Introduction to EU competition law

1. Introduction to
competition law
Julija Jerneva

2. Application of EU Competition law
•EU consists of 27 Member States
•EU and three other countries are part of European
Economic Area (EEA)
EU competition law applies to all countries in the EEA

3. Institutions
EU Institutions:
•European Commission
– enforces competition policy through directorate general (DG)
– Can launch surprise investigations at company premises
– Can require large mergers to be approved
•EU Member States have their own competition laws and authorities
•Companies must comply with competition laws of EU and Member
States

4. What is competition law?
• Competition law exists to protect the process of competition
in a free market economy
– A system where the allocation of resources is determined solely
by supply and demand in free markets
• Competition wanted because of the market result it
produces
– Efficiency
– Low prices
– Innovations
• Competition rules limits the freedom of the market players to
protect the process of competition

5. Economic efficiency
- main objective of competition policy
• Competition gives the best utilisation of scarce
resources
– Perfect competition v monopoly
• Perfect competition
– Pareto optimal use of resources
» None could be made better of without someone being made
worse of
» Consumer welfare maximized
– Productive efficiency
» Constant pressure on costs
» Cost reductions is the only means whereby firms can stay in
business and increase profits

6. • Monopoly
– Leads to an inefficient allocation of resources
» Quantity supplied less the quantity which would be supplied in a
competitive market
• Perfect competition, monopoly and competition in
the real world
– Workable competition

7. ”workable competition”
• The ECJs concept of ”workable competition” related
to what competitin is inteded to achieve in the
Community context
– Not one of the concepts of ”workable competition” found
in economic theory
» But influenced by the theory
• Concept of competition in the Merger Regulation
compared:
– Prohibits concentrations creating or strengthening a
dominant position ”as a result of which effective
competition would be significantly impeded in the
common market”

8. How to pursue the goals?
• Prevent agreements restrictive of competition
– Horisontal agreements (Among competitors)
– Vertical agreements (between parties at different levels
of the production or distribution chain)
• Control market power and its abuse
• Control oligopolistic markets
• Prevent mergers which lead to a concentration in
market power

9. Overview of EU Competition Law
Aspects of primary importance to business:
•Article 101 TFEU makes illegal any agreement or
concerted practice between undertakings that
significantly restricts competition within EEA
•Article 102 TFEU makes it illegal for dominant company
to abuse its dominant position in market
•Mergers
EU competition law deals with anti-competitive agreements between
companies and unilateral conduct of individual companies with
dominant position

10. Article 101 TFEU: Purpose and Rationale
Article 101 prohibits agreements that disrupt free-market
principles and hinder competitiveness
Article 101 promotes independent decision-making over -
•Pricing
•Whether to sell in one country or several
Decisions should be based on desire to attract new customers and retain
existing ones
Agreements that restrict two or more companies’ commercial options are
likely to violate Article 101

11. Article 101(1) TFEU
• The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the
internal market: all agreements between undertakings,
decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted
practices which may affect trade between Member States and
which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or
distortion of competition within the internal market, and in
particular those which:

12. Article 101(1) TFEU
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other
trading conditions;
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or
investment;
(c) share markets or sources of supply;
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other
trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the
other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or
according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject
of such contracts.

13. Article 101(2) TFEU
2. Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article
shall be automatically void.

14. Article 102 EC: Abuse of Market Dominance
Article 102 is a companion of Article 101
•Directed at unilateral conduct of companies
dominant in their market
•Targets abuse of dominant position
Abuse of a dominant position: Anti-competitive business practice
undertaken to maintain or increase market position
•Includes unfair pricing, restriction of production output, and imposing
discriminatory terms on trading partners
Violations of Article 102 can result in serious fines and other penalties

15. Article 102 TFEU
• Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position
within the internal market or in a substantial part of it shall be
prohibited as incompatible with the internal market in so far as it
may affect trade between Member States.

16. Article 102 TFEU
• Such abuse may, in particular, consist in:
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices
or other unfair trading conditions;
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the
prejudice of consumers;

17. Article 102 TFEU
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with
other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive
disadvantage;
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by
the other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their
nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection
with the subject of such contracts.

18. Consequences of Non-Compliance
Non-compliance has serious consequences:
•Fines up to 10% of annual worldwide turnover
•Liability in damages under national law
•Voiding of contract
•Criminal liability
•Substantial expenditure of time and money
•Bad publicity
•Investigations by other competition authorities

19. The sources of EC competition law
• The Treaty Articles
• Regulations
– Merger regulation
– Block exemptions
• Judgements
– European Court of Justice
– Court of First Instance
• Commission notices and guidelines
• Commission decisions
• Annual reports from the Commission
• Other documents

20. Some basic concepts
• Market power
• Market definition
• Barriers to entry
• S-C-P paradigm

21. The concept of market power
• Competition law concerned first and foremost with
the problems that occur when a firm or two or more
firms possess market power
• A firm or firms that possess market power can enjoy
some of the benefits available to the true monopolist
– Market power presents undertakings with the possibility
of limiting output and raising price, which are clearly
harmful to consumer welfare

22. Market Power
• Market Power is the ability of a firm or a group of firms in a
market to profitably raise prices, reduce quality, or slow down
innovation for a significant period of time compared to these
outcomes in a competitive market

23. Analysis of Market Power
• Market structure approach / Indirect approach
• Market definition
• Market shares
• Market concentration
• Barriers to entry and expansion
• Perception of market participants
• Competitive effects analysis / Direct approach
• Predict post-merger price effects
• Elasticity of demand

24. Relevant market definition
Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for
the purposes of Community competition law (also available in
Latvian!)

25. Relevant product market
 'A relevant product market comprises all those products and/or
services which are regarded as interchangeable or substitutable
by the consumer, by reason of the products' characteristics, their
prices and their intended use`

26. Relevant geographic market
 'The relevant geographic market comprises the area in which the
undertakings concerned are involved in the supply and demand
of products or services, in which the conditions of competition
are sufficiently homogeneous and which can be distinguished
from neighbouring areas because the conditions of competition
are appreciably different in those area`

27. Basic principles for market definition
 Competitive constraints:
 demand substitutability
 supply substitutability
 potential competition

28. Demand substitution
 starting from the type of products that the undertakings
involved sell and the area in which they sell them,
 additional products and areas will be included in, or excluded
from, the market definition
 depending on whether competition from these other products and areas
affect or restrain sufficiently the pricing of the parties' products in the
short term

29. SSNIP test
 small but significant and non-transitory increase in price (SSNIP)
 hypothetical monopolist or cartel could profit from a price
increase of 5% for at least one year (assuming that "the terms of
sale of all other products are constant)?

30. Demand substitution
 Will the customers switch to readily available substitutes or to
suppliers located elsewhere in response to a hypothetical small
(in the range 5 % to 10 %) but permanent relative price increase
in the products and areas ?

31. Cellophane Fallacy
 It may happen that using the SSNIP test one defines the relevant
market too broadly, including products which are not substitutes
 Du Pont (a cellophane producer) argued that cellophane was not
a separate relevant market since it competed with flexible
packaging materials such as aluminum foil, wax paper and
polyethylene

32. Critical loss
 Where demand elasticities cannot be estimated
 Defined as the maximum sales loss that could be sustained as a
result of the price increase without making the price increase
unprofitable.
 Where the likely loss of sales to the hypothetical monopolist (cartel) is
less than the Critical Loss, then a 5% price increase would be profitable
and the market is defined

33. Demand substitution example
 Soft-drinks with flavour A vs those with flavour B?
 Price = 10 (12 after the increase)
 Sales = 1000 units (800 after the increase)
 Variable costs:
 remaining at the same level
 Increase
 Decrease

34.  If the increase in price produces too much consumer substitution which
is not compensated by the increase in price nor the reduction in costs?
 The "market" formed by this only product is not "worth monopolising" as
an increase in prices would not be profitable

35. Supply substitution
 suppliers are able to switch production to the relevant products
and market them in the short term without incurring significant
additional costs or risks in response to small and permanent
changes in relative prices
 Example: paper

36. Potential competition
 conditions of entry
 Low barriers - potential competition will represent an effective
competitive constraint
 High barriers - potential competition is not likely to represent an
effective competitive constraint

37. Evidence – product dimension
 Evidence of substitution in the recent past
 Views of customers and competitors
 Consumer preferences
 Barriers and costs associated with switching demand to potential
substitutes

38. Evidence – geographic dimension
 Past evidence of diversion of orders to other areas
 Basic demand characteristics
 Views of customers and competitors
 Current geographic pattern of purchases
 Trade flows/pattern of shipments
 Barriers and switching costs associated to divert orders to
companies located in other areas

39. Barriers to entry
• Barriers to entry hinders the emergence of potential
competition which would otherwise constrain the
incumbent undertaking
• Crucial when determining market power
– May have high market shares but no market power if
there are no barriers to entry

40. Analysing barriers to entry
• Market definition and entry by production substitutes
• Market conditions and historical entry
• Assessment of absolute cost advantages
• Assessment of strategic (first mover) advantages
• Vertical foreclosure and exclusion
• Predatory behaviour
• Assessment of entry impediments

41. S-C-P approach
• Structure (competitive, monopolistic, monopolistically
competitive, or oligopolistic)
• - number of competitors, buyers, suppliers
• - level of product standartisation
• - barriers to entry
• - scale economies, costs structures
• Conduct (output decisions and pricing behavior, merger
policies, R&D, investment & advertising policies)
• Performance of the industry (production efficiency and
profitability)

42. Article 101(1) – the elements
• The meaning of “undertaking”
• Forms of co-operation caught
– The meaning of agreement
– Decisions by associations of undertakings
– Concerted practices
• “Object or effect the prevention, restriction or
distortion of competition”
• Effect on trade between member states
• De minimis

43. The concept of an “undertaking”
• Article 101 (and 102) applies only to “undertakings”
– Undertaking not defined in the EC Treaty
• ECJs definition of an undertaking:
– “the concept of an undertaking encompasses every entity
engaged in an economic activity regardless of the legal status of
the entity and the way in which it is financed”
» Case 41/90, Höfner and Elsner v Macrotron, para 21

44. • “Every entity”
– The legal form of the entity irrelevant
» All kind of companies
» Persons
• Self employed
• Not employees (Opinion of GA Jacobs, case C-67/96, Albany)
» Associations
• “Associations of undertakings” directly caught
• But can also be found to act as “undertakings”
• Example: Co-operatives, P&I clubs
• Exception: trade unions representing their members
– The entity’s engagement in “economic activity” decisive

45. • “Economic activity”
– Any activity consisting in offering goods and services on
a given market
» Wide definition

46. State bodies
• Exercising official authority
– ECJ: Article 101 does not apply to agreements concluded by bodies
“acting in their capacity as public authorities and undertakings
entrusted with the provision of a public service” (case 30/87,
Bodson)
– Includes tasks which are typical those of a public authority
– Such tasks are not of an economic nature
– Can to a certain extent be financed through fees of economic
contributions
• Engaging in economic activity
– Will be regarded as an “undertaking”
– How the public body is organised is not decisive

47. Some statistics

48. Ten Highest Cartel Fines Per Case Since
1969
Year Case name Amount in €
2008 Car Glass 1 383 896 000
2009 Gas 1 106 000 000
2007 Elevators and Escalators 992 312 200
2010 Airfreight 799 445 000
2001 Vitamins 790 515 000
2007 Gas Insulated Switchgear 750 712 500
2008 Candle Waxes 676 011 400
2010 LCD 648 925 000
2010 Bathroom fittings 622 250 782
2006 Butadiene Rubber/Emulsion Styrene Butadiene
Rubber
519 050 000

49. Ten Highest Cartel Fines Per Company
Since 1969
Year Case name Amount in €
2008 Saint Gobain (Car glass) 896.000.000
2009 E.ON (Gas) 553.000.000
2009 GDF Suez (Gas) 553.000.000
2001 F. Hoffmann-La Roche AG (Vitamins) 462.000.000
2007 Siemens AG (Gas insulated switchgear) 396.562.500
2008 Pilkington (Car glass) 370.000.000
2010 Ideal Standard (Bathroom fittings) 326.091.196
2007 ThyssenKrupp (Elevators and escalators) 319.779.900
2008 Sasol Ltd (Candle waxes) 318.200.000
2010 Air France / KLM (Airfreight) 310.080.000

50. Overview of Article 101 TFEU

51. §1 – The Prohibition
Rule (+ examples)
Are prohibited as incompatible with the internal market:
“all agreements between undertakings, decisions by
associations of undertakings and concerted practices which
may affect trade between Member States and which have as
their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of
competition within the internal market (…)”
§2 – The Rule of
Nullity
“Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this
Article shall be automatically null and void”
§3 – The Exception
Rule
§1 may be declared inapplicable to agreements which:
1. “contribute to improving the production or distribution of
goods or to promoting technical or economic progress,
2. allow consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit,
and which do not:
1. impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which
are not indispensable;
2. afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating
competition”

52. Basic structure of analysis of Art.101
• Agreements violating Article 101(1)
• and not capable of being exempted under Article 101(3)
• are null and void (Article 101(2))

53. Agreement:
horizontal or vertical
Step one
• Agreement?
• Between undertakings?
• Appreciable effect on trade?
• Object or effect?
Step two
• Derogations (Article 101 (3) TFEU)
• Rule of reason (incl. block
exemptions)

54. Elements (step one)
1. “Agreements”
2. Between “undertakings”
3. Which have appreciable effect on intra-state trade
4. Which have as their object or effect the prevention,
restriction or distortion of competition

55. Unilateral practices/behaviour
• Unilateral action NOT prohibited under Article 101
• Unilateral action is subject to rules of competition law only
under Article 102 (abuse of dominance)

56. Mergers
• Are “worse” than agreements”
• Joint ventures between the companies (depending on the level of
integration):
• Analysed under the merger rules; or
• Analysed under the Article 101 rules
Mergers Agreements
Eliminate competition Reduce competition (preserve at
least some level of competition)
Leave permanent effect on the
market
Leave temporary effects on the
market

57. Agreements

58. The concept of an “agreement”
• ”Agreement”  widely construed
– It is sufficient if the undertakings in question should have expressed
their joint intention to conduct themselves on the market in a specific
way
» Alignment of the competition parameters available to them
• “joint intention”  a legally binding agreement not necessary
– The form of no importance (oral, signed, unsigned)
– “gentlemen’s agreements”
– The agreement does not have to be exhaustive
» It is enough just to set the broad framework for the undertakings market conduct

59. • The engagement of the parties in the agreement
– It is enough to be partly engaged in the collaboration
» Breach of contract regarding parts of the agreement
– Passive “members”
– An excuse if an undertaking has been “forced” into a cartel?
• Collaboration through the establishment of a company (joint
ventures)

60. “Decisions of undertakings”
• Collusion can take place through the medium of an
association: Directly covered by art 101(1)
– Makes it possible to hold associations directly liable
• Association
 widely defined
• Decision
 every statement made with the object or effect of influencing the
commercial behaviour of the association’s members
– Does not have to be binding (e g recommendations)

61. “Concerted practices”
• A form of co-ordination where undertakings, without
concluding any sort of agreement or establishing a plan of
action, knowingly substitute practical co-operation between
them for the risks of competition
– This criteria avoids that situations where companies collaborate without
any kind of agreement but only on the basis of a common understand
falls outside article 101(1)
• It is contrary to the rules on competition for a producer to
co-operate with his competitors, in any way whatsoever, in
order to determine a co-operated way of action or to ensure
its success by prior elimination of all uncertainty as to each
others conduct regarding the essential elements of that
action
– ECJ, case 48/69, ICI v Commission

62. Proving concerted practices
• Direct or indirect contact
• Meeting of minds or some kind of consensus
– Exchange of information
– Unilateral disclosure
– Public announcements
• Subsequent behaviour in the market
• Indirect evidence of intention?

63. Can a concerted practice be inferred from
circumstantial evidence alone?
• A question of the use of economic evidence in
competition cases
• Parallel market behaviour alone in itself not a
concerted practice
• BUT: It may however amount to strong evidence of
such a practice if it leads to conditions of competition
which do not correspond to the normal conditions of
the market having regard to the nature of the products,
the size and numbers of undertakings, and the volume
of the said market power
– ECJ, case 48/69, ICI v Commission
• Oligopoly markets and economic evidence
– Joint dominance

64. The distinction between “agreement” and
“concerted practices”
• Overlapping concepts
• No precise distinction
– And no use for a precise distinction
• “Concerted practice” important mainly where the
Commission or the Courts is forced to rely upon
circumstantial evidence alone

65. Undertakings (market participants)

66. Competition law and math

67. Single economic unit doctrine
• Two or more separate legal undertakings can be treated as on
undertaking
– if the undertakings “form an economic unit within which the subsidiary
has no real freedom to determine its course of action on the market,
and if the agreements or practices are concerned merely with the
internal allocation of tasks as between the undertakings”
» Case 30/87, Corinne Bodson
• Agreements between two undertakings within a single
economic unit not regarded as an agreement “between”
undertakings
– Escapes the prohibition in article 101(1)

68. • The rationale:
– No freedom to take decisions regarding the market
conduct
» Regarded as unilateral conduct
» May be caught by article 102 if the undertaking has a dominant
market position
– Internal allocation of functions
• The other side of the coin:
– If a subsidiary engages in anti competitive agreements
the mother company will also be regarded as part of the
agreement

69. • The test of control
– If a parent company owns more than 50% of the shares
in a subsidiary interdependency is presumed
– Minority share holdings may also give control if combined
with specific rights attached to them
– One large shareholder and many small
– Joint control (50/50)
» Jointly controlled companies must belong to a single group of
companies to be regarded as part of one economic unit

70. The parent company’s responsibility for
infringements committed by subsidiary
• Case C-97/08 Akzo Nobel NV vs. Commission
”[W]here a parent company has a 100% shareholding in a subsidiary
which has infringed the Community competition rules (…) there is a
rebuttable presumption that the parent company does in fact exercise a
decisive influence over the conduct of its subsidiary (…) The Commission
will be able to regard the parent company as jointly and severally liable for
the payment of the fine imposed on its subsidiary”
100% (or close to) of shares in subsidiary gives rise to presumption
Parent company must show that the subsidiary acted independently on
market – difficult (impossible?)!
Maximum fine increases – 10% of group turnover
If parent company has been involved in prior cartel – increase in fine
Increased risk of being subject to specific increase for deterrence

71. Cross-border trade effect

72. Cross-border trade effect
• EU competition rules apply to practices which affect trade
between Member States
• Impact «within the internal market» («effects» doctrine)
• EU-based firms reach an anticompetitive agreement over
price/quantities on US markets – EU competition law is not applicable
• Non-EU based firms reach an anticompetitive agreement over
price/quantities on EU markets – EU competition law is applicable

73. Cross-border trade effect
1. Must be appreciable
2. Means decrease, increase or simply diversion of trade

74. Appreciable effect
• The stronger the market position of the undertakings concerned,
the more likely it is that an agreement or practice capable of
affecting trade between Member States can be held to do so
appreciably
• BPB Industries and British Gypsum, Case T-65/89
• BUT: appreciability requirement was also fulfilled when the sales of
the undertakings concerned accounted for about 5 % of the market
• Miller, Case 19/77

75. “Object” or “Effect”

76. • “The distinction between „infringements by object‟ and
„infringements by effect‟ arises from the fact that certain forms
of collusion between undertakings can be regarded, by their
very nature, as being injurious to the proper functioning of
normal competition”
• Competition Authority v BIDS and Barry Brothers, Case C-209/07

77. Object cases
• The object-category consist of “obvious restrictions of
competition”
• European Night Services v Commission, Joined cases T-374-375/94,
384/94
• The “object” rule can be described as a presumption rule:
• if object is found, harmful effects on competition are presumed
• certain types of agreements under normal market conditions always, or
almost always, restrict competition

78. Object cases
• Horizontal agreements:
• fixing prices
• sharing markets
• limiting outputs
• Vertical agreements
• Fixed and minimum resale price maintenance
• Absolute territorial protection
• Restrictions on passive sales
• Other cases, listed in the “block exemptions”

79. Effects cases
• All cases, not falling within the “object box”
• Negative effects on competition within the relevant market are
likely to occur when:
• the parties individually or jointly have or obtain some degree of market
power and
• the agreement contributes to the creation, maintenance or
strengthening of that market power or allows the parties to exploit such
market power.

80. Economics and competition

81. Economic theory usage
• How can the agreement hinder competition?
• Is collusion likely to occur on a given market?
• Is cooperation between competitors likely to succeed or fail?
Will it be easy or difficult?

82. The prisoners’ dilemma
Prisoner A
Prisoner B
Remain silent Confess
Remain silent 0, 0 25, 15
Confess 15, 25 20, 20
Firm A
Firm B
Collude Cheat
Collude 20, 20 15, 22
Cheat 22, 15 17, 17

83. The prisoners’ dilemma
• Prerequisites for a successful cartel and what complicates the
cartel?
• The problem of cheating?
• Efficiency, savings from the horizontal cooperation

84. What complicates collusion?
• Demand side
• Elastic demand (can the cartel set higher prices?)
• Balancing buyer power?
• Differentiated (vs homogenous products)
• Demand booms as a characteristics of the market)
• Non-stable demand

85. What complicates collusion?
• Supply side
• Low seller concentration
• Existence of competitors with elastic supply
• Ease of entry
• Cost assymmetries between cartel members
• Prior collusion history on the market (more attention from competition
authorities)

86. Need for the possibility of high gains
• Elastic and constant demand
• Potential fines? (active/inactive competition authorities)
• Members want and can cheat without being detected

87. Organisation
• Need to meet, agree
• Need to communicate regularly
• Many competitors vs “few” competitors
• Reinhard Selton, the Nobel prize winner in “Four are few and six are
many”:
• Profitable to collude if less than 5 cartel members
• More attractive to cheat if more than 5 cartel members

88. Thank you!
• Julija Jerneva
• Mobile: +371 29131597