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Dr. Jens Oberender
SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH




Smartphone applications –
Common Criteria is going Mobile




ICCC2012 Paris
How to CC-evaluate smartphone apps?
Agenda




 Specify Security Target
   TOE scope
   Application specific SFRs

 Assurance for Smartphone apps
 Insight Summary
          Common Criteria is going Mobile   2012 © SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH   Page 2
Specify TOE scope

TOE security functions                       TOE Environment
  Data import                                    Access control & isolation
  Key management                                 Policy enforcement
  Encrypted storage                              Mobile device management




           Common Criteria is going Mobile   2012 © SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH   Page 3
Security Functional Requirements
Generic Smartphone App
SFR              Smartphone App
FDP_RIP.2        Residual Information Protection
                 Wipe residual data on app hibernation
FDP_SDI.2        Stored Data Integrity
                 Ensure authentic configuration
FPT_TST          TSF Self Test
                 Detection of jail break and background apps
FPT_ITC          Inter-TSF trusted channel
                 Mutual assured identification
FTA_SSL.3        TSF-initiated termination
                 Inactivity wipes user authentication
FTP_TRP          Trusted Path
                 Key negotiation for secure transport

 Audit/log performed by mobile device management
            Common Criteria is going Mobile   2012 © SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH   Page 4
Security Assurance Requirements
Smartphone App Fields of Interest
SAR       Notes for Smartphone App
AGD_PRE   Authentic app market download
          Allow for determined set of component interfaces
AGD_OPE   Certificate chain validation
ALC       Secure rollout and destruction
          Crypto provider API versioning
ADV_TDS   Control flow, data flow for actions and forms


 Signed app ≠ authenticity & trust
 Remote wipe by mobile device management
 Security Awareness through Smartphone-CERT


          Common Criteria is going Mobile   2012 © SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH   Page 5
Security Architecture
Evaluation of ADV_ARC
SAR        Notes for Smartphone App
ADV_ARC    Secure startup                     platform settings
           Self-protection                    between hibernate and startup
           Non-bypassability                  configuration authenticity

  Set app permissions sparsely
  Regulate information flow with permissions
      Enforce interaction policy during runtime,
      e.g. caller version and configuration on IPC




            Common Criteria is going Mobile      2012 © SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH   Page 6
Vulnerability Analysis
Test and Penetrate
SAR        Notes for Smartphone App
ATE_IND    Validation of interface data
           Issues with hibernation
AVA        Address Space Layout Randomization
           Platform key chain mechanism
           Entropy in key derivation

  Strong base passwords necessary
  Appropriate data protection classes
  Relevance of Mass Infections (cf. chipcard domain)
      Required skills for exploitation phase
      Specific efforts & costs of performing attacks
            Common Criteria is going Mobile   2012 © SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH   Page 7
Insight Summary
Common Criteria is going Mobile
 Common Criteria approach well-suited for evaluation
    Identified app-specific requirements
    Demand for Smartphone-CERT
    Operation policies supplement platform measures
    App mass infections prevented by market countermeasures

 Achievable! CC-Evaluation
    TOE scope limited
    High-value targets: strict separation (eg. HASK-PP from 2008)
    Enterprise policy oriented (Mobile Device PP draft)



           Common Criteria is going Mobile   2012 © SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH   Page 8
References 1/2
http://www.enisa.europa.eu/activities/application-security/smartphone-security-1
https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Mobile_Security_Project
http://www.malgenomeproject.org/

K. Wain Yee Au, et. al. A Look at SmartPhone Permission Models, SPSM, 2011.
A. Alkassar, et. al. Sicherheitskern€ für Smartphones: Ansätze und Lösungen, DuD,
2012.
D. Barerra. Secure Software Installation on Smartphones, S&P, 2011.
M. Becher: Security of Smartphones at the Dawn of their Ubiquitousness. PhD
Thesis (in German), University of Mannheim, 2009.
B. Dodson, et. al. Secure, Consumer-Friendly Web Authentication and Payments
with a Phone. MobiCASE, 2010.
W. Enck. Defending Users Against Smartphone Apps: Techniques and Future
Directions, ICISS, 2011.
W. Enck. Understanding Android Security, S&P, 2009.
M. Grace, et. al. Systematic Detection of Capability Leaks in Stock Android
Smartphones, NDSS 2012, 2012.
                 Common Criteria is going Mobile   2012 © SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH   Page 9
References 2/2
S. Hallsteinsen, I. Jorstad, and D. Van Thanh. Using the mobile phone as a security
token for unified authentication. ICSNC, 2007.
D. Kleidermacher. Bringing Security to Android-based Devices. Information Quaterly,
issue 32.
C. R. Mulliner: Security of Smart Phones, Master Thesis, UCL, 2006.
M. Ongtang, et. al. Semantically Rich Application-Centric Security in Android,
ACSAC, 2009.
S. Schrittwieser, et. al. Guess Who’s Texting You? Evaluating the Security of
Smartphone Messaging Applications, NDSS, 2011.
A. Shabtai, et. al. Google Android: A State-of-the-Art Review of Security
Mechanisms, CoRR Dagstuhl, 2009.
A. Porter Felt, et. al. Android Permissions Demystified, CCS, 2011.
A. Porter Felt, et. al. The Effectiveness of Application Permissions, USENIX, 2011.
D. Wallach: Smartphone Security: Trends and Predictions. SecAppDev 2011
Y. Zhou, X. Jiang. Dissecting Android Malware: Characterization and Evolution, P&S,
2012


                 Common Criteria is going Mobile   2012 © SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH   Page 10
Thank You!




                    Dr. Jens Oberender
                    SRC - Security Research & Consulting GmbH
                    Graurheindorfer Str. 149a
                    53117 Bonn
                    Germany

                    phone            +49-228-2806-182 | -0
                    fax:             +49-228-2806-199
                    E-mail:          jens.oberender@src-gmbh.de
                    WWW:             www.src-gmbh.de
                                     www.src-gmbh.de/download.html

        Common Criteria is going Mobile   2012 © SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH   Page 11

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Smartphone Applications - Common Criteria is going Mobile

  • 1. Dr. Jens Oberender SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH Smartphone applications – Common Criteria is going Mobile ICCC2012 Paris
  • 2. How to CC-evaluate smartphone apps? Agenda Specify Security Target TOE scope Application specific SFRs Assurance for Smartphone apps Insight Summary Common Criteria is going Mobile 2012 © SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH Page 2
  • 3. Specify TOE scope TOE security functions TOE Environment Data import Access control & isolation Key management Policy enforcement Encrypted storage Mobile device management Common Criteria is going Mobile 2012 © SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH Page 3
  • 4. Security Functional Requirements Generic Smartphone App SFR Smartphone App FDP_RIP.2 Residual Information Protection Wipe residual data on app hibernation FDP_SDI.2 Stored Data Integrity Ensure authentic configuration FPT_TST TSF Self Test Detection of jail break and background apps FPT_ITC Inter-TSF trusted channel Mutual assured identification FTA_SSL.3 TSF-initiated termination Inactivity wipes user authentication FTP_TRP Trusted Path Key negotiation for secure transport Audit/log performed by mobile device management Common Criteria is going Mobile 2012 © SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH Page 4
  • 5. Security Assurance Requirements Smartphone App Fields of Interest SAR Notes for Smartphone App AGD_PRE Authentic app market download Allow for determined set of component interfaces AGD_OPE Certificate chain validation ALC Secure rollout and destruction Crypto provider API versioning ADV_TDS Control flow, data flow for actions and forms Signed app ≠ authenticity & trust Remote wipe by mobile device management Security Awareness through Smartphone-CERT Common Criteria is going Mobile 2012 © SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH Page 5
  • 6. Security Architecture Evaluation of ADV_ARC SAR Notes for Smartphone App ADV_ARC Secure startup platform settings Self-protection between hibernate and startup Non-bypassability configuration authenticity Set app permissions sparsely Regulate information flow with permissions Enforce interaction policy during runtime, e.g. caller version and configuration on IPC Common Criteria is going Mobile 2012 © SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH Page 6
  • 7. Vulnerability Analysis Test and Penetrate SAR Notes for Smartphone App ATE_IND Validation of interface data Issues with hibernation AVA Address Space Layout Randomization Platform key chain mechanism Entropy in key derivation Strong base passwords necessary Appropriate data protection classes Relevance of Mass Infections (cf. chipcard domain) Required skills for exploitation phase Specific efforts & costs of performing attacks Common Criteria is going Mobile 2012 © SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH Page 7
  • 8. Insight Summary Common Criteria is going Mobile Common Criteria approach well-suited for evaluation Identified app-specific requirements Demand for Smartphone-CERT Operation policies supplement platform measures App mass infections prevented by market countermeasures Achievable! CC-Evaluation TOE scope limited High-value targets: strict separation (eg. HASK-PP from 2008) Enterprise policy oriented (Mobile Device PP draft) Common Criteria is going Mobile 2012 © SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH Page 8
  • 9. References 1/2 http://www.enisa.europa.eu/activities/application-security/smartphone-security-1 https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Mobile_Security_Project http://www.malgenomeproject.org/ K. Wain Yee Au, et. al. A Look at SmartPhone Permission Models, SPSM, 2011. A. Alkassar, et. al. Sicherheitskern€ für Smartphones: Ansätze und Lösungen, DuD, 2012. D. Barerra. Secure Software Installation on Smartphones, S&P, 2011. M. Becher: Security of Smartphones at the Dawn of their Ubiquitousness. PhD Thesis (in German), University of Mannheim, 2009. B. Dodson, et. al. Secure, Consumer-Friendly Web Authentication and Payments with a Phone. MobiCASE, 2010. W. Enck. Defending Users Against Smartphone Apps: Techniques and Future Directions, ICISS, 2011. W. Enck. Understanding Android Security, S&P, 2009. M. Grace, et. al. Systematic Detection of Capability Leaks in Stock Android Smartphones, NDSS 2012, 2012. Common Criteria is going Mobile 2012 © SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH Page 9
  • 10. References 2/2 S. Hallsteinsen, I. Jorstad, and D. Van Thanh. Using the mobile phone as a security token for unified authentication. ICSNC, 2007. D. Kleidermacher. Bringing Security to Android-based Devices. Information Quaterly, issue 32. C. R. Mulliner: Security of Smart Phones, Master Thesis, UCL, 2006. M. Ongtang, et. al. Semantically Rich Application-Centric Security in Android, ACSAC, 2009. S. Schrittwieser, et. al. Guess Who’s Texting You? Evaluating the Security of Smartphone Messaging Applications, NDSS, 2011. A. Shabtai, et. al. Google Android: A State-of-the-Art Review of Security Mechanisms, CoRR Dagstuhl, 2009. A. Porter Felt, et. al. Android Permissions Demystified, CCS, 2011. A. Porter Felt, et. al. The Effectiveness of Application Permissions, USENIX, 2011. D. Wallach: Smartphone Security: Trends and Predictions. SecAppDev 2011 Y. Zhou, X. Jiang. Dissecting Android Malware: Characterization and Evolution, P&S, 2012 Common Criteria is going Mobile 2012 © SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH Page 10
  • 11. Thank You! Dr. Jens Oberender SRC - Security Research & Consulting GmbH Graurheindorfer Str. 149a 53117 Bonn Germany phone +49-228-2806-182 | -0 fax: +49-228-2806-199 E-mail: jens.oberender@src-gmbh.de WWW: www.src-gmbh.de www.src-gmbh.de/download.html Common Criteria is going Mobile 2012 © SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH Page 11