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Got database access?
    Own the network!
Bernardo Damele Assumpção Guimarães
Who I am

Bernardo Damele Assumpção Guimarães

   Penetration tester @ Portcullis Computer Security

   Proud father, avid spear-fisher, bad photographer

   Open source enthusiast
       sqlmap lead developer – http://sqlmap.sf.net
       keimpx developer – http://code.google.com/p/keimpx
       Database takeover UDF repository

AthCon 2010, Athens (Greece)                 June 3, 2010   2
Introduction

   Database management systems are powerful
   applications

       Store and interact with data

       Interact with the file system and operating system

           When they can’t by design, you can force them to
           When they can’t due to limited user’s privileges, you can
           exploit them!


AthCon 2010, Athens (Greece)                          June 3, 2010     3
Scenario
   You have got access to a DBMS

       Direct connection – provided account, weak
       passwords, brute-forcing credentials
       SQL injection – web application, stand-alone client,
       cash machine ☺, …

   What to do now other than enumerating data?

       Own the underlying operating system
       Why not even other servers within the network?


AthCon 2010, Athens (Greece)                    June 3, 2010   4
Command execution – State of art
   Microsoft SQL Server
       OPENROWSET can be abused to escalate privileges to
       DBA
       Token kidnapping to escalate privileges to SYSTEM
       Built-in xp_cmdshell to execute commands

   Oracle
       If you find an injection in a function owned by SYS and
       with authid definer, you can run PL/SQL statements
       as SYS
       Many ways to execute commands –
       DBMS_EXPORT_EXTENSION package, abuse Java
       functions, etc.
AthCon 2010, Athens (Greece)                   June 3, 2010   5
Command execution – State of art

   MySQL and PostgreSQL support user-defined
   functions: custom function that can be evaluated in
   SQL statements

   UDF can be created from shared libraries that are
   compiled binary files
       Dynamic-link library on Windows
       Shared object on Linux

   PostgreSQL supports also procedural languages

AthCon 2010, Athens (Greece)                June 3, 2010   6
Code snippet of sys_eval() UDF




        sys_eval() executes a command and returns its stdout
AthCon 2010, Athens (Greece)                        June 3, 2010   7
More than command execution

   Owning the database server is not only about OS
   command execution

   Out-of-band connection between the attacker host
   and the database server

   Database used as a stepping stone to establish this
   covert channel
       TCP: Shell, Meterpreter, VNC – http://metasploit.com
       UDP: DNS tunnel – http://heyoka.sourceforge.net

AthCon 2010, Athens (Greece)                  June 3, 2010   8
Stealth out-of-band connection

   On the attacker host
       Forge a shellcode with msfpayload
       Encode it with msfencode
       Run msfcli with multi/handler exploit

   On the database server
       Create a UDF that executes a payload in-memory
       Execute the UDF providing the payload as a parameter

   Anti-forensics technique – hard to track in a post-
   exploitation forensics investigation
AthCon 2010, Athens (Greece)                   June 3, 2010   9
User-defined function sys_bineval()

   Works in DEP/NX-enabled systems

   Supports alphanumeric-encoded payloads

   Protects the DBMS if the payload crashes
       Shellcode is executed in a SEH frame

   Does not always fork a new process
       Spawns a new thread


AthCon 2010, Athens (Greece)                  June 3, 2010   10
sys_bineval() vs DEP/NX
   Memory area for shellcode is allocated +rwx
       On Windows: VirtualAlloc()
      code = (char *) VirtualAlloc(NULL,
                         4096,
                         MEM_RESERVE|MEM_COMMIT,
                         PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE);

       On Unix: mmap()

      code = mmap(0, page_size, PROT_READ|
                  PROT_WRITE|PROT_EXEC,
                  MAP_SHARED|MAP_ANONYMOUS, 0, 0);

AthCon 2010, Athens (Greece)              June 3, 2010   11
sys_bineval() and alphanum payloads
   Supports alphanumeric-encoded payloads

       Metasploit’s msfencode has alphanumeric encoders to
       encode the payload



   Problem: It is not able to produce pure
   alphanumeric payloads due to get_pc()




AthCon 2010, Athens (Greece)                 June 3, 2010   12
sys_bineval() and alphanum payloads
   Solution:
       Use the BufferRegister option when encoding the
       shellcode
      ./msfencode BufferRegister=EAX –e x86/alpha_mixed …


       Put the payload address in EAX register before
       executing it
       __asm
       {
                MOV EAX, [lpPayload]
                CALL EAX
       }

AthCon 2010, Athens (Greece)                   June 3, 2010   13
sys_bineval() avoids DBMS crashes
   Spawn a new thread
    WaitForSingleObject(CreateThread(NULL, 0,
                        ExecPayload, CodePointer,
                        0, &pID),
                        INFINITE);

   Wrap the payload in a SEH frame
    __try {
          __asm {
                MOV EAX, [lpPayload]
                CALL EAX
          }
    }
AthCon 2010, Athens (Greece)           June 3, 2010   14
Code snippet of sys_bineval() UDF




sys_bineval() executes an alphanumeric-encoded payload in-memory
AthCon 2010, Athens (Greece)                     June 3, 2010   15
Am I really unprivileged?

   Your code, like any other within the DBMS process,
   runs with the privileges of the OS user running the
   DBMS

       Microsoft SQL Server can run as SYSTEM – Uncommon
       PostgreSQL and MySQL usually run as a unprivileged
       user
           MySQL on Windows runs as SYSTEM


   Regardless of the OS user running the DBMS, the
   attacker can escalate privileges

AthCon 2010, Athens (Greece)                  June 3, 2010   16
I have got the power or… ways to get it!

   Some ways to escalate privileges
       Meterpreter has some built-in commands
       (getsystem) and scripts
           Including kitrap0d – Kernel flaw unpatched for ~17 years

       Abuse weak permissions on files, services, named
       pipes, LSASS design, etc.
       Memory corruption bugs
       “All Users” startup file trick

   Got luck? whoami is your friend!

AthCon 2010, Athens (Greece)                        June 3, 2010   17
Want to execute fancier code on DBMS?

   sqlmap has a switch to inject your user-defined
   functions
       Write your own C/ASM code with the DBMS
       development libraries

       Compile as a shared object

       Fire up sqlmap with --udf-inject switch

       The tool will inject the UDFs you want and execute
       them onto the database server at your request

AthCon 2010, Athens (Greece)                    June 3, 2010   18
Direct connection to the database

   From July 2006 to March 2010 sqlmap has been “yet
   another” SQL injection tool

       With some kick-ass features like BOF exploit via SQL
       injection, sys_bineval(), file system access, etc.
       All in all.. One-shot favorite script-kiddies tool™

   Now, it is the only free tool able to takeover
   database servers via either web applications or direct
   connection


AthCon 2010, Athens (Greece)                       June 3, 2010   19
But… Wasn’t it meant to deal with data?
   When you get access to a DBMS, you have good
   chances to own the operating system

   Once you have access to the system you can escalate
   privileges – kernel flaws, weak permissions, etc.

   When you are a high-privileged OS user you can dump
   users’ password hashes and spray them across the
   network perimeter to easily own other machines –
   http://code.google.com/p/keimpx or SSHatter

   You can also pivot traffic through the compromised
   database server to the Corporate network or DMZ


AthCon 2010, Athens (Greece)                 June 3, 2010   20
Questions?




                bernardo.damele@gmail.com
            http://bernardodamele.blogspot.com
                http://sqlmap.sourceforge.net




                Thanks for your attention!

AthCon 2010, Athens (Greece)              June 3, 2010   21

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Got database access? Own the network!

  • 1. Got database access? Own the network! Bernardo Damele Assumpção Guimarães
  • 2. Who I am Bernardo Damele Assumpção Guimarães Penetration tester @ Portcullis Computer Security Proud father, avid spear-fisher, bad photographer Open source enthusiast sqlmap lead developer – http://sqlmap.sf.net keimpx developer – http://code.google.com/p/keimpx Database takeover UDF repository AthCon 2010, Athens (Greece) June 3, 2010 2
  • 3. Introduction Database management systems are powerful applications Store and interact with data Interact with the file system and operating system When they can’t by design, you can force them to When they can’t due to limited user’s privileges, you can exploit them! AthCon 2010, Athens (Greece) June 3, 2010 3
  • 4. Scenario You have got access to a DBMS Direct connection – provided account, weak passwords, brute-forcing credentials SQL injection – web application, stand-alone client, cash machine ☺, … What to do now other than enumerating data? Own the underlying operating system Why not even other servers within the network? AthCon 2010, Athens (Greece) June 3, 2010 4
  • 5. Command execution – State of art Microsoft SQL Server OPENROWSET can be abused to escalate privileges to DBA Token kidnapping to escalate privileges to SYSTEM Built-in xp_cmdshell to execute commands Oracle If you find an injection in a function owned by SYS and with authid definer, you can run PL/SQL statements as SYS Many ways to execute commands – DBMS_EXPORT_EXTENSION package, abuse Java functions, etc. AthCon 2010, Athens (Greece) June 3, 2010 5
  • 6. Command execution – State of art MySQL and PostgreSQL support user-defined functions: custom function that can be evaluated in SQL statements UDF can be created from shared libraries that are compiled binary files Dynamic-link library on Windows Shared object on Linux PostgreSQL supports also procedural languages AthCon 2010, Athens (Greece) June 3, 2010 6
  • 7. Code snippet of sys_eval() UDF sys_eval() executes a command and returns its stdout AthCon 2010, Athens (Greece) June 3, 2010 7
  • 8. More than command execution Owning the database server is not only about OS command execution Out-of-band connection between the attacker host and the database server Database used as a stepping stone to establish this covert channel TCP: Shell, Meterpreter, VNC – http://metasploit.com UDP: DNS tunnel – http://heyoka.sourceforge.net AthCon 2010, Athens (Greece) June 3, 2010 8
  • 9. Stealth out-of-band connection On the attacker host Forge a shellcode with msfpayload Encode it with msfencode Run msfcli with multi/handler exploit On the database server Create a UDF that executes a payload in-memory Execute the UDF providing the payload as a parameter Anti-forensics technique – hard to track in a post- exploitation forensics investigation AthCon 2010, Athens (Greece) June 3, 2010 9
  • 10. User-defined function sys_bineval() Works in DEP/NX-enabled systems Supports alphanumeric-encoded payloads Protects the DBMS if the payload crashes Shellcode is executed in a SEH frame Does not always fork a new process Spawns a new thread AthCon 2010, Athens (Greece) June 3, 2010 10
  • 11. sys_bineval() vs DEP/NX Memory area for shellcode is allocated +rwx On Windows: VirtualAlloc() code = (char *) VirtualAlloc(NULL, 4096, MEM_RESERVE|MEM_COMMIT, PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE); On Unix: mmap() code = mmap(0, page_size, PROT_READ| PROT_WRITE|PROT_EXEC, MAP_SHARED|MAP_ANONYMOUS, 0, 0); AthCon 2010, Athens (Greece) June 3, 2010 11
  • 12. sys_bineval() and alphanum payloads Supports alphanumeric-encoded payloads Metasploit’s msfencode has alphanumeric encoders to encode the payload Problem: It is not able to produce pure alphanumeric payloads due to get_pc() AthCon 2010, Athens (Greece) June 3, 2010 12
  • 13. sys_bineval() and alphanum payloads Solution: Use the BufferRegister option when encoding the shellcode ./msfencode BufferRegister=EAX –e x86/alpha_mixed … Put the payload address in EAX register before executing it __asm { MOV EAX, [lpPayload] CALL EAX } AthCon 2010, Athens (Greece) June 3, 2010 13
  • 14. sys_bineval() avoids DBMS crashes Spawn a new thread WaitForSingleObject(CreateThread(NULL, 0, ExecPayload, CodePointer, 0, &pID), INFINITE); Wrap the payload in a SEH frame __try { __asm { MOV EAX, [lpPayload] CALL EAX } } AthCon 2010, Athens (Greece) June 3, 2010 14
  • 15. Code snippet of sys_bineval() UDF sys_bineval() executes an alphanumeric-encoded payload in-memory AthCon 2010, Athens (Greece) June 3, 2010 15
  • 16. Am I really unprivileged? Your code, like any other within the DBMS process, runs with the privileges of the OS user running the DBMS Microsoft SQL Server can run as SYSTEM – Uncommon PostgreSQL and MySQL usually run as a unprivileged user MySQL on Windows runs as SYSTEM Regardless of the OS user running the DBMS, the attacker can escalate privileges AthCon 2010, Athens (Greece) June 3, 2010 16
  • 17. I have got the power or… ways to get it! Some ways to escalate privileges Meterpreter has some built-in commands (getsystem) and scripts Including kitrap0d – Kernel flaw unpatched for ~17 years Abuse weak permissions on files, services, named pipes, LSASS design, etc. Memory corruption bugs “All Users” startup file trick Got luck? whoami is your friend! AthCon 2010, Athens (Greece) June 3, 2010 17
  • 18. Want to execute fancier code on DBMS? sqlmap has a switch to inject your user-defined functions Write your own C/ASM code with the DBMS development libraries Compile as a shared object Fire up sqlmap with --udf-inject switch The tool will inject the UDFs you want and execute them onto the database server at your request AthCon 2010, Athens (Greece) June 3, 2010 18
  • 19. Direct connection to the database From July 2006 to March 2010 sqlmap has been “yet another” SQL injection tool With some kick-ass features like BOF exploit via SQL injection, sys_bineval(), file system access, etc. All in all.. One-shot favorite script-kiddies tool™ Now, it is the only free tool able to takeover database servers via either web applications or direct connection AthCon 2010, Athens (Greece) June 3, 2010 19
  • 20. But… Wasn’t it meant to deal with data? When you get access to a DBMS, you have good chances to own the operating system Once you have access to the system you can escalate privileges – kernel flaws, weak permissions, etc. When you are a high-privileged OS user you can dump users’ password hashes and spray them across the network perimeter to easily own other machines – http://code.google.com/p/keimpx or SSHatter You can also pivot traffic through the compromised database server to the Corporate network or DMZ AthCon 2010, Athens (Greece) June 3, 2010 20
  • 21. Questions? bernardo.damele@gmail.com http://bernardodamele.blogspot.com http://sqlmap.sourceforge.net Thanks for your attention! AthCon 2010, Athens (Greece) June 3, 2010 21