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© Copyright 2014 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. The information contained herein is subject to change without notice.
Giving Your AppSec Program the Edge
Using OpenSAMM for benchmarking and
software security improvement
Bruce C Jenkins, CISSP
bcj@hp.com
John B. Dickson, CISSP
@johnbdickson
Bruce’s Background
• USAF 28-year Veteran
• AppSec Program Strategist
• HP Fortify Security Lead
• Electronics / IT Hobbyist & Observer
of Social Implications of IT
HP Enterprise Security | About
• Leading provider of security and compliance solutions built
around world class products
HP Voltage
• HP Enterprise Security portfolio focused on six key areas
• Application security
• Data security
• Endpoint security
• Operations security
• Security governance, risk, and compliance
• Network security
John’s Background
• Application Security Enthusiast
• Helps CSO’s and CISO’s with
Application Security Programs
• ISSA Distinguished Fellow
• Security Author and Speaker
Denim Group | Company Background
• Professional services firm that builds & secures
enterprise applications
• External application & network assessments
• Web, mobile, and cloud
• Software development lifecycle development (SDLC) consulting
• Secure development services:
• Secure .NET and Java application development & remediation
• Classroom secure developer training for PCI compliance
• Developed ThreadFix
Overview
• The Challenge of Securing Applications
• Software Assurance Frameworks and OpenSAMM
• OpenSAMM Benchmarking Update
• Questions and Answers
THE CHALLENGE OF SECURING
APPLICATIONS
Giving Your AppSec Program the Edge
Value and Risk Are Not Equally Distributed
• Some Applications Matter More Than
Others
• Value and character of data being managed
• Value of the transactions being processed
• Cost of downtime and breaches
• Therefore All Applications Should Not Be
Treated the Same
• Allocate different levels of resources to
assurance
• Select different assurance activities
• Also must often address compliance and
regulatory requirements
True Software Attack Surface Is Often Unknown
Software you
currently know about
Why do these usually merit consideration?
• Substantial monetary or brand value flows
through them
• Compliance requirements
(e.g., PCI, HIPAA, FFIEC, etc.)
• Formal SLAs with customers
• You’ve had one or more previous security
incidents (or near misses)
What’s normally in this category?
• Critical legacy systems
• Notable web applications
To assess application security, many organizations focus on obvious
software resources, but overlook their overall inventory of applications
and code from less obvious sources when they analyze their assets.
True Software Attack Surface Is Often Unknown
To assess application security, many organizations focus on obvious
software resources, but overlook their overall inventory of applications
and code from less obvious sources when they analyze their assets.
Add in the rest of the web
applications your organization
actually develops and maintains
What’s normally in this category?
• Critical legacy systems
• Notable web applications
Why do these usually merit consideration?
• Substantial monetary or brand value flows
through them
• Compliance requirements
(e.g., PCI, HIPAA, FFIEC, etc.)
• Formal SLAs with customers
• You’ve had one or more previous security
incidents (or near misses)
True Software Attack Surface Is Often Unknown
12
Add in the software
you bought from
somewhere
Why do these usually merit consideration?
• Substantial monetary or brand value flows
through them
• Compliance requirements
(e.g., PCI, HIPAA, FFIEC, etc.)
• Formal SLAs with customers
• You’ve had one or more previous security
incidents (or near misses)
What’s normally in this category?
• Critical legacy systems
• Notable web applications
To assess application security, many organizations focus on obvious
software resources, but overlook their overall inventory of applications
and code from less obvious sources when they analyze their assets.
True Software Attack Surface Is Often Unknown
Why do these usually merit consideration?
• Substantial monetary or brand value flows
through them
• Compliance requirements
(e.g., PCI, HIPAA, FFIEC, etc.)
• Formal SLAs with customers
• You’ve had one or more previous security
incidents (or near misses)
What’s normally in this category?
• Critical legacy systems
• Notable web applications
Don’t forget mobile and cloud
To assess application security, many organizations focus on obvious
software resources, but overlook their overall inventory of applications
and code from less obvious sources when they analyze their assets.
We Need Better Audit Coverage of Attack Surface
We Need Better Audit Coverage of Attack Surface
We Need Better Audit Coverage of Attack Surface
Application Testing Is Often Under Scoped
Application security testing goes well beyond simply running static and
dynamic scanners. For critical or high value applications, or those that
process sensitive data, thorough testing may actually include a
combination of several methods.
Unauthenticated
Automated Scan
Automated
Source Code
Scanning
Blind
Penetration
Testing
Manual Source
Code Review
Authenticated
Automated Scan
Informed Manual
Testing
Automated
Binary Analysis
Manual Binary
Analysis
Vulnerability Discovery-to-Fix Time Is Excessive
• The Verizon 2015 DBIR emphasizes that 99.9 percent of
exploited vulnerabilities were compromised more than a
year after the CVE* was first published.
How would you report to management that a “serious,” likely
exploitable vulnerability was present in your primary public facing
web site or 3rd party hosted portal for more than six months?
What compensating controls could you explain to placate
management that a serious vulnerability could not be exploited?
• HP Security Research reports that organizations in a
study execute an average of six automated static code
scans before critical vulnerabilities are remediated.**
How does this help you explain application risk?
*Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures, cve.mitre.org
**HP Cyber Risk Report 2015, hp.com/go/cyberrisk
SOFTWARE ASSURANCE FRAMEWORKS
AND OPENSAMM
Giving Your AppSec Program the Edge
Software Assurance Frameworks*
*Examples Only; not intended to be a comprehensive list
**OpenSAMM update scheduled for CY2015
2005 2006 2008** 2010 2010 2013
OpenSAMM Design Intent
The Software Assurance Maturity Model (SAMM) is an
open framework to help organizations formulate and
implement a strategy for software security that is tailored to
the specific risks facing the organization. The resources
provided by SAMM will aid in:
• Evaluating an organization’s existing software security practices
• Building a balanced software security assurance program in
well-defined iterations
• Demonstrating concrete improvements to a security
assurance program
• Defining and measuring security-related
activities throughout an organization
Source: Software Assurance Maturity Model
OpenSAMM Business Functions
• Start with the core activities tied to any organization
performing software development
• Named generically, but should resonate with any
developer or manager
Source: Software Assurance Maturity Model
OpenSAMM Security Practices
• From each of the Business Functions, three Security
Practices are defined
• Security Practices cover all areas relevant to software
security assurance
Source: Software Assurance Maturity Model
OpenSAMM in Practice
Example OpenSAMM Scorecard
Level 1
Maturity
Level
Activity
Business
Functions
# Security Practices/Phase A B
Governance
1 Strategy & Metrics 0.5 0 1
2 Policy & Compliance 0.5 0 1
3 Education & Guidance 0 0 0
Construction
4 Threat Assessment 0 0 0
5 Security Requirements 0.5 0 1
6 Secure Architecture 0 0 0
Verification
7 Design Review 0.5 0 1
8 Code Review 0 0 0
9 Security Testing 0 0 0
Deployment
10 Vulnerability Management 1 1 1
11 Environment Hardening 1 1 1
12 Operational Enablement 0 0 0
SAMM Valid Maturity Levels
0 Implicit starting point representing the activities in the Practice being unfulfilled
1 Initial understanding and ad hoc provision of Security Practice
2 Increase efficiency and/or effectiveness of the Security Practice
3 Comprehensive mastery of the Security Practice at scale
Legend
Objective Activity was met.
Objective Activity was not met.
OPENSAMM BENCHMARKING UPDATE
Giving Your AppSec Program the Edge
OpenSAMM Benchmarking Initiative
• Solve data contribution problem
• New data scheme & DB
• Anonymization & trust model
• Who contributes and roles
• Identify an independent data host
• Addressed the need for team-based data
• Help drive wider industry acceptance
Coalition of the Willing
• Aspect Security
• AsTech Consulting
• Denim Group
• Gotham Digital Science
• Security Innovation
• Veracode
• HP (Joining)
• WhiteHat Security (Joining)
• NetSpi (Joining)
Data Model – High Level
Public vs Private
• Public data contributed, with random identifiers for
• Organization the data relates to
• Team within that organization
• Organization that performed the assessment
• Private data – not contributed
• Maintained by assessor
Data Model – High Level (continued)
• Granularity
• Organization versus Team
• Organization / Team Metadata
• Employee/Developer/DevSec count (ranges) (team and org)
• Sector (org)
• Region (org)
• Differing depths of data supported
• Crowd sourced versus centrally sourced
• Inclusive, not exclusive
• Quality of data
• Give you what you need to make your own decisions
What Analysis?
• Ask comparative sector questions
• “I’m a 1+ in this practice – what are other organizations similar
to me?”
• Validate transformation plans, support existing plans
• “We’re looking to be leaders in this practice. We will be ahead
of the market”
• Find specific maturities within teams/orgs
So Where Do You Go From Here?
Potential Approaches
• Conduct limited scope OpenSAMM assessment of
software development activities for certain software
teams
• Security Testing
• Code Review
• Vulnerability Management
• Make high-level prioritization recommendations
• Based upon risk, team, and technologies
• Provide process improvement and automated scanning
transition recommendations
Questions and Answers
Bruce C Jenkins, CISSP
bcj@hp.com
John B. Dickson, CISSP
@johnbdickson
© Copyright 2014 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. The information contained herein is subject to change without notice.
Thankyou
Contact information

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Giving your AppSec program the edge - using OpenSAMM for benchmarking and software security improvement

  • 1. © Copyright 2014 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. The information contained herein is subject to change without notice.
  • 2. Giving Your AppSec Program the Edge Using OpenSAMM for benchmarking and software security improvement Bruce C Jenkins, CISSP bcj@hp.com John B. Dickson, CISSP @johnbdickson
  • 3. Bruce’s Background • USAF 28-year Veteran • AppSec Program Strategist • HP Fortify Security Lead • Electronics / IT Hobbyist & Observer of Social Implications of IT
  • 4. HP Enterprise Security | About • Leading provider of security and compliance solutions built around world class products HP Voltage • HP Enterprise Security portfolio focused on six key areas • Application security • Data security • Endpoint security • Operations security • Security governance, risk, and compliance • Network security
  • 5. John’s Background • Application Security Enthusiast • Helps CSO’s and CISO’s with Application Security Programs • ISSA Distinguished Fellow • Security Author and Speaker
  • 6. Denim Group | Company Background • Professional services firm that builds & secures enterprise applications • External application & network assessments • Web, mobile, and cloud • Software development lifecycle development (SDLC) consulting • Secure development services: • Secure .NET and Java application development & remediation • Classroom secure developer training for PCI compliance • Developed ThreadFix
  • 7. Overview • The Challenge of Securing Applications • Software Assurance Frameworks and OpenSAMM • OpenSAMM Benchmarking Update • Questions and Answers
  • 8. THE CHALLENGE OF SECURING APPLICATIONS Giving Your AppSec Program the Edge
  • 9. Value and Risk Are Not Equally Distributed • Some Applications Matter More Than Others • Value and character of data being managed • Value of the transactions being processed • Cost of downtime and breaches • Therefore All Applications Should Not Be Treated the Same • Allocate different levels of resources to assurance • Select different assurance activities • Also must often address compliance and regulatory requirements
  • 10. True Software Attack Surface Is Often Unknown Software you currently know about Why do these usually merit consideration? • Substantial monetary or brand value flows through them • Compliance requirements (e.g., PCI, HIPAA, FFIEC, etc.) • Formal SLAs with customers • You’ve had one or more previous security incidents (or near misses) What’s normally in this category? • Critical legacy systems • Notable web applications To assess application security, many organizations focus on obvious software resources, but overlook their overall inventory of applications and code from less obvious sources when they analyze their assets.
  • 11. True Software Attack Surface Is Often Unknown To assess application security, many organizations focus on obvious software resources, but overlook their overall inventory of applications and code from less obvious sources when they analyze their assets. Add in the rest of the web applications your organization actually develops and maintains What’s normally in this category? • Critical legacy systems • Notable web applications Why do these usually merit consideration? • Substantial monetary or brand value flows through them • Compliance requirements (e.g., PCI, HIPAA, FFIEC, etc.) • Formal SLAs with customers • You’ve had one or more previous security incidents (or near misses)
  • 12. True Software Attack Surface Is Often Unknown 12 Add in the software you bought from somewhere Why do these usually merit consideration? • Substantial monetary or brand value flows through them • Compliance requirements (e.g., PCI, HIPAA, FFIEC, etc.) • Formal SLAs with customers • You’ve had one or more previous security incidents (or near misses) What’s normally in this category? • Critical legacy systems • Notable web applications To assess application security, many organizations focus on obvious software resources, but overlook their overall inventory of applications and code from less obvious sources when they analyze their assets.
  • 13. True Software Attack Surface Is Often Unknown Why do these usually merit consideration? • Substantial monetary or brand value flows through them • Compliance requirements (e.g., PCI, HIPAA, FFIEC, etc.) • Formal SLAs with customers • You’ve had one or more previous security incidents (or near misses) What’s normally in this category? • Critical legacy systems • Notable web applications Don’t forget mobile and cloud To assess application security, many organizations focus on obvious software resources, but overlook their overall inventory of applications and code from less obvious sources when they analyze their assets.
  • 14. We Need Better Audit Coverage of Attack Surface
  • 15. We Need Better Audit Coverage of Attack Surface
  • 16. We Need Better Audit Coverage of Attack Surface
  • 17. Application Testing Is Often Under Scoped Application security testing goes well beyond simply running static and dynamic scanners. For critical or high value applications, or those that process sensitive data, thorough testing may actually include a combination of several methods. Unauthenticated Automated Scan Automated Source Code Scanning Blind Penetration Testing Manual Source Code Review Authenticated Automated Scan Informed Manual Testing Automated Binary Analysis Manual Binary Analysis
  • 18. Vulnerability Discovery-to-Fix Time Is Excessive • The Verizon 2015 DBIR emphasizes that 99.9 percent of exploited vulnerabilities were compromised more than a year after the CVE* was first published. How would you report to management that a “serious,” likely exploitable vulnerability was present in your primary public facing web site or 3rd party hosted portal for more than six months? What compensating controls could you explain to placate management that a serious vulnerability could not be exploited? • HP Security Research reports that organizations in a study execute an average of six automated static code scans before critical vulnerabilities are remediated.** How does this help you explain application risk? *Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures, cve.mitre.org **HP Cyber Risk Report 2015, hp.com/go/cyberrisk
  • 19. SOFTWARE ASSURANCE FRAMEWORKS AND OPENSAMM Giving Your AppSec Program the Edge
  • 20. Software Assurance Frameworks* *Examples Only; not intended to be a comprehensive list **OpenSAMM update scheduled for CY2015 2005 2006 2008** 2010 2010 2013
  • 21. OpenSAMM Design Intent The Software Assurance Maturity Model (SAMM) is an open framework to help organizations formulate and implement a strategy for software security that is tailored to the specific risks facing the organization. The resources provided by SAMM will aid in: • Evaluating an organization’s existing software security practices • Building a balanced software security assurance program in well-defined iterations • Demonstrating concrete improvements to a security assurance program • Defining and measuring security-related activities throughout an organization Source: Software Assurance Maturity Model
  • 22. OpenSAMM Business Functions • Start with the core activities tied to any organization performing software development • Named generically, but should resonate with any developer or manager Source: Software Assurance Maturity Model
  • 23. OpenSAMM Security Practices • From each of the Business Functions, three Security Practices are defined • Security Practices cover all areas relevant to software security assurance Source: Software Assurance Maturity Model
  • 24. OpenSAMM in Practice Example OpenSAMM Scorecard Level 1 Maturity Level Activity Business Functions # Security Practices/Phase A B Governance 1 Strategy & Metrics 0.5 0 1 2 Policy & Compliance 0.5 0 1 3 Education & Guidance 0 0 0 Construction 4 Threat Assessment 0 0 0 5 Security Requirements 0.5 0 1 6 Secure Architecture 0 0 0 Verification 7 Design Review 0.5 0 1 8 Code Review 0 0 0 9 Security Testing 0 0 0 Deployment 10 Vulnerability Management 1 1 1 11 Environment Hardening 1 1 1 12 Operational Enablement 0 0 0 SAMM Valid Maturity Levels 0 Implicit starting point representing the activities in the Practice being unfulfilled 1 Initial understanding and ad hoc provision of Security Practice 2 Increase efficiency and/or effectiveness of the Security Practice 3 Comprehensive mastery of the Security Practice at scale Legend Objective Activity was met. Objective Activity was not met.
  • 25. OPENSAMM BENCHMARKING UPDATE Giving Your AppSec Program the Edge
  • 26. OpenSAMM Benchmarking Initiative • Solve data contribution problem • New data scheme & DB • Anonymization & trust model • Who contributes and roles • Identify an independent data host • Addressed the need for team-based data • Help drive wider industry acceptance
  • 27. Coalition of the Willing • Aspect Security • AsTech Consulting • Denim Group • Gotham Digital Science • Security Innovation • Veracode • HP (Joining) • WhiteHat Security (Joining) • NetSpi (Joining)
  • 28. Data Model – High Level Public vs Private • Public data contributed, with random identifiers for • Organization the data relates to • Team within that organization • Organization that performed the assessment • Private data – not contributed • Maintained by assessor
  • 29. Data Model – High Level (continued) • Granularity • Organization versus Team • Organization / Team Metadata • Employee/Developer/DevSec count (ranges) (team and org) • Sector (org) • Region (org) • Differing depths of data supported • Crowd sourced versus centrally sourced • Inclusive, not exclusive • Quality of data • Give you what you need to make your own decisions
  • 30. What Analysis? • Ask comparative sector questions • “I’m a 1+ in this practice – what are other organizations similar to me?” • Validate transformation plans, support existing plans • “We’re looking to be leaders in this practice. We will be ahead of the market” • Find specific maturities within teams/orgs
  • 31. So Where Do You Go From Here?
  • 32. Potential Approaches • Conduct limited scope OpenSAMM assessment of software development activities for certain software teams • Security Testing • Code Review • Vulnerability Management • Make high-level prioritization recommendations • Based upon risk, team, and technologies • Provide process improvement and automated scanning transition recommendations
  • 33. Questions and Answers Bruce C Jenkins, CISSP bcj@hp.com John B. Dickson, CISSP @johnbdickson
  • 34. © Copyright 2014 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. The information contained herein is subject to change without notice. Thankyou Contact information