1. āđāļĢāļ·āđāļāļ āļŦāļāđāļē
Antimicrobial Stewardship (ASP) and MDR 1
Epidemiology of Important MDRPathogens in Thailand 72
Outbreak of Multi-drug Resistant Organisms : An Overview 120
āļāļēāļĢāļāļąāļāļāļēāļĢāļāđāļēāļāļŦāđāļāļāļāļāļīāļāļąāļāļīāļāļēāļĢ 154
āļāļēāļĢāđāļāđāļēāļĢāļ°āļ§āļąāļāđāļāļ·āđāļāļāļ·āđāļāļĒāļēāļāđāļēāļāļāļļāļĨāļāļĩāļ āļŠāļģāļŦāļĢāļąāļāđāļāļāļĒāđ āđāļĨāļ°āļāļĒāļēāļāļēāļĨ 198
āļāļēāļĢāđāļāđāļēāļĢāļ°āļ§āļąāļāđāļāļ·āđāļāļāļ·āđāļāļĒāļēāļāđāļēāļāļāļļāļĨāļāļĩāļ āļŦāļĨāļąāļāļāļēāļĢāđāļĨāļ°āđāļŦāļāļļāļāļĨ 237
Prevention and Control of MDROs in Healthcare Settings 275
āļāļēāļĢāļāđāļāļāļāļąāļāļāļēāļĢāđāļāļĢāđāļāļĢāļ°āļāļēāļĒāđāļāļ·āđāļāļāļ·āđāļāļĒāļē 321
āļāļēāļĢāđāļāđāļēāļĢāļ°āļ§āļąāļāđāļāļ·āđāļāļāļ·āđāļāļĒāļēāļāđāļēāļāļāļļāļĨāļāļĩāļ 334
3. Outline of the Talk
âĒ Basic concept
âĒ Strategies
âĒ Administrative issue, collaboration between
clinician, pharmacist, microbiologist
âĒ Outcome
2
4. Definitions of ASP
âĒ An ongoing effort to optimize
antimicrobial use in order to
â Improve patient outcomes
â Ensure cost-effective therapy
â Reduce adverse sequelae of
antimicrobial use (including antimicrobial
resistance)
MacDougall C. & Polk RE Clin Microbiol Rev. 2005; 18 (4):638â656
5. Goals of ASP
âĒ Optimize clinical outcomes while
minimizing unintended consequences of
antimicrobial use
â Toxicity
â Selection of pathogenic organisms (such as
Clostridium difficile)
â Emergence of resistance
âĒ Reduce health care costs without
adversely impacting quality of care
Dellit TH et al. Clin Infect Dis 2007; 44:159â77
6. Antimicrobial Resistance:
Key Prevention Strategies
Antimicrobial
Resistance
Antimicrobial Use
Infection
Campaign to Prevent Antimicrobial Resistance in Healthcare Settings
5
Pathogen
7. Antimicrobial Resistance:
Key Prevention Strategies
Prevent
Transmission
Optimize Use
Prevent
Infection
Effective
Diagnosis
& Treatment
Antimicrobial
Resistance
Antimicrobial Use
Infection
Campaign to Prevent Antimicrobial Resistance in Healthcare Settings
6
Antimicrobial-Resistant Pathogen
12. Reasons for antimicrobial
stewardship programs
âĒ Increasing healthcare cost: antibiotic
accounts for âĨ 30% of hospital pharmacy
budget
â DRG, Health assurance
âĒ Increasing incidence of MDR
MacDougall C. & Polk RE Clin Microbiol Rev. 2005; 18 (4):638â656
13. Are these measures ATB
stewardship?
âĒ Substitution among antimicrobials in the
same class for cost-saving purposes
âĒ Intravenous-to-oral switching programs for
highly bioavailable drugs
âĒ Pharmacokinetic consultation services
Affect antimicrobial use, but less likely to have an impact on
overall antimicrobial use or antimicrobial resistance
MacDougall C. & Polk RE Clin Microbiol Rev. 2005; 18 (4):638â656
14. Scope of ATB stewardship
âĒ Antimicrobial stewardship includes
â Limiting inappropriate use
â Optimizing antimicrobial selection, dosing, route,
& duration of therapy
â Limiting the unintended consequences,
(emergence of resistance, adverse drug events,
and cost)
Dellit TH et al. Clin Infect Dis 2007; 44:159â77
15. Short-course Empiric Antibiotic Therapy for
Patients with Pulmonary Infiltrates in the
Intensive Care Unit: A Proposed Solution for
Indiscriminate Antibiotic Prescription
NINA SINGH, PAUL ROGERS, CHARLES W. ATWOOD, MARILYN M.
WAGENER, and VICTOR L. YU
Am J Respir Crit Care Med Vol 162. pp 505â511, 2000
16. NINA SINGH, et al Am J Respir Crit Care Med Vol 162. pp 505â511, 2000
17. NINA SINGH, et al Am J Respir Crit Care Med Vol 162. pp 505â511, 2000
18. NINA SINGH, et al Am J Respir Crit Care Med Vol 162. pp 505â511, 2000
19. NINA SINGH, et al Am J Respir Crit Care Med Vol 162. pp 505â511, 2000
20. Which of the following is the most
common inappropriate use?
A. Use antibiotics without evidence of
bacterial infections
B. Inappropriate surgical prophylaxis
C. Redundant spectrum
D. Bacterial resistance
E. Narrow spectrum was available
19
21. Effectiveness of Education and
an Antibiotic-Control Program in
a Tertiary Care Hospital in
Thailand
Apisarnthanarak A et al Clin Infect Dis 2006; 42:768â75
22. Reasons for inappropriateness
Variables Number (%)
Inappropriate surgical prophylaxisb 452 (25)
Use of antibiotic without any
723 (0)
evidence of infection
Redundant spectrum 217 (12)
Bacterial resistance 235 (13)
Narrow spectrum was available 181 (10)
bIncludes dose, interval, and duration of treatment before and after surgery.
Apisarnthanarak A et al Clin Infect Dis 2006; 42:768â75
24. Simple ASP
âĒ Limit the use of antibiotics
â Fever of âunknownâ origin
â Upper respiratory tract infections
â Acute diarrhea in normal host
â Chronic diarrhea
â Asymptomatic bacteriuria
âĒ Appropriate surgical prophylaxis
23
25. Fever of Unknown Origin
âĒ Various cause, both ID and non-ID
âĒ āļĒāļīāđāļāļāļēāļ āļĒāļīāđāļāļĄāļĩāđāļāļāļēāļŠāđāļāđāļ Pyogenic infection
āļāđāļāļĒ
24
30. Example
âĒ āļāļĢāļ§āļāļĢāđāļēāļāļāļēāļĒāļāļāļ§āđāļēāļĄāļĩāđāļāđ 38oC, not pale,
no oral lesion, no lymphadenopathy,
swollen and tender right knee and both
wrist joints
âĒ CBC: WBC 12,800 with 80% PMN
âĒ Joint fluid: WBC 45,000 with 78% PMN
âĒ X-ray: narrowing of interphalangeal
joint space
29
35. Upper Respiratory Tract Infection
âĒ >80% caused by virus
âĒ Symptomatic treatment only
âĒ Centor criteria
34
36. Modified Centor Criteria
Feature Score
History of fever +1
Tonsillar exudates +1
Tender anterior cervical adenopathy +1
Absence of cough +1
Age <15 add 1 point +1
Age >44 subtract 1 point -1
35
37. Modified Centor Criteria
âĒ <2 points - No antibiotic or throat
culture necessary
âĒ 2-3 points - throat culture, antibiotic if
culture is positive
âĒ >3 points â Empiric antibiotic
36
âĒ + 4 variables ïŧ 40 - 60% PPV for Group A
Streptococcus infection
âĒ The absence of all four variables ïŧPPV> 80%
51. NNIS index category 3 SSI rate
ïŧ13.3% during 2002-2004
Itani K.M.F., et al N Engl J Med 2006;355:2640-51
52. Risk factors for the acquisition of
carbapenem-resistant E. coli among
hospitalized patients
Variables Odds ratio 95% C.I. P
Carbapenem use 6.50 2.33â18.16 <.001
Metronidazole use 4.25 1.56â11.59 0.005
Presence of biliary
4.59 1.18â17.78 0.028
drainage catheter
Prior hospital stay
(<1 year)
1.02 1.00â1.03 0.012
M.-H. Jeon et al. / Diagnostic Microbiology and Infectious Disease 62 (2008)
402â406
55. Example 3
âĒ Which antibiotic for surgical prophylaxis?
âĒ What else could, and should we do?
56. Example 3
âĒ Nasal swab (and perianal swab) for MRSA
âĒ Standard precautions: Hand hygiene, etc.
âĒ Pre-op bath with chlorhexidine soap BID X 3
days
âĒ Cefazolin 2 g IV 30 min prior to incision, then
2 g IV q 8 h for 48 h
âĒ No SSI, VAP, UTI, etc. afterward
57. Key Principles of AMP in Surgery
âĒ Use narrow spectrum, preserve agents used
for treatment for further needs
âĒ Optimal time of administration: 30-60 min
before incision
âĒ Adequate dose, additional dose intra-op for
prolonged procedure or massive bleeding
âĒ Do not give beyond 24 hours post op (the
feast is over!!!!)
56
59. Which antimicrobial agents should be
included in ASP?
A. High cost
B. Narrow therapeutic index
C. Availability of generic preparation
D. Broad-spectrum agents that are risks for
difficult-to-treat MDR
58
60. Component of ASP
Active strategies
âĒ Prospective audit with
intervention and feedback
âĒ Formulary restriction and
preauthorization
Additional strategies
âĒ Education
âĒ Guideline and clinical
pathways
âĒ Antimicrobial order form
âĒ Streamlining or de-escalation
59
61. Who should initiate the program?
A. Hospital director
B. Infection control chair
C. Infection control nurse
D. Pharmacist
E. Microbiologist
F. Financial Manager
60
62. Core members of a multidisciplinary
antimicrobial stewardship team
âĒ Infectious diseases physicians
âĒ Clinical pharmacist with infectious
diseases training
âĒ Clinical microbiologist
âĒ Information system specialist
âĒ Infection control professional
âĒ Hospital epidemiologist
Dellit TH et al. Clin Infect Dis 2007; 44:159â77
63. Core members of a multidisciplinary
antimicrobial stewardship team
âĒ Any MD who are interested in AMR/ASP
âĒ Pharmacist with infectious diseases
interest
âĒ Lab tech
âĒ Information system specialist
âĒ Infection control team
âĒ Hospital epidemiologist
Dellit TH et al. Clin Infect Dis 2007; 44:159â77
64. Roles of each member
âĒ The clinical microbiology laboratory
â Providing patient-specific culture and
susceptibility data to optimize individual
antimicrobial management
â Surveillance of resistant organisms
â Molecular epidemiologic investigation of
outbreaks
Dellit TH et al. Clin Infect Dis 2007; 44:159â77
65. Roles of each member
âĒ Clinical and Hospital Pharmacists
â Processing medication orders
â Dispensing drugs
â Notify the prescriber that authorization is required
â Flag orders for review by infectious diseases
specialists
MacDougall C. & Polk RE Clin Microbiol Rev. 2005; 18 (4):638â656
66. Organization of ASP
Pharmacist
65
CEO/Admin
ATB Users ASP Team
LAB IT IC Team
67. Evaluation
âĒ Process measures
â Did the intervention result in the desired change
in antimicrobial use?
âĒ Outcome measures
â Did the process implemented reduce or prevent
resistance or other unintended consequences of
antimicrobial use?
68. Rate of use over time
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
āļĢāļ§āļĄāļĄāļđāļĨāļāđāļē
Carbapenems
(āļĨāđāļēāļāļāļēāļ)
30.46 69.44 33.21 42.73 44.74 35.85
āļĢāļ§āļĄ DDD/1000
pt-day 37.29 83.58 40.02 50.05 54.82 44.93
67
69. Challenges for Antimicrobial
Stewardship Programs
âĒ Cooperation of
stakeholders
â Internist
â Surgeon
â Intensivist
â General Practitioners
âĒ Collaboration
â Microbiology Lab
â Pharmacist
â MD
â IC
68
73. Epidemiology of Important MDR-Pathogens
in Thailand
āļ.āļĻ. āļ.āļ. āļāļģāļāļĢ āļĄāļēāļĨāļēāļāļĢāļĢāļĄ
āļŠāļēāļāļēāļ§āļīāļāļēāđāļĢāļāļāļīāļāđāļāļ·āđāļ
āļ āļēāļāļ§āļīāļāļēāļāļēāļĒāļļāļĢāļĻāļēāļŠāļāļĢāđ
āļāļāļ°āđāļāļāļĒāļĻāļēāļŠāļāļĢāđ āđāļĢāļāļāļĒāļēāļāļēāļĨāļĢāļēāļĄāļēāļāļīāļāļāļĩ
1
74. Outline
âĒ Definitions of MDR
âĒ Emerging Resistance
âŦ International
âŦ Domestic
âŦ Evolving epidemiology of MDR
âĒ Prevalence of MDR in Thailand
âĒ Adaptation to the new challenges
2
75. General definition of MDR
MDR XDR
The isolate is non-susceptible
to âĨ1
agent in âĨ3
antimicrobial
categories
The isolate is non-susceptible
to âĨ1
agent in all but 2 or
fewer antimicrobial
categories
A.-P Magiorakos et al Clin Microbiol Infect 2012; 18: 268â281
3
82. ESBL-Positive Enterobacteria Isolates in
Drinking Water
âĒ Aim of study: assess the presence of
ESBL-producing Enterobacteriaceae
isolates in sachet packaged water bags
sold as drinking water in the streets of
Kinshasa, the capital of Democratic
Republic of the Congo.
10
De Boeck H et al. Emerg Infect Dis 2012; 18(6):1019-20
83. ESBL-Positive Enterobacteria Isolates in
Drinking Water
âĒ 101 sachet-packaged water bags were
bought from street vendors
âĒ 150 non-duplicate Enterobacteriaceae
identified
âĒ Eight isolates (5.3 %) were confirmed
as ESBL producers
âĒ Five isolates carried blaCTX-M1
11
De Boeck H et al. Emerg Infect Dis 2012; 18(6):1019-20
84. Carbapenem-Resistant Enterobacteriaceae
âĒ Production of ESBL + modification of
cell membrane protein
âĒ Production of new b-lactamases
âŦ OXA-type (Acinetobacter baumannii)
âŦ KPC (K. pneumoniae)
âŦ NDM-1 (Enterobactericeae)
âŦ VIM, SIM, etc.
12
85. Key features of organisms that
produce KPC enzymes
Feature Details
Affected
antibiotics
Direct: Îēâlactam; Indirect: fluoroquinolones,
aminoglycosides, TMP/SMX
Bacterial
species
K. pneumoniae, Escherichia coli,
Enterobacter, Citrobacter and Salmonella
species
Risk factors Similar to other R traits
Mechanism
of resistance
Plasmid-encoded gene (blaKPC ) enables
hydrolysis of Îē-lactam antibiotics
Toye B et al CMAJ 2009; 180:1225-6 13
86. Global distribution of KPC b-lactamases
Walsh TR Intern J Antimicrob Agents 2010: 36S3; S8âS14
87. Global distribution of mobile metallo-b-lactamases
Walsh TR Intern J Antimicrob Agents 2010: 36S3; S8âS14
89. āļĨāļąāļāļĐāļāļ°āļŠāļģāļāļąāļāļāļāļāđāļāļ·āđāļ superbug
NDM-1 āđāļāđāļāđāļāļĩāļĒāđāļāđ
âĒ āđāļāđāļāđāļāļ·āđāļāļāđāļāđāļĢāļāđāļāļāļāļāļĩāđāđāļĄāđāđāļāđāđāļāđāļēāļĢāļąāļāļāļēāļĢ
āļĢāļąāļāļĐāļēāđāļāđāļĢāļāļāļĒāļēāļāļēāļĨ (āđāļāļ·āđāļāļāđāļāđāļĢāļāļāļēāļ
āļāļļāļĄāļāļ)
Kumarasamy KK et al Published Online August 11, 2010 DOI:10.1016/S1473-3099(10)70143-217
91. Hawser S P. et al (SMART 2007) Antimicrob Agents Chemother 2009; 53:3280â328419
92. Intra-abdominal isolates
20
Hsueh PR et al International Journal of Antimicrobial Agents 36 (2010) 408â414
93. ESBL producing GNR in travelers diarrhea
Region ESBL-pos (n) Proportion positive p-Value compared
to Europe
World 58 (58/242)=0.24
Europe excl. Sweden 2 (2/63)=0.03
Egypt 19 (19/38)=0.50 <0.0001
Thailand 8 (8/36)=0.22 0.0042
India 11 (11/14)=0.79 <0.0001
Middle East 4 (4/10)=0.40 0.0025
Southeast Asia incl.
Australia 5 (5/13)=0.38 0.0012
Africa excl. Egypt 2 (2/17)=0.12 0.1965 (NS)
America incl. West
Indies 1 (1/10)=0.10 0.3615 (NS)
Unspecified 6 (6/42)=0.15 0.0550 (NS)
Tham J et al Scandinavian Journal of Infectious Diseases, 2010; 42: 275â280
21
94. Features of NDM-1: Concerns
âĒ Plasmids carrying the gene for this
carbapenemase, blaNDM-1, can have
up to 14 other antibiotic resistance
determinants
âĒ Transferrable to other bacteria
Walsh T R et al Lancet Infect Dis 2011; 11:355â62 22
98. ESBL producers among ER patients
âĒ Rectal swab cultures from ER patients
âĒ 125 +ve screen for ESBL, of these, 79
+ve by confirmatory test (74 were E.
coli)
âĒ ïŧ 80% did not take ATB in the past
three months and never been admitted
âĒ Many were regular patients of hospitals
(OPD)
99. MDR in Community Hospitals
âĒ Referred from provincial/regional
hospitals with known MDR
âĒ Referred from provincial/regional
hospitals with occult MDR
âĒ Broad-spectrum antibiotics are also
supplied ïĻ further increased selective
pressure
27
100. CRE in Thailand
âĒ Case reported from hospitals in NE, E,
central, and Bangkok region
âĒ Most commonly found in NE
âĒ Number of isolates range 1-15/hospital
âĒ Variety of resistance genes
âŦ VIM, SIM, etc.
âŦ Plus NDM (number to be assigned)
28
101. Walsh T R et al Lancet Infect Dis 2011; 11:355â62 29
102. Key findings
âĒ Bacteria with blaNDM-1 were grown
from 12 of 171 seepage samples and
two of 50 water samples
âĒ 11 species has not been known to carry
NDM-1 (Shigella boydii and Vibrio
cholerae)
Walsh T R et al Lancet Infect Dis 2011; 11:355â62 30
103. Key findings
âĒ Carriage by enterobacteria,
aeromonads, and V. cholerae was
stable, generally transmissible, and
associated with resistance patterns
typical for NDM-1
Walsh T R et al Lancet Infect Dis 2011; 11:355â62 31
104. Global distribution of mobile metallo-b-lactamases
Walsh TR Intern J Antimicrob Agents 2010: 36S3; S8âS14
115. Basic information
âĒ 1,023 hospitals
âĒ 6,830,843 admissions
âĒ NI rates: 2.07-7.60 %
âĒ Infections: 268,628 episodes
âĒ Caused by MDR 87,751 episodes
43
116. Key findings
âĒ Total extra LOS: 3.2 million days
âĒ 38,481 death
âĒ ATB cost 2,539-6,084 million Bht
âĒ Indirect cost (morbidity, premature
death) 40,000 million Bht.
44
120. How should we adapt our selves?
âĒ More stringent antimicrobial
stewardship program to encompass all
healthcare sectors, including in farms
âĒ Stronger IC
âŦ Surveillance
âŦ Isolation precautions
48
121. 1
Emerging Antimicrobial resistance
Amari airport Hotel
9 Jan 2013
Outbreak of Multi-drug Resistant
Organisms : An Overview
Y. Rongrungruang, MD
Department of Medicine
Faculty of Medicine Siriraj Hospital
Mahidol University
122. Focus
Overview of MDR agents
Outbreak vs endemic MDR agents
From evidence to practice strategies
Conclusions
123. Emerging MDR Gram Negative
organisms in health-care facilities
âĒ ESBL-producing Enterobacteriaceae
âĒ Carbapenem-resistant A. baumannii & P.
aeruginosa
âĒ Carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae
âĒ Colistin-resistant A. baumannii & P.
aeruginosa
124. Emerging MDR Gram Positive
organisms in health-care facilities
âĒ Methicillin-resistant S. aureus (MRSA)
with reduced susceptibility to
glycopepetide
âĒ Ampicillin & high level gentamicin-resistant
Enterococci
âĒ Vancomycin-resistant Enterococci (VRE)
125. Epidemic vs Endemic
Epidemic
âĒ Occurrence of more cases of a disease than
expected among a given group of people over a
specific time period
Endemic
âĒ Usual or expected number of cases within a
specific geographic location or population
127. Is there an outbreak?
âĒ Usually occurs over short time period
âĒ Affects specific population with common
exposure/risk factor
âĒ Caused by single strain of organism
128. Is there an Outbreak?
âĒ One case of an uncommon disease
â Group A Strep SSI
âĒ A âclusterâ of unusual pathogen
â Pseudomonas cepacia BSI
â Carbapenem-R Acinetobacter baumannii
(new strain)
âĒ Increase of incidence in specific ward
â Pneumonia in psychiatric unit
129. Epidemic curve: transmission mode
Category Possible Modes
Point (common)
source
Gastroenteric illness
Person-to-person
(propagated) source
Respiratory illness
Continuous source*
(endemic)
Vector-borne,
zoonotic,
nosocomial, etc.
132. Epidemic Curve: Outbreak of Pseudomonas picketti
Bacteremia and Contaminated Infusate Traced to
Contaminated Fentanyl
4
3
D
No. of Cases January February March April
2
1
0
6 13 20 27 3 10 17 24 3 10 17 24 31 7 14 21
WWeeeekk ooff SSuurrggeerryy,, 22000011
P
D P
P
P
B
B B
PPrroobbaabbllee CCaassee
DDeeffiinniittee CCaassee
DDeeffiinniittee CCaassee wwiitthh BBaacctteerreemmiiaa
P
D
B
135. Intervention to reduce KPC-III
âĒ Efficacy assessment during 2006-2010
using quasi-experimental study
âĒ Intervention included
â patient isolation, cohorting
â environment cleaning
â education of staff, hand hygiene
â computerized notification system that flags
CRKP carriers and provides instructions
136. Cleaning/disinfecting CRKP
âĒ During hosp stay & after discharge
âĒ Use of hypochlorite 1,000 ppm provided
to all housekeeping staff
âĒ Vacated rooms had to be certified for
reuse by the infection control nurse
âĒ Same procedure applied to station that
had been used by CRKP cases/carriers
137.
138. Outbreak of Imipenem-Resistant Acinetobacter baumannii at Songklanagarind
Silom Jamulitrat, Somchit Thongpiyapoom , Nonglak Suwalak
J Med Assoc Thai 2007; 90 (10): 2181-91
139. Incidence
of colonized
or infected
with CR or CS
A. baumannii
& carbapenem
consumption
1997 to 1998
Corbella X.
J Clin Microb
2000:38;
4086â95
19
140. 20
A B B C D D D D D D E E
Patterns
obtained by
PFGE
for A. baumannii
after digestion
with SmaI
Corbella X.
J Clin Microb
2000:38;4086â95
141. Temporal
trends in
environmental
contamination
with
A. baumannii
clones
before
and
after
interventions
Corbella X.
J Clin Microb
2000:38;4086â95
21
142. Endemic MRSA & intervention
âĒ MRSA bundleâ was implemented in 2007
in acute care VA hospitals nationwide in
an effort to decrease MRSA HAI.
âĒ Bundle consisted of universal nasal
surveillance for MRSA, contact
precautions, hand hygiene, and a change
in the institutional culture during
October 2007 through June 2010
143. Endemic MRSA & intervention
âĒ 1,934,598 admissions and 8,318,675
patient-days
âĒ Screening at admission 82% to 96%,
transfer/discharge 72% to 93%
âĒ Mean colonization/infection = 13.6 Âą 3.7%
âĒ MRSA HAI declined from 1.64 to 0.62
per 1000 pt-days (62%, P<0.001)
144. ICU MRSA 1.64 to 0.62 per 1000
patient-days in October 2007 to June
2010, a decrease of 62% (P<0.001)
non-ICUs fell from 0.47 per 1000
patient-days
to 0.26 per 1000 patient-days, a
decrease of 45% (P<0.001)
Rates of Health CareâAssociated Methicillin-Resistant
Staphylococcus aureus in Veterans Affairs (VA) Facilities &
MRSA bundle
Jain R, et al. N Engl J Med 2011;364:1419-30.
145. Skin bath with 4% chlorhexidine & VRE, MRSA colonization,
blood stream infections Climo MW. Crit Care Med 2009; 37:1858â65
146. Skin bath with 4% chlorhexidine & VRE, MRSA colonization,
blood stream infections Climo MW. Crit Care Med 2009; 37:1858â65
147. Outbreak vs endemic MDR
organisms in health-care facilities
âĒ New strain, single clone, small cluster ,
specific unit favor outbreak > endemic &
success of eradicate/control
âĒ Oligoclonal/polyclonal strains, late,
prolonged outbreak or endemic MDR
associated with higher rate of failure to
eradicate/control
149. multifaceted, evidence-based
approach on MDRo guideline 2006
Infection prevention
Accurate/prompt diagnosis and
treatment
Prudent use of antimicrobials
Prevention of transmission
150. Intervention on MDRo transmission 2006
Category Grade
Hand hygiene Recommended
Contact precaution Recommended
Environment cleaning Recommended
Communication between
Recommended
unit/hospitals
151. Intervention on MDRo transmission 2006
Category Grade
Single room or cohorting Preferred
Intensified precaution in
Considered
uncontrolled transmission
Active culture surveillance Considered
Decolonization Considered
152. 32
Priority on MDR Enterobacteriaceae
prevention & control
Category Rationale & Comments
Standard
and contact
precautions
Essential, especially hand
hygiene compliance. behavioral
aspects of compliance warranted
Active
surveillance
Indicated, but be tailored to at-risk
groups and resources, esp laboratory,
isolation facilities, incidence fell after
enhanced screening, isolation/cohort
in studies
Khan AS, et al. J Hosp Infect
82 (2012:82;85-93.
153. 33
Priority on MDR Enterobacteriaceae
prevention & control
Category Rationale & Comments
Environment
cleaning
Reduced susceptibility to
chlorhexidine among XDR KP
Decolonization No recognized methods,
antibiotic stewardship vs GI
decolonization with antibiotics
Antimicrobial
stewardship
Effective control of antibiotic
use inside and outside hospital
Khan AS, et al. J Hosp Infect
82 (2012:82;85-93.
154. Conclusion
New strain, single clone, small cluster , early
intervention favor outbreak > endemic &
success of eradicate/control
Oligoclonal/polyclonal strains, late
intervention, prolonged outbreak or endemic
MDR associated with higher rate of failure
to eradicate/control
Enhanced & sustained implementation of
MDR bundles in certain settings
162. āļŠāļāļēāļāļāļēāļĢāļāđāļāļĢāļāļāļī
Infection Control team
IInnffoorrmmaattiioonn
Prevalence and Incidence of multidrug
resistance isolates in specific populations
or patient care locations
IInnffeeccttiioonn CCoonnttrrooll NNuurrssee
Laboratory
Antimicrobial susceptibility reports: IInnffoorrmmaattiioonn
Pathogen-specific prevalence of
resistance among clinical isolates
āđāļĢāļāļāļīāļāđāļāļ·āđāļāđāļāđāļĢāļāļāļĒāļēāļāļēāļĨāđāļĨāļ°āļāļēāļĢāļŠāļāļāļŠāļ§āļāļāļēāļĢāļĢāļ°āļāļēāļ 7
172. Habitat of antibiotic resistant bacteria
Organism Clinical specimen Environmental Sources
Gram-negative bacilli
Escherichia coli All sites, feces most common contaminated food, water
Citrobacter freundii All sites, feces most common water, soil, fish, animals, food
Citrobacter diversus All sites, CSF Unknown
Enterobacter aerogenes All sites Water, soil, sewage, animals, dairy products
Enterobacter cloacae All sites Water, soil, sewage, meat
Klebsiella pneumoniae All sites, respiratory tract/urinary Ubiquitous, include foods and water
tract most common
Serratia marcescens All sites, respiratory tract common Water, soil, plants, vegetables, animals, insects
Proteus mirabilis Urinary tract, blood, CSF Animals, birds, fresh- and saltwater fish
Proteus vulgaris Urinary tract, wound, stool, similar to P. mirabilis
respiratory tract
Gram-positive bacteria
Methicillin-resistant All sites, skin and soft tissue Foods
Staphylococcus aureus common
Enterococcus All sites, feces most common soil, water, food, plants, animals
āđāļĢāļāļāļīāļāđāļāļ·āđāļāđāļāđāļĢāļāļāļĒāļēāļāļēāļĨāđāļĨāļ°āļāļēāļĢāļŠāļāļāļŠāļ§āļāļāļēāļĢāļĢāļ°āļāļēāļ 17
174. āļŠāļāļēāļāļāļēāļĢāļāđāļĢāļ°āļāļēāļ
Case definition
Environmental factors Literature
Specific agent
reviews
GGeenneerraall bbaacckkggrroouunndd
NNaattuurree ooff mmiiccrroooorrggaanniissmm
CCuullttiivvaattiioonn
SSuuppppoorrttiivvee llaabb ddiiaaggnnoossiiss
SSuurrvveeiillllaannccee ssyysstteemm
TTyyppiinngg tteecchhnniiqquuee
SSttoorraaggee ooff iissoollaatteess
OOtthheerrss
āđāļĢāļāļāļīāļāđāļāļ·āđāļāđāļāđāļĢāļāļāļĒāļēāļāļēāļĨāđāļĨāļ°āļāļēāļĢāļŠāļāļāļŠāļ§āļāļāļēāļĢāļĢāļ°āļāļēāļ 19
175. āļŠāļāļēāļāļāļēāļĢāļāđāļĢāļ°āļāļēāļ
1. Surveillance and early warning system
(clusters of infections, resistance patterns)
2. Establish case definition including lab diagnosis
3. Characterize isolates; store all sterile site
isolates and epidemiologically important
isolates
Diekema DJ, Pfaller MA. Infection control and clinical microbiology.
Manual of Clinical Microbiology. 8th eds, ASM press 2003
āđāļĢāļāļāļīāļāđāļāļ·āđāļāđāļāđāļĢāļāļāļĒāļēāļāļēāļĨāđāļĨāļ°āļāļēāļĢāļŠāļāļāļŠāļ§āļāļāļēāļĢāļĢāļ°āļāļēāļ 20
176. āļŠāļāļēāļāļāļēāļĢāļāđāļĢāļ°āļāļēāļ
4. Perform typing of involved strains
. Perform supplementary studies or 5. ccuullttuurree aass
need (only if justified by epidemiologic link to
transmission)
6. Adjust lab procedure as necessary
7. Maintain surveillance and early-warning system
āđāļĢāļāļāļīāļāđāļāļ·āđāļāđāļāđāļĢāļāļāļĒāļēāļāļēāļĨāđāļĨāļ°āļāļēāļĢāļŠāļāļāļŠāļ§āļāļāļēāļĢāļĢāļ°āļāļēāļ 21
177. āļŠāļāļēāļāļāļēāļĢāļāđāļĢāļ°āļāļēāļ
Table Active surveillance culture method
Source method
Blood products Broth culture incubated aerobically and
anaerobically at 30-32 C for 10 days
Environmental surface Swab-rinse
Disinfectants and antiseptics Plating of serial dilutions of the product with
and without specific neutralizers
Air Mechanical air sampler; settling plates
Water Membrane filter for water samples, swab of
faucets and showerheads
Hands of personnel Broth-bag; 10-20 ml nutrient broth in sterile
plastic bag; wash hands in broth, and plate
semiquantitatively
Anterior nares of personnel Swab culture
Diekema DJ, Pfaller MA. Infection control and clinical microbiology.
Manual of Clinical Microbiology. 8th eds, ASM press 2003
āđāļĢāļāļāļīāļāđāļāļ·āđāļāđāļāđāļĢāļāļāļĒāļēāļāļēāļĨāđāļĨāļ°āļāļēāļĢāļŠāļāļāļŠāļ§āļāļāļēāļĢāļĢāļ°āļāļēāļ 22
178. āļŠāļāļēāļāļāļēāļĢāļāđāļĢāļ°āļāļēāļ
selective/enrichment media
commercial screening media
Identification system/: conventional methods
Antimicrobial commercial/automated method
Susceptibility including antibiogram as typing
CDC 2006
Microbiology
Isolation system: conventional methods
āđāļĢāļāļāļīāļāđāļāļ·āđāļāđāļāđāļĢāļāļāļĒāļēāļāļēāļĨāđāļĨāļ°āļāļēāļĢāļŠāļāļāļŠāļ§āļāļāļēāļĢāļĢāļ°āļāļēāļ 23
179. Detection of MRSA āļŠāļāļēāļāļāļēāļĢāļāđāļĢāļ°āļāļēāļ
Cefoxitin disk (30 ïg/disk): <21 mm inhibition zone
Cefoxitin MIC: < 4 ïg/mL
Selective media: BBLâĒ CHROMagarâĒ MRSA
: Oxacillin Resistant Screening Agar (ORSA)
Selective broth : Oxacillin-Mueller Hinton broth
Rapid Identification: Latex agglutination kit for S. aureus
Latex MRSA screen
āđāļĢāļāļāļīāļāđāļāļ·āđāļāđāļāđāļĢāļāļāļĒāļēāļāļēāļĨāđāļĨāļ°āļāļēāļĢāļŠāļāļāļŠāļ§āļāļāļēāļĢāļĢāļ°āļāļēāļ 24
180. āļŠāļāļēāļāļāļēāļĢāļāđāļĢāļ°āļāļēāļ
Detection of carbapenem resistant GNB
Carbapenemase
Class A penicillinase: KPC (K. pneumoniae)
Class B Metallo-ïĒ-lactamase (NDM-1, IMP, VIM)
Class C Cephalosporinase or AmpC
Class D Oxacillinase (Oxa-23, Oxa-48)
āđāļĢāļāļāļīāļāđāļāļ·āđāļāđāļāđāļĢāļāļāļĒāļēāļāļēāļĨāđāļĨāļ°āļāļēāļĢāļŠāļāļāļŠāļ§āļāļāļēāļĢāļĢāļ°āļāļēāļ 25
184. Detection of ESBL āļŠāļāļēāļāļāļēāļĢāļāđāļĢāļ°āļāļēāļ
Disk diffusion
Ceftazidime (30 ïg) zone < 22 mm
Cefotaxime zone (30 ïg) < 27 mm
Ceftriaxone zone (30 ïg) < 25 mm
Double disk diffusion
Ceftazidime (30ïg) + Ceftazidime-clavulanic acid(10ïg)
Cefotaxime (30ïg) + Ceftazidime-clavulanic acid(10ïg)
> 5 mm increase in a zone diameter
āđāļĢāļāļāļīāļāđāļāļ·āđāļāđāļāđāļĢāļāļāļĒāļēāļāļēāļĨāđāļĨāļ°āļāļēāļĢāļŠāļāļāļŠāļ§āļāļāļēāļĢāļĢāļ°āļāļēāļ 29
188. Detection of ESBL āļŠāļāļēāļāļāļēāļĢāļāđāļĢāļ°āļāļēāļ
Selective commercial culture medium
Brilliant ESBL Agar (Oxoid)
āđāļĢāļāļāļīāļāđāļāļ·āđāļāđāļāđāļĢāļāļāļĒāļēāļāļēāļĨāđāļĨāļ°āļāļēāļĢāļŠāļāļāļŠāļ§āļāļāļēāļĢāļĢāļ°āļāļēāļ 5
189. Appendix B. Intrinsic resistance-Enterobacteriaceae (CLSI 2012)
āđāļĢāļāļāļīāļāđāļāļ·āđāļāđāļāđāļĢāļāļāļĒāļēāļāļēāļĨāđāļĨāļ°āļāļēāļĢāļŠāļāļāļŠāļ§āļāļāļēāļĢāļĢāļ°āļāļēāļ 29
200. Topics
âĒ Strategy on Prevention and Containment of
Antimicrobial Resistance
âĒ Surveillance Activities
âĒ Monitor resistance in microorganisms (lab data)
â Ensure performance of lab testings
â Recognize emerging microorganisms and mechanisms
of resistance
201. WHO Strategy on Prevention and Containment
of Antimicrobial Resistance
2001 2010 2011
Global Regional National
203. Strategy on Prevention and Containment of
Antimicrobial Resistance
OBJECTIVES:
1. To establish a national alliance for the prevention and
control of antimicrobial resistance
2. To institute a surveillance system that captures the
emergence of resistance, trends in its spread and
utilization of antimicrobial agents in different settings
3. To promote rational use of antimicrobial agents at all
levels of health-care and veterinary settings
4. To strenghten infection prevention and control measures
to reduce the disease burden
5. To promote research in the area of antimicrobial
resistance
204.
205. Surveillance
Surveillance of antimicrobial resistance is
fundamental to understanding trends in
resistance, to developing treatment
guidelines accurately and to assessing the
effectiveness of interventions appropriately.
Without adequate surveillance, the majority of
efforts to contain emerging antimicrobial
resistance will be difficult.
206. ACTIVITIES:
1. Monitor resistance in microorganisms
2. Monitor use of antimicrobials
3. Monitor disease and economic burden due
to resistant organisms
207. Activity of monitor resistance pattern in microorganisms
ïą Establish a national and regional surveillance system on AM use, resistance and
information dissemination mechanisms
ïą Support standardization of laboratory methodologies (develop SOP), quality assurance
techniques and improve availability and reliability of microbiology laboratory facilities
ïą Support and conduct culture and sensitivity tests on targeted microorganisms and AMs
ïą Support and conduct series of population-based, real time surveillance systems to
monitor resistance patterns to demonstrate the extent of the problem in both human and
animal health
ïą Ensure the establishment of surveillance network to develop linkages between human
and veterinary sectors at national and regional levels
ïą Quantify resistance patterns of clinically important microorganisms through networks of
laboratories equipped with the capacity to perform quality assured AM susceptibility
testing
ïą Disseminate data to users, national and regional focal points and stakeholders
ïą Encourage healthcare providers to utilize resistance data efficiently
208. Lab data
1. Ensure performance and quality assurance of
appropriate diagnostic tests, microbial
identification, antimicrobial susceptibility tests
of key pathogens, and timely and relevant
reporting of results.
Detection / Identification /antimirobial susceptibility test of bacterial pathogens
Report
209. Always use
up-to-date standard guideline
âĒ For therapeutic purpose
âĒ For surveillance purpose
Surang (NARST )
211. M39-A3 :
Analysis and Presentation of Cumulative Antimicrobial Susceptility Test
Data; Approved Guideline â Third Edition (2009)
Member: 60$
Surang (NARST ) Nonmember: 120 $
212. SSttaapphhyyllooccooccccuuss sspppp..
MMeetthhiicciilllliinn rreessiissttaanntt SS.. aauurreeuuss
(MMRRSSAA))
Oxacillin disk : S âĨ 13, I =11-12, R âĪ 10 mm
Cefoxitin disk: S âĨ 22, I = - , R âĪ 21 mm
MMeetthhiicciilllliinn rreessiissttaanntt SSttaapphhyyllooccooccccuuss ccooaagguullaassee nneeggaattiivvee
((MMRRSSCCNN))
Cefoxitin disk: S âĨ 25, I = - , R âĪ 24 mm
If oxacillin â intermediate results are obtained for S. aureus, perform testing for mec A, or PBP 2a,
the , the cefoxitin MIC or cefoxitin disk test, an oxacillin MIC test or the oxacillin-salt agar screening
Test, Report the result of the alternative test rather than the oxacillin intermediate result.
NARST data
213. SSttaapphhyyllooccooccccuuss sspppp..
Vancomycin: Zone >= 7 mm. āļāļēāļĢāđāļāļĨāļāļĨāļāļēāļāđāļĄāđāļāđāļēāđāļāļ·āđāļāļāļ·āļ
MIC Breakpoint (ug/mL) S I R
Staphylococcus spp. âĪ 2 4-8 âĨ16
Staphylococcus coagulase negative âĪ 4 8-16 âĨ32
āļāđāļāļāļāļāļŠāļāļāđāļĨāļ°āļĢāļēāļĒāļāļēāļāļāļĨāļāđāļ§āļĒāļāđāļē MIC āđāļāđāļēāļāļąāđāļ
215. 17
Enterobacteriaceae
RevisedâĶ Carbapenem Zone Diameters Breakpoints (mm)
Agent
CLSI M100-S19 (2009)
CLSI M100-S20 (2010)
CLSI M100-S20U (2010)
CLSI M100-S21 (2011)
CLSI M100-S22 (2012)
S I R S I R
Doripenem - - - âĨ23 20-22 âĪ19
Ertapenem âĨ19 16-18 âĪ15 âĨ23 20-22 âĪ19
Imipenem âĨ16 14-15 âĪ13 âĨ23 20-22 âĪ19
Meropenem âĨ16 14-15 âĪ13 âĨ23 20-22 âĪ19
MHT-positive R R R
Report as appear
MHT-negative Report as appear Report as I
appear
Surang (NARST )
216. 18
Enterobacteriaceae
RevisedâĶ Carbapenem MIC Breakpoints (ug/mL)
Agent
CLSI M100-S19 (2009)
CLSI M100-S20 (2010)
CLSI M100-S20U (2010)
CLSI M100-S21 (2011)
CLSI M100-S22 (2012)
S I R S I R
Doripenem - - - âĪ1 2 âĨ4
Ertapenem âĪ2 4 âĨ8 âĪ0.5 1 âĨ2
Imipenem âĪ4 8 âĨ16 âĪ1 2 âĨ4
Meropenem âĪ4 8 âĨ16 âĪ1 2 âĨ4
Report as appear
MHT-positive R R R
MHT-negative Report as appear I
Report as appear
Surang (NARST )
217. Streptococcus pneumoniae
Penicillin āđāļĄāđāļĄāļĩāļĢāļēāļĒāļāļēāļ âIâ āļŦāļĢāļ·āļ âRâ āđāļāļĒ disk diffusion
(āđāļĄāļ·āđāļāļāļāļŠāļāļāļāđāļ§āļĒ oxacillin disk 1 ug)
Zone(mm) āļāļēāļĢāđāļāļĨāļāļĨ
âĨ 20 S
< 20 āļāļēāļāđāļāđāļ S/I/R āļāđāļāļāļ§āļąāļāļāđāļē MIC
āļŠāļģāļŦāļĢāļąāļāđāļāļ·āđāļāļāļĩāđāđāļĒāļāđāļāđāļāļēāļ CSF (meningitis)
āļāđāļāļāļĢāļēāļĒāļāļēāļāļāđāļē MIC āļāđāļāļĒāļē Penicillin āđāļĨāļ°
Cefotaxime āļŦāļĢāļ·āļ Ceftriaxone āļŦāļĢāļ·āļ Meropenem
218. āđāļāļ·āđāļāļāļĩāđāļāđāļāļāļāļāļŠāļāļāļāđāļ§āļĒāļ§āļīāļāļĩāļŦāļē MIC āđāļāđāļēāļāļąāđāļ
Organisms MIC determination
Acinetobacter Colistin
Enterococcus
Vancomycin
Vancomcin 15-16 mm (I)
Staphylococcus Vancomycin
S. pneumoniae
penicillin
(Penicillin <20mm)
S. pneumoniae cefotaxime, cetriaxone, cefuroxime,
cefipime, amoxicillin,
amoxicillin/clavulinic acid
Streptococcus viridans group Vancomycin
Burkholderia pseudomallei
219. Lab data
2. The lab should be able to recognize emerging microorganisms
and mechanisms of resistance.
NDM-positive by hospital in each region
21 of 48 hosp. NDM-positive, 39 Jan-Sep 2012
33
North East Central East Bangkok North South
2 2 1 1
11
3 2 1 1
7
2 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
NE 1
NE 2
NE 3
NE 4
NE 5
NE 6
C 1
C 2
C 3
C 4
C 5
E
BKK 1
BKK 2
BKK 3
N 1
N 2
N 3
N 4
N 5
S
221. Lab data
3. Ensure that laboratory data are recorded, preferably on a
database, and are used to produce clinically- and
epidemiologically-useful surveillance reports of resistance
patterns among common pathogens and infections in a timely
manner with feedback to prescribers and to the infection
control programme.
222. Consensus on Minimal Data Set
âĒ Patient ID (HN no.)
âĒ Specimen no. (lab no)
âĒ Location (ward)
âĒ Location type (IN, OPD, ICU, COM etc.)
âĒ Specimen type (site of infection)
âĒ name of all isolates (genus species, no growth, normal flora, mix)
âĒ Quantitative susceptibilty data (diameter or MIC)
âĒ AAggee
âĒ Sex
âĒ DDiiaaggnnoossiiss ((CCII oorr NNII))
âĒ UUnnddeerrllyyiinngg DDiisseeaassee
Surang (NARST )
225. AAnnttiibbiiooggrraamm
National Antibiogram
Magnitude of resistance to a given drug
ï āđāļŦāđāļāļĢāļēāļāļŠāļāļēāļāļāļēāļĢāļāđāđāļāļ·āđāļāļāļ·āđāļāļĒāļēāļĢāļ°āļāļąāļāļāļĢāļ°āđāļāļĻ āđāļāļĢāļĩāļĒāļāđāļāļĩāļĒāļāļĢāļ°āļŦāļ§āđāļēāļ āļāļąāļāļŦāļ§āļąāļ/āļ āļēāļ
ï āđāļāļ§āļāļēāļāļāļēāļĢāļĢāļąāļāļĐāļēāđāļĢāļāļāļīāļāđāļāļ·āđāļāđāļāļāļļāļĄāļāļ,
ï āđāļāļ§āļāļēāļāļāļēāļĢāļāļ§āļāļāļļāļĄāđāļāļ·āđāļāļāļ·āđāļāļĒāļēāļĢāļ°āļāļąāļāļāļĢāļ°āđāļāļĻ,
ï āđāļāļ§āļāļēāļāļāļąāļāļāļģāļāļąāļāļāļĩāļĒāļēāļŦāļĨāļąāļāđāļŦāđāļāļāļēāļāļī,
ï āđāļāļ§āļāļēāļāļāļēāļĢāļāļģ clinical guideline
Hospital Antibiogram
More valuable to clinicians
when managing the patients
āđāļāļ·āđāļāđāļāđāđāļāđāļāđāļāļ§āļāļēāļāđāļāļāļēāļĢāđāļĨāļ·āļāļāļĒāļēāļĢāļąāļāļĐāļēāļāļđāđāļāđāļ§āļĒāļāļīāļāđāļāļ·āđāļāđāļāļāļāļĩāđāļĢāļĩāļĒāļāļĩāđāđāļŦāļĄāļēāļ°āļāļąāļāļāđāļāļāļāļīāđāļ
226. NNaattiioonnaall SSuurrvveeiillllaannccee NNeettwwoorrkk
NARST
1998
ARI
1993
Thai IBIS
2004
Organism All organism
(from routine isolation)
S. pneumoniae
H. influenzae
S. pneumoniae, H. influenzae,
N. meningitidis, Salmonella spp.,
Streptococcus spp.,
Listeria monocytogenes
Specimen All specimens Nasopharyngeal
swab
Sterile site
Patient All age ïĢ5 year old
ARI and healthy
All age with invasive
infection
Hospital
network
60 hospitals 6 hospitals
(6 provinces)
57 hospitals
Time
Frame
Continuously One year period
(every 2-5 year)
93 / 94 / 97 / 00 / 05 /10
Continuously
Purpose Resistance situation
Resistance Trend
Etiologic incidence
Resistance situation
Carrier rate
Clinical + Lab data
Bacterial characteristics
Resistance patterns
227. Sample size estimates for prevalence of
antimicrobial resistance in a large population
232. Rate of vancomycin resistance enterococci
(2288 hhoossppiittaallss,, 11999988-22000077)
E.faecalis E.faecium
Aug 1999:
Use of Avoparcin as
growth promotor
was banned in Thailand
NARST data
0.1
1.5
8.1
1.5
1.4 0.5 0.6
1
1.4
2
0.3
1.2
1.6
0.4 0.6
1.9
0.5
1.1
7.1
1.1
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
% R
233. AAnnttiibbiiooggrraamm
National Antibiogram
Magnitude of resistance to a given drug
ï āđāļŦāđāļāļĢāļēāļāļŠāļāļēāļāļāļēāļĢāļāđāđāļāļ·āđāļāļāļ·āđāļāļĒāļēāļĢāļ°āļāļąāļāļāļĢāļ°āđāļāļĻ āđāļāļĢāļĩāļĒāļāđāļāļĩāļĒāļāļĢāļ°āļŦāļ§āđāļēāļ āļāļąāļāļŦāļ§āļąāļ/āļ āļēāļ
ï āđāļāļ§āļāļēāļāļāļēāļĢāļĢāļąāļāļĐāļēāđāļĢāļāļāļīāļāđāļāļ·āđāļāđāļāļāļļāļĄāļāļ,
ï āđāļāļ§āļāļēāļāļāļēāļĢāļāļ§āļāļāļļāļĄāđāļāļ·āđāļāļāļ·āđāļāļĒāļēāļĢāļ°āļāļąāļāļāļĢāļ°āđāļāļĻ,
ï āđāļāļ§āļāļēāļāļāļąāļāļāļģāļāļąāļāļāļĩāļĒāļēāļŦāļĨāļąāļāđāļŦāđāļāļāļēāļāļī,
ï āđāļāļ§āļāļēāļāļāļēāļĢāļāļģ clinical guideline
Hospital Antibiogram
More valuable to clinicians
when managing the patients
āđāļāļ·āđāļāđāļāđāđāļāđāļāđāļāļ§āļāļēāļāđāļāļāļēāļĢāđāļĨāļ·āļāļāļĒāļēāļĢāļąāļāļĐāļēāļāļđāđāļāđāļ§āļĒāļāļīāļāđāļāļ·āđāļāđāļāļāļāļĩāđāļĢāļĩāļĒāļāļĩāđāđāļŦāļĄāļēāļ°āļāļąāļāļāđāļāļāļāļīāđāļ
234. Hospital antibiogram
âĒ Primary aim: prepare a report to guide clinicians in the selection of
âempirical antimicrobial therapyâ for initial infection.
âĒ
Include only diagnostic isolates (not surveillance)
âĒ Eliminate duplicate by including only the first isolate
of a species/patient/analysis period, irrespective of body
site or antimicrobial profile.
âĒ Not aim for emergence of resistance during therapy,
empirical for later infection
âĒ Include only species with testing data for âĨ30 isolates.
âĒ Include only antimicrobial agents routinely tested and
clinical useful
âĒ do not report supplemental agents selectively tested on
resistant isolates only
âĒ
243. MMDDRR bbaacctteerriiaa SSttrraatteeggiieess
1. Develop newer antibiotics
2. Minimize drug resistance
âĒ ATB stewardship (healthcare & agriculture industry)
3. Prevent cross-transmission
âĒ New design of hospital equipment & environment
âĒ Hand hygiene & Contact precautions
âĒ Active surveillance & Rapid alert system
âĒ Decolonization & Decontamination
4. Prevent infections
âĒ Good clinical practice
âĒ Device-associated bundle
244. MMRRSSAA iinn tthhee NNeetthheerrllaannddss
âĒ 0.03- 0.06 % asymptomatic MRSA-nasal carriage
âĒ 1-2% of all hospital S.aureus is MRSA
âĒ 1% of blood isolations of S.aureus is MRSA
Low prevalence due to
âĒ Low use of human antibiotics (Lowest in Europe)
âĒ Search-and-destroy policy (since end 80th):
measures for patients and staff based on risk categories
1. Isolation of patients proven and at risk
2. Screening of asymptomatic carriers
3. Cohorting of patients and personnel
4. Eradication of carriership
5. Education of personnel
6. Disinfection
http://www.infection-prevention.eu/Nutzerdaten/File/meetings/2010_April_Berlin_MrsaInTheNetherlands.pdf
http://www.wip.nl/UK/free_content/Richtlijnen/MRSA%20hospital.pdf
245. PPaattiieennttss rriisskk ccaatteeggoorryy ooff tthhee pprreesseennccee ooff MMRRSSAA
Category 1: proven MRSA carrier
Category 2 : high risk of being a carrier
âĒ Patients who were cared for in a foreign hospital for more than 24 hours less
than 2 months ago
âĒ Foreign patients in the dialysis department
âĒ Patients who have stayed in the same room with an unexpected MRSA carrier
Category 3 : moderately elevated risk of being a carrier
âĒ Patients during the first year following treatment for carrying MRSA, with
negative control cultures
âĒ Patients cared for in a foreign hospital more than 2 months ago, who still have
persistent skin lesions and/or risk factors, such as chronic respiratory or urinary
tract infections
Category 4 : no elevated risk of being a carrier
âĒ Patients cared for in a foreign hospital more than 2 months ago, who have no
persistent skin lesions and/or risk factors, such as chronic respiratory or urinary
tract infections
246. Procedure ffoorr ((ppootteennttiiaallllyy))
ccoonnttaammiinnaatteedd ssttaaffff
Category 1 staff
âĒ Staff with MRSA
Category 2 staff: e.g.
âĒ staff member who was admitted to a
foreign hospital < 2 months
âĒ unprotected contact with an MRSA-positive
patient.
Category 3 staff : e.g.
âĒ regularly work in foreign hospitals
Category 4 staff: e.g.
âĒ Cultures remain negative for > 1 year
http://www.wip.nl/UK/free_content/Richtlijnen/MRSA%20hospital.pdf
247. CCoommmmoonn HHaabbiittaatt ooff BBaacctteerriiaa
OOrrggaanniissmmss CCoommmmoonn
HHaabbiittaatt
SSccrreeeenniinngg
MRSA
VISA
VRSA
Anterior nare>
pharynx >
skin >
GI tract
Swab culture from
âĒ anterior vestibule of the nose ïą
throat
âĒ areas of skin breakdown
âĒ Perirectal/perineal area
VRE
C. Difficile
Enterobacteriaceae
Rectum >
perineum
Stool samples
Swab samples from
âĒ the rectum or
âĒ perirectal area
A. baumannii Skin>
Sputum
Sponge/swab culture from
3 skin sites
Sputum culture
251. Contact Precautions SSttrraatteeggiieess ffoorr MMDDRR BBaacctteerriiaa
Strategies Appropriate Situations
1. Passive
surveillance
âĒ Very low prevalence of MDR bacteria
âĒ Lack of effective active surveillance
âĒ Good compliance with IC practices
252. Adherence rates on room entry and exit:
âĒ Hand hygiene 19 and 48 %
âĒ Gloves 68 and 64 %
âĒ Gowns 68 and 77 %
Am J Infect Control 2010;38:105-11
255. Potential Unintended CCoonnsseeqquueenncceess ooff
SSiinnggllee PPaattiieenntt RRoooomm ffoorr IIssoollaattiioonn
âĒ Complexity for the management of beds
âĒ Reduction in contacts between HCWs and
patients ~ 50%
âĒ Increase in feelings of isolation and loss of
control ï anxiety and depression
âĒ Prolong duration of stay
âĒ Increase in noninfectious adverse events
âĒ Patient dissatisfaction
Clinical Infectious Diseases 2007; 44:1101â7
256. Contact Precautions SSttrraatteeggiieess ffoorr MMDDRR BBaacctteerriiaa
Strategies Appropriate Situations
2. Active
surveillance
âĒ Low prevalence of MDR bacteria
âĒ Rapid & sensitive surveillance culture e.g.
MRSA, VRE
âĒ Good compliance with IC practices
257. Elements of an Effective Active Surveillance PPrrooggrraamm
Screening test:
âĒ Must be timely, affordable, and reliable
Clinical efficacy:
âĒ Should reduce transmission rate to patients and HCW
âĒ Should reduce infection rate by preventing acquisition
Implementation:
âĒ Hospital and administrative financial support
âĒ Systems and staff to screen patients
âĒ Systems and staff to monitor effectiveness and compliance
âĒ Education of patients, staff, and families
âĒ Adequate physical plant and supplies (eg. private rooms, gloves,
gowns, and antimicrobial agents)
âĒ Plan to manage social isolation and safety of patients under
contact precautions
Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol. 2007 Mar;28(3):249-60.
258. Potential Unintended CCoonnsseeqquueenncceess ooff
AAccttiivvee SSuurrvveeiillllaannccee ffoorr MMDDRR bbaacctteerriiaa
âĒ Increase risk for lawsuits
âĒ Incapacity of the hospital for expanding contact
precautions to many more patients
âĒ Laboratory workload (conventional & rapid test)
âĒ Extra charge (patient vs. hospital)
âĒ Conflict (patient refusal for active surveillance)
259. Contact Precautions SSttrraatteeggiieess ffoorr MMDDRR BBaacctteerriiaa
Strategies Appropriate Situations
3. Pre-emptive âĒ High prevalence of multiple MDR bacteria
âĒ High risk patients for developing HAIs
e.g. intubated patients in the ICU
âĒ Adequate staff & PPE
âĒ Limited laboratory diagnosis
âĒ Good compliance with IC practices
260. âOur surveillance data in the ICU revealed that intubated
patients were at 8 times higher risk of acquiring MRSA than
non-intubated patients, so we hypothesised that pre-emptive
contact precautions for all intubated patients would prevent
healthcare-associated infection by MRSA in the ICU.â
Journal of Hospital Infection 78 (2011)
261. âĒ Quasi-experimental study
âĒ A medical, surgical and trauma ICU at Osaka
University Graduate School of Medicine, Japan
âĒ 2 private rooms and a 17-bed main area
âĒ The distance from bed centre to bed centre in
the main area was 5 meters
âĒ January 2004 - December 2007
415 patients 1280
patients Journal of Hospital Infection 78 (2011)
263. Contact Precautions SSttrraatteeggiieess ffoorr MMDDRR BBaacctteerriiaa
Strategies Appropriate Situations
4. Universal âĒ Outbreak management w/o ward closure
âĒ Lack of effective active surveillance
âĒ Good teamwork
âĒ Adequate staff & PPE
âĒ Good compliance with IC practices
5. Reverse isolation âĒ Initial low risk of MDR colonization in
selected patients
âĒ Very high prevalence of multiple MDR
bacteria in the unit
âĒ Very high risk patients for developing
HAIs & mortality
266. MMuullttiiddrruugg-RReessiissttaanntt OOrrggaanniissmm SSuurrvveeiillllaannccee
aanndd MMoonniittoorriinngg iinn HHoossppiittaall SSeettttiinngg
Prevention Process Measures Surveillance
âmonitoring adherence to hand hygiene
âmonitoring adherence to gown and gloves use as part of
contact precautions
âmonitoring adherence to active surveillance testing
âmonitoring environmental cleaning
http://www.cdc.gov/nhsn/PDFs/pscManual/12pscMDRO_CDADcurrent.pdf
268. MMDDRROO DDeeffiinniittiioonnss
CephR-Klebsiella: Any Klebsiella spp. testing non-susceptible
(i.e., resistant or intermediate) to
ceftazidime, cefotaxime, ceftriaxone, or cefepime.
CRE-Klebsiella: Any Klebsiella spp. testing non-susceptible
(i.e., resistant or intermediate) to
imipenem, meropenem, or doripenem, by standard
susceptibility testing methods or by a positive result
for any method FDA-approved for carbapenemase
detection from specific specimen sources.
http://www.cdc.gov/nhsn/PDFs/pscManual/12pscMDRO_CDADcurrent.pdf