The document discusses biosafety principles and practices for protecting laboratory personnel and the environment from exposure to potentially infectious biological materials and agents, including determining the risks posed by different agents, assessing those risks, and establishing biosafety levels and containment procedures appropriate to the level of risk.
2. Principles and practices employed to protect
laboratory personnel and the environment from
exposure or infection while working with living
organisms, biological materials, or agents.
Included are any materials that may be potentially
infectious.
Includes recombinant DNA research
What is Biosafety?
3. The “agent” is the what creates risk
Risks to the worker or environment are
often unknown
Determining “acceptable risk”?
Agents and Risks
4. There is always risk!
The risk must be identified
The risk is evaluated
The risk must be measured
Plan to minimize the risk
Assessing Risk
5. Assessment is conducted by a Biosafety
Professional in partnership with and based on
information provided by the Principal
Investigator
The assessment is presented to the
Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC) for
approval
Who Determines Acceptable Risk?
6. Understand the biology of the agent
Susceptibility and transmission within
the host
Hazards associated with equipment
and procedures
Goal:
Provide the highest practical protection
and the lowest practical exposure
Identifying Risk
7. Worst case scenario -What might happen?
Likelihood of an event
Seriousness of the incident
Actions needed to resolve the problems
Evaluating Risk Acceptability
8. Since there is no such thing as “no risk”
“Safe” means risk has been judged acceptable
Judging risk is a subjective- humans make
decisions
Measuring risk is objective- use available
guidelines, data, and documentation
Keep records of how determinations were made
due to subjective nature of the process
What is Acceptable Risk?
9. Sunday, Sep. 20, 2009
Did the Plague Kill Illinois Scientist?
By AP
(AP / CHICAGO) — The University of Chicago Medical Center says the infection that killed a
scientist may be connected to bacteria he researched that causes the plague.
The university said Saturday that its researcher studied the genetics of harmful bacteria including
Yersinia pestis, which causes the illness. He died Sept. 13. His name and age haven't been
released
The medical center says the bacteria he worked with was a weakened strain that isn't known to cause
illness in healthy adults. The strain was approved by the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention for laboratory studies.
An autopsy found no obvious cause of death but did find the presence of the bacteria. More tests are
planned. No other illnesses have been reported.
10. Biosafety in Various Disciplines
Biosafety is related to several fields
ECOLOGY: referring to imported
life forms not indigenous to the
region (Reggie the alligator)
AGRICULTURE: reducing the
risk of alien viral or transgenic
genes, or prions such as
BSE/"MadCow“; reducing the risk
of food bacterial contamination
MEDICINE: referring to
organs or tissues from biological
origin, or genetic therapy
products, virus; levels of lab
containment protocols BSL-1, 2,
3, 4 in rising order of danger
CHEMISTRY: i.e., nitrates in
water, PCB levels affecting
fertility
EXOBIOLOGY: i.e., NASA's
policy for containing alien
microbes that may exist on space
samples - sometimes called
"biosafety level 5"
11. Biosafety in Academic Research
Research Universities:
Promoting safe laboratory
practices, and procedures;
proper use of containment
equipment and facilities;
provides advice on
laboratory design and risk
assesment of experiments
involving infectious agents,
rDNA in-vitro and in-vivo.
Bottom Line: Risk & Containment
12. Biohazard Symbol
Charles Baldwin at
National Cancer
Institute at NIH.
Symbol to be
“memorable but
meaningless” so it
could be learned.
Blaze orange – most
visible under harsh
conditions
14. Biosafety Issues (con’t.)
Respiratory Protection
Bioterrorism and Select agents
Mold and indoor air quality
Occupational safety and health in the use
of research animals
Biohazards used in animal models
18. Biohazardous Materials
Human and Primate Cells, Tissues, and
Body Fluids
Brain Tissue from Demented Patients
Viral Vectors
Replication deficient viruses
19. Biosafety In Microbiological
and Biomedical Laboratories
“BMBL” (acronym)
CDC/NIH Publication
Safety “Guidelines”
Regulations of Institution receives
NIH funding
Code of Practice and “Gold”
Standard in Industry anl
Gold Standard
Clinical & Research Lab.
Biosafety Concepts
HHS Publication No. (CDC) 93-8395
20. The New BMBL
Early print
edition….
Emphasis on “Risk
& Containment”
21. The BMBL continues
to be published by
the
CDC and the NIH
5th edition is now at
the printers
http://www.cdc.gov/od/ohs/bi
osfty/bmbl5/bmbl5toc.htm
Biosafety Concepts
The BMBL
22. Are the NIH Guidelines Optional?
“Guidelines” does not mean
“optional”
They are a term and condition of
NIH funding for recombinant DNA
research.
From Kathryn Harris, NIH, OBA
23. Biosafety Concepts from
the BMBL
Principles of Biosafety
Practice and Procedures
Standard Practices
Special Practices & Considerations
Safety Equipment
Facility Design and Construction
Increasing levels of protection
24. Principles of Biosafety
Biosafety Levels 1-4 (BSL)
Increasing levels of employee and environmental protection
Guidelines for working safely in research & medical
laboratory facilities
Animal Biosafety Levels 1- 4
(ABSL)
Laboratory animal facilities
Animal models that support research
Guidelines for working safely in animal research facilities
25. Biosafety
Concepts
The BMBL
(1) Standard Microbiological Practices
Most important concept / Strict adherence
Aware of potential hazard
Trained & proficient in techniques
Supervisors responsible for:
Appropriate Laboratory facilities
Personnel & Training
Special practices & precautions
Occupational Health Programs
26. Biosafety Issues
The BMBL
(2) Safety Equipment
Primary Containment Barrier
Minimize exposure to hazard
Prevent contact / Contain aerosols
Engineering controls/ equipment
Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)
Gloves, gowns, Respirator, Face shield, Booties
Biological Safety Cabinets
Covered or ventilated animal cage systems
27. Biosafety Concepts
The BMBL
(3) Facility Design and
Construction
Secondary Barrier/ Engineering
controls
Contributes to worker protection
Protects outside the laboratory
Environment & Neighborhood
Ex. Building & Lab design,
Ventilation, Autoclaves, Cage wash
facilities, etc.
30. Biosafety Level-1
Concepts of Biosafety
Biosafety Level-1 (BSL-1 or ABSL-1)
Well characterized agents
Agents not known to cause disease (in healthy human
adults; now healthy immunocompetent adults)
Prophylactic treatment available
Open bench procedures
Animals in open cage system or open environment
(outdoors)
Good laboratory practices
32. BSL-1 Practices
Bench-top work allowed
Daily Decontamination
Manual pipetting
Required Handwashing
Red bag waste
Bio cabinet not required
(unless creating aerosols)
2˚ containment
33. Risk Group 2 Agents
Human or Primate
Cells
Herpes Simplex Virus
Replication
Incompetent
Attenuated Human
Immunodeficiency
Virus
Patient specimens
34. BSL-2 Practices
Concepts of Biosafety
Practices & Procedures
Agents associated w/ human disease
Treatment for disease available
Agent poses moderate hazard to personnel and
environment
Direct contact or exposure
Percutaneous exposure
Scratch, Puncture, Needle stick
Mucus membrane exposure
Eyes, Mouth, open cut
35. BSL-2 Practices
Limited access to lab
when work in progress
Daily decontamination
Mechanical pipetting
Labcoat, safety glasses
and gloves required
Red bag & sharps
containers required
36. BSL-2 Practices (con’t)
Biohaz. Sign posted at
entrance to lab
Label all equipment
(incubators, freezers, etc.)
TC room – negative air flow
Documented training
Baseline serology or pre-
vaccination may be required
37. Risk Group 3 Agents
Human
Immunodeficiency
Virus
Mycobacterium
tuberculosis
Coxiella burnetii
38. Biosafety Level 3
Working in High Containment
Biosafety Level-3 (BSL-3 or
ABSL-3)
Indigenous or exotic agents
Aerosol transmission
Serious health effects
Treatment may or may not exist
39. BSL-3 Practices
Public access NOT permitted
Daily decontamination after spill and
upon completion of experiment
Autoclave required and waste is
disposed at the end of day
Required foot activated handwashing
sink and controls
No sharps unless absolutely necessary
40. BSL-3 Practices (con’t)
Aerosol minimization procedures required
Wrap around disposable clothing is
required. Specialized equipment may be
required depending upon procedures
Biohaz. Signs and labels posted
Air flow from low hazard to high hazard
“Pressure Mapping”
41. BSL-3 Practices (con’t)
Bench top work not permitted
Documented training and personnel competency
certification (for BSL-3 procedures)
Baseline serology
Spills – report immediately and treat accordingly
Vaccinations/post exposure protocols and SOP’s,
Biosafety Manual, Biosafety Officer
43. Biosafety Level-4
Working in High Containment
Biosafety Level-4
Builds on BSL-3/ ABSL-3 practices
Maximum containment facilities
Pressurized Containment Suite
BSL-3 + Class III Biosafety Cabinet
Chemical decontamination showers
Liquid effluent collection / decontamination
No BSL-4 labs exist at UCSD
45. Biosafety Concepts
Working in High Containment
Biosafety Level-4 (BSL-4 or ABSL-4)
Dangerous/exotic agents
Life threatening disease
Aerosol transmission
Agents of unknown risk
of transmission or health affects
No known treatment
47. Bacterial:
76% from clinical labs
8% from research labs
Exposure:
60% acquired from inhalation
Other exposures include:
digestion, sharps, splashes, direct and indirect contact
Laboratory Acquired Infections (LAI)
48. Viral
16% from clinical labs
70% from research labs
32% from animal related activities
Laboratory Acquired Infections
(LAI)
49. General Good Lab Technique
Hygienic Practices
No Smoking, Eating, Applying cosmetics, lip
balm, contacts
Wash hands after procedures
Decontaminate lab bench before and after
work
50. General Operational Practices
Proper attire
Minimum – lab coat, safety glasses, gloves
Plan your work
Know in advance what you are working with
Read available resources (MSDS)
http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/pphb-dgspsp/msds-
ftss/index.html
52. Discussion # 2
Based on what you know about Biosafety
Levels, Practices and Operational Controls,
what are some discussion issues for
conducting Biohazard risk assessments?
How do you approach risks when
addressing a particular organism?
55. Addressing Risk Assessments
What is the organism?
Is it Wild-type, attenuated, irradiated, or
chemically treated? Look at kill data or kill
curves.
What is the max. concentration, volume,
infectious dose?
What is the work space like?
Aerosolizing procedures? How do they contain
their aerosols?
56. Risk Assessment, con’t
Are personnel trained? Do
personnel understand the
organism, infectious dose and
symptoms?
What are their experimental
procedures?
Will they be transporting the
material? Shipping intra, inter-
state or international?
Are they doing tissue culture?
Do they have adequate
containment equipment?
Tom Pugh
57. Risk Assessment, Con’t
Are they doing this
work in-vivo? Have
you consulted and
discussed this with
the Vets and IACUC
to determine special
needs and housing?
Waste issues
addressed?
Pregnancy issues with
the organisms?
58. Risk Assessment, con’t
Do they share their
Tissue Culture room?
Do they have more than
1 Biosafety Cabinet?
Occupational Health
informed and set up to
receive patient or offer
counseling?
59. Accidental Spills
Evacuate area, alert personnel and
cordon off so that aerosols may settle
Don PPE; Cover with paper towels and
apply bleach (1 part bleach : 9 parts water
Allow 15 – 20 min contact time
Wipe up working towards center
Use tongs if broken glass is involved
Is Recombinant DNA involved?
60. First Aid Measures
Splash to Eye or Needlestick Injury
Rinse thoroughly for 15 minutes at the eyewash or
sink
Editor's Notes
The 4th edition of the BMBL (1999) contained the first government writings about security concepts for Select Agents. By inclusion, these ideas can be used by all laboratories that store and use pathogens, particularly those that might be perceived as or used for terrorist purposes.
Now although they are called ‘Guidelines’ we don’t want to give you the impression that they are optional. You can’t pick and choose which sections to follow based on what sounds like a good idea or seems to much trouble to deal with.
The Guidelines are a term and condition of NIH funding for recombinant DNA research and failure to comply with them can affect the funding for recombinant DNA work at an institution.
Before doing a transfection experiment, it is important to determine the concentration of selection reagent required for efficient selection. This is usually achieved by doing a kill curve, which is basically growing cells in various concentrations of the selection reagent. An important point to note when doing a kill curve is that each well must be seeded with a limiting number of cells, so that cell growth does not reach saturation in a short time and thus can be accurately quantitated. We can measure cell growth by measuring the no. of cells or the protein content, though I usually just measure the number of colonies on the plate after a specific time period.