The South China Sea dispute involves competing territorial claims among China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei to island groups and maritime areas in the South China Sea. There are disputes over sovereignty of the Paracel and Spratly Islands as well as maritime boundaries. The conference in Hanoi discussed potential solutions but China rejected calls to curb its actions and asserted its claims. Key issues include sovereignty, economic interests in potential oil, gas and fishing resources, and freedom of navigation in strategic shipping lanes.

1. The South China Sea Dispute

2. • Territorial disputes in the South China Sea involve both island
and maritime claims among seven sovereign states within the
region, namely Brunei, the People's Republic of
China, Taiwan, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam.
• There are disputes concerning both the Spratly and
the Paracel islands, as well as maritime boundaries in the Gulf
of Tonkin and elsewhere.
• There is a further dispute in the waters near the
Indonesian Natuna Islands.
CSIS, 2014

3. The interests of different nations include acquiring
fishing areas around the two archipelagos; the
potential exploitation of suspected crude
oil and natural gas under the waters of various parts
of the South China Sea; and the strategic control of
important shipping lanes.
US Department of State, 2014

4. The disputes involve both maritime boundaries and
islands. There are several disputes, each of which
involved a different collection of countries:
• Maritime boundary along the Vietnamese coast between
Vietnam, China, and Taiwan.
• Maritime boundary in the waters north of the Natuna
Islands between Indonesia, China, and Taiwan.
• Maritime boundary north of Borneo between Vietnam, China,
Taiwan, Malaysia, Philippines, and Brunei.
• Islands in the southern reaches of the South China Sea,
including the Spratly Islands between Vietnam, Malaysia, The
Philippines, Brunei, Taiwan, and China.
CSIS, 2014

5. • Maritime boundary off the coast
of Palawan and Luzon between the Philippines, China, and
Taiwan
• Islands in the northern reaches of the South China Sea,
including the Paracel Islands between Vietnam, China, and
Taiwan
• Maritime boundary in the Luzon Strait between the
Philippines and Taiwan, including islands
• Land in eastern part of Sabah (formerly North Borneo)
between Malaysia and the Philippines
• The nine-dash line area claimed by China which covers most
of the South China sea and overlaps Exclusive Economic
Zone claims of Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam
CSIS, 2014

6. Area of dispute Brunei China Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Taiwan Vietnam
The nine-dash line area
✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
Maritime boundary
along Vietnamese coast
✔ ✔ ✔
Maritime boundary
north of Natuna Islands
✔ ✔ ✔
Maritime boundary
north of Borneo
✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
Maritime boundary off
Palawan and Luzon
✔ ✔ ✔
Maritime boundary &
islands in Luzon Strait
✔ ✔
Islands in southern
South China Sea
✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
Islands in northern
South China Sea
✔ ✔ ✔
Land in eastern Sabah ✔ ✔

8. Background on South China Sea Islands
• Two island groups, Paracels and Spratlys.
• Paracels firmly in Chinese hands since January 1974, when
China seized islands from South Vietnamese government.
• Little land, huge area of water, nations cannot easily station
troops.
• Need for blue water navy, aircraft that refuel in the air.
• Resources: natural gas, oil, fishing.
• Important shipping lanes with 15% of world’s trade passing
through these sea lanes.
• End of Cold War created a power vacuum in the region.
The Guardian, 2013

9. 9
Competing Claims
• Six governments—Philippines, China, Taiwan, Vietnam,
Malaysia and Brunei have claims, very overlapping.
• China, Taiwan, and Vietnam claim all the islands—Malaysia,
Brunei, and Philippines claim some of them.
• Dobson and Fravel--China’s claims ambiguous, refusing to
draw clear “exclusive economic zones” (EEZ) to maximize
flexibility in negotiations.
• China’s claim based on history, artifacts, Zeng Ho voyages.
• Goes back to 1930s, but bolstered by March 1992 NPC
territorial law affirming China’s claim to the Spratly Islands
and authoring the PLAN to use force to protect its sovereignty.
The Guardian, 2013

10. 10
Points of Conflict
• Dispute began after UN Convention on the Law of the Sea
guaranteed exploitation rights of undersea resources to
state’s adjacent waters, so pushed state’s to make public
claims to offshore islands.
• Law of Sea set 200 mile offshore area as exclusive economic
zones (EEZs).
• Also gave states sovereign rights over continental shelf.
• Before this, China and Vietnam had fought over the Paracel
Islands in 1974.
US Department of State, 2014

11. 11
ASEAN Views and Efforts
• ASEAN hesitancy to air dispute in public and confront China,
although several members feel threatened.
• Indonesia sought to carry out “confidence building measures”
after 1991 to keep dispute from exploding but these efforts
have had limited success.
• 1992 ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea called on all
states to settle disputes peacefully and support regional
cooperation.
• Philippines (and Vietnam) as most strenuous resistor of China’s
efforts.
• 1995, President Ramos went on public television to challenge
China in Mischief Reef.
• In 1998, Philippines took journalists to see China’s building of
naval platforms at Mischief Reef, well inside Philippines 200
mile zone.
The Economist, 2013

12. 12
Cont.
• Philippines feels unable to defend itself due to weaker military.
• Vietnam fought with China in 1988 and lost 6 islands. Major
conflict with China over oil exploration.
• Vietnamese problems seen in isolation by ASEAN, until China
took Mischief Reef (Philippine’s claim) and until Vietnam joined
ASEAN.
• Now, as member of ASEAN, Vietnam tries to use ASEAN to
defend its interests, but receives only limited support. Feels it
must “bandwagon” on this issue.
• Critical role of Hangzhou meeting in April 1995, where ASEAN
criticized China behind closed doors.
• ASEAN maintains somewhat united front versus China and
before the Asian Crisis was buying lots of weapons.
The Economist, 2013

13. 13
China’s Statements and Activities
• Took Paracels by force in 1974 from South Vietnamese
government.
• Paracels as key base for military support in Spratlys.
• China professes conciliatory policy but most aggressive in
pursuing military solutions.
• 1990, Li Peng offered to resolve conflict peacefully
• Defense Chief, in 1993, Chi Haotian promised that China would
not use force.
• July 1995, Qian Qichen told ASEAN that China would insure
freedom of navigation.
• May 1996, China ratified the Law of the Sea Convention
CSIS, 2014

14. 14
Roots of Chinese actions?
• Garver sees PLAN pushing south, based on bureaucratic
energies—bases in Zhanjiang—that cannot be constrained by
the central government.
• Could also increase PLAN demand for funding.
• Dobson and Fravel call this a “talk and take” policy, and see it
due to bureaucratic conflict between PLA Navy (PLAN) and the
MOFA.
• Also see PLAN independence on Spratlys as pay-off to PLA for
supporting CCP in Tiananmen crackdown.
• Sovereignty issues, relating to “century of humiliation,” —
creates support for claims for Taiwan as well, which also appeal
to nationalism—key source of CCP legitimacy.
CSIS, 2014

15. Cont.
• In meeting in Shanghai, retired military leaders took hard-line
position, that they could not give up territories that might be
claimed by the next generation of Chinese.
• China keeps issue off multilateral agendas, preferring bilateral
discussions.
CSIS, 2014

16. 16
External forces
• Philippines pulls in U.S., while most ASEAN powers want to keep
the external powers out of the dispute.
• U.S. as hegemon, feels need to prevent conflict and insure right
of passage for all vessels.
• U.S. Defense Dept. in 1995 said the U.S. would insure free
navigation by escorting ships through the South China Sea if
conflicts broke out.
• Japanese enhanced security agreement with U.S. could get
them more involved in minesweeping and other support activity.
• Vietnam tried to pull U.S. in by giving oil concessions to U.S. oil
companies.
US Department of State, 2014

17. 17
How big a threat to regional peace?
• Dobson and Fravel do not see the South China Sea becoming
“a Chinese lake.”
• Much activity to date is establishing claims, outposts and then
threatening other country’s citizens who come too close to
claimed territories.
• Conflict limited by China’s limited capabilities--”even if China
were the hegemon some believe it to be, its military is
incapable of filling a hegemon’s shoes.”
• China has no aircraft carrier, but it does have power to refuel
in the air.
US Department of State, 2014

18. The Conference
• The two-day conference was held in Hanoi, Vietnam on 17th
and 18th November, 2014.
• It featured speeches by senior administration officials, and
remarks and discussion by an all-star line-up of South China
Sea experts, including representatives from China, India,
Japan, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam.
• The focus of the discussion was ideas for resolving differences
between the six claimants in the South China Sea.

19. MAJOR TAKEAWAYS FROM
THE CONFERENCE

20. • China rejected a motion by the Philippines seeking to curb its
actions in disputed waters.
• ASEAN Regional Forum got underway.
• Philippines called for disputes to be resolved within the
framework of the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea.
• China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi called the motion
premature.
• As negotiations stalled, China continued to assert its claims
with ships, an oil rig and by building structures on rocks in
waters thought to be rich in oil and gas.
CSIS, 2014

21. • China won’t budge from its stance on defence and maritime
rights, Wang said in a statement after meeting with
counterparts from ASEAN.
• China is keen to use a “dual-track” policy to resolve the
situation in the South China Sea and doesn’t approve of
anybody attempting to heighten tensions there, Wang said in
a separate statement.
• “It’s no understatement that what happens here matters not
just to this region and to the U.S. but it matters to everybody
in the world,” U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry
CSIS, 2014

22. 22
Potential Solutions
• Track II negotiations underway under Indonesian lead since
1990, leading to establishment of working groups on resource
assessment and development, marine scientific research,
environmental protection, biodiversity research, and legal
matters.
• Concept of joint exploration, setting aside territorial claims,
put forward by Li Peng in 1990
• But quite unclear what “joint exploration” means in practice.
• Valencia’s solution of a Spratly Management Authority (SMA)
to administer the region, with countries holding shares in the
authority and getting profits from resources.
• Current debate on ways to establish a “code of conduct” for
states in the region.
US Department of State, 2014

23. References
• The South China Sea: A sea of disputes | The Economist. 2014. The South China
Sea: A sea of disputes | The Economist. [ONLINE] Available at:
http://www.economist.com/blogs/banyan/2011/02/south_china_sea.
[Accessed 20 November 2014].
• Managing Tensions in the South China Sea | Center for Strategic and
International Studies. 2014. Managing Tensions in the South China Sea | Center
for Strategic and International Studies. [ONLINE] Available at:
http://csis.org/event/managing-tensions-south-china-sea. [Accessed 20
November 2014].
• Fourth Annual South China Sea Conference. 2014. Fourth Annual South China
Sea Conference. [ONLINE] Available at:
http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2014/07/229129.htm. [Accessed 20
November 2014].
• China Rejects Push at Asean to Curb South China Sea Activity - Bloomberg .
2014. China Rejects Push at Asean to Curb South China Sea Activity -
Bloomberg . [ONLINE] Available at: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-
08-09/south-china-sea-tension-seen-dominating-asean-ministers-meeting.
html. [Accessed 20 November 2014].