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Windows  Service  Hardening
Applied	
  to	
  Securing	
  PI	
  Interfaces	
  
S4x15	
  
OT	
  Day	
  
Bryan	
  S	
  Owen	
  PE	
  
bryan@osiso8.com	
  
Objec5ves
•  What	
  is	
  Service	
  Hardening?	
  
•  How	
  to	
  harden	
  a	
  PI	
  Interface?	
  
	
  
Service  Hardening  is  a  Defensive  Prac5ce
•  Part	
  of	
  ‘Assume	
  Breach’	
  mindset	
  
•  Strive	
  to	
  limit	
  damage	
  poten?al	
  
Reality:  Services  are  A?rac5ve  Targets
•  Readily	
  discoverable	
  
•  Open	
  network	
  ports	
  
•  No	
  user	
  interac?on	
  
•  Elevated	
  privileges	
  
	
  
Countermeasures
Whitelis?ng	
  approach	
  for:	
  
1.  Specific	
  Privileges	
  
2.  Allowed	
  Communica?on	
  
Service Hardening
ACL
File system
Registry
Network
Windows  Service  Hardening  
Kernel  changes  in  Windows  6.0  (Vista/2008  and  later)
D DD
•  Reduce	
  size	
  of	
  high	
  
risk	
  layers	
  
•  Segment	
  the	
  
services	
  
•  Increase	
  number	
  	
  
of	
  layers	
  
Kernel DriversD
D User-mode Drivers
D
D D
Service
1
Service
2
Service
3
Service
…
Service
…
Service
A
Service
B
Built-­‐in  Users/Groups
•  System	
  
•  Administrators	
  
•  Network	
  Service	
  
•  Users,	
  Local	
  Service	
  
•  Virtual	
  Service	
  Account	
  
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  (NT	
  ServiceServiceName)	
  
Most	
  
Privilege	
  
Least	
  
Privilege	
  
Default  Service  Account  is  ‘System’!
Used	
  in	
  
Stuxnet	
  
Worm	
  
Numerous	
  
aYacks	
  
Access  Control  List  (ACL)  Example
Local	
  System	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
Default:	
  Full	
  control	
  	
  
	
  
…access	
  to	
  everything	
  
Opportuni5es
•  Network	
  access	
  restric?ons	
  
•  Service	
  isola?on	
  
File	
  system	
  and	
  registry	
  permissions	
  
•  Specify	
  required	
  privileges	
  
•  Service	
  accounts	
  
PISNMP  Interface  CASE  Study
Securing	
  PI	
  Interfaces	
  
Harden	
  	
  	
  Harden	
  	
  	
  Harden	
  
Harden	
  	
  	
  Harden	
  	
  	
  Harden	
  
PI  SNMP  Interface  Data  flow
SNMP	
  capable	
  ICS	
  device	
  
PI	
  SNMP	
  Interface	
  Node	
  
(collect	
  and	
  buffer	
  services)	
  
PI	
  Server	
  PINET	
  protocol	
  Harden	
  	
  	
  Harden	
  	
  	
  Harden	
  	
  	
  Harden	
  	
  	
  Harden	
  
SNMP	
  protocol	
  
Harden	
  	
  	
  Harden	
  	
  	
  Harden	
  	
  	
  Harden	
  	
  	
  Harden	
  
Service  Hardening  Scope
1.  Service	
  Recovery	
  Policy	
  
2.  Reduce	
  Privilege	
  
3.  Protect	
  File	
  System	
  
4.  Firewall	
  Service	
  Rules	
  
SCM	
  
Service  Control  Manager  “SCM”  
Configura5on  Tools
Basic	
  
Advanced	
  
Service  Recovery
Service  Process  Privileges
SeChangeNo?fyPrivilege	
  
SeCreateGlobalPrivilege	
  
SeImpersonatePrivilege	
  
SeAuditPrivilege	
  
SeChangeNo?fyPrivilege	
  
SeCreateGlobalPrivilege	
  
SeCreatePagefilePrivilege	
  
SeCreatePermanentPrivilege	
  
SeCreateSymbolicLinkPrivilege	
  
SeDebugPrivilege	
  
SeImpersonatePrivilege	
  
SeIncreaseWorkingSetPrivilege	
  
SeLockMemoryPrivilege	
  
SeProfileSingleProcessPrivilege	
  
SeSystemProfilePrivilege	
  
SeSystemProfilePrivilege	
  
SeTcbPrivilege	
  
SeTimeZonePrivilege	
  
	
  
SeChangeNo?fyPrivilege	
  
System	
   Network	
  Service	
   Minimum	
  Required	
  
Network  Service
No	
  longer	
  full	
  access	
  
•  Reduced	
  privileges	
  
•  Authen?cated	
  Users	
  
Quiz
By	
  default,	
  is	
  “Network	
  Service”	
  allowed	
  to	
  write	
  then	
  execute	
  
from	
  disk?	
  
Hint:	
  
•  “ICACLS	
  %SystemRoot%system32”	
  
•  “ICACLS	
  %SystemDrive%”	
  	
  
Service  ‘Hopping’  with  Built-­‐In  Accounts
•  Shared	
  Logon:	
  Network	
  Service	
  
ACL	
  
Network	
  
Service	
  
Service1	
   Service2	
  
Virtual  Service  Account
•  Creates	
  a	
  security	
  iden?fier	
  based	
  on	
  service	
  name	
  
•  Alterna?ve	
  to	
  sharing	
  built	
  in	
  service	
  accounts	
  
•  NT	
  Serviceservice	
  name	
  
•  Local	
  account	
  
•  Windows	
  networking	
  iden?ty	
  
•  Domain:	
  machine	
  name$	
  
•  Workgroup:	
  anonymous	
  	
  
•  Passwords	
  
•  Automa?cally	
  generated,	
  non-­‐expiring,	
  cannot	
  be	
  locked-­‐out	
  	
  
•  240	
  bytes,	
  cryptographically	
  random.	
  
Enable  Virtual  Service  Account  (example)
C:>sc	
  qsidtype	
  pisnmp1	
  	
  
[SC]	
  QueryServiceConfig2	
  SUCCESS	
  	
  
SERVICE_NAME:	
  pisnmp1	
  	
  
SERVICE_SID_TYPE:	
  NONE	
  	
  
	
  
C:>sc	
  sidtype	
  pisnmp1	
  unrestricted	
  	
  
[SC]	
  ChangeServiceConfig2	
  SUCCESS	
  	
  
	
  
	
  
SID  Types
•  None	
  
No	
  virtual	
  service	
  account	
  SID	
  available.	
  
•  Unrestricted	
  
Access	
  token	
  “NT	
  SERVICEServiceName”	
  	
  
•  Restricted	
  
Access	
  token	
  with	
  RESTRICTED,MANDATORY	
  flags:	
  
•  NT	
  SERVICEServiceName	
  
•  NT	
  AUTHORITYWRITE	
  RESTRICTED	
  
•  Everyone	
  
•  NT	
  AUTHORITYS-­‐1-­‐5-­‐5-­‐0-­‐…..	
  (Logon	
  SID,	
  A	
  unique	
  SID	
  is	
  created	
  for	
  each	
  logon	
  session).	
  
Service  Isola5on  
Grant  permission  to  Virtual  Service  Account
Default	
  ACL	
  
Full	
  Access	
  
Logon:	
  Local	
  System	
  
ACL	
  
NT	
  Servicepisnmp1	
  –	
  r/w	
  
Logon:	
  NT	
  ServicePISNMP1	
  More	
  secure	
  
Any	
  File	
   Program	
  FilesPIPCInterfacesSNMP	
  
PISNMP1	
   PISNMP1	
  
Specify  Required  Privileges
C:>sc	
  sidtype	
  pisnmp1	
  unrestricted	
  	
  
[SC]	
  ChangeServiceConfig2	
  SUCCESS	
  	
  
	
  
C:>sc	
  privs	
  pisnmp1	
  seChangeNoPfyPrivilege	
  	
  
[SC]	
  ChangeServiceConfig2	
  SUCCESS	
  	
  
	
  
C:>sc	
  qprivs	
  pisnmp1	
  	
  
[SC]	
  QueryServiceConfig2	
  SUCCESS	
  	
  
SERVICE_NAME:	
  pisnmp1	
  	
  
PRIVILEGES	
  :	
  seChangeNoJfyPrivilege	
  	
  
	
  
**	
  Restart	
  the	
  service	
  **	
  
Quiz
•  Find	
  a	
  Windows	
  service	
  that	
  has	
  an	
  ‘unrestricted’	
  SID	
  with	
  
minimal	
  privileges.	
  
Hint:	
  
•  use	
  “sc	
  query	
  |	
  findstr	
  SERVICE_NAME”	
  	
  
•  Then	
  “sc	
  qsidtype	
  servicename”	
  
•  And	
  “sc	
  qprivs	
  servicename”	
  (scheduler,	
  spooler,	
  etc…)	
  
Network  Service  Restric5ons
PI	
  SNMP	
  
Port	
  *	
  
PI	
  SNMP	
  
Port	
  *	
  
PI	
  SNMP	
  Port	
  *	
  
Port	
  
5450	
  
Port	
  
53	
  
Define	
  Required	
  Communica?on	
  
Endpoints	
  and	
  Ports	
  for	
  each	
  Windows	
  Service	
  
DNS	
  Server	
  
Port	
  
161	
  
PI	
  Network	
  Manager	
  
Port	
  *	
  
(Proxy	
  for	
  PIBufSS	
  Service)	
  
PI	
  Server	
  
SNMP	
  ICS	
  Device	
  
PI	
  SNMP	
  	
  
Interface	
  
Bind  Windows  Firewall  Rule  to  a  Service
Quiz
•  Why	
  did	
  the	
  PISNMP	
  service	
  need	
  a	
  separate	
  firewall	
  rule	
  for	
  
DNS?	
  
Hint:	
  
•  Browse	
  firewall	
  rules	
  for	
  "Core	
  Networking	
  -­‐	
  DNS	
  (UDP-­‐Out)"	
  
•  (Alt)	
  redirect	
  output	
  to	
  file	
  and	
  search	
  file	
  
“netsh	
  advfirewall	
  firewall	
  show	
  rule	
  name	
  =	
  all	
  verbose”	
  
Ideal  Case:  More  Secure  by  Default
Secure	
  
Configura?on	
  
Maintenance	
  
References
•  Overview	
  of	
  Windows	
  Services	
  (Microsot)	
  
•  Securing	
  PI	
  Interfaces	
  (OSIsot	
  UC2014	
  Learning	
  Day	
  Workbooks)	
  	
  
	
  
Enjoy	
  the	
  rest	
  of	
  OT	
  Day	
  and	
  S4x15!	
  

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Windows Service Hardening

  • 1. Windows  Service  Hardening Applied  to  Securing  PI  Interfaces   S4x15   OT  Day   Bryan  S  Owen  PE   bryan@osiso8.com  
  • 2. Objec5ves •  What  is  Service  Hardening?   •  How  to  harden  a  PI  Interface?    
  • 3. Service  Hardening  is  a  Defensive  Prac5ce •  Part  of  ‘Assume  Breach’  mindset   •  Strive  to  limit  damage  poten?al  
  • 4. Reality:  Services  are  A?rac5ve  Targets •  Readily  discoverable   •  Open  network  ports   •  No  user  interac?on   •  Elevated  privileges    
  • 5. Countermeasures Whitelis?ng  approach  for:   1.  Specific  Privileges   2.  Allowed  Communica?on   Service Hardening ACL File system Registry Network
  • 6. Windows  Service  Hardening   Kernel  changes  in  Windows  6.0  (Vista/2008  and  later) D DD •  Reduce  size  of  high   risk  layers   •  Segment  the   services   •  Increase  number     of  layers   Kernel DriversD D User-mode Drivers D D D Service 1 Service 2 Service 3 Service … Service … Service A Service B
  • 7. Built-­‐in  Users/Groups •  System   •  Administrators   •  Network  Service   •  Users,  Local  Service   •  Virtual  Service  Account            (NT  ServiceServiceName)   Most   Privilege   Least   Privilege  
  • 8. Default  Service  Account  is  ‘System’! Used  in   Stuxnet   Worm   Numerous   aYacks  
  • 9. Access  Control  List  (ACL)  Example Local  System         Default:  Full  control       …access  to  everything  
  • 10. Opportuni5es •  Network  access  restric?ons   •  Service  isola?on   File  system  and  registry  permissions   •  Specify  required  privileges   •  Service  accounts  
  • 11. PISNMP  Interface  CASE  Study Securing  PI  Interfaces  
  • 12. Harden      Harden      Harden   Harden      Harden      Harden   PI  SNMP  Interface  Data  flow SNMP  capable  ICS  device   PI  SNMP  Interface  Node   (collect  and  buffer  services)   PI  Server  PINET  protocol  Harden      Harden      Harden      Harden      Harden   SNMP  protocol   Harden      Harden      Harden      Harden      Harden  
  • 13. Service  Hardening  Scope 1.  Service  Recovery  Policy   2.  Reduce  Privilege   3.  Protect  File  System   4.  Firewall  Service  Rules  
  • 14. SCM   Service  Control  Manager  “SCM”   Configura5on  Tools Basic   Advanced  
  • 16. Service  Process  Privileges SeChangeNo?fyPrivilege   SeCreateGlobalPrivilege   SeImpersonatePrivilege   SeAuditPrivilege   SeChangeNo?fyPrivilege   SeCreateGlobalPrivilege   SeCreatePagefilePrivilege   SeCreatePermanentPrivilege   SeCreateSymbolicLinkPrivilege   SeDebugPrivilege   SeImpersonatePrivilege   SeIncreaseWorkingSetPrivilege   SeLockMemoryPrivilege   SeProfileSingleProcessPrivilege   SeSystemProfilePrivilege   SeSystemProfilePrivilege   SeTcbPrivilege   SeTimeZonePrivilege     SeChangeNo?fyPrivilege   System   Network  Service   Minimum  Required  
  • 17. Network  Service No  longer  full  access   •  Reduced  privileges   •  Authen?cated  Users  
  • 18. Quiz By  default,  is  “Network  Service”  allowed  to  write  then  execute   from  disk?   Hint:   •  “ICACLS  %SystemRoot%system32”   •  “ICACLS  %SystemDrive%”    
  • 19. Service  ‘Hopping’  with  Built-­‐In  Accounts •  Shared  Logon:  Network  Service   ACL   Network   Service   Service1   Service2  
  • 20. Virtual  Service  Account •  Creates  a  security  iden?fier  based  on  service  name   •  Alterna?ve  to  sharing  built  in  service  accounts   •  NT  Serviceservice  name   •  Local  account   •  Windows  networking  iden?ty   •  Domain:  machine  name$   •  Workgroup:  anonymous     •  Passwords   •  Automa?cally  generated,  non-­‐expiring,  cannot  be  locked-­‐out     •  240  bytes,  cryptographically  random.  
  • 21. Enable  Virtual  Service  Account  (example) C:>sc  qsidtype  pisnmp1     [SC]  QueryServiceConfig2  SUCCESS     SERVICE_NAME:  pisnmp1     SERVICE_SID_TYPE:  NONE       C:>sc  sidtype  pisnmp1  unrestricted     [SC]  ChangeServiceConfig2  SUCCESS        
  • 22. SID  Types •  None   No  virtual  service  account  SID  available.   •  Unrestricted   Access  token  “NT  SERVICEServiceName”     •  Restricted   Access  token  with  RESTRICTED,MANDATORY  flags:   •  NT  SERVICEServiceName   •  NT  AUTHORITYWRITE  RESTRICTED   •  Everyone   •  NT  AUTHORITYS-­‐1-­‐5-­‐5-­‐0-­‐…..  (Logon  SID,  A  unique  SID  is  created  for  each  logon  session).  
  • 23. Service  Isola5on   Grant  permission  to  Virtual  Service  Account Default  ACL   Full  Access   Logon:  Local  System   ACL   NT  Servicepisnmp1  –  r/w   Logon:  NT  ServicePISNMP1  More  secure   Any  File   Program  FilesPIPCInterfacesSNMP   PISNMP1   PISNMP1  
  • 24. Specify  Required  Privileges C:>sc  sidtype  pisnmp1  unrestricted     [SC]  ChangeServiceConfig2  SUCCESS       C:>sc  privs  pisnmp1  seChangeNoPfyPrivilege     [SC]  ChangeServiceConfig2  SUCCESS       C:>sc  qprivs  pisnmp1     [SC]  QueryServiceConfig2  SUCCESS     SERVICE_NAME:  pisnmp1     PRIVILEGES  :  seChangeNoJfyPrivilege       **  Restart  the  service  **  
  • 25. Quiz •  Find  a  Windows  service  that  has  an  ‘unrestricted’  SID  with   minimal  privileges.   Hint:   •  use  “sc  query  |  findstr  SERVICE_NAME”     •  Then  “sc  qsidtype  servicename”   •  And  “sc  qprivs  servicename”  (scheduler,  spooler,  etc…)  
  • 26. Network  Service  Restric5ons PI  SNMP   Port  *   PI  SNMP   Port  *   PI  SNMP  Port  *   Port   5450   Port   53   Define  Required  Communica?on   Endpoints  and  Ports  for  each  Windows  Service   DNS  Server   Port   161   PI  Network  Manager   Port  *   (Proxy  for  PIBufSS  Service)   PI  Server   SNMP  ICS  Device   PI  SNMP     Interface  
  • 27. Bind  Windows  Firewall  Rule  to  a  Service
  • 28. Quiz •  Why  did  the  PISNMP  service  need  a  separate  firewall  rule  for   DNS?   Hint:   •  Browse  firewall  rules  for  "Core  Networking  -­‐  DNS  (UDP-­‐Out)"   •  (Alt)  redirect  output  to  file  and  search  file   “netsh  advfirewall  firewall  show  rule  name  =  all  verbose”  
  • 29. Ideal  Case:  More  Secure  by  Default Secure   Configura?on   Maintenance  
  • 30. References •  Overview  of  Windows  Services  (Microsot)   •  Securing  PI  Interfaces  (OSIsot  UC2014  Learning  Day  Workbooks)       Enjoy  the  rest  of  OT  Day  and  S4x15!