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snyk.io
Serverless Security:

What’s Left to Protect?
Guy Podjarny, Snyk
@guypod
snyk.io
About Me
• Guy Podjarny, @guypod on Twitter
• CEO & Co-founder at Snyk
• History:
• Cyber Security part of Israel Defense Forces
• First Web App Firewall(AppShield), Dynamic/Static Tester(AppScan)
• Security: Worked in Sanctum -> Watchfire -> IBM
• Performance: Founded Blaze -> CTO @Akamai
• O’Reilly author, speaker
snyk.io
Serverless

Changes Security
snyk.io
Serverless Is…
Better for some security concerns
Neutral for some security concerns
Worse for some security concerns
snyk.io
When is Serverless 

Better for Security?
snyk.io
Serverless has no Servers!
(that you manage and secure)
snyk.io
Vulnerable

OS Dependencies
“patching”your servers
Less need to worry about…
snyk.io
Heartbleed
snyk.io
Shellshock
snyk.io
snyk.io
Verizon:

“Most attacks exploit known
vulnerabilities that have never been
patched despite patches being
available for months, or even years”
snyk.io
Symantec: 

“Through 2020, 99% of vulnerabilities
exploited will continue to be ones
known by security and IT
professionals for at least one year”
snyk.io
With Serverless, it’s the

platform’s responsibility
And it’s the platform operators core competency
snyk.io
FaaS ~= PaaS
FaaS naturally relies less on OS dependencies
snyk.io
Denial of Service
Less need to worry about…
snyk.io
DoS means a stream of

specific“heavy”requests

take down server(s)(e.g. ReDoS).
In FaaS, there is no long standing server to take down
snyk.io
Auto Scale FTW!
Deal with bad demand just like dealing with good demand
snyk.io
Caveat: 

Concurrent execution limit
AWS Lambda default limit 1000 concurrent function executions pre region
snyk.io
Caveat: 

Resource exhaustion
Back-end resources are often not equally elastic
snyk.io
Caveat: 

Limited in size
100Gbps attack will still take you down…

Consider a DDoS protection solution too.
snyk.io
Caveat: 

Your bill
You still pay for extra traffic…
snyk.io
Long-lived
Compromised Servers
Less need to worry about…
snyk.io
Attackers penetrate 

in stages
snyk.io
Attackers like to lay in wait
snyk.io
FaaS forces Statelessness -

including bad state
Attackers need to repeat attacks many times, risking detection & remediation
snyk.io
Caveat: 

Containers are often reused
A compromised function may still compromise other users
snyk.io
FaaS > PaaS
PaaS Servers are managed, but still live longer
snyk.io
Security in Serverless
Vulnerable OS Dependencies
Denial of Service
Long-lived Compromised
Servers
Better
snyk.io
So attackers will go…
¯_(ツ)_/¯
Right?
snyk.io
When is Serverless 

Neutral for Security?
snyk.io
Permissions
and authorization
Still need to worry about…
snyk.io
Who can invoke your
function?
snyk.io
Who can access code & 

env vars for your function?
snyk.io
If your function was
compromised, what can it do?
snyk.io
AWS Security Policy
snyk.io
AWS Security Policy
Easier
Policy 3Policy 2
Policy 1
Safer
snyk.io
Keep your policies granular
snyk.io
iRobot automates IAM roles
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BVVHzCd8APw
snyk.io
Use Least Privilege Principle
snyk.io
Policies continuously
expand until somebody
adds an asterix
snyk.io
Adding permissions is easy.

Removing permissions is hard
snyk.io
Caveat:

FaaS permissions are limited to

Platform actions
snyk.io
PureSec FunctionShield
snyk.io
Serverless is a bit better

for authorization
if managed properly, which it often isn’t
snyk.io
Securing Data(at rest)
Still need to worry about…
snyk.io
FaaS apps still store data
and that data can be stolen or tampered with
snyk.io
Bad:

FaaS means more state 

outside the server
can no longer keep sensitive data “on the machine”
snyk.io
Good:

FaaS allows more granular

data access controls
Control which functions can access which data
snyk.io
Tips & Tricks
• Encrypt all sensitive persistent data
• Encrypt all sensitive off-box state data
• Minimize functions that can access each data store
• Use separate DB credentials per function
• And control what these credentials should do
• Monitor which functions are accessing which data
snyk.io
Vulnerabilities in 

Your Code
Still need to worry about…
snyk.io
Serverless doesn’t protect

the Application Layer
snyk.io
SQL Injection
Cross Site Scripting
Remote Command Execution
Cross Site Request Forgery
Bad auth logic
…
snyk.io https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_Top_Ten_Project
snyk.io
App Sec Tips
• Dynamic App Sec Testing
• Static App Sec Testing
• Standardize input processing to include sanitization
• Use shared libraries across functions
• Make API Gateway models as strict as possible
• Secure each function independently
• Secure unit tests FTW!
snyk.io
Vulnerable

Application Dependencies
Still need to worry about…
snyk.io
Serverless functions use

Application Dependencies
npm, Maven, PyPI, nuget…
snyk.io
For many functions, the majority 

of code is dependencies
3rd party code can hold vulnerabilities just like 1st party code
snyk.io
Example: Fetch file & store in s3
(Serverless Framework Example)
19 Lines of Code
2 Direct dependencies
19 dependencies(incl. indirect)
191,155 Lines of Code
snyk.io
More code ~= 

More Vulnerabilities
snyk.io
Over time, dependencies grow

stale & vulnerable
snyk.io
snyk.io
The platform manages 

OS Dependencies.



You need to manage 

App Dependencies.
snyk.io
<Shameless Plug>
snyk.io
Snyk for Serverless!

(and PaaS)
snyk.io
Snyk for Serverless!

(and PaaS)
snyk.io
Fix during Dev
snyk.io
</Shameless Plug>
snyk.io
Security in Serverless
Vulnerabilities in your code
Vulnerable App Dependencies
Permissions
Securing Data at rest
Vulnerable OS Dependencies
Denial of Service
Long-lived Compromised
Servers
Better Neutral
snyk.io
Neutral ~= Worse
By eliminating some threats, 

Serverless shifts attacker attention to what’s left
snyk.io
When is Serverless 

Worse for Security?
snyk.io
Serverless doesn’t create 

new security problems.
snyk.io
Serverless means more…


Independent Services
Flexible Interfaces
Use of 3rd party services
including the risks that entails!
snyk.io
Third Party Services
and securing data in transit
More need to worry about…
snyk.io
What data are you sharing?
and how well does the other service manage it?
For each service, worry about…
snyk.io
Is data in transit secured?
Is it using HTTPS? Is it within a VPC? Is it encrypted?
For each service, worry about…
snyk.io
Who are you talking to?
You use an API key, but how do you authenticate them?

Validate HTTPS cert, especially when exiting your network
For each service, worry about…
snyk.io
Do you trust its responses?
If the other service is compromised, can it be used to get to you?
For each service, worry about…
snyk.io
How to store API keys?
Be sure to use a KMS and rotate keys!
For each service, worry about…
snyk.io
For each service, worry about…
• What data are you sharing?
• Is data in transit secured?
• Who are you talking to?
• Do you trust its responses?
• How to store API keys?
snyk.io
Worry about 

1st party services too!
Don’t let your least secure function take down the system
snyk.io
Use

AWS X-Ray

for visibility
Image via Yan Cui’s blog
snyk.io
Attack Surface
mo’ functions, mo’ problems
More need to worry about…
snyk.io
Serverless -> Granularity ->

Flexibility
snyk.io
Flexibility -> Risk
Harder to define what’s “right”, more use-cases to abuse
snyk.io
A function is a perimeter
That needs to be secured
Perimeter Perimeter
Perimeter
Perimeter
Perimeter
snyk.io
Tips & Tricks
• Test every function for security flaws, independently
• Don’t rely on limiting access to a function
• Access controls will change over time, without code changes
• Use shared input/output processing libraries
• Make it easier to process input securely than insecurely
• Limit functionality to what you actually need
• Sometimes you need to work more to let functions do less
• Monitor both individual functions and full flows
snyk.io
Security Monitoring
mo’ functions, mo’ problems
More need to worry about…
snyk.io
Why NOT

deploy a function?
Super easy,(effectively)zero cost
snyk.io
Easy deployment + min cost =
LOTS of functions
Many of which are lightly used
snyk.io
Easy to add,

Hard to remove
snyk.io
Policies tend to expand…
Expanding is easy, contracting is hard
snyk.io
LOTS of functions,

many of which are lightly used,

with overly open policies…
our future?
snyk.io
Every Function 

introduces Risk
snyk.io
No ops cost != 

No cost of ownership
Risk & Management costs still exist
snyk.io
Tips & Tricks
• Consider before you deploy. Do you need this?
• Separate networks/accounts for groups of functions
• Track what you have deployed, and how it’s used
• Minimize permissions up front
• Chaos-style reduce permissions and see what breaks
• Monitor for known vulnerabilities in functions
snyk.io
Security in Serverless
Vulnerabilities in your code
Vulnerable App Dependencies
Permissions
Securing Data at rest
Vulnerable OS Dependencies
Denial of Service
Long-lived Compromised
Servers
Third Party Services
Attack Surface
Security Monitoring
Better Neutral Worse
snyk.io
Tools?
snyk.io
https://thenewstack.io/serverless-roadmaps-monitoring-security-frameworks-tools/
snyk.io
Monitor attacks in the SOCC

(Security Operation Control Center)
PureSec
Twistlock
Protego
snyk.io
Monitor & Fix vulnerable libs 

in Dev & CI/CD
snyk.io
Summary
snyk.io
Serverless dramatically reduces
some top security threats
snyk.io
But…
snyk.io
Security is hard - 

and attackers don’t give up
snyk.io
Serverless shuffles 

security priorities
Previously easy attacks are now hard.

Attackers will move on to the next item on the list

snyk.io
Security in Serverless
Vulnerabilities in your code
Vulnerable App Dependencies
Permissions
Securing Data at rest
Vulnerable OS Dependencies
Denial of Service
Long-lived Compromised
Servers
Third Party Services
Attack Surface
Security Monitoring
Better Neutral Worse
snyk.io
Serverless is defined now.

Let’s build Security in.
Thank You!
Guy Podjarny, Snyk
@guypod

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