Asp 3.3 sess. i cold war

American Sea Power
Part 3
Unprecedented Global Reach

“…The US ended the Second World War as dominant world power. Her industrial power had
surged by almost 50% since 1939 and was more than equal to all other nations combined. Not
all production had been for armaments. Her people enjoyed the highest standard of living in
the world with an income per head almost twice that of the next-richest group of nations, the
British Commonwealth and Switzerland. She was also the greatest exporter, the greatest
creditor nation and owned three-quarters of the world’s gold. The dollar ruled. As she was the
sole possessor of the atomic bomb her armed might was unchallengeable; and her navy was
greater than the navies of the rest of the world combined.
“Her cultural influence was as wide. Ragtime, jazz, blues, and swing derived from dances
and songs of southern American Negro slaves had swept the post-first-war world and
influenced music everywhere; at the height of the Second World War British ‘black’
propaganda stations transmitted American jazz to attract German military personnel to their
broadcasts, with great success; U-boat crews were especially responsive….”
Peter Padfield, Maritime Dominion and the Triumph of the Free World; Naval Campaigns that Shaped the Modern World, 1852-2001. p. 299.
25
THE ‘COLD WAR’—AND AFTER

“…especially responsive.…
“In historical terms, America after the war occupied the place in the world and in men’s imagination that
Britain had in the period after Napoleon’s defeat in 1815. European visitors to the US were stunned by the
sheer scale of wealth and modernity, just as nineteenth-century visitors to Britain had been overwhelmed….
“Going back two centuries, the Dutch republic, the United Provinces, had drawn similar expressions of
wonderment from foreign visitors during her golden age after the 1650s…
“Freedom of expression is the golden thread running from the Dutch republic and Great Britain at the height
to the United States. It is the symptom of merchant ascendancy spun from trading wealth, its essential
compliments devolved, consultative systems of government and an independent judiciary. These
distinguished the great maritime trading powers from their land-based contemporaries ruled by autocrats or
centralizing bureaucracies employing regulations, extreme censorship and executive justice….
“There could have been no more extreme version of the latter than the Soviet Union, which emerged from
the world war as the second major power after the US. Every area of life was subjected to central control
imposed by terror. In pursuit of Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy, Stalin had liquidated untold millions of his own
people, over twice as many as the Jews and other peoples exterminated by the Nazis, many more than the
number of Soviet soldiers who had died fighting Hitler….
“Such were the origins of the ‘cold war’ between the West and Soviet Russia in the decades after WW II. It
was the age-old conflict between the mutually antagonistic systems of maritime and territorial power,
between commerce and conquest, but given an ideological instead of a dynastic or religious rationale….”
Padfield. pp. 300–302.
25
THE ‘COLD WAR’—AND AFTER

The American Century
“All things change—nothing remains the same.”—Heraclitus of Ephesus, c.535-c.475 BC
What would America do with its unprecedented power?
The League of Nations had been unsuccessful in preventing war. Would America’s United Nations
Organization fare better?”.
How long would the US monopoly of The Bomb last?
Who “started” the Cold War?
jbp

Major Topics
I. Peace?
II. The Uniﬁcation Battle
III. Cold War in Europe
IV. The Far East
V. The USN During the Cold War

Peace?
“America’s hopes for the UN sped her…
demobilization….But the Soviet Union,
making only a token demobilization….”
—Sea Power, p. 842.
United Nations Headquarters in New York City, view from Roosevelt Island, 6 Jan 2014 —Wikipedia

“Even before the surrender of the Imperial Japanese forces the War and Navy Departments
of the US began to feel pressure to ‘bring the boys home.’ The American public, negligent of the
requirements for occupation forces, and unaware of other vast commitments inevitable in a
postwar world, forced upon Congress a swift demobilization which in a few months reduced
the vast ﬁghting forces of the US to near impotence. The Navy hastily arranged ‘Operation
Magic Carpet,’ employing all types of ships in transport service.• Cots and hammocks were
rigged on the hangar decks of carriers, which ran shuttle services across both the Atlantic and
the Paciﬁc.…”
Potter & Nimitz, eds., Sea Power, p. 842.
44:
The Uneasy Peace

“Even before the surrender of the Imperial Japanese forces the War and Navy Departments
of the US began to feel pressure to ‘bring the boys home.’ The American public, negligent of the
requirements for occupation forces, and unaware of other vast commitments inevitable in a
postwar world, forced upon Congress a swift demobilization which in a few months reduced
the vast ﬁghting forces of the US to near impotence. The Navy hastily arranged ‘Operation
Magic Carpet,’ employing all types of ships in transport service.• Cots and hammocks were
rigged on the hangar decks of carriers, which ran shuttle services across both the Atlantic and
the Paciﬁc. In one such crossing the Lake Champlain, crowded with troops, set a speed record
for the Gibraltar-NYC crossing, but even that seemed too slow to the troops aboard and to the
American people at home.”
Potter & Nimitz, eds., Sea Power, p. 842.
44:
The Uneasy Peace

“While the US and her allies disarmed, the Soviet Union resumed the offensive in its
ceaseless war against capitalism. The temporary wartime alliance with the West had been only
a tactical maneuver, Russia’s strategic goals remained unchanged.
“The US, possessing a world monopoly of the atomic bomb, and having few post-war
strategic objectives, depended on the good faith of the victors to maintain the principles
enunciated in the Atlantic Charter. As after WW I, the victorious allies banded together to
establish a world organization to settle international disputes. Planning for such an
organization had been going on for more than a year; the UN ofﬁcially came into existence in
San Francisco on 26 Jun 45….”
44:
The Uneasy Peace
Soviet Expansion and the

United Nations
Ibid.

“While the US and her allies disarmed, the Soviet Union resumed the offensive in its
ceaseless war against capitalism. The temporary wartime alliance with the West had been only
a tactical maneuver, Russia’s strategic goals remained unchanged.
“The US, possessing a world monopoly of the atomic bomb, and having few post-war
strategic objectives, depended on the good faith of the victors to maintain the principles
enunciated in the Atlantic Charter. As after WW I, the victorious allies banded together to
establish a world organization to settle international disputes. Planning for such an
organization had been going on for more than a year; the UN ofﬁcially came into existence in
San Francisco on 26 Jun 45. While the details of the UN Charter are outside the scope of this
book, a few points need to be made clear in view of their importance in connection with the
Korean War. Two representative bodies, the General Assembly and the Security Council, were
established. The General Assembly provided for one vote for each of the member states and
was designed to be a guiding and advisory rather than a policy-making body….”
44:
The Uneasy Peace

United Nations
Ibid.

“…policy-making body. The real strength of the UN was vested in the Security Council of
eleven members [originally, now 15—Big Five, now Russia and PRC in place of Nationalist
China and USSR, are permanent]. Five of these members, the US, the USSR, Great Britain,
France and China, were permanent, the other six being elected in rotation. Each of the ﬁve
permanent members possessed veto power over any action proposed by the Security Council,
which might employ a wide variety of measures for the settlement of international disputes,
ranging from mediation and conciliation at one extreme to ‘such action by air, sea, or land forces
as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace.’
“America’s hopes for the UN sped her process of demobilization and slashed her military
budgets. But the Soviet Union, making only a token demobilization, still had power to move
into areas which could not be contested by the US other than by diplomatic protest or by the
use of the atomic bomb. Short of these extremes there was no practicable way to oppose Soviet
expansion or to hold the USSR accountable for violations of agreements reached in
conferences at Yalta and Potsdam….”
44:
The Uneasy Peace

United Nations
Ibid.

“…and Potsdam. Already a limitation in American strategy was becoming apparent, a
limitation which for several years was to hamper the US in its international relations. To be
effective, particularly against an expansionist state, diplomacy must be backed up with power
in order to enforce the will of the protester, or at least to bring about a reasonable compromise,
which is, of course, a partial defeat for the expanding nation. By the spring of 1946, the US had
too few men under arms to supply its garrison forces and have any force lefts a support for
diplomacy. American public opinion was solidly against more war, even in the face of
outrageously bold Soviet violations of wartime agreements. A good many people in the US
were suffering pangs of conscience over the use of the atomic bombs at Hiroshima and
Nagasaki.…”
44:
The Uneasy Peace

United Nations
op. cit., pp. 842-843.

“…and Potsdam. Already a limitation in American strategy was becoming apparent, a
limitation which for several years was to hamper the US in its international relations. To be
effective, particularly against an expansionist state, diplomacy must be backed up with power
in order to enforce the will of the protester, or at least to bring about a reasonable compromise,
which is, of course, a partial defeat for the expanding nation. By the spring of 1946, the US had
too few men under arms to supply its garrison forces and have any force lefts a support for
diplomacy. American public opinion was solidly against more war, even in the face of
outrageously bold Soviet violations of wartime agreements. A good many people in the US
were suffering pangs of conscience over the use of the atomic bombs at Hiroshima and
Nagasaki. Hence, the Soviet’s calculated risk that the US would not employ this terrible
weapon against its former ally was shrewdly judged, and the US was nearly impotent to take
any effective steps to hold Russia to the terms of the wartime agreements or to keep her from
territorial expansion.”
44:
The Uneasy Peace

United Nations
op. cit., pp. 842-843.

“A study of the globe will reveal that in the over-all strategic picture, Russia enjoys the
advantage of interior position with respect to the areas that were to come into dispute….”
44:
The Uneasy Peace
Russia’s Strategic Picture

“A study of the globe will reveal that in the over-all strategic picture, Russia enjoys the
advantage of interior position with respect to the areas that were to come into dispute. On
both littorals ( li•TOR•ulz) of the Eurasian land mass exist countries over which Russia
sought control. These countries were, generally speaking, weakened [if not devastated!] from
the efforts of WW II, and occupation [twice] or partial occupation had disrupted the
governments and the economies of these countries. Germany, France, Finland, Belgium,
Norway, the Netherlands, and Italy on the Atlantic side had all undergone defeat and
occupation, and the consequent instability of these countries seemed a natural opportunity or
series of opportunities for Russia. On the Paciﬁc side, the Kremlin saw its opportunity in
China and Korea. Korea had been under Japanese rule for years [since 1910]; China had not
been defeated by Japan, but large areas had been occupied; a Communist movement was
already making headway in China, and the Nationalist Government of Chiang Kai-shek was
losing the support of the masses. Into both these coastal areas the USSR planned to extend its
control, but was prepared apparently to draw back when opposed by signiﬁcant force or when
there seemed to be risk of global war….”
44:
The Uneasy Peace
op. cit., p. 843.

“…global war.
“Immediately off both the Atlantic and Pacific shores of this vast continent are situated
island powers which in hands unfriendly to Soviet expansion could serve as great dangers to
any Russian military op against the littoral areas. The British Isles in the Atlantic had already
proved their usefulness as air and naval bases in the war against Germany and Italy. Japan, in
a similar position off the Pacific coast of Eurasia, controls the sea entrances to Russia’s only
Pacific ports; hence bombers based on Japan would offer a serious threat to the Soviet LOC
between European Russia and the coastal cities of Siberia. Both of these island groups off the
continental mass were under the control of powers which the USSR deemed unfriendly to her
national aims. However, lacking a navy which could compete with that of either the US or
Great Britain, the Soviet Union could not readily threaten these island groups as it could the
continental nations of Europe and Asia.
“Another opportunity for Russia existed in the Middle East…”
44:
The Uneasy Peace
Ibid.

“…global war.
“Immediately off both the Atlantic and Pacific shores of this vast continent are situated
island powers which in hands unfriendly to Soviet expansion could serve as great dangers to
any Russian military op against the littoral areas. The British Isles in the Atlantic had already
proved their usefulness as air and naval bases in the war against Germany and Italy. Japan, in
a similar position off the Pacific coast of Eurasia, controls the sea entrances to Russia’s only
Pacific ports; hence bombers based on Japan would offer a serious threat to the Soviet LOC
between European Russia and the coastal cities of Siberia. Both of these island groups off the
continental mass were under the control of powers which the USSR deemed unfriendly to her
national aims. However, lacking a navy which could compete with that of either the US or
Great Britain, the Soviet Union could not readily threaten these island groups as it could the
continental nations of Europe and Asia.
“Another opportunity for Russia existed in the Middle East. The large deposits of oil in Iran
and Iraq offered tempting bait to any nation whose civilian or military components were large
oil consumers. Again however these areas are coastal in a large sense. They lie within the
reach of the Med, the Red Sea, and the Persian Gulf, and at somewhat greater distance from
the Indian Ocean.”
44:
The Uneasy Peace
Ibid.

“In this strategic situation, with the USSR in ﬁrm and expanding control over the center of
the largest land area in the world, with the littoral countries weakened in military power and
torn by internal dissension, the Western Powers—especially the US and Great Britain—sought
a means of living with this new threat. It was not however immediately recognized as a threat.
Large numbers of people both in and out of government in the two countries felt that Russia
was merely pursuing legitimate defensive policies to protect herself against ‘encirclement’ by
unfriendly powers. Also both countries were more concerned with domestic policies than with
large, complex, international problems. The Labor Government in the UK, under PM Clement
Attlee, was devoting a great deal of its energy to nationalization of basic industries—railroads,
coal, and steel. In the US, there was a rush to resume ‘normal’ life, by which people meant life
as it had existed before the war.”
44:
The Uneasy Peace
The Weakness of the

Western World
op. cit., pp. 843-846.

The Unification
Battle
How to direct the greatest
military power ever
assembled.— jbp

“With demobilization came about a reappraisal of the defense establishment of the US.
Uniﬁcation had long been advocated by many military leaders, and the shrinking of budgets
to peace-time levels caused a scramble for each service to get more than its share at the
expense of the others. The Navy in particular came in for criticism. The maintenance of ships,
or even their preservation in ‘mothballs’…”
44:
The Uneasy Peace
op. cit., p. 846.
The Uniﬁcation Battle

“With demobilization came about a reappraisal of the defense establishment of the US.
Uniﬁcation had long been advocated by many military leaders, and the shrinking of budgets
to peace-time levels caused a scramble for each service to get more than its share at the
expense of the others. The Navy in particular came in for criticism. The maintenance of ships,
or even their preservation in ‘mothballs’ was looked upon by some members of Congress and
some of the public as needlessly extravagant, for what would ever be the use of naval ships
again? Great Britain, which possessed the next largest navy—only one-third the size of that of
the US—was a friend and ally. Russia had no navy to speak of; hence there was no use for a
large navy in the US.
“Such arguments revealed a lack of understanding of the purposes of a navy; they suffer
from the common layman’s misconception that a navy exists primarily to ﬁght another. The
better informed critics of the Navy pointed out that while we would need naval forces to keep
communications open and to deny an enemy the use of his communications, this was all that a
navy could do in a future war which would inevitably be against a land power.…”
44:
The Uneasy Peace
op. cit., p. 846.

“…land power. Unless a navy could make its offensive strength felt against a large land mass,
it should properly be subordinated to those services which could strike at the heart of a
continent,
“Thinking along these lines, recognizing the role played by the Army Air Forces • in WW II,
and attempting to integrate the place of the atomic bomb in strategic and tactical planning
brought about a desire for the reorganization of the armed forces of the US. The idea of
reorganization received special impetus from the consideration of the strategic picture existing
at the end of WW II. The institution of the JCS, which had directed the war against the axis
powers, was looked upon as too much a case of strategy by committee. Hence, General of the
Army Dwight D. Eisenhower,• Army Chief of Staff, and others in the US Army sought the
establishment of a single overall chief of staff and a single Department of National Defense in
which the existing services should be made three, Army, Navy, and Air Force, but reduced to
subordinate levels and headed by Assistant Secretaries—Asst SecDef for the Army, Asst
SecDef for the Navy, and Asst SecDef for Air.…”
44:
The Uneasy Peace
Ibid.

“…for Air. This scheme, which won the support of President Truman, was strongly opposed
by the SecNav James V. Forrestal.• Thus began the great ‘Unification Battle’ that was to rage
from this time until the outbreak of the war in Korea pushed it into the background. The story
is exceedingly complex, and unfortunate intrusion of personalities sometimes caused the
issues to be forgotten in a spate of name-calling.•
“The battle grew out of two fundamentally different concepts of war. The view of the Army
was in many respects close to that of its air wing, and was based on the experiences of the
army leaders who had borne their heaviest responsibilities in the war in Europe. Here they
had fought against a land mass where large bodies of troops faced each other on vast fronts
and where the effort by air was primarily directed to strategic bombing, that is, to hitting the
enemy’s industrial targets far behind the lines and thus reducing his capacity to fight. Most
high-ranking naval officers had had their most important experience in the Pacific in a war of
movement over vast distances against an island empire and against objectives whose area and
whose garrisons were tiny in comparison to those encountered in Europe, and where tactical
air support played an enormous part.…”
44:
The Uneasy Peace
Ibid.

“…enormous part. This is not to say that either group was too narrow to be able to appreciate
and understand the war as it had been fought on the other side of the globe, but intellectual
understanding is one thing and wholehearted acceptance is another. All were convinced that
the most likely—indeed, the only possible—enemy was Soviet Russia, or a Russian-inspired
satellite, but methods proposed for countering the threat differed. The Army and its air
component, the Army Air Forces, felt that the only realistic possibility was to plan on the basis
of an all-out war with Russia. The US obviously could not hope to match the number of
soldiers that Russia could place in the ﬁeld, but the advantage in troops could be neutralized
by strategic bombing, for if the factories behind the lines could be knocked out, the huge
armies of the Soviet (200 divisions or more) could not long be supported in the ﬁeld. This
strategic bombing concept was based largely on the fact of American possession of the atomic
bomb which, it was believed, would prove a powerful deterrent to war.…”
44:
The Uneasy Peace
op. cit., p. 847.

“… to war.
“The Navy’s point of view,• shared by
SecNav Forrestal and CNO Nimitz, was
that strategic bombing, even with the
atomic bomb, could not alone win a major
war.…”
44:
The Uneasy Peace
op. cit., p. 847.

“…major war. Sooner or later, ground forces would have to move in, and they would require
support of two kinds: direct air support in battle, usually called tactical support, and logistic
support, which would require shipping and protection of shipping. The navy men also felt
that the danger was not so much that a big war would break out in the immediately
foreseeable future, but that the US would be unable to oppose the piecemeal taking over of
countries on the littorals of Eurasia having nothing between protest and the atomic bomb as a
counter to this kind of move. Mr Forrestal opposed the idea of a single Chief of Staff on the
grounds that the officer who filled this post would be in the position of being oversold on the
potentialities of one service only, and that the consequent loss of flexibility would embarrass
or even cripple the war potential of the US.
“Out of these different concepts came differing methods of planning for another war.
“The airmen were convinced of the deterrent effect of the atomic bomb and the effectiveness
of strategic bombing. They prepared to assume the Navy’s traditional role of the First Line of
Defense, even though almost all of their planning was offensive or at least retaliatory in
nature.…”
44:
The Uneasy Peace
Ibid.

“…in nature. They pinned their faith in the B-36 bomber, which was capable, they said, of
delivering an atomic bomb anywhere in the world and of bombing from 40,000 feet. In their
opinion the major portion of the defense funds of the US should be devoted to the air arm
with the other services substantially reduced.…”
44:
The Uneasy Peace
Ibid.

“…substantially reduced.
“The view of Secretary Forrestal was that there should be ‘balanced forces.’ This phrase,
unfortunately, was subjected to almost immediate misunderstanding. His critics leaped to the
conclusion that he meant that each service should get an equal pard of the defense budget.
This was far from Forrestal’s thinking. By ‘balanced forces’ he meant balanced in capability, so
that each would be able to function capably and to coordinate with the others. In this manner,
he hoped to achieve ﬂexibility and the capability of responding to threats in ways of the
nation’s own choosing, without having to depend on the all-out destructiveness of atomic
warfare.
“Inter-service rivalry aggravated, and in some ways obscured, the points at issue between
the armed forces. Air Force enthusiasts sought control over all aviation, no matter how used.
…”
44:
The Uneasy Peace
Ibid.

“…how used. Whether their view was the simple one that each service should have control of
all weapons in its particular ﬁeld—the Air Force, all air; the Army, all ground troops; and the
Navy, all ships—or whether they feared that air expenditures by the Navy and the Army
would offer budgetary competition or needless duplication and expense, their view found
widespread support both in Congress and among the public.
“The idea of relying on the Air Force to win the next war by strategic bombing was as
appealing to the public as it was appalling to the navy leaders.• The Navy felt that such a
rigid strategic plan would invite disaster and that it would also make it impossible for the
naval establishment to carry out its mission. The Navy needed to duplicate or at least adapt
two types of military force which would come under the control of other services if the Air
Force view prevailed. It needed a highly mobile body of troops,• trained in sea-to-land ops,
which could be used to seize, protect, and garrison bases needed for naval ops, and to protect
American lives and interests in troubled parts of the world. To this end the Marine Corps had
been formed and its achievements had become a part of the national heritage of the US.…”
44:
The Uneasy Peace
op. cit., pp. 847-848.

Joe Rosenthal’s iconic picture (23 Feb 45) forever enshrined the
sacriﬁces of the USMC in the Paciﬁc war—jbp

“…the US. The other requirement of the Navy was for an air arm which would be under naval
control and which could be used to support the naval mission.1
“At least in the mind of the general public, there was never any idea of entirely doing away
with the Marine Corps. But it was felt that there should not be two land armies in the US with
identical missions. This criticism resulted from the widespread employment of marines on the
division scale in the Paciﬁc and on the multidivision scale on Iwo and Okinawa. Army leaders
tended to feel that such employment of marines was a usurpation of the army’s proper
function. In the same way, Air Force enthusiasts felt that the air arm properly belonged to
them and that the Navy was stepping out of line in its employment of air. Although the Navy
perhaps had the need of carrier-based air for its ASW ops in mid-ocean, the Air Force argued
that it should not have control of land-based air, whatever its mission, or of combatant air,
even carrier-based, that was not directed against strictly naval targets.…”
44:
The Uneasy Peace
op. cit., p. 848.
______
1 The Navy had fought this battle during WW II when the Army sought to control antisubmarine patrols flown from the
east coast of the US (see Chapter 30) [see USN in WW II, part I, session v., “The Atlantic War.”].

“…naval targets.
“To understand the Navy’s objections, we must review its three main functions—to defend
American territory against sea-borne attack, to defend merchant ships against enemy
warships, and to carry the attack with its logistic requirements across the sea to an enemy.
Each of these missions requires a degree of command of the sea; at times this command may
be tenuous and strictly limited in area, as in the case of a convoy whose escort commands only
the water through which the convoy is passing; at other times it is much broader. However if
signiﬁcant strategic use is to be made of the oceans of the world, and if they are to be used as
highways of attack, it follows that the nation desiring to employ these weapons must exercise
a substantial degree of command of the sea.
“To a large extent since WW I, and to some extent even earlier, command of the sea has
become three-dimensional. When Farragut reportedly damned the torpedoes in Mobile Bay,
he was at least recognizing an effort to dispute command of the sea by means of underwater
attack by moored mines. Blake, St. Vincent, Decatur, Nelson and the rest had to contend only
with the surface.…”
44:
The Uneasy Peace
Ibid.

“…the surface. But mines, torpedoes and especially submarines [beginning in 17 Feb 1864
with CSS Hunley] have greatly complicated the problem of the navy that seeks command of
the sea in wartime, for command must also extend to the sub-surface. In the same way, the
airplane has extended the problem to the air, and the air and sub-surface may be exploited on
a hit-and-run basis by a force that does not command the surface. But a nation wishing to use
the sea for large-scale transport of strategic materials must command the surface, the sub-
surface, and the air above the surface to such a degree that the losses the enemy can inﬂict are
kept to an acceptable minimum. This command not only requires a high degree of ﬂexibility in
the employment of naval weapons, but also requires that it adopt weapons traditionally
assigned to other services, notably troops and a/c, if it is to accomplish its role. It needs troops
to seize and hold bases required for ops, and it needs a/c to be able to dispute the enemy’s
command of the air. In addition, the a/c is one of the best instruments for detecting SSs. To
this end, not only carrier-based air is needed, but also land-based air for detection of SSs and
for searching for other naval targets.…”
44:
The Uneasy Peace
Ibid.

“…naval targets. To hold a CVA near a coast to do a task that might be accomplished by a NAS
(Naval Air Station) is to negate the chief advantage of a carrier; its mobility.
“For these reasons the Navy opposed the unification billing pushed by the Army and its air
component. Yet there were many things to be said for unification. Even as recently as WW II
there had been difficulties arising from the lack of unified command. Presumably the new bill
would preclude such experiences. It was possible through unification moreover to eliminate
considerable waste and duplication among the services.”
44:
The Uneasy Peace
op. cit., pp. 848-849.

“After a long and sometimes bitter debate, Congress passed the National Security Act of
1947, which became law on 26 Jul. The Act specified a sweeping reorganization of the defenses
of the US. It provided for three super-military policy boards. It established the National
Military Establishment2 with three basic components: the Department of the Army,• the
Department of the Navy,• and the Department of the AirForce.• It specified the functions of
the JCS and provided for inter-service staffs and boards for coordinated planning.
“Under the Act the National Security Council (NSC) became the nation’s top policy body. Its
membership consisted of the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the SecDef
and several other officers of policy boards. Its duties were:”
44:
The Uneasy Peace
op. cit., p. 849.
The National Security Act

of 1947
______
2 Replaced in 1949 (Defense Reorganization Act) by a regular executive department, the Department of Defense (DoD).
(1) to assess and praise the objectives, commitments and risks of the US in relation to our actual
and potential military power, in the interest of national security, for the purpose of making
recommendations to the President in connection therewith; and
(2) to consider the policies on matters of common interest to the departments and agencies of the
Government concerned with the national security, and to make recommendations to the President in
connection therewith.3
3 National Security Act of 1947, Washington, 1953, 2.

“The Central Intelligence Agency, also provided in the Act, placed high-level strategic
intelligence under a single direction. The National Security Resources Board4 was established
to coordinate plans for use of the nation’s natural and industrial resources in time of war.
“By the terms of the National Security Act, the National Military Establishment (later DoD)
was to be headed by a SecDef, who would sit in the President’s Cabinet. Heading the sub-
departments were the Secretaries of the Army, of the Navy, and of the Air Force, who would
not be of Cabinet rank. The Act further speciﬁed that the Air Force be given responsibility for
strategic bombing and for combat ops in support of land armies. The Navy retained not only
its carrier aviation but also its land-based reconnaissance wing and a Marine Corps of limited
size. The Army was left its traditional functions virtually unchanged.
“SecNav Forrestal became the ﬁrst SecDef and set about administering the law that he had
helped to keep within reasonable bounds despite the efforts of extremists.”
44:
The Uneasy Peace
Ibid.
The National Security Act

of 1947
______
4 Replaced in the Reorganization of 1953 by the Office of Defense Mobilization, which in 1958 merged with the Federal
Civil Defense Agency to form the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization.
connection therewith.3

“Matters rested in fairly peaceable fashion until bitter acrimony again broke out among the
services in 1948. The quarrel seems to have originated in the projected budget, which was set
at $16 billion for defense. Air Force spokesmen charged that the Navy was attempting to edge
its way into the field of strategic bombing by requesting new larger CVAs and CVA a/c
capable of transporting the atomic bomb. Naval supporters responded with an attack on the
B-36, on which the Air Force was basing its strategy.• A series of articles in the popular
magazines succeeded in selling the public the idea of an easy victory through strategic atom
bombing. In the naval view, this projected planes not only inflexible but was nearly suicidal.
Tempers flared. The B-36 was attacked as lacking the capability to press home an attack. Air
Force supporters retorted that the CVA was obsolete, that it was too vulnerable to land-based
air, to SSs, and to weather conditions. So the arguments raged. SecDef Louis Johnson, who had
succeeded Forrestal, accepted the Air Force view in the main and added fuel to the flames by
his decision to cancel the 60,000 CVA United States, then under construction at Newport News.
…”
44:
The Uneasy Peace
Ibid.
“The Great Debate”

“…Newport News. Tempers grew so hot that this so-called “Great Debate” [Potter is being
diplomatic here. The press and most histories called it “the Revolt of the Admirals.” But
Potter’s co-editor • was one of the “revolting” admirals!] that it seemed to many that the
whole affair was out of hand. The debate was ended, as far as the public was concerned, with
the dismissal of the CNO, Adm Louis Denﬁeld,• and his replacement by Adm Forrest P.
Sherman, but the dispute was effectively ended only by the outbreak of war in Korea, with its
immediate problems and more liberal budgets.”
44:
The Uneasy Peace
“The Great Debate”
op. cit., pp. 849-850.

Cold War in Europe
Berlin came to be the focus of the
East-West struggle for mastery in
Europe—jbp
C-47 Skytrains unloading at Tempelhof Airport during the Berlin Airlift.—Wikipedia.

“It is now time to back-track in order to examine in detail the strategic picture of the world.
Even before the end of WW II it was apparent that there would be every prospect of trouble
with Russia, conceivably leading to war between the US and the Soviet Union. The US had
stood by helplessly as the Soviets expanded to the Baltic and into the Balkans and threatened
the Middle East. The ﬁrst major trouble came over Iran, but serious consequences were
averted through action of the United Nations.• In the spring of 1947 President Truman
proclaimed a new policy in regard to US relations with Russia, a policy of helping free peoples
everywhere ‘against aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them totalitarian regimes’ and
‘of supporting who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.’
“Although the Soviet Union was not mentioned by name, there was no doubt that this policy
was directed against her. At this time, Greece and Turkey were both threatened by Soviet
aspirations. In Greece civil war was in progress, the rebels receiving substantial aid from
Yugoslav sympathizers across the border and even aid from the Yugoslav government itself.
…”
44:
The Uneasy Peace
The Truman Doctrine

and the Marshall Plan
op. cit., p. 850.

“…government itself. At that time Yugoslavia was considered to be a Russian puppet
government acting with the approval of and in support of the Russian Politburo. Russia also
demanded of Turkey the rights to—indeed complete control of—the Dardanelles. The Truman
Doctrine effectively served notice on the Soviet Union that the US would clearly support
Greece and Turkey against any expansion by Communist forces into their territory. American
supplies and munitions and American military advisers were sent to aid the Greek
government.Visits of American naval forces to the Med, begun in 1946, were stepped up to
serve as a diplomatic show of force. Again serious trouble was avoided.
“In early Jun 1947 Secretary of State George C. Marshall,• speaking at Harvard, proposed a
scheme for reconstruction of European countries through their own efforts, supported by
American economic aid. This program came to be called the Marshall Plan….This plan, which
at ﬁrst met with enthusiastic response, was later viewed with a certain degree of hostility in
Congress. The USSR denounced the plan as American Economic aggression and not only
refused to participate but also kept any of its satellites from accepting American assistance.”
44:
The Uneasy Peace
Ibid.
The Truman Doctrine

and the Marshall Plan

“Ever since the end of WW II Czechoslovakia had been governed by coalition governments,
which despite Soviet inﬂuence had maintained respect for civil liberties. Then in a sudden
coup d’ état in 1948, the Communist Party under PM Klement Gottwald seized complete
control of the Czech government.…”
44:
The Uneasy Peace
Ibid.
Coup in Czechoslovakia

“…Czech government. This coup, the ﬁrst seizure after WW II by Communists of a country not
under Red Army domination served to awaken many people the ferocity and determination of
Communist aggression.
“Because of this action and because of deteriorating relationships with Russia, American
defense ofﬁcials began to press for a revival of Selective Service and also for universal military
training (UMT). These two proposals touched off bitter Congressional debate. At length in Jun
48, the Selective Service Act was passed, but Congress balked at UMT. The Selective Service
Act was later rewritten to act as a substitute for UMT by requiring service in the reserve
components in addition to prescribed tours of active duty.”
44:
The Uneasy Peace
Ibid.
Coup in Czechoslovakia

“The most dangerous situation to confront the US since the end of WW II occurred in Jun 48,
when to all intents and purposes, the USSR clamped down a blockade on Berlin, preventing
all material from entering or leaving by road, rail, or canal. This blockade resulted partly from
the division of Germany into four zones of occupation after WW II….”
44:
The Uneasy Peace
op. cit., p. 851.
The Berlin Blockade

“The most dangerous situation to confront the US since the end of WW II occurred in Jun 48,
when to all intents and purposes, the USSR clamped down a blockade on Berlin, preventing
all material from entering or leaving by road, rail, or canal. This blockade resulted partly from
the division of Germany into four zones of occupation after WW II. The Russian Zone
surrounded all of Berlin, but the capital itself was under quadripartite rule • in a manner
similar to that of occupied Germany itself….”
44:
The Uneasy Peace
op. cit., p. 851.
The Berlin Blockade

“…grave problem. Russia, obviously making a major bid for supremacy in Germany, was
forcing a show of strength. On the reaction of the Western Powers depended not only the fate
of Germany but also that of the free world. It was clear that if the free nations backed down
now, Russia would assume they were acting from fear and would proceed to further and even
more serious aggression. The challenge was clear. How could the West respond? Secretary
Forrestal outlined the alternatives:
“The second of these alternatives was adopted, but rather than resort to force by sending an
armed train or escorted truck convoy overland, an airlift was attempted….”
44:
The Uneasy Peace
Ibid.
The Berlin Blockade
1. Decide now to withdraw from our position in Berlin, in concert with the other Western powers, at an
appropriate time in the future, presumably when a constituent assembly [one empowered to write a
constitution] for a Western German government is called on 1 Sept, and plan accordingly.
2. Decide at this time to retain our position in Berlin by all possible means, including supplying Berlin by
convoy or using force in some other manner, such action to be only as a last resort after utilizing all
diplomatic and other means without force to avoid war, but accepting the possibility of war as a
consequence if necessary.
3. To maintain our unprovocative but firm stand in Berlin, utilizing first every local means, and
subsequently every diplomatic means to obtain recognition and assertion of our rights while postponing
ultimate decision to stay in Berlin or withdraw.5
______
5 Walter Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries, (New York, 1951), 453.

“…was attempted. This proved successful. Soon large quantities of foodstuffs, coal and other
supplies were being delivered to the former German capital on a round-the-clock schedule by
British and American planes.• The Russians did not oppose the airlift in any serious way
although Russian ﬁghters made dry runs on airlift planes. The American and British pilots
were careful to stick to the routes prescribed in the original agreement on Berlin in 1945. The
Soviets clearly did not wish to resort to force unless the Western Powers used it ﬁrst as would
be inevitable if an armed convoy were sent through. USN as well as USAF planes were used in
the airlift to supply foodstuffs, medical supplies, and coal. The blockade came to an end early
in May 1949, when the Western Powers and Russia agreed to hold another session of the
Council of Foreign Ministers to reconsider the German problem. In the 11 months of the
blockade the Anglo-American airlift transported 2,343,315 tons of supplies.”
44:
The Uneasy Peace
Ibid.
The Berlin Blockade

“As the cold war progressed from insult and viliﬁcation to such dangerous phases as the
Berlin Blockade, the US and several of the western European nations began to realize that their
national security was at stake and that military cooperation between free countries was
essential to combat the Soviet threat. Hence in 1949 the US and eleven other nations agreed
upon a treaty, the North Atlantic Pact, by which it was provided that the member nations
would consider an attack on any one of them as an attack against them all. The signatory
nations were Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the US. The year after its inception
NATO invited Greece and Turkey to become members.
“The language of the treaty had to be carefully chosen to keep within the limitations of the
UN Charter, especially Article 53, which provides for UN action in times of aggression. When
Russia later charged that the North Atlantic Pact violated Article 53, Secretary of State Dean
Acheson pointed out the provisions of Art. 51 and 52 which allow each member state to take
whatever action it deems necessary in self-defense.…”
44:
The Uneasy Peace
op. cit., pp. 851-852.
The North Atlantic

Treaty Organization

“…self-defense. Another hurdle that the pact had to face was ratiﬁcation procedure in the US
Senate. Some members charged that the decision on declaring war would no longer be up to
Congress but would rest with any of the signatories who faced themselves attacked. In spite of
they opposition, the Senate gave consent to the treaty in Jul 49, by a vote of 82-13.
“The teeth of the pact are in Art. 5, which states:
“Provisions of the treaty called also for a command organization of military forces to be
made available for military ops as necessary. The employment of this force was to be directed
by a council known as the North Atlantic Council, which would sit permanently in Paris. This
council represented the political planning level and was to be responsible for grand strategic
direction. Below the council came the military level, which was to be directed by the Military
Committee through its executive agency, the Standing Group.…”
44:
The Uneasy Peace
op. cit., p. 852.
The North Atlantic

Treaty Organization
The parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be
considered an attack against them all. And consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs,
each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Art. 51 of the
Charter of the UN, will assist the party so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with
other parties, such actions as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain
the security of the North Atlantic area..

“…Standing Group. The Standing Group, composed of representatives of the chiefs of staff of
France, the UK and the US, would coordinate and integrate defense plans originating in the major
NATO commands. The basic commands were Allied Command Europe, Allied Command Atlantic,
Allied Command Channel, and the Canada-US Regional Planning Group.
“To implement the program, the US passed a billion dollar grant-in-aid for military equipment
needed under the proposed arrangement. At a meeting in London in May 50, it was agreed that in
order to avoid duplication of effort, each member nation should concentrate on a part of the
defense machinery. Great Britain, for example, was to concentrate on jet tactical a/c and naval
vessels; France, on light artillery and infantry weapons; and the US, nonstrategic bombers and
naval forces. In Dec 50,• Gen of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower was appointed Supreme Allied
Commander Europe (Saceur), and in Jan 52,• Adm Lynde D. McCormick USN was named to
command the naval forces and to become Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (Saclant). The
actual op of setting up a military force met with considerable difﬁculty because of national pride
and national rivalries and because of the economic impact of armament budgets on countries still
trying to recover from the economic disruptions of WW II.”
44:
The Uneasy Peace
Ibid.
The North Atlantic

Treaty Organization

The Far East
The US debate over “Who lost
China?” begs the question “Was
China ours to Lose?”
Stalin’s brutal behavior led us
to back unworthy
anticommunists like Chiang—
jbp
Mao Zedong proclaiming the establishment of the PRC in 1949—Wikipedia

“At the end of WW II, the victorious allies seemed to have nothing to fear. Japan was badly
beaten; the other eastern powers were allied to the common effort. Yet within five years, all of
China was shut off from the Free World behind a ‘Bamboo Curtain’ like the Iron Curtain in
Europe, and outright war was in progress in the Far East. China was gradually lost through
civil war. Step by step the Communists won territory until at length the Nationalists fled to
Formosa (Taiwan) and established a ‘temporary’ government seat there. Similar civil war broke
out in Indo-China in 1946. In Korea, the artificial division of the country at the 38th parallel
(38º N Lat.) led to open warfare in Jun of 1950.”
44:
The Uneasy Peace
op. cit., pp. 852-853.
The Far East

“The government of Chiang Kai-shek, which had fought the war against Japan,…”
44:
The Uneasy Peace
op. cit., p. 853.
China

“The government of Chiang Kai-shek, which had fought the war against Japan, came under
severe criticism both inside and outside China. Charges of corruption and mismanagement
were loud and severe. Local unrest bred by uneven distribution of food and other consumer
goods was seized upon by the Chinese Communists. As time went on, the Communists under
Mao Zedong • became well organized and were armed with surrendered Japanese weapons,
captured Chinese Nationalist weapons, with American weapons originally supplied to Chiang
but sold by unscrupulous persons, some of them inside the Nationalist government itself. In
the course of events sporadic guerrilla ﬁghting spread into organized civil war between the
Nationalists and the Communists.
“Attempting to halt the deterioration of the situation in China, the US supplied more money
and arms to the Nationalists and sent a special representative to strive to resolve the conﬂict.
Gen of the Army George C. Marshall • was chosen for this mission; his instructions were to
attempt to bring about a coalition government of the Nationalists and the People’s Party—as
the Communists called themselves.…”
44:
The Uneasy Peace
op. cit., p. 853.
China

“…called themselves. The efforts of Marshall met with very little success. American marines,
which had been in China since the end of the war, were withdrawn, and the Communists
gained strength as time went on. By Oct 48 they had occupied all of Manchuria, and during
’49 and ’50 took over the rest of the country. The Nationalist Government moved to Taipeh,
Formosa in Dec 49.
“Mao immediately established a rapprochement with Soviet Russia and a 30-year pact of
‘friendship, alliance, and mutual assistance’ was signed by the two Communist powers on 15 Feb
50. Thus within ﬁve years, nearly 500 million persons came under the domination of the
Communist world. An American ‘White Paper’ issued late in ’49 pointed out American efforts
to stem the tide, noting that the equipment for 39 divisions and over two billion dollars in aid
had been given to the Chinese Nationalists and that most of the arms and money had gone
ultimately into the hands of Mao and his followers. The loss of arms and money was serious
enough, but the loss of China behind the ‘Bamboo Curtain’ was to have consequences of the
utmost gravity.…”
44:
The Uneasy Peace
Ibid.
China

“At the Potsdam Conference [17 Jul-2 Aug 45, near the ruins of Nazi Berlin] it had in effect
been decided that on a temporary basis Russia would occupy North Korea and the US South
Korea [after the USSR declared war on Japan and drove through their forces in NE China]. The
actual line of demarcation, the 38th parallel, was decided on the spot as a convenient division
line for the acceptance of the Japanese surrender. No one on the non-Communist side thought
of it as an actual boundary. In the last four days of WW II, Russian forces moved into North
Korea and seized Japanese forces there. Immediately the Soviets began organizing Socialists
and Communists in their zone and set up a Korean People’s Interim Committee as the basis of
a government in opposition to the Democratic Party of Kim Koo and Syngman Rhee.• Much
political maneuvering ensued [including a possible American CIC assassination order on
Koo] , with the Russians refusing to recognize Rhee and his party or even to allow the US and,
later, UN ofﬁcials to visit north of the 38th parallel. In Sept 47, the Soviet Union, having
organized the North Korean government and army to its liking,• proposed that all occupation
forces be withdrawn by Jan 48….
44:
The Uneasy Peace
Ibid.
Korea

“… Jan 48. This proposal was rejected. The UN named a commission to hold free elections in
all of Korea in ’48 but the members of that commission were summarily refused permission to
enter North Korea. Making the best of a bad situation, South Koreans established in South
Korea the Republic of Korea (ROK) with Syngman Rhee as president and the capital at Seoul.
This government was elected in Jul 48, and on 15 Aug, the US turned the government over to
the ROK. American troops were withdrawn by the end of Jun 49.
“In May 48, the Communists of North Korea proclaimed the People’s Democratic Republic
of Korea • with its capital at Pyongyang.…” 
44:
The Uneasy Peace
op. cit., pp. 853-854.
Korea

of Korea • with its capital at Pyongyang.• Shortly after this the Russians withdrew, leaving
behind them a well organized and trained North Korean army.…” 
44:
The Uneasy Peace
op. cit., pp. 853-854.
Korea

of Korea • with its capital at Pyongyang.• Shortly after this the Russians withdrew, leaving
behind them a well organized and trained North Korean army. The US had left South Korea
with nothing more than a police or constabulary force to keep order but lacking the
organization, equipment and training for ﬁghting against an army. Thus the situation was ripe
for the North Korean attack on South Korea in Jun 50. 
44:
The Uneasy Peace
op. cit., pp. 853-854.
Korea

“As early as 1941, a nationalist movement had
begun to gather strength in French Indo-China,
but Japan’s occupation of that country during WW
II prevented any fulﬁllment of the Indo-Chinese
desire desire for independence. When Japan’s
forces were withdrawn in 1945, the nationalist
drive was renewed, and met with some degree of
sympathy in Paris. The French government
recognized the Vietnam Republic of Annamese
Nationalists in 1946, but following a series of
Communist-inspired guerrilla raids, withdrew its
recognition. The Viet Minh Communist forces
under Gen Ho Chi Minh….”
op. cit., p. 854.
Indo-China

“As early as 1941, a nationalist movement had
begun to gather strength in French Indo-China,
but Japan’s occupation of that country during WW
II prevented any fulﬁllment of the Indo-Chinese
desire desire for independence. When Japan’s
forces were withdrawn in 1945, the nationalist
drive was renewed, and met with some degree of
sympathy in Paris. The French government
recognized the Vietnam Republic of Annamese
Nationalists in 1946, but following a series of
Communist-inspired guerrilla raids, withdrew its
recognition. The Viet Minh Communist forces
under Gen Ho Chi Minh had early sought to
exploit the power vacuum caused by the
withdrawal of Japanese troops, and these activities
caused the French to station an expeditionary
force there, including elements of the famed
French Foreign Legion, almost as soon as the
Japanese moved out.. op. cit., p. 854.
Indo-China

“…moved out. When France recognized the
new anticommunist Provisional Government
of Vietnam in Jun 48, civil war broke out. The
French diverted a large proportion of their
national income to maintaining forces in
Indo-China and were thereby weakened in
fulﬁlling their commitments to the European
Army. The US extended economic aid to the
French in Indo-China without producing
decisive results. The issue was further
clouded by the fact that many
anticommunists are also anti-French. Further,
because there was no distinct territorial
division as in Korea, no well-deﬁned battle
lines could be drawn.”
44:
The Uneasy Peace
Ibid.
Indo-China

MacArthur as US
Viceroy of occupied
Japan
at the Imperial
Palace with the
former God-Emperor
now reduced to a
civilian ﬁgurehead.

“Unlike Germany, Japan was not divided between occupying powers at the end of the war. The
Allied Command named the US as the occupying power and Gen of the Army Douglas MacArthur
as Supreme Commander. By the terms of the surrender, Japan agreed to a democratic government
and to free elections. Under the direction of Gen MacArthur, a cabinet headed by Baron Kijuro
Shidehara granted the franchise to women, lowered the voting age from 25 to 20, and dissolved the
vast family and corporate trusts that had constituted much of Japan’s economic and military
strength. A new constitution was ratiﬁed and became effective 3 May 47. Under it Japan renounced
her right to wage war and the idea of the divinity of the emperor,• and also abolished the House of
Peers. A new Diet became the ‘highest organ of state power and sole law-making authority.’
“In American strategic planning for the Far East, Japan was established as one of a series of key
positions running from Japan through Okinawa and Formosa to the Philippines. Areas of friction
with the Russians developed over the Kurile Islands and ﬁshing rights in the waters between Japan
and Siberia. Further friction developed from Russia’s efforts to organize a Communist Party in
Japan. Although small, the party was well organized and active that on 6 Jun 50, Gen MacArthur
ordered the government to ban Communist members of the Council from public activities ‘for
perversion of truth and incitation to mass violence.’ ”
44:
The Uneasy Peace
Ibid.
Japan

The USN in the
Cold War
“After the dropping of the atomic
bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki…it
became imperative for naval leaders to
have more exact knowledge of this
weapon—Sea Power, p. 856.

“With the deterioration of relations between the Western Powers and Russia following WW II, it
became necessary for military planners in the West to consider Russia as the most likely future
enemy and to base plans and policies on this assumption. Accordingly, heads of naval forces set in
motion plans and programs to counter Russia’s known or suspected capabilities. It was perfectly
obvious that no nation could challenge the sea power of the US, for her navy in terms of tonnage
was larger than that of the rest of the world combined. However, Russia could choose the role of an
inferior naval power, that of commerce raiding, depending largely on SSs. At the end of the war,
Russia secured not only several of the latest German hydrogen peroxide [Type XVII] U-boats,• but
also the persons and services of several top designers responsible for that type. The hydrogen
peroxide U-boat had been developed too late to be of war service to Germany, but its menace was
real. It was a limited submersible, not requiring surface air for its propulsion unit and capable of
high speed submerged, if only for a short period.
“War planners among the non-Communist powers had to assume that in a future war, Russia
would embark on wide scale SS ops, not only against commerce but against surface forces as
well….”
44:
The Uneasy Peace
op. cit., pp. 854-855.
Naval Developments

“…as well. In 1950 Russia was known to have about 350 operational SSs in contrast to the 56 with
which Germany started WW II. Armed with new acoustic torpedoes and equipped with the
snorkel, even the conventional boat was a threat, while the probability of encountering high-test
peroxide (HTP) boats or improvements on them presented Western naval planners with very grave
problems.
“To meet these problems required much imagination and boldness in a time when national
feeling was concentrated on peace. Officers and men of the USN were being released from active
duty [and my father, Cdr John R. Powers, USNR, from reserve duty in ’53] so fast that it was
sometimes difficult to get ships to ports where they could be decommissioned. The first step taken
in the US to prepare for possible future trouble was to organize a strong reserve of both ships and
trained personnel. Some ships that had outlived their usefulness or whose cost of maintenance
would exceed their replacement value were disposed of by sale or transfer. Others were sold
outright to private citizens. Some were scrapped. A few were used as target ships in atomic tests at
Bikini Atoll in the Marshall Islands….”
44:
The Uneasy Peace
op. cit., p. 855.
Naval Developments

“…as well. In 1950 Russia was known to have about 350 operational SSs in contrast to the 56 with
which Germany started WW II. Armed with new acoustic torpedoes and equipped with the
snorkel, even the conventional boat was a threat, while the probability of encountering high-test
peroxide (HTP) boats or improvements on them presented Western naval planners with very
grave problems.
“To meet these problems required much imagination and boldness in a time when national
feeling was concentrated on peace. Officers and men of the USN were being released from active
duty [and my father, Cdr John R. Powers, USNR, from reserve duty in ’53] so fast that it was
sometimes difficult to get ships to ports where they could be decommissioned. The first step
taken in the US to prepare for possible future trouble was to organize a strong reserve of both
ships and trained personnel. Some ships that had outlived their usefulness or whose cost of
maintenance would exceed their replacement value were disposed of by sale or transfer. Others
were sold outright to private citizens. Some were scrapped. A few were used as target ships in
atomic tests at Bikini Atoll in the Marshall Islands. Most ships which were worth retaining in the
fleet but which had to be decommissioned for want of funds and personnel were put in
‘mothballs.’6….”
44:
The Uneasy Peace
op. cit., p. 855.
Naval Developments
______
6 “Mothballing” was intended to preserve ships from the deterioration usually considered inevitable inland periods of
idleness. Gun mounts were covered in a moisture-proof “cocoon” of vinylite plastic. Machinery spaces were sealed and
electrically dehumidified. Ships’ records were transferred intact to storage, and propulsion machinery was greased and
otherwise protected from moisture. The success of the program became apparent with the outbreak of the Korean War
when the mothballed ships were returned to service in a few weeks.

“…in ‘mothballs.’6
“The establishment of an adequate, well-trained Naval Reserve was of utmost importance.
Drilling units were set up in the various naval districts, some with drill pay for 48 drills a year. The
Organized Reserve consisted of units with authorized compliments of 200 enlisted men and 15
officers. In addition there were many volunteer specialized units in electronics, intelligence, base
construction (Sea-bees) , aviation, and many others. Fourteen days’ paid training duty afloat or
ashore annually was authorized for reservists in these programs. Some of these cruises were on
fleet ships, others on district ships, usually DEs assigned to the various naval districts and kept in
partial commission with a skeleton crew aboard. The reservists would fill out the crew and help
take the ship to sea.
“The active fleet ops were extended to include the Navy’s traditional role of implementing
diplomacy. Beginning in 1947 the US Sixth Fleet remained on continuous duty in the Med, showing
the flag and helping to support Western interests. One large CVA—the Midway, the Franklin D.
Roosevelt,• or the Coral Sea—was always on duty there; a second CVA, several CAs and DDs
completed the carrier task force. In addition there was maintained an amphi force of transports
carrying the Fleet Marine Force. Logistic supply was handled primarily from the US on a simulated
wartime basis.…”
44:
The Uneasy Peace
Ibid.
Naval Developments

“…wartime basis. This force existed not only as an arm of diplomacy but as a force to strike
offensively in time of war, to protect American lives and interests, to act as goodwill ambassadors,
and to keep control of all that vital waterway, essential for western communication lines. With the
establishment of NATO, joint naval ops came into increasing prominence. NATO signals and
tactics were developed for joint ops of ships of NATO navies and joint maneuvers were
successfully held on several occasions.
“The American navy spent much time and effort in combatting the SS menace for future ops.
Hunter-killer groups, sonobuoys, high frequency radio direction finders, sonar, and other devices
were refined and improved. [My 1/c summer cruise, 1961, was aboard USS Clamagore (SS-343) off
the Bahama banks. We were the test SS for a British ELF sonar array designed to detect Soviet SSs
trying to enter the Caribbean undetected.]
“Developments were also extensive in naval a/c design and operation. The jet fighter completely
replaced the old propellor-driven types. Jet bombers became common, and the speed of a/c, both
fighter and bomber, far outstripped anything available in the war years. Essex-type CVAs gradually
received strengthened flight decks to accommodate jet planes and heavier bombers.…”
44:
The Uneasy Peace
op. cit., pp. 855-856.
Naval Developments

“…heavier bombers. One of the most radical changes in design was the angled CVA deck,
which was developed by the British and was installed (1n 1952) in the USS Antietam (CV/
CVA/CVS-36) • and other US CVAs.…”
44:
The Uneasy Peace
Naval Developments
op. cit., p. 856.

“…a/c program. Its ﬂexibility of operation and the small space needed for landing and take-
off meant that it could operate successfully from CAs and BBs as well as CVAs. It made a good
scout and was able to relieve DDs of some of the more onerous mail-delivering duties as well
as the duty of plane guard in CVA ops. In Korea these craft were to play many other important
roles from air strike control planes to rescue missions. Supply or evacuation of isolated
positions was but one of the vital services they performed. The lives of many wounded were
saved by these ‘whirlybirds’ operating from hospital LSTs and hospital ships, for they were able
to pick a wounded man up from an advance dressing station and ﬂy him directly to the
hospital ship. Most important of all, the Marine Corps began experiments in the use of
helicopters for ship-to-shore movements in amphib ops.”
44:
The Uneasy Peace
Ibid.
Naval Developments

“After the dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in the closing days of
the war, it became imperative for military leaders to have more exact knowledge of this
weapon. They needed to know how to use it effectively in offense and they needed to know its
capabilities and limitations so that some countermeasures might be taken to minimize its
effects in the event that an enemy used it. For this purpose Operation CROSSROADS was
scheduled as a test of the atomic bomb against naval ships. The venture became a joint
experiment of the War and Navy Departments. Under the command of VAdm William H.P.
Blandy USN,• tests were conducted at Bikini Atoll in the Marshall Islands. Over 200 ships, 150
a/c, and 42,000 men were involved in the test. Seventy-ﬁve ships were placed in the target
area to provide data for study of blast damage and radiation contamination. The target ship,
the Nevada, was in the center with four other BBs, the Pennsylvania, the Arkansas, the New York,
and the Japanese Nagato, ranged around. Two CVs, the Saratoga and the Independence, were
included as well as the CAs Pensacola, Salt Lake City, the German Prinz Eugen, and the Japanese
Sakawa.…”
44:
The Uneasy Peace
Ibid.
The Atomic Bomb

“…Japanese Sakawa. In addition there were other CAs, DDs, AKAs, SSs, and various smaller
vessels. Each of the ships contained scientific instruments, an assortment of equipment, and
live animals to measure or reflect the effects of the blast and subsequent radiation. Drone
airplanes were prepared to fly through the cloud and send back scientific data. Drone boats
were to take samples of the water after the explosions.
“Test Able, a drop from a B-29, took place on 1 Jul 46 at 0900 Bikini time. The damage was
summarized by an evaluation board set up by the JCS. A DD and two AKAs sank at once, and
another DD capsized and sank later. The Japanese CA Sakawa sank the next day. The
Independence was wrecked and gutted by fire. The SS Skate’s superstructure received extensive
damage. The superstructures of the Nevada, Arkansas, and Pensacola were badly wrecked.•
Casualties would have been very high among exposed personnel, but the animal survivors
indicated some measure of protection from radiation would be afforded crew members below
decks.…”
44:
The Uneasy Peace
op. cit., pp. 856-857.
The Atomic Bomb

“…below decks.
“Test Baker, held at 0825 on 25 Jul 46, was an underwater explosion. The bomb was
suspended below LSM 60, which disintegrated from the blast. Also sunk were the Arkansas,
the Saratoga, an LST, an LSM, and an AO, while the DD Hughes and the AKA Falcon were
beached to prevent them from sinking. One submerged and three surfaced SSs went
permanently to the bottom. The Japanese BB Nagato sank ﬁve days later. The water of the
lagoon was so dangerous from radioactivity that four days after Test Baker it was unsafe for
personnel to spend any ‘useful length of time’ on the target vessels. Subsequent tests were held
at a new test area in Eniwetok Atoll.
“The US did not long enjoy the monopoly on the atomic bomb.…”
44:
The Uneasy Peace
op. cit., p. 857.
The Atomic Bomb

“…below decks.
“The US did not long enjoy the monopoly on the atomic bomb. Partly as the result of the
work of traitors.…”
44:
The Uneasy Peace
op. cit., p. 857.
The Atomic Bomb

“…below decks.
“The US did not long enjoy the monopoly on the atomic bomb. Partly as the result of the
work of traitors and partly as a result of Soviet scientiﬁc knowledge,• the Russians developed
an atomic bomb several years ahead of the time Western scientists thought possible.…”
44:
The Uneasy Peace
op. cit., p. 857.
The Atomic Bomb

“…thought possible. They successfully exploded the prototype somewhere in the Caucasus
area in Sept 49. [“It was detonated on 29 August 1949 at 7:00 a.m.,[2] at Semipalatinsk, Kazakh SSR,[3] “—
Wikipedia] • Detection of radioactive particles in the atmosphere led to American knowledge of
this explosion, an event conﬁrmed by the Russians a short time later. The fact of Soviet
possession of atomic weapons caused military and political leaders to take another look at the
world strategic picture. They had scarcely begun this process when a new development
brought war from a hypothetical to an actual condition. The militarized North Koreans
recklessly ﬂung down the gauntlet; the response was up to the free world.”
44:
The Uneasy Peace
Ibid.
The Atomic Bomb

The American Century?
Was power already beginning to pass to the Communists?
They certainly believed that the “Scientific Socialism” of Marx predicted World Revolution and
Communist triumph.
Stalin and Mao had made remarkable, threatening gains in the last five years.
Could the UN rise to this new challenge from the USSR’s client state, North Korea?
MacArthur had warned against “a land war in Asia”!
How would President Truman respond?
jbp

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