healy)
Figure 10.1: Allocation of funds to the bonus pool,
based on accounting profit
41. EMPIRICAL TESTS
Empirical tests – tests using contract details
(Healy)
Figure 10.2: Accounting accruals as a function of
bonus plan specifications
42. EMPIRICAL TESTS
Refining the specification
of political costs
• Liberty & Zimmerman
• Godfrey & Jones
• DeAngelo
• Wong
• Lemke & Page
• Panchapakesan & McKinnon
• Ali & Kumar
43. EMPIRICAL TESTS
Tests of
efficient
contracting
hypotheses
interest capitalisation
voluntary consolidated
financial reporting
changes in CEO
other studies
44. EVALUATION OF THE THEORY
Methodological and statistical criticisms
• empirical evidence weak and inconclusive
• McKee, Bell & Boatsman
• Christie
• Leftwich
45. EVALUATION OF THE THEORY
Philosophical criticisms
Tinker, Merino and Neimark
Christenson
Watts and Zimmerman
