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Chapter 22 
Frontiers of Microeconomics 
TRUE/FALSE 
1. The science of economics is a finished jewel, perfect and unchanging. 
ANS: F DIF: 1 REF: 22-0 
NAT: Analytic LOC: The Study of economics, and definitions in economics 
TOP: economics MSC: Definitional 
2. In economics, a difference in access to relevant knowledge is called a behavioral asymmetry. 
ANS: F DIF: 1 REF: 22-1 
NAT: Analytic LOC: The Study of economics, and definitions in economics 
TOP: Asymmetric information MSC: Definitional 
3. Informational asymmetry may apply to a hidden action or hidden characteristic where the informed party may 
be reluctant to reveal relevant information. 
ANS: T DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Asymmetric information MSC: Applicative 
4. An example of asymmetric information is when a seller of a house knows more than the buyer about the 
house’s condition. 
ANS: T DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Asymmetric information MSC: Applicative 
5. Economists have found that asymmetric information is not very prevalent. 
ANS: F DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 
NAT: Analytic LOC: The Study of economics, and definitions in economics 
TOP: Asymmetric information MSC: Interpretive 
6. An example of an information asymmetry is when a worker knows more than his employer about his work 
effort. 
ANS: T DIF: 1 REF: 22-1 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Asymmetric information MSC: Interpretive 
7. The criminal actions of the top managers of corporations such as Enron, Tyco, WorldCom, and Adelphia are 
an example of moral hazard. 
ANS: T DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Moral hazard MSC: Applicative 
8. The problem of moral hazard is a problem of hidden action. 
ANS: T DIF: 1 REF: 22-1 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Moral hazard MSC: Interpretive 
9. The problem that arises when one person performs a task on behalf of another person is called the lemons 
problem. 
ANS: F DIF: 1 REF: 22-1 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Moral hazard MSC: Interpretive 
10. One of the things that employers can do to lessen the moral hazard problem involving their employees is to 
pay them in advance for their work. 
ANS: F DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Moral hazard MSC: Interpretive 
205
206  Chapter 22/Frontiers of Microeconomics 
11. In the employer-worker relationship, the employer is regarded as the principal and the worker is regarded as 
the agent. 
ANS: T DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Moral hazard MSC: Definitional 
12. The moral hazard problem and the desire of firms to lessen that problem serve as a plausible explanation for a 
firm paying above-equilibrium wages to its workers. 
ANS: T DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Moral hazard MSC: Interpretive 
13. The classic example of adverse selection is the market for used cars. 
ANS: T DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Adverse selection MSC: Interpretive 
14. The two major problems caused by asymmetric information are the moral-hazard problem and the principal-agent 
problem. 
ANS: F DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Asymmetric information MSC: Interpretive 
15. Signaling is an action taken by an uninformed party to induce an informed party to reveal information. 
ANS: F DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Screening | Signaling MSC: Definitional 
16. An example of signaling is a boyfriend giving an expensive, romantic gift to his girlfriend to convey his love 
for her. 
ANS: T DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Signaling MSC: Applicative 
17. Valerie prefers A to B and she prefers B to C. If Valerie's preferences are transitive, then she prefers A to C. 
ANS: T DIF: 1 REF: 22-2 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Transitivity MSC: Definitional 
18. The Condorcet voting paradox shows that outcomes based on dictatorial preferences do not always obey the 
property of transitivity. 
ANS: F DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Condorcet paradox MSC: Interpretive 
19. The Condorcet paradox implies that the order in which items are voted on under majority rule is unimportant. 
ANS: F DIF: 1 REF: 22-2 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Condorcet paradox MSC: Interpretive 
20. Condorcet explained his paradox in a 1951 book called Social Choice and Individual Values. 
ANS: F DIF: 1 REF: 22-2 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Condorcet paradox MSC: Interpretive 
21. The Condorcet paradox demonstrates that the order in which people vote on choices may influence the final 
outcome. 
ANS: T DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Condorcet paradox MSC: Interpretive
Chapter 22/Frontiers of Microeconomics  207 
22. Borda count is a voting method often used in polls that rank sports teams. 
ANS: T DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Borda count MSC: Interpretive 
23. Arrow’s impossibility theorem demonstrates the impossibility of the median voter theorem. 
ANS: F DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Arrow's impossibility theorem MSC: Interpretive 
24. Arrow's impossibility theorem shows that it is impossible to find a better voting system than pairwise majority 
voting. 
ANS: F DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Arrow's impossibility theorem MSC: Interpretive 
25. Majority rule will produce the outcome most preferred by the median voter. 
ANS: T DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Median voter theorem MSC: Definitional 
26. According to the median voter theorem, majority rule will produce an outcome that is inconsistent with 
transitive preferences. 
ANS: F DIF: 3 REF: 22-2 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Median voter theorem MSC: Interpretive 
27. An implication of the median voter theorem is that Republicans and Democrats will try to align their views 
with those of the median voter. 
ANS: T DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Median voter theorem MSC: Interpretive 
28. Political leaders are always aiming for an optimal combination of efficiency and equality. 
ANS: F DIF: 1 REF: 22-2 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Political economy MSC: Interpretive 
29. In the field of study called political economy, economists make use of insights from the field of psychology. 
ANS: F DIF: 1 REF: 22-2 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Political economy MSC: Definitional 
30. A satisficer is a person whose decisionmaking is the same as that predicted by mainstream economic 
models. 
ANS: F DIF: 2 REF: 22-3 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Behavioral economics MSC: Definitional 
31. Researchers have found that the systematic mistakes that people make in their decisionmaking include a lack 
of confidence in their own abilities. 
ANS: F DIF: 2 REF: 22-3 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Behavioral economics MSC: Interpretive 
32. Most economic models incorporate the assumption of rational behavior on the part of economic actors. 
ANS: T DIF: 1 REF: 22-3 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Behavioral economics MSC: Interpretive
208  Chapter 22/Frontiers of Microeconomics 
33. Studies of human decision-making have found that people do not give enough weight to a small number of 
vivid observations. 
ANS: F DIF: 2 REF: 22-3 
NAT: Analytic LOC: The Study of economics, and definitions in economics 
TOP: Behavioral economics MSC: Interpretive 
34. Studies of human decision making have found that people are reluctant to change their minds. 
ANS: T DIF: 2 REF: 22-3 
NAT: Analytic LOC: The Study of economics, and definitions in economics 
TOP: Behavioral economics MSC: Interpretive 
35. Evidence from experiments in which real people play the ultimatum game supports the idea that people care 
about fairness as well as about maximization of their personal wealth. 
ANS: T DIF: 2 REF: 22-3 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Behavioral economics MSC: Interpretive 
36. Based on studies of human decision making, many people care more about the fairness of a game than about 
their personal winnings. 
ANS: T DIF: 2 REF: 22-3 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Behavioral economics MSC: Interpretive 
37. The tendency of many people to procrastinate supports the view that people are consistent over time. 
ANS: F DIF: 2 REF: 22-3 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Behavioral economics MSC: Interpretive 
SHORT ANSWER 
1. Explain what is meant by asymmetric information. Identify and explain the two basic types of problems that 
arise when there is asymmetric information. 
ANS: 
Asymmetric information is present when there is a difference in access to relevant information. Examples include 
information differences between (1) a worker and his employer, (2) a buyer and seller, and (3) an insured person and 
his insurer. The two basic types of problems are (1) moral hazard, which is a problem of hidden actions and 
ordinarily involves a principal and an agent, and (2) adverse selection, which is a problem of hidden characteristics 
or lemons. 
DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 NAT: Analytic 
LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Asymmetric information 
MSC: Definitional 
2. Explain how the presence of asymmetric information in car insurance markets may lead people who are good 
drivers or even average drivers to choose not to buy car insurance unless the law requires it. 
ANS: 
Drivers (buyers and potential buyers of car insurance) know more about their driving habits than do the insurance 
companies (sellers of car insurance). The price of car insurance is likely to reflect the information asymmetry in that 
it incorporates more of a risk component than is really necessary to insure good and average drivers. Consequently, 
good and average drivers are priced out of the market and they rationally choose not to buy the insurance unless they 
are required to do so. 
DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 NAT: Analytic 
LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Asymmetric information 
MSC: Interpretive
Chapter 22/Frontiers of Microeconomics  209 
3. Explain the Condorcet paradox. To which type of voting system does it apply? 
ANS: 
The Condorcet paradox applies directly to pairwise majority voting. It shows that even if individual voters' 
preferences exhibit transitivity, that property does not follow through to outcomes of pairwise majority voting. 
Consequently, the order in which choices are put up, in pairwise fashion, affects the final outcome. Using choices A, 
B, and C, it may be the case, for example, that under pairwise voting voters choose A over B and B over C, but then 
they may choose C over A. This result can obtain even when individual voters' preferences are transitive; hence, the 
paradox. 
DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 NAT: Analytic 
LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Condorcet paradox 
MSC: Definitional 
4. Assume there are two major political parties: the Conservatives and the Liberals. What does the median voter 
theorem imply about the nature of the platforms (that is, policy stances) of the Conservatives and Liberals? 
ANS: 
The median voter theorem implies that political parties will set their platforms so as to appeal to the median 
(middle of the distribution) voter. Therefore, rather than adopting extreme views, the Conservatives and Liberals 
will both adopt platforms that are toward the middle of the road. 
DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 NAT: Analytic 
LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Median voter theorem 
MSC: Interpretive 
5. How have insights from the field of psychology influenced the thinking of economists in recent years? 
ANS: 
Insights from psychology have led some economists to question the assumption of rationality that pervades 
mainstream economic models. Evidence from experimental economics does raise serious questions about the 
rationality assumption. For example, most people may be concerned with the fairness of outcomes, in addition to the 
impact of those outcomes on their own well-being. An open question is: If the rationality assumption does not really 
reflect the behavior of real economic actors, then how important is it that we model other motivations, such as the 
desire for fairness, the tendency to procrastinate, overconfidence, etc.? 
DIF: 2 REF: 22-3 NAT: Analytic 
LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Behavioral economics 
MSC: Interpretive 
Sec00 
MULTIPLE CHOICE 
1. Which of the following is not correct? 
a. Economics is a study of the choices that people make and the resulting interactions they have with 
one another. 
b. Economists are not interested in finding new areas to study and new phenomena to explain. 
c. Economists are trying to expand their understanding of human behavior and society. 
d. The economics of asymmetric information, political economy, and behavioral economics are all 
topics at the frontier of microeconomics. 
ANS: B DIF: 2 REF: 22-0 
NAT: Analytic LOC: The study of economics, and the definitions of economics 
TOP: Frontiers of microeconomics MSC: Interpretive 
2. Asymmetric information, political economy, and behavioral economics 
a. are topics at the frontier of microeconomics. 
b. are topics that economists no longer research. 
c. are being studied as economists try to expand their understanding of human behavior and society. 
d. both a and c are correct. 
ANS: D DIF: 1 REF: 22-0 
NAT: Analytic LOC: The study of economics, and the definitions of economics 
TOP: Frontiers of microeconomics MSC: Interpretive
210  Chapter 22/Frontiers of Microeconomics 
3. When markets fail, which of the following is true? 
a. Government intervention can always improve outcomes. 
b. Government intervention can potentially improve outcomes. 
c. Government intervention can never improve outcomes. 
d. Markets do not fail. 
ANS: B DIF: 1 REF: 22-0 
NAT: Analytic LOC: The study of economics, and the definitions of economics 
TOP: Frontiers of microeconomics MSC: Interpretive 
Sec01-Asymmetric Information 
MULTIPLE CHOICE 
1. In economics, a difference in access to relevant knowledge is called a(n) 
a. relevancy frontier. 
b. knowledge gap. 
c. information asymmetry. 
d. information equilibrium. 
ANS: C DIF: 1 REF: 22-1 
NAT: Analytic LOC: The Study of economics, and definitions in economics 
TOP: Asymmetric information MSC: Definitional 
2. Informational asymmetry is a difference in 
a. efficiency. 
b. equality. 
c. relevant knowledge. 
d. signaling. 
ANS: C DIF: 1 REF: 22-1 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Asymmetric information MSC: Definitional 
3. Information asymmetry refers to 
a. the tendency of a person who is imperfectly monitored to engage in dishonest or otherwise 
undesirable behavior. 
b. the tendency for the mix of unobserved attributes to become undesirable from the standpoint of an 
uninformed party. 
c. an action taken by an informed party to reveal private information to an uninformed party. 
d. a difference in access to relevant knowledge. 
ANS: D DIF: 1 REF: 22-1 
NAT: Analytic LOC: The Study of economics, and definitions in economics 
TOP: Asymmetric information MSC: Definitional 
4. The 2001 Nobel prize in economics was awarded to George Akerlof, Michael Spence, and Joseph Stiglitz for 
their work on 
a. asymmetric information. 
b. political economy. 
c. behavioral economics. 
d. growth theory. 
ANS: A DIF: 1 REF: 22-1 
NAT: Analytic LOC: The Study of economics, and definitions in economics 
TOP: Asymmetric information MSC: Interpretive 
5. Which of the following relationships involves asymmetric information? 
a. An employee knows more than his employer knows about his work effort. 
b. A borrower knows more than the lender about his ability to repay the loan. 
c. The seller of a 30-year-old house knows more than the buyer about the condition of the house. 
d. All of the above are correct.
Chapter 22/Frontiers of Microeconomics  211 
ANS: D DIF: 1 REF: 22-1 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Asymmetric information MSC: Analytical 
6. Which of the following relationships involves asymmetric information? 
a. Patients can look up information regarding certain prescription drugs giving them the same 
information as their doctors. 
b. Consumer Reports allows customers of DVD players to know as much about the quality of various 
players as the store salesperson. 
c. Car Fax allows car buyers to obtain used-vehicle histories providing them with the same 
information as the dealership salesperson. 
d. The batter in a baseball game must guess whether the pitcher is going to throw a fastball, curveball, 
or change-up. 
ANS: D DIF: 1 REF: 22-1 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Asymmetric information MSC: Interpretive 
7. A driver knows more than his auto insurer about how cautiously he drives. This is an example of 
a. a hidden action. 
b. a hidden characteristic. 
c. adverse selection. 
d. the Condorcet Paradox. 
ANS: A DIF: 1 REF: 22-1 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Asymmetric information MSC: Interpretive 
8. Frequently it is the case that: (1) A worker knows more than his employer about how much effort he puts into 
his job, and (2) the seller of a used car knows more than the buyer about the car's condition. 
a. Neither (1) nor (2) serves as an example of asymmetric information. 
b. Both (1) and (2) serve as examples of asymmetric information. 
c. Neither (1) nor (2) serves as an example of a hidden action. 
d. Both (1) and (2) serve as examples of hidden action. 
ANS: B DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Asymmetric information MSC: Analytical 
9. Asymmetric information 
a. is not an area of current research in economics. 
b. can take the form of a hidden action or a hidden characteristic. 
c. explains Arrow’s impossibility theorem. 
d. is uncommon in corporate management. 
ANS: B DIF: 1 REF: 22-1 
NAT: Analytic LOC: The Study of economics, and definitions in economics 
TOP: Asymmetric information MSC: Analytical 
10. Government action in cases of asymmetric information may not be an ideal solution because 
a. the private market can sometimes deal with information asymmetries on its own. 
b. the government tends to have more information than private parties. 
c. both (a) and (b). 
d. None of the above is correct. 
ANS: A DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Asymmetric information MSC: Interpretive
212  Chapter 22/Frontiers of Microeconomics 
11. Which of the following is an example of informational asymmetry? 
a. A seller of a house knows more about its true condition than does a potential buyer. 
b. A salesperson knows more about her efforts than does her manager. 
c. A child knows more about how much time he spent playing video games while he was alone in his 
bedroom than do his parents. 
d. All of the above are correct. 
ANS: D DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Asymmetric information MSC: Applicative 
12. When asymmetric information affects a relationship between two parties, it is always the case that 
a. neither party is well informed. 
b. one party is better informed than the other party. 
c. both parties are equally well informed. 
d. the government is better informed than either of the two parties. 
ANS: B DIF: 1 REF: 22-1 
NAT: Analytic LOC: The Study of economics, and definitions in economics 
TOP: Asymmetric information MSC: Interpretive 
13. Which of the following statements is correct? 
a. Hidden actions and hidden characteristics are both associated with the moral-hazard problem. 
b. Hidden actions and hidden characteristics are both associated with the adverse-selection problem. 
c. Hidden actions are associated with the moral-hazard problem, whereas hidden characteristics are 
associated with the adverse-selection problem. 
d. Hidden actions are associated with the adverse-selection problem, whereas hidden characteristics 
are associated with the moral-hazard problem. 
ANS: C DIF: 1 REF: 22-1 
NAT: Analytic LOC: The Study of economics, and definitions in economics 
TOP: Asymmetric information MSC: Definitional 
14. The problem that arises when one person performs a task on behalf of another person is called 
a. the hidden characteristics problem. 
b. the lemons problem. 
c. moral hazard. 
d. adverse selection. 
ANS: C DIF: 1 REF: 22-1 
NAT: Analytic LOC: The Study of economics, and definitions in economics 
TOP: Moral hazard MSC: Definitional 
15. Which of the following is not an example of a principal-agent relationship? 
a. a soccer player and her coach 
b. a man and his neighbor 
c. an construction worker and his foreman 
d. a driver and her insurance agent 
ANS: B DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Principals; agents MSC: Applicative 
16. Which of the following is not an example of a principal trying to solve the moral-hazard problem? 
a. the principal conducts an extensive interview of the agent 
b. the principal installs hidden cameras to monitor the agent’s behavior 
c. the principal pays the agent efficiency wages 
d. the principal pays the agent a year-end bonus 
ANS: A DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Moral hazard MSC: Applicative
Chapter 22/Frontiers of Microeconomics  213 
17. Which of the following would be an example of a principal trying to deal with a moral hazard problem? 
a. The parents of an infant secretly place video cameras in their house before the baby-sitter arrives. 
b. An insurance company checks police records to determine if its policyholders have received traffic 
citations. 
c. An employer examines his workers' output on a daily basis. 
d. All of the above are correct. 
ANS: D DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Moral hazard MSC: Interpretive 
18. Which of the following offers an explanation as to why the principal-agent problem exists for a firm? 
a. The firm cares less about profit and more about cost when there are many competitors in the 
market. 
b. The firm offers an employee-incentive program in which employees share in the firm’s profits. 
c. The firm operates in a market with many competitors forcing the firm to pay its employees more to 
keep them from switching to another firm. 
d. The firm operates to maximize profit while the employees attempt to work as little as possible to 
earn their paychecks. 
ANS: D DIF: 1 REF: 22-1 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Moral hazard MSC: Interpretive 
19. Which of the following practices would indicate that an employer is trying to overcome a moral-hazard 
problem with his employees? 
a. The employer pays his workers wages that are unusually high for the industry and region. 
b. The employer has voluntarily removed video cameras from the factory floor. 
c. The employer has discontinued the practice of giving his employees' year-end bonuses. 
d. Both A and B are correct. 
ANS: A DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Moral hazard MSC: Interpretive 
20. Which of the following is not an example of moral hazard? 
a. a person with car insurance drives recklessly 
b. a pet-sitter being paid to walk a dog for one hour per day only walks the dog for 20 minutes per day 
c. a thief steals a car 
d. All of the above are examples of moral hazard. 
ANS: C DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Moral hazard MSC: Applicative 
21. In the case of a moral-hazard problem, which of the following is not a way for the principal to encourage the 
agent to act more responsibly? 
a. the principal could better monitor the agent 
b. the principal could pay the agent above-equilibrium wages 
c. the principal could delay payment to the agent 
d. the principal could pay the agent below-equilibrium wages 
ANS: D DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Moral hazard MSC: Interpretive
214  Chapter 22/Frontiers of Microeconomics 
22. Which of the following is not an example of a moral hazard problem? 
a. A manager stays late one evening so that her employee can leave early to attend his child’s music 
recital. 
b. A small child takes an extra cookie from the cookie jar when he thinks his mom isn’t watching him 
closely. 
c. An employee plays solitaire on her computer at 4:30 p.m. on a Friday when her boss has left for the 
day. 
d. A customer whose new eyeglasses come with a “60-day insurance policy in case of breakage” 
leaves her glasses out where her new puppy can chew on them. 
ANS: A DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Moral hazard MSC: Applicative 
23. Moral hazard occurs when 
a. an employer closely monitors an employee. 
b. two people consider a trade with each other and one person has relevant information about some 
aspect of the product's quality that the other person lacks. 
c. an employee lacks an incentive to promote the best interests of the employer, and the employer 
cannot observe the actions of the employee. 
d. an employee closely monitors the actions of her employer. 
ANS: C DIF: 1 REF: 22-1 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Moral hazard MSC: Definitional 
24. The temptation of imperfectly-monitored workers to shirk their responsibilities is 
a. an example of the moral hazard problem. 
b. an example of the adverse selection problem. 
c. an example of screening. 
d. an example of signaling. 
ANS: A DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Moral hazard MSC: Interpretive 
25. Employers can try to overcome the moral-hazard problem involving their employees by 
a. paying their employees more often. 
b. paying their employees below-equilibrium wages since the employees will likely shirk some of 
their responsibilities. 
c. better monitoring their employees' work efforts. 
d. requiring their employees to take a pre-employment work effort test. 
ANS: C DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Moral hazard MSC: Interpretive 
26. Ed was recently hired as a salesman for a national consulting firm. His job involves spending a significant 
portion of his time out of the office visiting prospects and attending conferences. His firm is paying him a 
wage that is higher than the equilibrium wage, but he receives much of his income in quarterly bonuses based 
on how much he sells. 
a. The consulting firm is trying to prevent adverse selection with its compensation strategy. 
b. Ed has an incentive to go golfing with his buddies rather than conducting sales meetings. 
c. The consulting firm is responding to the moral hazard problem with its compensation strategy. 
d. Ed should quit this job and take a job where he gets paid an equilibrium wage more frequently. 
ANS: C DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Moral hazard MSC: Interpretive
Chapter 22/Frontiers of Microeconomics  215 
27. Ed was recently hired as a salesman for a national consulting firm. His job responsibilities involve spending a 
significant portion of his time out of the office visiting prospects and attending conferences. Which of the 
following is strategy the consulting firm may employ to discourage Ed from shirking his responsibilities? 
a. Tell Ed that the shareholders want to earn a large profit this year. 
b. Pay Ed commissions on what he sells after the work has been completed. 
c. Allow Ed to set his own schedule and work from home frequently. 
d. Pay Ed a lower wage than he would earn in a similar job at another firm. 
ANS: B DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Moral hazard MSC: Interpretive 
28. Employers may choose to pay their workers a wage that exceeds the equilibrium wage according to 
a. efficiency-wage theories. 
b. equilibrium wage theories. 
c. screening theories. 
d. signaling theories. 
ANS: A DIF: 1 REF: 22-1 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Moral hazard MSC: Definitional 
29. An efficiency wage 
a. gives an employee an incentive to shirk his duties. 
b. is lower than the equilibrium wage for that position and region. 
c. is higher than the equilibrium wage for that position and region. 
d. both a and b are correct. 
ANS: C DIF: 1 REF: 22-1 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Moral hazard MSC: Definitional 
30. Which of the following is a plausible explanation for a firm paying above-equilibrium wages to its workers? 
a. It increases the probability that a worker who shirks will be caught. 
b. It discourages workers from shirking out of fear of losing their high-paying job. 
c. The Condorcet Paradox suggests that paying high wages will result in greater effort by employees. 
d. By paying a high wage, employers solve this adverse selection problem and motivate the 
employees to work harder. 
ANS: B DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Moral hazard MSC: Interpretive 
31. Jason buys automobile insurance from No Wreck Insurance Company. If Jason avoids having an accident for 
three years, No Wreck will reduce the price he has to pay for his insurance. Nevertheless, he routinely drives 
fast and with reckless abandon. 
a. This is an adverse selection problem which should be corrected with government intervention. 
b. Jason is a principal and No Wreck is an agent in this principal-agent problem. 
c. This is a moral hazard problem. 
d. There is no way for No Wreck to determine whether Jason is a cautious or risky driver. 
ANS: C DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Moral hazard MSC: Interpretive 
32. Robert borrowed some money from Granite Bank, telling the loan officer that he intended to use the money to 
make repairs to his home. After getting the loan, Robert and his girlfriend immediately took the money and 
headed to the nearest riverboat casino for a weekend of gambling and entertainment. 
a. This is an example of adverse selection since banks have difficulty selecting their customers. 
b. This is a typical example of the Condorcet Paradox. 
c. From the given information, Robert is the principal and his girlfriend is the agent. 
d. From the given information, Granite Bank is the principal and Robert is the agent.
216  Chapter 22/Frontiers of Microeconomics 
ANS: D DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Moral hazard MSC: Interpretive 
33. When a night watchman only performs two walk-throughs per night when he is being paid to perform five 
walk-throughs per night, it is an example of 
a. both moral hazard and adverse selection. 
b. neither moral hazard nor adverse selection. 
c. moral hazard, but not adverse selection. 
d. adverse selection, but not moral hazard. 
ANS: C DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Moral hazard | adverse selection MSC: Applicative 
34. A radio story reported a study on the makes and models of cars that were observed going through intersections 
in the Washington, D.C. area without stopping at the stop signs. According to the story, Volvos were heavily 
overrepresented; the fraction of cars running stop signs that were Volvos was much greater than the fraction of 
Volvos in the total population of cars in the D.C. area. This is initially surprising because Volvo has built a 
reputation as an especially safe car that appeals to sensible, safety-conscious drivers. How is this observation 
best explained? 
a. Volvo drivers are not willing to take risks that they would take in another, less safe car. Driving a 
Volvo leads to a propensity to run stop signs. 
b. Volvo drivers are not willing to take risks that they would take in another, less safe car. Driving a 
Volvo reduces the propensity to run stop signs. 
c. Volvo drivers are willing to take risks that they would not take in another, less safe car. Driving a 
Volvo reduces the propensity to run stop signs. 
d. Volvo drivers are willing to take risks that they would not take in another, less safe car. Driving a 
Volvo leads to a propensity to run stop signs. 
ANS: D DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Moral hazard MSC: Analytical 
35. Suppose you are covered under health insurance or belong to a Health Maintenance Organization (HMO), and 
you are insured against all or most of the costs of visits to the doctor. As a result you are likely to make 
greater use of medical services of all kinds. This tendency of people with insurance to change their behavior in 
a way that leads to more claims against the insurance company is called 
a. adverse selection. 
b. moral hazard. 
c. screening 
d. signaling. 
ANS: B DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Moral hazard MSC: Interpretive 
36. Bill owns a small business in Milwaukee. He travels frequently, meeting with important customers, and 
attending conferences. Bill hired Nicole to work in the Milwaukee office as the day-to-day general manager of 
the business. 
a. This is a moral hazard problem since Nicole may not work as hard as Bill would like when she is 
not monitored. 
b. Bill choosing to hire Nicole is an example of adverse selection since it is possible that Nicole will 
not work as hard as Bill expects. 
c. Bill will most likely pay Nicole a lower salary than normal since Bill will not be there to monitor 
Nicole’s work effort, and since Nicole will not likely work hard knowing Bill cannot monitor her 
effort. 
d. The Condorcet Paradox implies that Nicole will not work as hard as Bill would like even though he 
will likely pay her an above equilibrium wage. 
ANS: A DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Moral hazard MSC: Interpretive
Chapter 22/Frontiers of Microeconomics  217 
37. When new professors are hired, their job performance is monitored closely. If they meet their institution's 
standards, they will eventually receive tenure. After receiving tenure, professors' job performance is less 
closely monitored, and they become difficult to fire. Tenure thus creates 
a. adverse selection. 
b. a Condorcet paradox. 
c. a screening problem. 
d. moral hazard. 
ANS: D DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Moral hazard MSC: Interpretive 
38. Carlos, who knows nothing about construction, paid Joe to remodel a room in his house. Two years later, one 
wall in the remodeled room crumbled because Joe used poor-quality materials. This illustrates which 
economic problem? 
a. Adverse selection 
b. Screening 
c. Moral hazard 
d. Signaling 
ANS: C DIF: 1 REF: 22-1 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Moral hazard MSC: Interpretive 
39. John goes to work 8 hours per day, but while he is at work he spends most of his time visiting internet sites 
that provide him with information on his favorite hobby. This is an example of 
a. the Condorcet Paradox. 
b. signaling. 
c. moral hazard. 
d. screening. 
ANS: C DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Moral hazard MSC: Interpretive 
40. In corporations, a principal-agent problem can arise when 
a. the shareholders are the principal and the managers are the agent. 
b. the board of directors is the principal and the managers are the agent. 
c. the shareholders are the principal and the board of directors is the agent. 
d. All of the above are correct. 
ANS: D DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Moral hazard MSC: Interpretive 
41. In corporations, which of the following are agents but not principals? 
a. shareholders 
b. the board of directors 
c. managers 
d. workers 
ANS: D DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Moral hazard MSC: Interpretive 
42. In corporations, which of the following are principals but not agents? 
a. shareholders 
b. the board of directors 
c. managers 
d. workers 
ANS: A DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Moral hazard MSC: Interpretive
218  Chapter 22/Frontiers of Microeconomics 
43. Insurance companies charge annual premiums to collect revenue, which they then use to pay customers who 
file claims for damages they incur. As a result of the moral hazard problem (1) what is the percentage of 
policy holders making claims, and (2) what is the average premium charged when compared to a world with 
no moral hazard problem? 
a. The percentage of policy holders making claims is higher; average annual premiums are lower. 
b. The percentage of policy holders making claims is lower; average annual premiums are lower. 
c. The percentage of policy holders making claims is higher; average annual premiums are higher. 
d. The percentage of policy holders making claims is lower; average annual premiums are higher. 
ANS: C DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Moral hazard MSC: Analytical 
44. Insurance companies charge annual premiums to collect revenue, which they then use to pay customers who 
file claims for damages they incur. Because of the moral hazard problem insurance companies separate 
customers into groups. Group 1: customers who file few claims  Group 2: customers that file a lot of claims. 
After creating these groups, what happens to the average annual premium within a group? 
a. Group 1: average annual premium increases 
Group 2: average annual premium increases 
b. Group 1: average annual premium decreases 
Group 2: average annual premium increases 
c. Group 1: average annual premium increases 
Group 2: average annual premium decreases 
d. Group 1: average annual premium decreases 
Group 2: average annual premium decreases 
ANS: B DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Moral hazard MSC: Analytical 
45. Which of the following is a characteristic of a corporation but not of a small family-owned business? 
a. The firm buys inputs in markets for the factors of production. 
b. The firm sells output in markets for goods and services. 
c. The firm is guided in its decisions by the objective of profit maximization. 
d. The firm faces a principal-agent problem created by the separation of ownership and control. 
ANS: D DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Moral hazard MSC: Interpretive 
46. Adverse selection is 
a. the tendency of a person who is imperfectly monitored to engage in dishonest or otherwise 
undesirable behavior. 
b. an action taken by an uninformed party to induce an informed party to reveal information. 
c. the failure of majority voting to produce transitive preferences for society. 
d. the tendency for the mix of unobserved attributes to become undesirable from the standpoint of an 
uninformed party. 
ANS: D DIF: 1 REF: 22-1 
NAT: Analytic LOC: The Study of economics, and definitions in economics 
TOP: Adverse selection MSC: Definitional 
47. When homeowners sell a house, part of the paperwork they complete is a statement of disclosure on which the 
homeowners are supposed to reveal everything that they know is wrong with the house. The purpose of the 
statement of disclosure is to try to solve the 
a. principal-agent problem. 
b. moral-hazard problem. 
c. adverse-selection problem. 
d. signaling problem. 
ANS: C DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Adverse selection MSC: Applicative
Chapter 22/Frontiers of Microeconomics  219 
48. Steve is planning to sell his home. In preparation for the sale, he paints all of the ceilings in his house to cover 
up water stains from his leaking roof so that potential buyers will be unaware of this problem. This is an 
example of 
a. moral hazard. 
b. screening. 
c. adverse selection. 
d. the principal-agent problem. 
ANS: C DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Adverse selection MSC: Interpretive 
49. Adverse selection may lead to 
a. owners of used cars choosing to keep them rather than sell them at the low price that skeptical 
buyers are willing to pay. 
b. wages being stuck above the level that balances supply and demand, resulting in unemployment. 
c. buyers with low risk choosing to remain uninsured because the policies they are offered fail to 
reflect their true characteristics. 
d. All of the above are correct. 
ANS: D DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Adverse selection MSC: Interpretive 
50. Which of the following is not correct? 
a. An example of adverse selection is man who tries to sell his used car without disclosing that it 
needs a new transmission. 
b. The “invisible hand” of a free market will always fix the problems of adverse selection and moral 
hazard. 
c. An employer may try to prevent a moral hazard problem by paying her workers an efficiency wage. 
d. One interpretation of gift giving is that it reflects asymmetric information and signaling. 
ANS: B DIF: 3 REF: 22-1 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Adverse selection, moral hazard, signaling MSC: Interpretive 
51. The buyer runs a risk of being sold a good of low quality when there is 
a. a principal-agent problem. 
b. a moral-hazard problem. 
c. a problem involving hidden actions. 
d. a problem involving hidden characteristics. 
ANS: D DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 
NAT: Analytic LOC: The Study of economics, and definitions in economics 
TOP: Adverse selection MSC: Interpretive 
52. When a jeweler sells a low quality diamond to a young man who believes the diamond is the highest quality, 
she is engaging in 
a. both moral hazard and adverse selection. 
b. neither moral hazard nor adverse selection. 
c. moral hazard, but not adverse selection. 
d. adverse selection, but not moral hazard. 
ANS: D DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Moral hazard | adverse selection MSC: Applicative 
53. A life insurance company requires new applicants to have a medical exam prior to writing the insurance 
policy. This requirement is an example of 
a. signaling. 
b. screening. 
c. moral hazard. 
d. adverse selection.
220  Chapter 22/Frontiers of Microeconomics 
ANS: B DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Adverse selection MSC: Interpretive 
54. Which of the following is an example of an adverse selection problem? 
a. A customer purchases four apples, two of which are inedible. 
b. A card shop puts its Halloween merchandise on sale on November 1st. 
c. A young worker is fired after she is late for work three times in one month. 
d. A man whose father had a heart attack wants to increase his life insurance coverage. 
ANS: D DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Adverse selection MSC: Applicative 
55. The Latin term caveat emptor, meaning let the buyer beware, brings to mind the problem of 
a. hidden actions. 
b. adverse selection. 
c. principals and agents. 
d. moral hazard. 
ANS: B DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 
NAT: Analytic LOC: The Study of economics, and definitions in economics 
TOP: Adverse selection MSC: Interpretive 
56. When the buyer knows less than the seller about the characteristics of the good being sold, there is 
a. a principal-agent problem. 
b. a moral hazard problem. 
c. an adverse selection problem. 
d. a signaling problem. 
ANS: C DIF: 1 REF: 22-1 
NAT: Analytic LOC: The Study of economics, and definitions in economics 
TOP: Adverse selection MSC: Definitional 
57. The classic example of adverse selection is the 
a. market for used cars. 
b. market for new cars. 
c. relationship between shareholders and managers. 
d. relationship between a coach and an athlete. 
ANS: A DIF: 1 REF: 22-1 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Adverse selection MSC: Interpretive 
58. The fact that someone with a high risk of medical problems is likely to buy a large amount of health insurance 
is an example of 
a. adverse selection. 
b. monitoring. 
c. moral hazard. 
d. screening. 
ANS: A DIF: 1 REF: 22-1 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Adverse selection MSC: Interpretive 
59. The adverse selection problem is a likely explanation for the fact that 
a. a few months after a new car is purchased, its value decreases very little. 
b. some corporate managers were recently sent to prison for enriching themselves at the expense of 
shareholders. 
c. people in average health may be discouraged from buying health insurance by the high price. 
d. gifts can be interpreted as signals. 
ANS: C DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Adverse selection MSC: Interpretive
Chapter 22/Frontiers of Microeconomics  221 
60. Because people with hidden health problems are more likely to buy health insurance than are other people, 
a. the price of health insurance reflects the costs of a sicker-than-average person. 
b. the price of health insurance is too low, relative to the socially-optimal price. 
c. people in average health may be encouraged to buy too much health insurance, relative to the 
socially-optimal quantity. 
d. the Condorcet Paradox suggests that people who are sicker than average will ultimately buy more 
health insurance. 
ANS: A DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Adverse selection MSC: Interpretive 
61. Severe adverse-selection problems may result in 
a. too few good used cars being offered for sale. 
b. wages that are too low relative to equilibrium levels. 
c. too many good drivers buying too much automobile insurance. 
d. people with average health buying too much health insurance. 
ANS: A DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Adverse selection MSC: Interpretive 
62. Signaling refers to actions by an informed party for the sole purpose of 
a. telling another party that the signaler has information to reveal, without actually revealing that 
information. 
b. conveying false information. 
c. confusing another party. 
d. credibly revealing private information. 
ANS: D DIF: 1 REF: 22-1 
NAT: Analytic LOC: The Study of economics, and definitions in economics 
TOP: Signaling MSC: Definitional 
63. Effective signals 
a. convey useful information from informed parties to uninformed parties. 
b. impose little or no cost on the signaler. 
c. cannot be conveyed accurately when there is an information asymmetry. 
d. can be used by employers to alleviate the moral hazard problem in the workplace. 
ANS: A DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Signaling MSC: Interpretive 
64. Which of the following is not an example of signaling? 
a. screening 
b. advertising 
c. getting an education 
d. gift giving 
ANS: A DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Signaling MSC: Applicative 
65. A woman gives her boyfriend a birthday present. The gift could be viewed by the boyfriend as a 
a. moral hazard problem. 
b. screening device. 
c. signal of how much she cares for him. 
d. All of the above are correct. 
ANS: C DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Signaling MSC: Interpretive
222  Chapter 22/Frontiers of Microeconomics 
66. A brand of wine is priced at only $5 per bottle, far below the market price of most high quality wines. Before 
any reputation exists for the wine, consumers buy very little of this inexpensive wine because they interpret 
the low price to mean that the wine is of poor quality. The company decides to change the label on the wine to 
show that it has won awards for quality. This label change is an example of 
a. signaling. 
b. screening. 
c. selecting. 
d. All of the above are correct. 
ANS: A DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Signaling MSC: Interpretive 
67. If the seller of a used car offers a limited warranty, the warranty is an example of a(n) 
a. signal. 
b. screen. 
c. efficiency wage. 
d. agent. 
ANS: A DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Signaling MSC: Applicative 
68. A firm with a very good product 
a. has a higher cost of signaling (advertising) than does a firm with an inferior product. 
b. has more to gain by signaling (advertising) than does a firm with an inferior product. 
c. does not need to signal (advertise) because the product’s quality speaks for itself. 
d. will signal (advertise) effectively if signaling is free. 
ANS: B DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Signaling MSC: Interpretive 
69. Which of the following is an example of signaling? 
a. Graduates of highly-respected universities highlight that fact on their resumes. 
b. Magazine advertisements include the phrase as seen on TV. 
c. Advertisements for universities include the phrase fully accredited. 
d. All of the above are correct. 
ANS: D DIF: 1 REF: 22-1 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Signaling MSC: Interpretive 
70. Which of the following events best exemplifies the concept of signaling? 
a. A college student's parents, having learned that their child is short of money, send her a check for 
$1,000. 
b. A woman, who is trying to win the love of a certain man, buys him a very personal gift. 
c. A grocery store maintains a policy of examining the driver's license of everyone who writes a 
personal check to purchase his groceries. 
d. A university maintains a policy of considering for admission only those students who graduated 
among the top ten percent of their high school class. 
ANS: B DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Signaling MSC: Interpretive 
71. Joe's Computers builds and sells computers for the local retail market. Since Joe's business does not have the 
name recognition of some of the bigger computer retailers, Joe advertises a One-Year Money Back 
Guarantee to indicate to buyers that his product is of high quality. This guarantee is an example of 
a. screening. 
b. signaling. 
c. the seller's curse. 
d. the principal-agent problem.
Chapter 22/Frontiers of Microeconomics  223 
ANS: B DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Signaling MSC: Interpretive 
72. Which of the following is an example of signaling? 
a. John is considering the purchase of a used car. Before making the purchase he has the car checked 
by an auto mechanic. 
b. Steve is applying for a new life insurance policy. Before writing the policy, the insurance company 
requires Steve to be examined by a doctor. 
c. Traci is applying for a new job. Before hiring her, the firm requires Traci to take a drug test. 
d. Ray is planning to ask for Honna's hand in marriage. Before asking her, he buys her a box of her 
favorite chocolates and takes her to dinner at her favorite restaurant. 
ANS: D DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Signaling MSC: Interpretive 
73. Screening occurs when 
a. an informed party acts to reveal his private information. 
b. an informed party acts to conceal his private information. 
c. an uninformed party acts to induce the informed party to reveal private information. 
d. one informed party acts to prevent another informed party from revealing private information. 
ANS: C DIF: 1 REF: 22-1 
NAT: Analytic LOC: The Study of economics, and definitions in economics 
TOP: Screening MSC: Definitional 
74. An insurance company that writes automobile policies tries to separate safe drivers from risky drivers by 
offering policies that feature different deductibles and different premiums. This practice is best described as an 
example of 
a. screening. 
b. behavioral economics. 
c. the Condorcet Paradox. 
d. signaling. 
ANS: A DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Screening MSC: Interpretive 
75. A safe driver would likely choose an auto insurance policy with a 
a. low premium and a high deductible. 
b. high premium and a high deductible. 
c. high premium and a low deductible. 
d. high premium and no deductible. 
ANS: A DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Screening MSC: Interpretive 
76. An unhealthy person would likely choose a medical insurance policy with a 
a. low premium and a high deductible. 
b. high premium and a high deductible. 
c. high premium and no deductible. 
d. The unhealthy person would choose not to be insured. 
ANS: C DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Screening MSC: Interpretive
224  Chapter 22/Frontiers of Microeconomics 
77. An airline knows that business travelers have more inelastic demand for travel than vacationers. That is, 
business travelers are often willing to pay more for airline tickets than vacationers. The airline also knows that 
business travelers do not like to travel over weekends. When customers request airline tickets that do not 
involve travel over a weekend, the airline determines that a traveler is likely a business traveler and charges a 
higher price. This is an example of 
a. moral hazard. 
b. signaling. 
c. screening. 
d. adverse selection. 
ANS: C DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Screening MSC: Interpretive 
78. Suppose that an economics department is offering a student exchange program with a university in Moscow, 
Russia. If the department requires students to submit an essay in order to be considered for the program, the 
essay may be an example of a(n) 
a. signal. 
b. screen. 
c. efficiency wage. 
d. principal. 
ANS: B DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Screening MSC: Applicative 
79. On car insurance policies, State Ranch Insurance Company offers drivers an option: Policy 1 features a 
deductible of $1,000, and it requires a driver to pay an annual premium of $500. Policy 2 features a deductible 
of $500, and it requires a driver to pay an annual premium of $750. 
a. In offering these two policies, State Ranch is engaging in illegal price discrimination. 
b. In offering these two policies, State Ranch is screening drivers. 
c. Policy 1 is more of a burden for safe drivers than it is for risky drivers. 
d. In offering these two policies, State Ranch is signaling their quality to drivers. 
ANS: B DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Screening MSC: Analytical 
80. In view of the possible need for government action in markets where asymmetric information is a problem, 
which of the following is a valid concern? 
a. The government rarely has more information than the private parties. 
b. Private markets can sometimes deal with information asymmetries on their own. 
c. The government is itself an imperfect institution. 
d. All of the above are valid concerns. 
ANS: D DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Asymmetric information MSC: Interpretive 
Sec02-Political Economy 
MULTIPLE CHOICE 
1. The field of political economy 
a. casts aside most of the standard methods of economic analysis. 
b. is also referred to as the field of public choice. 
c. is also referred to as the field of macroeconomics. 
d. produces the conclusion that democratic principles rarely lead to desirable economic outcomes. 
ANS: B DIF: 1 REF: 22-2 
NAT: Analytic LOC: The Study of economics, and definitions in economics 
TOP: Political economy MSC: Definitional
Chapter 22/Frontiers of Microeconomics  225 
2. Which of the following sets of preferences can not satisfy the property of transitivity? 
a. Plan A is preferred to plan D. Plan D is preferred to plan B. Plan C is preferred to plan B. 
b. Plan A is preferred to plan B. Plan B is preferred to plan C. Plan A is preferred to plan C. 
c. Plan C is preferred to plan A. Plan B is preferred to plan A. Plan C is preferred to plan B. 
d. Plan D is preferred to plan C. Plan C is preferred to plan B. Plan B is preferred to plan D. 
ANS: D DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Transitivity MSC: Applicative 
3. The Condorcet paradox 
a. demonstrates that the order in which one votes on options may influence the outcome. 
b. demonstrates that majority voting by itself may not reveal the outcome that society wants. 
c. disproves Arrow’s impossibility theorem. 
d. Both a and b are correct. 
ANS: D DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Condorcet paradox MSC: Interpretive 
4. Suppose that residents of a town are asked to vote on the best way to improve the safety of an intersection. 
The three choices are: a stoplight, a 4-way stop, and a 2-way stop. When the mayor asks the residents to 
choose between a stoplight and a 4-way stop, the residents choose a 4-way stop. Then, when the mayor asks 
them to choose between a 4-way stop and a 2-way stop, they choose a 2-way stop. However, if the mayor 
firsts asks the residents to choose between a 4-way stop and a 2-way stop, they choose a 2-way stop. Then, 
when the mayor asks the residents to choose between a 2-way stop and a stoplight, they choose a stoplight. 
What does this example illustrate? 
a. Arrow’s impossibility theorem 
b. the Condorcet paradox 
c. a Borda count 
d. the median voter theorem 
ANS: B DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Condorcet paradox MSC: Applicative 
5. Suppose that residents of a town are asked to vote on the best day to improve the safety of an intersection. 
The three choices are: a stoplight, a 4-way stop, and a 2-way stop. The mayor asks the residents to assign 3 
points to their first choice, 2 points to their second choice, and 1 point to their last choice. The intersection 
will be controlled by the method that receives the most points. This voting scheme is called 
a. Arrow’s impossibility theorem. 
b. the Condorcet paradox. 
c. a Borda count. 
d. the median voter theorem. 
ANS: C DIF: 1 REF: 22-2 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Borda counts MSC: Applicative 
6. Which of the following sets of preferences satisfies the property of transitivity? 
a. Cookies are preferred to brownies. Brownies are preferred to ice cream. Ice cream is preferred to 
cookies. 
b. Cookies are preferred to pie. Brownies are preferred to pie. Pie is preferred to cookies. 
c. Cookies are preferred to ice cream. Ice cream is preferred to brownies. Cookies are preferred to 
brownies. 
d. Cookies are preferred to pie. Ice cream is preferred to cookies. Pie is preferred to ice cream. 
ANS: C DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Transitivity MSC: Applicative
226  Chapter 22/Frontiers of Microeconomics 
Table 22-1 
Three friends -- Tricia, Sarah, and Katie -- are deciding where to go together for vacation. They all agree that they 
should go to one of three places: Ireland, Italy, or Greece. They also agree that they will have two pairwise votes to 
determine where to go on vacation, with the majority determining the outcome on each vote. The first, second, and 
third choices for each person are as indicated in the table below. 
Tricia Sarah Katie 
First choice Ireland Italy Greece 
Second choice Italy Greece Ireland 
Third choice Greece Ireland Italy 
7. Refer to Table 22-1. If the first vote pits Ireland against Italy and the second vote pits Greece against the 
winner of the first vote, then the outcome is as follows: 
a. Ireland wins the first vote and Greece wins the second vote, so they go to Greece. 
b. Ireland wins the first vote and Ireland wins the second vote, so they go to Ireland. 
c. Italy wins the first vote and Italy wins the second vote, so they go to Italy. 
d. Italy wins the first vote and Greece wins the second vote, so they go to Greece. 
ANS: A DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Condorcet paradox MSC: Applicative 
8. Refer to Table 22-1. If the first vote pits Ireland against Greece and the second vote pits Italy against the 
winner of the first vote, then the outcome is as follows: 
a. Ireland wins the first vote and Italy wins the second vote, so they go to Italy. 
b. Ireland wins the first vote and Ireland wins the second vote, so they go to Ireland. 
c. Greece wins the first vote and Greece wins the second vote, so they go to Greece. 
d. Greece wins the first vote and Italy wins the second vote, so they go to Italy. 
ANS: D DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Condorcet paradox MSC: Applicative 
9. Refer to Table 22-1. If the first vote pits Italy against Greece and the second vote pits Ireland against the 
winner of the first vote, then the outcome is as follows: 
a. Italy wins the first vote and Ireland wins the second vote, so they go to Ireland. 
b. Italy wins the first vote and Italy wins the second vote, so they go to Italy. 
c. Greece wins the first vote and Greece wins the second vote, so they go to Greece. 
d. Greece wins the first vote and Ireland wins the second vote, so they go to Ireland. 
ANS: A DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Condorcet paradox MSC: Applicative 
10. Refer to Table 22-1. Depending on the order of the pairwise voting, 
a. the friends could go to either Ireland, Greece, or Italy. 
b. the friends could go to either Ireland or Greece, but they will not go to Italy. 
c. the friends could go to either Greece or Italy, but they will not go to Ireland. 
d. the friends could go to either Ireland or Italy, but they will not go to Greece. 
ANS: A DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Condorcet paradox MSC: Applicative 
11. Refer to Table 22-1. If the friends change their minds and decide to choose a vacation destination using a 
Borda count, then 
a. the friends will go to Ireland. 
b. the friends will go to Italy. 
c. the friends will go to Greece. 
d. A Borda count will not result in a single winner in this case.
Chapter 22/Frontiers of Microeconomics  227 
ANS: D DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Borda counts MSC: Applicative 
12. Which of the following is not correct? 
a. Pairwise voting never produces transitive preferences. 
b. The order of pairwise voting can affect the result. 
c. Majority voting by itself does not tell us what outcome a society really wants. 
d. No voting system can satisfy all of the following properties: unanimity, transitivity, independence 
of irrelevant alternatives, and no dictators. 
ANS: A DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Political economy MSC: Interpretive 
13. The field of political economy 
a. applies the methods of political science to microeconomics. 
b. applies the methods of political science to macroeconomics. 
c. is relevant to the issue of how active government should be in economic matters. 
d. integrates psychological insights to better understand individual choices. 
ANS: C DIF: 1 REF: 22-2 
NAT: Analytic LOC: The Study of economics, and definitions in economics 
TOP: Political economy MSC: Interpretive 
14. Recent developments in political economy 
a. render much of the traditional field of political science obsolete. 
b. render much of the traditional field of economics obsolete. 
c. illustrate the resolute nature of democracy. 
d. point to the fact that government is a less-than-perfect institution. 
ANS: D DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 
NAT: Analytic LOC: The Study of economics, and definitions in economics 
TOP: Political economy MSC: Interpretive 
15. The Condorcet voting paradox applies to situations in which voters 
a. decide between exactly two possible outcomes. 
b. decide among more than two possible outcomes. 
c. as a group have transitive preferences. 
d. choose the inferior candidate even though the majority preferred the better candidate. 
ANS: B DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Condorcet paradox MSC: Interpretive 
16. The Condorcet paradox 
a. proved that the Arrow impossibility theorem is wrong. 
b. was proved wrong by the Arrow impossibility theorem. 
c. serves as an example of the Arrow impossibility theorem. 
d. pertains to voting systems, whereas Arrow's Impossibility Theorem does not. 
ANS: C DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Condorcet paradox MSC: Interpretive 
17. Normally, we expect voters' preferences to exhibit a property called 
a. transitivity. 
b. transversality. 
c. normality. 
d. universality. 
ANS: A DIF: 1 REF: 22-2 
NAT: Analytic LOC: The Study of economics, and definitions in economics 
TOP: Transitivity MSC: Interpretive
228  Chapter 22/Frontiers of Microeconomics 
18. If preferences exhibit the property of transitivity, then 
a. the preferences are irrational. 
b. individuals prefer more government involvement in private markets than do people whose 
preferences are not transitive. 
c. preferences change over time more quickly than when preferences are not transitive. 
d. preferences satisfy one of the properties assumed to be desireable by Kenneth Arrow in Social 
Choice and Individual Values. 
ANS: D DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 
NAT: Analytic LOC: The Study of economics, and definitions in economics 
TOP: Transitivity MSC: Interpretive 
19. Which of the following statements captures the meaning of transitivity of preferences? 
a. If A is preferred to B, then B is less preferred than A. 
b. If A is preferred to B, and B is preferred to C, then A is preferred to C. 
c. If A is preferred to B and B is preferred to C, then the preference for A over B is stronger than the 
preference for B over C. 
d. If A is preferred to C, then there exists B such that A is preferred to B and C is preferred to A. 
ANS: B DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Transitivity MSC: Definitional 
20. The Condorcet voting paradox demonstrates that democratic outcomes do not always obey the property of 
a. narrowness of preferences. 
b. concavity of preferences. 
c. asymmetry of preferences. 
d. transitivity of preferences. 
ANS: D DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Condorcet paradox MSC: Interpretive 
21. The Condorcet paradox shows that 
a. allocations of resources based on majority rule are always inefficient. 
b. problems in counting votes can negate legitimate democratic outcomes. 
c. the order on which things are voted can affect the result. 
d. transitive preferences are inconsistent with rationality. 
ANS: C DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Condorcet paradox MSC: Interpretive 
22. Under majority rule, the order in which items are voted on is 
a. unimportant, and this is a lesson of the Condorcet paradox. 
b. unimportant, and this is a lesson of Arrow’s impossibility theorem. 
c. important, and this is a lesson of the Condorcet paradox. 
d. important, and this is a lesson of Arrow’s impossibility theorem. 
ANS: C DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Condorcet paradox MSC: Interpretive 
Table 22-2 
Three longtime friends-Fred, Barney, and Wilma-are deciding how they will spend their Sunday afternoon. They all 
agree that they should do one of three things: go to a movie, go to the beach, or go to a museum. They also agree 
that they will have two pairwise votes to determine how to spend their evening, with the majority determining the 
outcome on each vote. The first, second, and third choices for each person are as indicated in the table below. 
Fred Barney Wilma 
First choice Museum Beach Movie 
Second choice Beach Movie Museum 
Third choice Movie Museum Beach
Chapter 22/Frontiers of Microeconomics  229 
23. Refer to Table 22-2. If (1) the first vote pits museum against movie, and (2) the second vote pits beach 
against the winner of the first vote, then the outcome is as follows: 
a. Museum wins the first vote and museum wins the second vote, so they go to a museum. 
b. Museum wins the first vote and beach wins the second vote, so they go to the beach. 
c. Movie wins the first vote and movie wins the second vote, so they go to a movie. 
d. Movie wins the first vote and beach wins the second vote, so they go to the beach. 
ANS: D DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Condorcet paradox MSC: Applicative 
24. Refer to Table 22-1. If (1) the first vote pits museum against beach, and (2) the second vote pits movie 
against the winner of the first vote, then 
a. Museum wins the first vote and museum wins the second vote, so they go to a museum. 
b. Museum wins the first vote and movie wins the second vote, so they go to a movie. 
c. Beach wins the first vote and beach wins the second vote, so they go to the beach. 
d. Beach wins the first vote and movie wins the second vote, so they go to a movie. 
ANS: B DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Condorcet paradox MSC: Applicative 
25. Refer to Table 22-2. Which of the following statements is correct? 
a. In a pairwise election, movie beats beach. 
b. In a pairwise election, beach beats museum. 
c. In a pairwise election, museum beats movie. 
d. None of the above is correct. 
ANS: D DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Condorcet paradox MSC: Applicative 
26. Refer to Table 22-1. Which of the following statements is correct? 
a. In a pairwise election, beach beats movie. 
b. In a pairwise election, museum beats beach. 
c. In a pairwise election, movie beats museum. 
d. All of the above are correct. 
ANS: D DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Condorcet paradox MSC: Applicative 
27. Refer to Table 22-2. Which of the following statements is correct regarding the Condorcet paradox and the 
results of pairwise voting by Fred, Barney, and Wilma? 
a. The paradox implies that pairwise voting never produces transitive preferences, and so the voting 
by Fred, Barney, and Wilma fails to produce transitive preferences. 
b. The paradox implies that pairwise voting sometimes (but not always) produces transitive 
preferences, and the voting by Fred, Barney, and Wilma does produce transitive preferences. 
c. The paradox implies that pairwise voting sometimes (but not always) fails to produce transitive 
preferences, and the voting by Fred, Barney, and Wilma fails to produce transitive preferences. 
d. The paradox does not apply to the case at hand, because Barney's preferences are not individually 
transitive. 
ANS: C DIF: 3 REF: 22-2 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Condorcet paradox MSC: Interpretive 
28. Refer to Table 22-2. If Fred, Barney, and Wilma use a Borda count, rather than pairwise majority voting, to 
decide how to spend their afternoon, then they will go 
a. to a movie. 
b. to a concert. 
c. out to dinner. 
d. None of the above is correct; a Borda count fails to produce a winner in this instance.
230  Chapter 22/Frontiers of Microeconomics 
ANS: D DIF: 3 REF: 22-2 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Borda counts MSC: Applicative 
Table 22-3 
The citizens of Paradoxopolis will decide whether to build a new school, build a new park, or build a new road. 
Exactly one of the three choices will prevail, and the choice will be made by way of pairwise voting, with the 
majority determining the outcome on each vote. The preferences of the voters are summarized in the table below. 
Voter Type 
Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 
Percent of Electorate 25 35 40 
First choice School Park Road 
Second choice Park Road School 
Third choice Road School Park 
29. Refer to Table 22-3. If (1) the first vote pits school against park, and (2) the second vote pits road 
against the winner of the first vote, then the outcome is as follows: 
a. School wins the first vote and school wins the second vote, so they build a school. 
b. School wins the first vote and road wins the second vote, so they build a road. 
c. Park wins the first vote and park wins the second vote, so they build a park. 
d. Park wins the first vote and road wins the second vote, so they build a road. 
ANS: B DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Condorcet paradox MSC: Applicative 
30. Refer to Table 22-3. If (1) the first vote pits school against road, and (2) the second vote pits park 
against the winner of the first vote, then the outcome is as follows: 
a. School wins the first vote and school wins the second vote, so they build a school. 
b. School wins the first vote and park wins the second vote, so they build a park. 
c. Road wins the first vote and road wins the second vote, so they build a road. 
d. Road wins the first vote and park wins the second vote, so they build a park. 
ANS: D DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Condorcet paradox MSC: Applicative 
31. Refer to Table 22-3. Which of the following statements is correct? 
a. In a pairwise election, school beats road. 
b. In a pairwise election, road beats park. 
c. In a pairwise election, school beats park. 
d. All of the above are correct. 
ANS: C DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 
TOP: Condorcet paradox MSC: Applicative 
32. Refer to Table 22-3. Which of the following statements is correct? 
a. In a pairwise election, road beats school. 
b. In a pairwise election, school beats park. 
c. In a pairwise election, park beats road. 
d. All of the above are correct. 
ANS: D DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Condorcet paradox MSC: Applicative
Chapter 22/Frontiers of Microeconomics  231 
33. Refer to Table 22-3. Which of the following statements is correct regarding the Condorcet paradox and the 
results of pairwise voting in Paradoxopolis? 
a. The paradox implies that pairwise voting never produces transitive preferences, and so the voting in 
Paradoxopolis fails to produce transitive preferences. 
b. The paradox implies that pairwise voting sometimes (but not always) produces transitive 
preferences, and the voting in Paradoxopolis does produce transitive preferences. 
c. The paradox implies that pairwise voting sometimes (but not always) fails to produce transitive 
preferences, and the voting in Paradoxopolis fails to produce transitive preferences. 
d. The paradox does not apply to the case at hand, because the preferences of Type 3 voters are not 
individually transitive. 
ANS: C DIF: 3 REF: 22-2 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Condorcet paradox MSC: Interpretive 
34. Refer to Table 22-3. If the citizens of Paradoxopolis use a Borda count, rather than pairwise majority voting, 
to decide what to build, then they will build a new 
a. school. 
b. park. 
c. road. 
d. None of the above is correct; a Borda count fails to produce a winner in this instance. 
ANS: C DIF: 3 REF: 22-2 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Borda counts MSC: Applicative 
35. As an alternative to pairwise majority voting, each voter could be asked to rank the possible outcomes, giving 
1 point to her lowest choice, 2 points to her second-lowest choice, 3 points to her third-lowest choice, and so 
on. This voting method is called a(n) 
a. median vote. 
b. pairwise minority vote. 
c. Borda count. 
d. Arrow count. 
ANS: C DIF: 1 REF: 22-2 
NAT: Analytic LOC: The Study of economics, and definitions in economics 
TOP: Borda counts MSC: Definitional 
36. Economist Kenneth Arrow wrote a famous book in 1951 in which he took up the question, 
a. Is there a perfect voting system? 
b. Are preferences transitive? 
c. Is a dictatorship a good form of government? 
d. Should the president of the United States be elected to a single, six-year term? 
ANS: A DIF: 1 REF: 22-2 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Arrow's impossibility theorem MSC: Interpretive 
37. In his 1951 book, Social Choice and Individual Values, Kenneth Arrow defined a perfect voting system. 
That system includes which of the following features? 
a. unanimity 
b. transitivity 
c. absence of a dictator 
d. All of the above are correct. 
ANS: D DIF: 1 REF: 22-2 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Arrow's impossibility theorem MSC: Definitional 
38. In his 1951 book, Social Choice and Individual Values, Kenneth Arrow used the term unanimity to mean 
a. A beats B only if everyone prefers A to B. 
b. if everyone prefers A to B, then A beats B. 
c. if A beats B and B beats C, then A must best C. 
d. everyone who is eligible to vote must vote; otherwise, the outcome is invalid.
232  Chapter 22/Frontiers of Microeconomics 
ANS: B DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Arrow's impossibility theorem MSC: Definitional 
39. Arrow’s impossibility theorem shows that no voting system can satisfy which of the following properties? 
a. unanimity and transitivity only 
b. transitivity and independence of irrelevant alternatives only 
c. no dictators and transitivity only 
d. unanimity, transitivity, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and no dictators 
ANS: D DIF: 1 REF: 22-2 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Arrow's impossibility theorem MSC: Definitional 
40. One property of Kenneth Arrow's perfect voting system is that the ranking between any two outcomes A and 
B should not depend on whether some third outcome C is also available. Arrow called this property 
a. transitivity. 
b. pairwise perfection. 
c. independence of irrelevant alternatives. 
d. irrelevance of social choices. 
ANS: C DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Arrow's impossibility theorem MSC: Definitional 
41. Kenneth Arrow proved that the voting system that satisfied all of the properties of his perfect voting system 
was 
a. one in which a single person (a dictator) imposes his preferences on everyone else. 
b. pairwise majority voting. 
c. majority voting that is not pairwise. 
d. None of the above is correct. Arrow proved that no voting system can satisfy all of the properties 
of his perfect system. 
ANS: D DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Arrow's impossibility theorem MSC: Interpretive 
42. The Borda count fails to satisfy which of Kenneth Arrow's properties of a perfect voting system? 
a. no dictator 
b. unanimity 
c. transitivity 
d. independence of irrelevant alternatives 
ANS: D DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Arrow's impossibility theorem MSC: Interpretive 
43. The Arrow impossibility theorem shows that 
a. democracy should be abandoned as a form of government. 
b. it is impossible to improve upon democratic voting methods as a mechanism for social choice. 
c. all voting systems are flawed as a mechanism for social choice. 
d. the median voter’s preferences will always win in a two-way vote. 
ANS: C DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Arrow's impossibility theorem MSC: Interpretive 
44. Majority rule will produce the outcome most preferred by the median voter, as demonstrated by the 
a. Arrow impossibility theorem. 
b. Condorcet paradox. 
c. pairwise voting proposition. 
d. median voter theorem.
Chapter 22/Frontiers of Microeconomics  233 
ANS: D DIF: 1 REF: 22-2 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Median voter theorem MSC: Interpretive 
45. When each voter has a most-preferred outcome for the expenditure on a particular government program, 
majority rule will produce the outcome 
a. preferred by the mean (average) voter. 
b. preferred by the median voter. 
c. that causes the political party in power to increase its power. 
d. defined by Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem. 
ANS: B DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Median voter theorem MSC: Interpretive 
46. Assume there are nine voters in a certain small town and let x = the preferred number of dollars spent per 
person per month on garbage collection. For Voters 1, 2, and 3, x = $10; for Voter 4, x = $15; for Voter 5, x = 
$18; and for Voters 6, 7, 8 and 9, x = $20. The median voter is 
a. Voter 3. 
b. Voter 4. 
c. Voter 5. 
d. Voter 6. 
ANS: C DIF: 1 REF: 22-2 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Median voter theorem MSC: Interpretive 
47. The median voter 
a. is the voter exactly in the middle of the distribution. 
b. is the voter whose preferred outcome beats any other proposal in a two-way race. 
c. always has more than half the votes on his side in a two-way race. 
d. All of the above are correct. 
ANS: D DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Median voter theorem MSC: Definitional 
48. If the median voter theorem holds, 
a. a Borda count will violate the principle of transitivity. 
b. the Condorcet paradox also holds. 
c. minority views will not receive much consideration. 
d. All of the above are correct. 
ANS: C DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Median voter theorem MSC: Interpretive 
49. The assertion that the median voter is king refers directly to the result established by the 
a. Arrow impossibility theorem. 
b. Condorcet paradox. 
c. median voter theorem. 
d. Borda mechanism. 
ANS: C DIF: 1 REF: 22-2 
NAT: Analytic LOC: The Study of economics, and definitions in economics 
TOP: Median voter theorem MSC: Definitional 
50. According to the median voter theorem, majority rule will 
a. always produce an inconclusive outcome. 
b. produce the outcome least preferred by the median voter. 
c. produce the outcome most preferred by the median voter. 
d. produce an outcome that is inconsistent with transitive preferences.
234  Chapter 22/Frontiers of Microeconomics 
ANS: C DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Median voter theorem MSC: Definitional 
51. Arrow's impossibility theorem is disturbing in the sense that it proves that 
a. no voting system is perfect. 
b. only a dictator can produce a desirable social outcome. 
c. the preferences of the wealthy should be given more weight than the preferences of the poor. 
d. the centuries-old Condorcet paradox was not a paradox after all. 
ANS: A DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Arrow's impossibility theorem MSC: Interpretive 
52. The median voter's preferred outcome is the same as the 
a. average preferred outcome. 
b. outcome preferred by the greatest number of voters. 
c. outcome produced by majority rule. 
d. outcome preferred by Arrow’s “perfect” voter. 
ANS: C DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Median voter theorem MSC: Interpretive 
Scenario 22-1 
At issue in a particular city vote is how much to spend, per person, on road repair next year. Among the 10,000 
voters, 1,500 prefer to spend $300 per person, but no more; 2,800 prefer to spend $450 per person, but no more; 
3,500 prefer to spend $800 per person, but no more; and 2,200 prefer to spend $1500 per person, but no more. 
53. Refer to Scenario 22-1. The median voter is one who prefers to spend 
a. $300. 
b. $450. 
c. $800. 
d. $1500. 
ANS: C DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Median voter theorem MSC: Applicative 
54. Refer to Scenario 22-1. If there is a vote on whether to spend $600 per person or $800 per person, the median 
voter will vote to spend 
a. $600 per person and the voting outcome will be $600 per person. 
b. $600 per person and the voting outcome will be $800 per person. 
c. $800 per person and the voting outcome will be $600 per person. 
d. $800 per person and the voting outcome will be $800 per person. 
ANS: D DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Median voter theorem MSC: Applicative 
55. Refer to Scenario 22-1. If there is a vote on whether to spend $800 per person or $1100 per person, the 
median voter will vote to spend 
a. $800 per person and the voting outcome will be $800 per person. 
b. $800 per person and the voting outcome will be $1100 per person. 
c. $1100 per person and the voting outcome will be $800 per person. 
d. $1100 per person and the voting outcome will be $1100 per person. 
ANS: A DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Median voter theorem MSC: Applicative
Chapter 22/Frontiers of Microeconomics  235 
56. An implication of the median voter theorem is that, in a race between Republicans and Democrats, 
a. if Republicans want to win, they will take a “middle-of-the-road” stance on many issues. 
b. if Democrats want to win, they will take an extreme stance on many issues. 
c. Republicans and Democrats go to extremes to differentiate themselves from one another. 
d. Republicans and Democrats work hard to identify the fringe voters. 
ANS: A DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Median voter theorem MSC: Interpretive 
57. When Republicans and Democrats offer similar platforms in an election campaign, a likely explanation is the 
a. Arrow impossibility theorem. 
b. Condorcet paradox. 
c. median voter theorem. 
d. fact that politicians are more interested in the national interest than their own self-interest. 
ANS: C DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Median voter theorem MSC: Interpretive 
58. In American politics, we often observe that during a campaign, the Democratic and Republican positions on 
many issues are similar, which illustrates 
a. Arrow’s impossibility theorem. 
b. the Condorcet paradox. 
c. a Borda count. 
d. the median voter theorem. 
ANS: D DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Median voter theorem MSC: Applicative 
59. An implication of the median voter theorem is that 
a. minority views and majority views are given equal weight. 
b. platforms of the major political parties will not differ greatly. 
c. the logic of democracy is fundamentally flawed. 
d. behavioral economics plays a signficant role in voting outcomes. 
ANS: B DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Median voter theorem MSC: Interpretive 
Table 22-4 
Five voters must choose from among four options: A, B, C, or D. Each voter’s preferences are summarized in the 
table below. Options higher in the table are more preferred by the voter. 
Preferences Voter 1 Voter 2 Voter 3 Voter 4 Voter 5 
1st Choice D C B C A 
2nd Choice A B A D D 
3rd Choice B A D B C 
4th Choice C D C A B 
60. Refer to Table 22-4. If the vote were conducted according to a Borda count system where each person's first 
choice receives 4 points, second choice 3 points, third choice 2 points and fourth choice 1 point, the result 
would be 
a. that A would win. 
b. that B would win. 
c. that C would win. 
d. a tie between A and D. 
ANS: D DIF: 3 REF: 22-2 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Borda counts MSC: Applicative
236  Chapter 22/Frontiers of Microeconomics 
61. Refer to Table 22-4. If the vote were conducted according to a modified Borda count system where each 
person's first choice receives 10 points, second choice 5 points, third choice 3 points and fourth choice 1 point, 
the result would be 
a. that A would win. 
b. that B would win. 
c. that C would win. 
d. that D would win. 
ANS: C DIF: 3 REF: 22-2 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Borda counts MSC: Applicative 
62. Refer to Table 22-4. Which pairwise voting scheme would result in outcome B? 
a. First, choose between A and B. Second, voters choose between the winner of the first vote and C. 
Third, voters choose between the winner of the second vote and D. 
b. First, choose between B and C. Second, voters choose between the winner of the first vote and A. 
Third, voters choose between the winner of the second vote and D. 
c. First, choose between B and D. Second, voters choose between the winner of the first vote and C. 
Third, voters choose between the winner of the second vote and A. 
d. First, choose between C and D. Second, voters choose between the winner of the first vote and A. 
Third, voters choose between the winner of the second vote and B. 
ANS: D DIF: 3 REF: 22-2 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Pairwise voting MSC: Applicative 
63. Refer to Table 22-4. Which pairwise voting scheme would result in outcome D? 
a. First, choose between A and B. Second, voters choose between the winner of the first vote and C. 
Third, voters choose between the winner of the second vote and D. 
b. First, choose between B and D. Second, voters choose between the winner of the first vote and C. 
Third, voters choose between the winner of the second vote and A. 
c. First, choose between C and D. Second, voters choose between the winner of the first vote and A. 
Third, voters choose between the winner of the second vote and B. 
d. First, choose between C and D. Second, voters choose between the winner of the first vote and B. 
Third, voters choose between the winner of the second vote and A. 
ANS: A DIF: 3 REF: 22-2 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Pairwise voting MSC: Applicative 
64. Refer to Table 22-4. Which pairwise voting scheme would result in outcome A? 
a. First, choose between A and B. Second, voters choose between the winner of the first vote and C. 
Third, voters choose between the winner of the second vote and D. 
b. First, choose between A and C. Second, voters choose between the winner of the first vote and B. 
Third, voters choose between the winner of the second vote and D. 
c. First, choose between B and D. Second, voters choose between the winner of the first vote and C. 
Third, voters choose between the winner of the second vote and A. 
d. First, choose between C and D. Second, voters choose between the winner of the first vote and A. 
Third, voters choose between the winner of the second vote and B. 
ANS: C DIF: 3 REF: 22-2 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Pairwise voting MSC: Applicative
Chapter 22/Frontiers of Microeconomics  237 
Table 22-5 
The 500 voters of Appleton are deciding by majority rule how much to spend on a new library. 
Number of voters who most prefer this amount of spending 
$0 65 
$1 million 60 
$2 million 100 
$3 million 75 
$4 million 200 
65. Refer to Table 22-5. The median voter prefers to spend 
a. $2 million. 
b. $2.57 million. 
c. $3 million. 
d. $4 million. 
ANS: C DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Median voter theorem MSC: Applicative 
Table 22-6 
Voter Type 
Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 
Percent of electorate 55 25 20 
First choice X Y Z 
Second choice Y Z Y 
Third choice Z X X 
66. Refer to Table 22-6. The table shows the preferences of three types of voters over three possible outcomes: 
X, Y, and Z. In addition, the table shows the percentage of voters of each type. Based on this information, 
which of the following statements is true? 
a. As the Condorcet Paradox predicts, majority rule fails to produce transitive preferences for society. 
b. As Arrow's Impossibility Theorem demonstrates, it is impossible from this information to 
determine which outcome the voters prefer. 
c. The median voter theorem allows us to conclude that in a vote between X and Y, Y will win since 
the Type 2 voter is the median voter. 
d. While the Condorcet Paradox predicts that majority rule may not produce transitive preferences for 
society as a whole, society's preferences in this case are transitive. 
ANS: D DIF: 3 REF: 22-2 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Condorcet paradox MSC: Applicative 
67. Refer to Table 22-6. The table shows the preferences of three types of voters over three possible outcomes: 
X, Y, and Z. The table also shows the percentage of voters of each type. Based on this information, which 
voter type is the median voter? 
a. Type 1 
b. Type 2 
c. Type 3 
d. The median voter cannot be determined without knowing the pair of outcomes from which the 
voters will be choosing. 
ANS: A DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Median voter theorem MSC: Analytical
238  Chapter 22/Frontiers of Microeconomics 
68. Refer to Table 22-6. The table shows the preferences for three types of voters over three possible outcomes: 
X, Y, and Z. The table also shows the percentage of voters of each type. Based on this information, which of 
the following statements is true? 
a. In a vote between X and Y, X loses since only the Type 1 voters prefer X to Y. 
b. In a vote between Y and Z, Y wins getting 80% of the total vote. 
c. In a vote between X and Z, X loses getting only 45% of the total vote. 
d. Both a and b. 
ANS: B DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Median voter theorem MSC: Applicative 
Table 22-7 
Number of People Preferred Budget 
4 $20 
7 $30 
10 $ 0 
13 $40 
15 $10 
26 $50 
69. Refer to Table 22-7. The table shows the most preferred budget of 75 voters. In an election, each voter will 
select the budget closest to his or her most preferred budget. Using this information, what is the most preferred 
budget of the median voter? 
a. $10 
b. $20 
c. $30 
d. $40 
ANS: D DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Median voter theorem MSC: Analytical 
70. Refer to Table 22-7. The table shows the most preferred budget of 75 voters. In an election, each voter will 
select the budget closest to his or her most preferred budget. Which of the following statements regarding this 
information is true? 
a. In an election between a $33 budget and a $37 budget, the $33 budget will win. 
b. Since the median voter theorem implies that the budget of the median voter will win the election, 
we would expect the overall best budget to be $25, the median of the available budgets. 
c. In an election between a $10 budget and a $40 budget, the $40 budget will win. 
d. Both b and c. 
ANS: C DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Median voter theorem MSC: Analytical 
Table 22-8 
Voter Type 
Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 4 
Percent of electorate 32 20 15 33 
First choice W X Z Y 
Second choice X Z W W 
Third choice Y W Y Z 
Fourth choice Z Y X X
Chapter 22/Frontiers of Microeconomics  239 
71. Refer to Table 22-8. The table shows the preferences of four types of voters over four possible outcomes: W, 
X, Y, and Z. In addition, the table shows the percentage of voters of each type. Based on this information, 
which of the following statements is false? 
a. Outcome W is preferred to outcome X overall. 
b. Outcome X is preferred to outcome Y overall. 
c. Outcome Y is preferred to outcome W overall. 
d. Outcome W is preferred to outcome Z overall. 
ANS: C DIF: 3 REF: 22-2 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Condorcet paradox MSC: Analytical 
72. Refer to Table 22-8. The table shows the preferences of four types of voters over four possible outcomes: W, 
X, Y, and Z. In addition, the table shows the percentage of voters of each type. Suppose a Borda count election 
is held in which each voter ranks the four outcomes, giving 1 point to last place, 2 points to second to last, 3 
points to the second best, and 4 points to the best. In this case, which outcome would win? 
a. W 
b. X 
c. Y 
d. Z 
ANS: A DIF: 3 REF: 22-2 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Borda counts MSC: Analytical 
73. Refer to Table 22-8. The table shows the preferences of four types of voters over four possible outcomes: W, 
X, Y, and Z. In addition, the table shows the percentage of voters of each type. Suppose that, for some reason, 
W is eliminated as a possible option. Using a Borda count election, with 3 points for the best choice, 2 points 
for the second best choice, and 1 point for the last choice, which outcome would win this election? 
a. X 
b. Y 
c. Z 
d. There would be a three-way tie. 
ANS: B DIF: 3 REF: 22-2 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Borda counts MSC: Analytical 
Table 22-9 
Voter Type 
Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 
# Voters 40 15 45 
First choice C B A 
Second choice B A C 
Third choice A C B 
74. Refer to Table 22-9. The table shows the preferences of 100 voters over three possible outcomes: A, B, and 
C. If a Borda count election were held among these voters, giving three points to each voter's first choice, two 
points to the second choice, and one point to the last choice, which outcome would win the election? 
a. Outcome A 
b. Outcome B 
c. Outcome C 
d. Either outcome A or outcome C since these have the same total score. 
ANS: C DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 
NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models 
TOP: Borda counts MSC: Analytical
Microeconomics Chapter 22 Key Concepts
Microeconomics Chapter 22 Key Concepts
Microeconomics Chapter 22 Key Concepts
Microeconomics Chapter 22 Key Concepts
Microeconomics Chapter 22 Key Concepts
Microeconomics Chapter 22 Key Concepts
Microeconomics Chapter 22 Key Concepts
Microeconomics Chapter 22 Key Concepts
Microeconomics Chapter 22 Key Concepts
Microeconomics Chapter 22 Key Concepts
Microeconomics Chapter 22 Key Concepts
Microeconomics Chapter 22 Key Concepts
Microeconomics Chapter 22 Key Concepts

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Microeconomics Chapter 22 Key Concepts

  • 1. Chapter 22 Frontiers of Microeconomics TRUE/FALSE 1. The science of economics is a finished jewel, perfect and unchanging. ANS: F DIF: 1 REF: 22-0 NAT: Analytic LOC: The Study of economics, and definitions in economics TOP: economics MSC: Definitional 2. In economics, a difference in access to relevant knowledge is called a behavioral asymmetry. ANS: F DIF: 1 REF: 22-1 NAT: Analytic LOC: The Study of economics, and definitions in economics TOP: Asymmetric information MSC: Definitional 3. Informational asymmetry may apply to a hidden action or hidden characteristic where the informed party may be reluctant to reveal relevant information. ANS: T DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Asymmetric information MSC: Applicative 4. An example of asymmetric information is when a seller of a house knows more than the buyer about the house’s condition. ANS: T DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Asymmetric information MSC: Applicative 5. Economists have found that asymmetric information is not very prevalent. ANS: F DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 NAT: Analytic LOC: The Study of economics, and definitions in economics TOP: Asymmetric information MSC: Interpretive 6. An example of an information asymmetry is when a worker knows more than his employer about his work effort. ANS: T DIF: 1 REF: 22-1 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Asymmetric information MSC: Interpretive 7. The criminal actions of the top managers of corporations such as Enron, Tyco, WorldCom, and Adelphia are an example of moral hazard. ANS: T DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Moral hazard MSC: Applicative 8. The problem of moral hazard is a problem of hidden action. ANS: T DIF: 1 REF: 22-1 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Moral hazard MSC: Interpretive 9. The problem that arises when one person performs a task on behalf of another person is called the lemons problem. ANS: F DIF: 1 REF: 22-1 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Moral hazard MSC: Interpretive 10. One of the things that employers can do to lessen the moral hazard problem involving their employees is to pay them in advance for their work. ANS: F DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Moral hazard MSC: Interpretive 205
  • 2. 206 Chapter 22/Frontiers of Microeconomics 11. In the employer-worker relationship, the employer is regarded as the principal and the worker is regarded as the agent. ANS: T DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Moral hazard MSC: Definitional 12. The moral hazard problem and the desire of firms to lessen that problem serve as a plausible explanation for a firm paying above-equilibrium wages to its workers. ANS: T DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Moral hazard MSC: Interpretive 13. The classic example of adverse selection is the market for used cars. ANS: T DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Adverse selection MSC: Interpretive 14. The two major problems caused by asymmetric information are the moral-hazard problem and the principal-agent problem. ANS: F DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Asymmetric information MSC: Interpretive 15. Signaling is an action taken by an uninformed party to induce an informed party to reveal information. ANS: F DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Screening | Signaling MSC: Definitional 16. An example of signaling is a boyfriend giving an expensive, romantic gift to his girlfriend to convey his love for her. ANS: T DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Signaling MSC: Applicative 17. Valerie prefers A to B and she prefers B to C. If Valerie's preferences are transitive, then she prefers A to C. ANS: T DIF: 1 REF: 22-2 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Transitivity MSC: Definitional 18. The Condorcet voting paradox shows that outcomes based on dictatorial preferences do not always obey the property of transitivity. ANS: F DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Condorcet paradox MSC: Interpretive 19. The Condorcet paradox implies that the order in which items are voted on under majority rule is unimportant. ANS: F DIF: 1 REF: 22-2 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Condorcet paradox MSC: Interpretive 20. Condorcet explained his paradox in a 1951 book called Social Choice and Individual Values. ANS: F DIF: 1 REF: 22-2 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Condorcet paradox MSC: Interpretive 21. The Condorcet paradox demonstrates that the order in which people vote on choices may influence the final outcome. ANS: T DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Condorcet paradox MSC: Interpretive
  • 3. Chapter 22/Frontiers of Microeconomics 207 22. Borda count is a voting method often used in polls that rank sports teams. ANS: T DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Borda count MSC: Interpretive 23. Arrow’s impossibility theorem demonstrates the impossibility of the median voter theorem. ANS: F DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Arrow's impossibility theorem MSC: Interpretive 24. Arrow's impossibility theorem shows that it is impossible to find a better voting system than pairwise majority voting. ANS: F DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Arrow's impossibility theorem MSC: Interpretive 25. Majority rule will produce the outcome most preferred by the median voter. ANS: T DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Median voter theorem MSC: Definitional 26. According to the median voter theorem, majority rule will produce an outcome that is inconsistent with transitive preferences. ANS: F DIF: 3 REF: 22-2 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Median voter theorem MSC: Interpretive 27. An implication of the median voter theorem is that Republicans and Democrats will try to align their views with those of the median voter. ANS: T DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Median voter theorem MSC: Interpretive 28. Political leaders are always aiming for an optimal combination of efficiency and equality. ANS: F DIF: 1 REF: 22-2 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Political economy MSC: Interpretive 29. In the field of study called political economy, economists make use of insights from the field of psychology. ANS: F DIF: 1 REF: 22-2 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Political economy MSC: Definitional 30. A satisficer is a person whose decisionmaking is the same as that predicted by mainstream economic models. ANS: F DIF: 2 REF: 22-3 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Behavioral economics MSC: Definitional 31. Researchers have found that the systematic mistakes that people make in their decisionmaking include a lack of confidence in their own abilities. ANS: F DIF: 2 REF: 22-3 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Behavioral economics MSC: Interpretive 32. Most economic models incorporate the assumption of rational behavior on the part of economic actors. ANS: T DIF: 1 REF: 22-3 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Behavioral economics MSC: Interpretive
  • 4. 208 Chapter 22/Frontiers of Microeconomics 33. Studies of human decision-making have found that people do not give enough weight to a small number of vivid observations. ANS: F DIF: 2 REF: 22-3 NAT: Analytic LOC: The Study of economics, and definitions in economics TOP: Behavioral economics MSC: Interpretive 34. Studies of human decision making have found that people are reluctant to change their minds. ANS: T DIF: 2 REF: 22-3 NAT: Analytic LOC: The Study of economics, and definitions in economics TOP: Behavioral economics MSC: Interpretive 35. Evidence from experiments in which real people play the ultimatum game supports the idea that people care about fairness as well as about maximization of their personal wealth. ANS: T DIF: 2 REF: 22-3 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Behavioral economics MSC: Interpretive 36. Based on studies of human decision making, many people care more about the fairness of a game than about their personal winnings. ANS: T DIF: 2 REF: 22-3 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Behavioral economics MSC: Interpretive 37. The tendency of many people to procrastinate supports the view that people are consistent over time. ANS: F DIF: 2 REF: 22-3 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Behavioral economics MSC: Interpretive SHORT ANSWER 1. Explain what is meant by asymmetric information. Identify and explain the two basic types of problems that arise when there is asymmetric information. ANS: Asymmetric information is present when there is a difference in access to relevant information. Examples include information differences between (1) a worker and his employer, (2) a buyer and seller, and (3) an insured person and his insurer. The two basic types of problems are (1) moral hazard, which is a problem of hidden actions and ordinarily involves a principal and an agent, and (2) adverse selection, which is a problem of hidden characteristics or lemons. DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Asymmetric information MSC: Definitional 2. Explain how the presence of asymmetric information in car insurance markets may lead people who are good drivers or even average drivers to choose not to buy car insurance unless the law requires it. ANS: Drivers (buyers and potential buyers of car insurance) know more about their driving habits than do the insurance companies (sellers of car insurance). The price of car insurance is likely to reflect the information asymmetry in that it incorporates more of a risk component than is really necessary to insure good and average drivers. Consequently, good and average drivers are priced out of the market and they rationally choose not to buy the insurance unless they are required to do so. DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Asymmetric information MSC: Interpretive
  • 5. Chapter 22/Frontiers of Microeconomics 209 3. Explain the Condorcet paradox. To which type of voting system does it apply? ANS: The Condorcet paradox applies directly to pairwise majority voting. It shows that even if individual voters' preferences exhibit transitivity, that property does not follow through to outcomes of pairwise majority voting. Consequently, the order in which choices are put up, in pairwise fashion, affects the final outcome. Using choices A, B, and C, it may be the case, for example, that under pairwise voting voters choose A over B and B over C, but then they may choose C over A. This result can obtain even when individual voters' preferences are transitive; hence, the paradox. DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Condorcet paradox MSC: Definitional 4. Assume there are two major political parties: the Conservatives and the Liberals. What does the median voter theorem imply about the nature of the platforms (that is, policy stances) of the Conservatives and Liberals? ANS: The median voter theorem implies that political parties will set their platforms so as to appeal to the median (middle of the distribution) voter. Therefore, rather than adopting extreme views, the Conservatives and Liberals will both adopt platforms that are toward the middle of the road. DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Median voter theorem MSC: Interpretive 5. How have insights from the field of psychology influenced the thinking of economists in recent years? ANS: Insights from psychology have led some economists to question the assumption of rationality that pervades mainstream economic models. Evidence from experimental economics does raise serious questions about the rationality assumption. For example, most people may be concerned with the fairness of outcomes, in addition to the impact of those outcomes on their own well-being. An open question is: If the rationality assumption does not really reflect the behavior of real economic actors, then how important is it that we model other motivations, such as the desire for fairness, the tendency to procrastinate, overconfidence, etc.? DIF: 2 REF: 22-3 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Behavioral economics MSC: Interpretive Sec00 MULTIPLE CHOICE 1. Which of the following is not correct? a. Economics is a study of the choices that people make and the resulting interactions they have with one another. b. Economists are not interested in finding new areas to study and new phenomena to explain. c. Economists are trying to expand their understanding of human behavior and society. d. The economics of asymmetric information, political economy, and behavioral economics are all topics at the frontier of microeconomics. ANS: B DIF: 2 REF: 22-0 NAT: Analytic LOC: The study of economics, and the definitions of economics TOP: Frontiers of microeconomics MSC: Interpretive 2. Asymmetric information, political economy, and behavioral economics a. are topics at the frontier of microeconomics. b. are topics that economists no longer research. c. are being studied as economists try to expand their understanding of human behavior and society. d. both a and c are correct. ANS: D DIF: 1 REF: 22-0 NAT: Analytic LOC: The study of economics, and the definitions of economics TOP: Frontiers of microeconomics MSC: Interpretive
  • 6. 210 Chapter 22/Frontiers of Microeconomics 3. When markets fail, which of the following is true? a. Government intervention can always improve outcomes. b. Government intervention can potentially improve outcomes. c. Government intervention can never improve outcomes. d. Markets do not fail. ANS: B DIF: 1 REF: 22-0 NAT: Analytic LOC: The study of economics, and the definitions of economics TOP: Frontiers of microeconomics MSC: Interpretive Sec01-Asymmetric Information MULTIPLE CHOICE 1. In economics, a difference in access to relevant knowledge is called a(n) a. relevancy frontier. b. knowledge gap. c. information asymmetry. d. information equilibrium. ANS: C DIF: 1 REF: 22-1 NAT: Analytic LOC: The Study of economics, and definitions in economics TOP: Asymmetric information MSC: Definitional 2. Informational asymmetry is a difference in a. efficiency. b. equality. c. relevant knowledge. d. signaling. ANS: C DIF: 1 REF: 22-1 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Asymmetric information MSC: Definitional 3. Information asymmetry refers to a. the tendency of a person who is imperfectly monitored to engage in dishonest or otherwise undesirable behavior. b. the tendency for the mix of unobserved attributes to become undesirable from the standpoint of an uninformed party. c. an action taken by an informed party to reveal private information to an uninformed party. d. a difference in access to relevant knowledge. ANS: D DIF: 1 REF: 22-1 NAT: Analytic LOC: The Study of economics, and definitions in economics TOP: Asymmetric information MSC: Definitional 4. The 2001 Nobel prize in economics was awarded to George Akerlof, Michael Spence, and Joseph Stiglitz for their work on a. asymmetric information. b. political economy. c. behavioral economics. d. growth theory. ANS: A DIF: 1 REF: 22-1 NAT: Analytic LOC: The Study of economics, and definitions in economics TOP: Asymmetric information MSC: Interpretive 5. Which of the following relationships involves asymmetric information? a. An employee knows more than his employer knows about his work effort. b. A borrower knows more than the lender about his ability to repay the loan. c. The seller of a 30-year-old house knows more than the buyer about the condition of the house. d. All of the above are correct.
  • 7. Chapter 22/Frontiers of Microeconomics 211 ANS: D DIF: 1 REF: 22-1 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Asymmetric information MSC: Analytical 6. Which of the following relationships involves asymmetric information? a. Patients can look up information regarding certain prescription drugs giving them the same information as their doctors. b. Consumer Reports allows customers of DVD players to know as much about the quality of various players as the store salesperson. c. Car Fax allows car buyers to obtain used-vehicle histories providing them with the same information as the dealership salesperson. d. The batter in a baseball game must guess whether the pitcher is going to throw a fastball, curveball, or change-up. ANS: D DIF: 1 REF: 22-1 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Asymmetric information MSC: Interpretive 7. A driver knows more than his auto insurer about how cautiously he drives. This is an example of a. a hidden action. b. a hidden characteristic. c. adverse selection. d. the Condorcet Paradox. ANS: A DIF: 1 REF: 22-1 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Asymmetric information MSC: Interpretive 8. Frequently it is the case that: (1) A worker knows more than his employer about how much effort he puts into his job, and (2) the seller of a used car knows more than the buyer about the car's condition. a. Neither (1) nor (2) serves as an example of asymmetric information. b. Both (1) and (2) serve as examples of asymmetric information. c. Neither (1) nor (2) serves as an example of a hidden action. d. Both (1) and (2) serve as examples of hidden action. ANS: B DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Asymmetric information MSC: Analytical 9. Asymmetric information a. is not an area of current research in economics. b. can take the form of a hidden action or a hidden characteristic. c. explains Arrow’s impossibility theorem. d. is uncommon in corporate management. ANS: B DIF: 1 REF: 22-1 NAT: Analytic LOC: The Study of economics, and definitions in economics TOP: Asymmetric information MSC: Analytical 10. Government action in cases of asymmetric information may not be an ideal solution because a. the private market can sometimes deal with information asymmetries on its own. b. the government tends to have more information than private parties. c. both (a) and (b). d. None of the above is correct. ANS: A DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Asymmetric information MSC: Interpretive
  • 8. 212 Chapter 22/Frontiers of Microeconomics 11. Which of the following is an example of informational asymmetry? a. A seller of a house knows more about its true condition than does a potential buyer. b. A salesperson knows more about her efforts than does her manager. c. A child knows more about how much time he spent playing video games while he was alone in his bedroom than do his parents. d. All of the above are correct. ANS: D DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Asymmetric information MSC: Applicative 12. When asymmetric information affects a relationship between two parties, it is always the case that a. neither party is well informed. b. one party is better informed than the other party. c. both parties are equally well informed. d. the government is better informed than either of the two parties. ANS: B DIF: 1 REF: 22-1 NAT: Analytic LOC: The Study of economics, and definitions in economics TOP: Asymmetric information MSC: Interpretive 13. Which of the following statements is correct? a. Hidden actions and hidden characteristics are both associated with the moral-hazard problem. b. Hidden actions and hidden characteristics are both associated with the adverse-selection problem. c. Hidden actions are associated with the moral-hazard problem, whereas hidden characteristics are associated with the adverse-selection problem. d. Hidden actions are associated with the adverse-selection problem, whereas hidden characteristics are associated with the moral-hazard problem. ANS: C DIF: 1 REF: 22-1 NAT: Analytic LOC: The Study of economics, and definitions in economics TOP: Asymmetric information MSC: Definitional 14. The problem that arises when one person performs a task on behalf of another person is called a. the hidden characteristics problem. b. the lemons problem. c. moral hazard. d. adverse selection. ANS: C DIF: 1 REF: 22-1 NAT: Analytic LOC: The Study of economics, and definitions in economics TOP: Moral hazard MSC: Definitional 15. Which of the following is not an example of a principal-agent relationship? a. a soccer player and her coach b. a man and his neighbor c. an construction worker and his foreman d. a driver and her insurance agent ANS: B DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Principals; agents MSC: Applicative 16. Which of the following is not an example of a principal trying to solve the moral-hazard problem? a. the principal conducts an extensive interview of the agent b. the principal installs hidden cameras to monitor the agent’s behavior c. the principal pays the agent efficiency wages d. the principal pays the agent a year-end bonus ANS: A DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Moral hazard MSC: Applicative
  • 9. Chapter 22/Frontiers of Microeconomics 213 17. Which of the following would be an example of a principal trying to deal with a moral hazard problem? a. The parents of an infant secretly place video cameras in their house before the baby-sitter arrives. b. An insurance company checks police records to determine if its policyholders have received traffic citations. c. An employer examines his workers' output on a daily basis. d. All of the above are correct. ANS: D DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Moral hazard MSC: Interpretive 18. Which of the following offers an explanation as to why the principal-agent problem exists for a firm? a. The firm cares less about profit and more about cost when there are many competitors in the market. b. The firm offers an employee-incentive program in which employees share in the firm’s profits. c. The firm operates in a market with many competitors forcing the firm to pay its employees more to keep them from switching to another firm. d. The firm operates to maximize profit while the employees attempt to work as little as possible to earn their paychecks. ANS: D DIF: 1 REF: 22-1 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Moral hazard MSC: Interpretive 19. Which of the following practices would indicate that an employer is trying to overcome a moral-hazard problem with his employees? a. The employer pays his workers wages that are unusually high for the industry and region. b. The employer has voluntarily removed video cameras from the factory floor. c. The employer has discontinued the practice of giving his employees' year-end bonuses. d. Both A and B are correct. ANS: A DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Moral hazard MSC: Interpretive 20. Which of the following is not an example of moral hazard? a. a person with car insurance drives recklessly b. a pet-sitter being paid to walk a dog for one hour per day only walks the dog for 20 minutes per day c. a thief steals a car d. All of the above are examples of moral hazard. ANS: C DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Moral hazard MSC: Applicative 21. In the case of a moral-hazard problem, which of the following is not a way for the principal to encourage the agent to act more responsibly? a. the principal could better monitor the agent b. the principal could pay the agent above-equilibrium wages c. the principal could delay payment to the agent d. the principal could pay the agent below-equilibrium wages ANS: D DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Moral hazard MSC: Interpretive
  • 10. 214 Chapter 22/Frontiers of Microeconomics 22. Which of the following is not an example of a moral hazard problem? a. A manager stays late one evening so that her employee can leave early to attend his child’s music recital. b. A small child takes an extra cookie from the cookie jar when he thinks his mom isn’t watching him closely. c. An employee plays solitaire on her computer at 4:30 p.m. on a Friday when her boss has left for the day. d. A customer whose new eyeglasses come with a “60-day insurance policy in case of breakage” leaves her glasses out where her new puppy can chew on them. ANS: A DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Moral hazard MSC: Applicative 23. Moral hazard occurs when a. an employer closely monitors an employee. b. two people consider a trade with each other and one person has relevant information about some aspect of the product's quality that the other person lacks. c. an employee lacks an incentive to promote the best interests of the employer, and the employer cannot observe the actions of the employee. d. an employee closely monitors the actions of her employer. ANS: C DIF: 1 REF: 22-1 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Moral hazard MSC: Definitional 24. The temptation of imperfectly-monitored workers to shirk their responsibilities is a. an example of the moral hazard problem. b. an example of the adverse selection problem. c. an example of screening. d. an example of signaling. ANS: A DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Moral hazard MSC: Interpretive 25. Employers can try to overcome the moral-hazard problem involving their employees by a. paying their employees more often. b. paying their employees below-equilibrium wages since the employees will likely shirk some of their responsibilities. c. better monitoring their employees' work efforts. d. requiring their employees to take a pre-employment work effort test. ANS: C DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Moral hazard MSC: Interpretive 26. Ed was recently hired as a salesman for a national consulting firm. His job involves spending a significant portion of his time out of the office visiting prospects and attending conferences. His firm is paying him a wage that is higher than the equilibrium wage, but he receives much of his income in quarterly bonuses based on how much he sells. a. The consulting firm is trying to prevent adverse selection with its compensation strategy. b. Ed has an incentive to go golfing with his buddies rather than conducting sales meetings. c. The consulting firm is responding to the moral hazard problem with its compensation strategy. d. Ed should quit this job and take a job where he gets paid an equilibrium wage more frequently. ANS: C DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Moral hazard MSC: Interpretive
  • 11. Chapter 22/Frontiers of Microeconomics 215 27. Ed was recently hired as a salesman for a national consulting firm. His job responsibilities involve spending a significant portion of his time out of the office visiting prospects and attending conferences. Which of the following is strategy the consulting firm may employ to discourage Ed from shirking his responsibilities? a. Tell Ed that the shareholders want to earn a large profit this year. b. Pay Ed commissions on what he sells after the work has been completed. c. Allow Ed to set his own schedule and work from home frequently. d. Pay Ed a lower wage than he would earn in a similar job at another firm. ANS: B DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Moral hazard MSC: Interpretive 28. Employers may choose to pay their workers a wage that exceeds the equilibrium wage according to a. efficiency-wage theories. b. equilibrium wage theories. c. screening theories. d. signaling theories. ANS: A DIF: 1 REF: 22-1 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Moral hazard MSC: Definitional 29. An efficiency wage a. gives an employee an incentive to shirk his duties. b. is lower than the equilibrium wage for that position and region. c. is higher than the equilibrium wage for that position and region. d. both a and b are correct. ANS: C DIF: 1 REF: 22-1 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Moral hazard MSC: Definitional 30. Which of the following is a plausible explanation for a firm paying above-equilibrium wages to its workers? a. It increases the probability that a worker who shirks will be caught. b. It discourages workers from shirking out of fear of losing their high-paying job. c. The Condorcet Paradox suggests that paying high wages will result in greater effort by employees. d. By paying a high wage, employers solve this adverse selection problem and motivate the employees to work harder. ANS: B DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Moral hazard MSC: Interpretive 31. Jason buys automobile insurance from No Wreck Insurance Company. If Jason avoids having an accident for three years, No Wreck will reduce the price he has to pay for his insurance. Nevertheless, he routinely drives fast and with reckless abandon. a. This is an adverse selection problem which should be corrected with government intervention. b. Jason is a principal and No Wreck is an agent in this principal-agent problem. c. This is a moral hazard problem. d. There is no way for No Wreck to determine whether Jason is a cautious or risky driver. ANS: C DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Moral hazard MSC: Interpretive 32. Robert borrowed some money from Granite Bank, telling the loan officer that he intended to use the money to make repairs to his home. After getting the loan, Robert and his girlfriend immediately took the money and headed to the nearest riverboat casino for a weekend of gambling and entertainment. a. This is an example of adverse selection since banks have difficulty selecting their customers. b. This is a typical example of the Condorcet Paradox. c. From the given information, Robert is the principal and his girlfriend is the agent. d. From the given information, Granite Bank is the principal and Robert is the agent.
  • 12. 216 Chapter 22/Frontiers of Microeconomics ANS: D DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Moral hazard MSC: Interpretive 33. When a night watchman only performs two walk-throughs per night when he is being paid to perform five walk-throughs per night, it is an example of a. both moral hazard and adverse selection. b. neither moral hazard nor adverse selection. c. moral hazard, but not adverse selection. d. adverse selection, but not moral hazard. ANS: C DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Moral hazard | adverse selection MSC: Applicative 34. A radio story reported a study on the makes and models of cars that were observed going through intersections in the Washington, D.C. area without stopping at the stop signs. According to the story, Volvos were heavily overrepresented; the fraction of cars running stop signs that were Volvos was much greater than the fraction of Volvos in the total population of cars in the D.C. area. This is initially surprising because Volvo has built a reputation as an especially safe car that appeals to sensible, safety-conscious drivers. How is this observation best explained? a. Volvo drivers are not willing to take risks that they would take in another, less safe car. Driving a Volvo leads to a propensity to run stop signs. b. Volvo drivers are not willing to take risks that they would take in another, less safe car. Driving a Volvo reduces the propensity to run stop signs. c. Volvo drivers are willing to take risks that they would not take in another, less safe car. Driving a Volvo reduces the propensity to run stop signs. d. Volvo drivers are willing to take risks that they would not take in another, less safe car. Driving a Volvo leads to a propensity to run stop signs. ANS: D DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Moral hazard MSC: Analytical 35. Suppose you are covered under health insurance or belong to a Health Maintenance Organization (HMO), and you are insured against all or most of the costs of visits to the doctor. As a result you are likely to make greater use of medical services of all kinds. This tendency of people with insurance to change their behavior in a way that leads to more claims against the insurance company is called a. adverse selection. b. moral hazard. c. screening d. signaling. ANS: B DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Moral hazard MSC: Interpretive 36. Bill owns a small business in Milwaukee. He travels frequently, meeting with important customers, and attending conferences. Bill hired Nicole to work in the Milwaukee office as the day-to-day general manager of the business. a. This is a moral hazard problem since Nicole may not work as hard as Bill would like when she is not monitored. b. Bill choosing to hire Nicole is an example of adverse selection since it is possible that Nicole will not work as hard as Bill expects. c. Bill will most likely pay Nicole a lower salary than normal since Bill will not be there to monitor Nicole’s work effort, and since Nicole will not likely work hard knowing Bill cannot monitor her effort. d. The Condorcet Paradox implies that Nicole will not work as hard as Bill would like even though he will likely pay her an above equilibrium wage. ANS: A DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Moral hazard MSC: Interpretive
  • 13. Chapter 22/Frontiers of Microeconomics 217 37. When new professors are hired, their job performance is monitored closely. If they meet their institution's standards, they will eventually receive tenure. After receiving tenure, professors' job performance is less closely monitored, and they become difficult to fire. Tenure thus creates a. adverse selection. b. a Condorcet paradox. c. a screening problem. d. moral hazard. ANS: D DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Moral hazard MSC: Interpretive 38. Carlos, who knows nothing about construction, paid Joe to remodel a room in his house. Two years later, one wall in the remodeled room crumbled because Joe used poor-quality materials. This illustrates which economic problem? a. Adverse selection b. Screening c. Moral hazard d. Signaling ANS: C DIF: 1 REF: 22-1 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Moral hazard MSC: Interpretive 39. John goes to work 8 hours per day, but while he is at work he spends most of his time visiting internet sites that provide him with information on his favorite hobby. This is an example of a. the Condorcet Paradox. b. signaling. c. moral hazard. d. screening. ANS: C DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Moral hazard MSC: Interpretive 40. In corporations, a principal-agent problem can arise when a. the shareholders are the principal and the managers are the agent. b. the board of directors is the principal and the managers are the agent. c. the shareholders are the principal and the board of directors is the agent. d. All of the above are correct. ANS: D DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Moral hazard MSC: Interpretive 41. In corporations, which of the following are agents but not principals? a. shareholders b. the board of directors c. managers d. workers ANS: D DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Moral hazard MSC: Interpretive 42. In corporations, which of the following are principals but not agents? a. shareholders b. the board of directors c. managers d. workers ANS: A DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Moral hazard MSC: Interpretive
  • 14. 218 Chapter 22/Frontiers of Microeconomics 43. Insurance companies charge annual premiums to collect revenue, which they then use to pay customers who file claims for damages they incur. As a result of the moral hazard problem (1) what is the percentage of policy holders making claims, and (2) what is the average premium charged when compared to a world with no moral hazard problem? a. The percentage of policy holders making claims is higher; average annual premiums are lower. b. The percentage of policy holders making claims is lower; average annual premiums are lower. c. The percentage of policy holders making claims is higher; average annual premiums are higher. d. The percentage of policy holders making claims is lower; average annual premiums are higher. ANS: C DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Moral hazard MSC: Analytical 44. Insurance companies charge annual premiums to collect revenue, which they then use to pay customers who file claims for damages they incur. Because of the moral hazard problem insurance companies separate customers into groups. Group 1: customers who file few claims Group 2: customers that file a lot of claims. After creating these groups, what happens to the average annual premium within a group? a. Group 1: average annual premium increases Group 2: average annual premium increases b. Group 1: average annual premium decreases Group 2: average annual premium increases c. Group 1: average annual premium increases Group 2: average annual premium decreases d. Group 1: average annual premium decreases Group 2: average annual premium decreases ANS: B DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Moral hazard MSC: Analytical 45. Which of the following is a characteristic of a corporation but not of a small family-owned business? a. The firm buys inputs in markets for the factors of production. b. The firm sells output in markets for goods and services. c. The firm is guided in its decisions by the objective of profit maximization. d. The firm faces a principal-agent problem created by the separation of ownership and control. ANS: D DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Moral hazard MSC: Interpretive 46. Adverse selection is a. the tendency of a person who is imperfectly monitored to engage in dishonest or otherwise undesirable behavior. b. an action taken by an uninformed party to induce an informed party to reveal information. c. the failure of majority voting to produce transitive preferences for society. d. the tendency for the mix of unobserved attributes to become undesirable from the standpoint of an uninformed party. ANS: D DIF: 1 REF: 22-1 NAT: Analytic LOC: The Study of economics, and definitions in economics TOP: Adverse selection MSC: Definitional 47. When homeowners sell a house, part of the paperwork they complete is a statement of disclosure on which the homeowners are supposed to reveal everything that they know is wrong with the house. The purpose of the statement of disclosure is to try to solve the a. principal-agent problem. b. moral-hazard problem. c. adverse-selection problem. d. signaling problem. ANS: C DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Adverse selection MSC: Applicative
  • 15. Chapter 22/Frontiers of Microeconomics 219 48. Steve is planning to sell his home. In preparation for the sale, he paints all of the ceilings in his house to cover up water stains from his leaking roof so that potential buyers will be unaware of this problem. This is an example of a. moral hazard. b. screening. c. adverse selection. d. the principal-agent problem. ANS: C DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Adverse selection MSC: Interpretive 49. Adverse selection may lead to a. owners of used cars choosing to keep them rather than sell them at the low price that skeptical buyers are willing to pay. b. wages being stuck above the level that balances supply and demand, resulting in unemployment. c. buyers with low risk choosing to remain uninsured because the policies they are offered fail to reflect their true characteristics. d. All of the above are correct. ANS: D DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Adverse selection MSC: Interpretive 50. Which of the following is not correct? a. An example of adverse selection is man who tries to sell his used car without disclosing that it needs a new transmission. b. The “invisible hand” of a free market will always fix the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard. c. An employer may try to prevent a moral hazard problem by paying her workers an efficiency wage. d. One interpretation of gift giving is that it reflects asymmetric information and signaling. ANS: B DIF: 3 REF: 22-1 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Adverse selection, moral hazard, signaling MSC: Interpretive 51. The buyer runs a risk of being sold a good of low quality when there is a. a principal-agent problem. b. a moral-hazard problem. c. a problem involving hidden actions. d. a problem involving hidden characteristics. ANS: D DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 NAT: Analytic LOC: The Study of economics, and definitions in economics TOP: Adverse selection MSC: Interpretive 52. When a jeweler sells a low quality diamond to a young man who believes the diamond is the highest quality, she is engaging in a. both moral hazard and adverse selection. b. neither moral hazard nor adverse selection. c. moral hazard, but not adverse selection. d. adverse selection, but not moral hazard. ANS: D DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Moral hazard | adverse selection MSC: Applicative 53. A life insurance company requires new applicants to have a medical exam prior to writing the insurance policy. This requirement is an example of a. signaling. b. screening. c. moral hazard. d. adverse selection.
  • 16. 220 Chapter 22/Frontiers of Microeconomics ANS: B DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Adverse selection MSC: Interpretive 54. Which of the following is an example of an adverse selection problem? a. A customer purchases four apples, two of which are inedible. b. A card shop puts its Halloween merchandise on sale on November 1st. c. A young worker is fired after she is late for work three times in one month. d. A man whose father had a heart attack wants to increase his life insurance coverage. ANS: D DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Adverse selection MSC: Applicative 55. The Latin term caveat emptor, meaning let the buyer beware, brings to mind the problem of a. hidden actions. b. adverse selection. c. principals and agents. d. moral hazard. ANS: B DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 NAT: Analytic LOC: The Study of economics, and definitions in economics TOP: Adverse selection MSC: Interpretive 56. When the buyer knows less than the seller about the characteristics of the good being sold, there is a. a principal-agent problem. b. a moral hazard problem. c. an adverse selection problem. d. a signaling problem. ANS: C DIF: 1 REF: 22-1 NAT: Analytic LOC: The Study of economics, and definitions in economics TOP: Adverse selection MSC: Definitional 57. The classic example of adverse selection is the a. market for used cars. b. market for new cars. c. relationship between shareholders and managers. d. relationship between a coach and an athlete. ANS: A DIF: 1 REF: 22-1 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Adverse selection MSC: Interpretive 58. The fact that someone with a high risk of medical problems is likely to buy a large amount of health insurance is an example of a. adverse selection. b. monitoring. c. moral hazard. d. screening. ANS: A DIF: 1 REF: 22-1 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Adverse selection MSC: Interpretive 59. The adverse selection problem is a likely explanation for the fact that a. a few months after a new car is purchased, its value decreases very little. b. some corporate managers were recently sent to prison for enriching themselves at the expense of shareholders. c. people in average health may be discouraged from buying health insurance by the high price. d. gifts can be interpreted as signals. ANS: C DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Adverse selection MSC: Interpretive
  • 17. Chapter 22/Frontiers of Microeconomics 221 60. Because people with hidden health problems are more likely to buy health insurance than are other people, a. the price of health insurance reflects the costs of a sicker-than-average person. b. the price of health insurance is too low, relative to the socially-optimal price. c. people in average health may be encouraged to buy too much health insurance, relative to the socially-optimal quantity. d. the Condorcet Paradox suggests that people who are sicker than average will ultimately buy more health insurance. ANS: A DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Adverse selection MSC: Interpretive 61. Severe adverse-selection problems may result in a. too few good used cars being offered for sale. b. wages that are too low relative to equilibrium levels. c. too many good drivers buying too much automobile insurance. d. people with average health buying too much health insurance. ANS: A DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Adverse selection MSC: Interpretive 62. Signaling refers to actions by an informed party for the sole purpose of a. telling another party that the signaler has information to reveal, without actually revealing that information. b. conveying false information. c. confusing another party. d. credibly revealing private information. ANS: D DIF: 1 REF: 22-1 NAT: Analytic LOC: The Study of economics, and definitions in economics TOP: Signaling MSC: Definitional 63. Effective signals a. convey useful information from informed parties to uninformed parties. b. impose little or no cost on the signaler. c. cannot be conveyed accurately when there is an information asymmetry. d. can be used by employers to alleviate the moral hazard problem in the workplace. ANS: A DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Signaling MSC: Interpretive 64. Which of the following is not an example of signaling? a. screening b. advertising c. getting an education d. gift giving ANS: A DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Signaling MSC: Applicative 65. A woman gives her boyfriend a birthday present. The gift could be viewed by the boyfriend as a a. moral hazard problem. b. screening device. c. signal of how much she cares for him. d. All of the above are correct. ANS: C DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Signaling MSC: Interpretive
  • 18. 222 Chapter 22/Frontiers of Microeconomics 66. A brand of wine is priced at only $5 per bottle, far below the market price of most high quality wines. Before any reputation exists for the wine, consumers buy very little of this inexpensive wine because they interpret the low price to mean that the wine is of poor quality. The company decides to change the label on the wine to show that it has won awards for quality. This label change is an example of a. signaling. b. screening. c. selecting. d. All of the above are correct. ANS: A DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Signaling MSC: Interpretive 67. If the seller of a used car offers a limited warranty, the warranty is an example of a(n) a. signal. b. screen. c. efficiency wage. d. agent. ANS: A DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Signaling MSC: Applicative 68. A firm with a very good product a. has a higher cost of signaling (advertising) than does a firm with an inferior product. b. has more to gain by signaling (advertising) than does a firm with an inferior product. c. does not need to signal (advertise) because the product’s quality speaks for itself. d. will signal (advertise) effectively if signaling is free. ANS: B DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Signaling MSC: Interpretive 69. Which of the following is an example of signaling? a. Graduates of highly-respected universities highlight that fact on their resumes. b. Magazine advertisements include the phrase as seen on TV. c. Advertisements for universities include the phrase fully accredited. d. All of the above are correct. ANS: D DIF: 1 REF: 22-1 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Signaling MSC: Interpretive 70. Which of the following events best exemplifies the concept of signaling? a. A college student's parents, having learned that their child is short of money, send her a check for $1,000. b. A woman, who is trying to win the love of a certain man, buys him a very personal gift. c. A grocery store maintains a policy of examining the driver's license of everyone who writes a personal check to purchase his groceries. d. A university maintains a policy of considering for admission only those students who graduated among the top ten percent of their high school class. ANS: B DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Signaling MSC: Interpretive 71. Joe's Computers builds and sells computers for the local retail market. Since Joe's business does not have the name recognition of some of the bigger computer retailers, Joe advertises a One-Year Money Back Guarantee to indicate to buyers that his product is of high quality. This guarantee is an example of a. screening. b. signaling. c. the seller's curse. d. the principal-agent problem.
  • 19. Chapter 22/Frontiers of Microeconomics 223 ANS: B DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Signaling MSC: Interpretive 72. Which of the following is an example of signaling? a. John is considering the purchase of a used car. Before making the purchase he has the car checked by an auto mechanic. b. Steve is applying for a new life insurance policy. Before writing the policy, the insurance company requires Steve to be examined by a doctor. c. Traci is applying for a new job. Before hiring her, the firm requires Traci to take a drug test. d. Ray is planning to ask for Honna's hand in marriage. Before asking her, he buys her a box of her favorite chocolates and takes her to dinner at her favorite restaurant. ANS: D DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Signaling MSC: Interpretive 73. Screening occurs when a. an informed party acts to reveal his private information. b. an informed party acts to conceal his private information. c. an uninformed party acts to induce the informed party to reveal private information. d. one informed party acts to prevent another informed party from revealing private information. ANS: C DIF: 1 REF: 22-1 NAT: Analytic LOC: The Study of economics, and definitions in economics TOP: Screening MSC: Definitional 74. An insurance company that writes automobile policies tries to separate safe drivers from risky drivers by offering policies that feature different deductibles and different premiums. This practice is best described as an example of a. screening. b. behavioral economics. c. the Condorcet Paradox. d. signaling. ANS: A DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Screening MSC: Interpretive 75. A safe driver would likely choose an auto insurance policy with a a. low premium and a high deductible. b. high premium and a high deductible. c. high premium and a low deductible. d. high premium and no deductible. ANS: A DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Screening MSC: Interpretive 76. An unhealthy person would likely choose a medical insurance policy with a a. low premium and a high deductible. b. high premium and a high deductible. c. high premium and no deductible. d. The unhealthy person would choose not to be insured. ANS: C DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Screening MSC: Interpretive
  • 20. 224 Chapter 22/Frontiers of Microeconomics 77. An airline knows that business travelers have more inelastic demand for travel than vacationers. That is, business travelers are often willing to pay more for airline tickets than vacationers. The airline also knows that business travelers do not like to travel over weekends. When customers request airline tickets that do not involve travel over a weekend, the airline determines that a traveler is likely a business traveler and charges a higher price. This is an example of a. moral hazard. b. signaling. c. screening. d. adverse selection. ANS: C DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Screening MSC: Interpretive 78. Suppose that an economics department is offering a student exchange program with a university in Moscow, Russia. If the department requires students to submit an essay in order to be considered for the program, the essay may be an example of a(n) a. signal. b. screen. c. efficiency wage. d. principal. ANS: B DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Screening MSC: Applicative 79. On car insurance policies, State Ranch Insurance Company offers drivers an option: Policy 1 features a deductible of $1,000, and it requires a driver to pay an annual premium of $500. Policy 2 features a deductible of $500, and it requires a driver to pay an annual premium of $750. a. In offering these two policies, State Ranch is engaging in illegal price discrimination. b. In offering these two policies, State Ranch is screening drivers. c. Policy 1 is more of a burden for safe drivers than it is for risky drivers. d. In offering these two policies, State Ranch is signaling their quality to drivers. ANS: B DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Screening MSC: Analytical 80. In view of the possible need for government action in markets where asymmetric information is a problem, which of the following is a valid concern? a. The government rarely has more information than the private parties. b. Private markets can sometimes deal with information asymmetries on their own. c. The government is itself an imperfect institution. d. All of the above are valid concerns. ANS: D DIF: 2 REF: 22-1 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Asymmetric information MSC: Interpretive Sec02-Political Economy MULTIPLE CHOICE 1. The field of political economy a. casts aside most of the standard methods of economic analysis. b. is also referred to as the field of public choice. c. is also referred to as the field of macroeconomics. d. produces the conclusion that democratic principles rarely lead to desirable economic outcomes. ANS: B DIF: 1 REF: 22-2 NAT: Analytic LOC: The Study of economics, and definitions in economics TOP: Political economy MSC: Definitional
  • 21. Chapter 22/Frontiers of Microeconomics 225 2. Which of the following sets of preferences can not satisfy the property of transitivity? a. Plan A is preferred to plan D. Plan D is preferred to plan B. Plan C is preferred to plan B. b. Plan A is preferred to plan B. Plan B is preferred to plan C. Plan A is preferred to plan C. c. Plan C is preferred to plan A. Plan B is preferred to plan A. Plan C is preferred to plan B. d. Plan D is preferred to plan C. Plan C is preferred to plan B. Plan B is preferred to plan D. ANS: D DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Transitivity MSC: Applicative 3. The Condorcet paradox a. demonstrates that the order in which one votes on options may influence the outcome. b. demonstrates that majority voting by itself may not reveal the outcome that society wants. c. disproves Arrow’s impossibility theorem. d. Both a and b are correct. ANS: D DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Condorcet paradox MSC: Interpretive 4. Suppose that residents of a town are asked to vote on the best way to improve the safety of an intersection. The three choices are: a stoplight, a 4-way stop, and a 2-way stop. When the mayor asks the residents to choose between a stoplight and a 4-way stop, the residents choose a 4-way stop. Then, when the mayor asks them to choose between a 4-way stop and a 2-way stop, they choose a 2-way stop. However, if the mayor firsts asks the residents to choose between a 4-way stop and a 2-way stop, they choose a 2-way stop. Then, when the mayor asks the residents to choose between a 2-way stop and a stoplight, they choose a stoplight. What does this example illustrate? a. Arrow’s impossibility theorem b. the Condorcet paradox c. a Borda count d. the median voter theorem ANS: B DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Condorcet paradox MSC: Applicative 5. Suppose that residents of a town are asked to vote on the best day to improve the safety of an intersection. The three choices are: a stoplight, a 4-way stop, and a 2-way stop. The mayor asks the residents to assign 3 points to their first choice, 2 points to their second choice, and 1 point to their last choice. The intersection will be controlled by the method that receives the most points. This voting scheme is called a. Arrow’s impossibility theorem. b. the Condorcet paradox. c. a Borda count. d. the median voter theorem. ANS: C DIF: 1 REF: 22-2 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Borda counts MSC: Applicative 6. Which of the following sets of preferences satisfies the property of transitivity? a. Cookies are preferred to brownies. Brownies are preferred to ice cream. Ice cream is preferred to cookies. b. Cookies are preferred to pie. Brownies are preferred to pie. Pie is preferred to cookies. c. Cookies are preferred to ice cream. Ice cream is preferred to brownies. Cookies are preferred to brownies. d. Cookies are preferred to pie. Ice cream is preferred to cookies. Pie is preferred to ice cream. ANS: C DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Transitivity MSC: Applicative
  • 22. 226 Chapter 22/Frontiers of Microeconomics Table 22-1 Three friends -- Tricia, Sarah, and Katie -- are deciding where to go together for vacation. They all agree that they should go to one of three places: Ireland, Italy, or Greece. They also agree that they will have two pairwise votes to determine where to go on vacation, with the majority determining the outcome on each vote. The first, second, and third choices for each person are as indicated in the table below. Tricia Sarah Katie First choice Ireland Italy Greece Second choice Italy Greece Ireland Third choice Greece Ireland Italy 7. Refer to Table 22-1. If the first vote pits Ireland against Italy and the second vote pits Greece against the winner of the first vote, then the outcome is as follows: a. Ireland wins the first vote and Greece wins the second vote, so they go to Greece. b. Ireland wins the first vote and Ireland wins the second vote, so they go to Ireland. c. Italy wins the first vote and Italy wins the second vote, so they go to Italy. d. Italy wins the first vote and Greece wins the second vote, so they go to Greece. ANS: A DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Condorcet paradox MSC: Applicative 8. Refer to Table 22-1. If the first vote pits Ireland against Greece and the second vote pits Italy against the winner of the first vote, then the outcome is as follows: a. Ireland wins the first vote and Italy wins the second vote, so they go to Italy. b. Ireland wins the first vote and Ireland wins the second vote, so they go to Ireland. c. Greece wins the first vote and Greece wins the second vote, so they go to Greece. d. Greece wins the first vote and Italy wins the second vote, so they go to Italy. ANS: D DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Condorcet paradox MSC: Applicative 9. Refer to Table 22-1. If the first vote pits Italy against Greece and the second vote pits Ireland against the winner of the first vote, then the outcome is as follows: a. Italy wins the first vote and Ireland wins the second vote, so they go to Ireland. b. Italy wins the first vote and Italy wins the second vote, so they go to Italy. c. Greece wins the first vote and Greece wins the second vote, so they go to Greece. d. Greece wins the first vote and Ireland wins the second vote, so they go to Ireland. ANS: A DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Condorcet paradox MSC: Applicative 10. Refer to Table 22-1. Depending on the order of the pairwise voting, a. the friends could go to either Ireland, Greece, or Italy. b. the friends could go to either Ireland or Greece, but they will not go to Italy. c. the friends could go to either Greece or Italy, but they will not go to Ireland. d. the friends could go to either Ireland or Italy, but they will not go to Greece. ANS: A DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Condorcet paradox MSC: Applicative 11. Refer to Table 22-1. If the friends change their minds and decide to choose a vacation destination using a Borda count, then a. the friends will go to Ireland. b. the friends will go to Italy. c. the friends will go to Greece. d. A Borda count will not result in a single winner in this case.
  • 23. Chapter 22/Frontiers of Microeconomics 227 ANS: D DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Borda counts MSC: Applicative 12. Which of the following is not correct? a. Pairwise voting never produces transitive preferences. b. The order of pairwise voting can affect the result. c. Majority voting by itself does not tell us what outcome a society really wants. d. No voting system can satisfy all of the following properties: unanimity, transitivity, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and no dictators. ANS: A DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Political economy MSC: Interpretive 13. The field of political economy a. applies the methods of political science to microeconomics. b. applies the methods of political science to macroeconomics. c. is relevant to the issue of how active government should be in economic matters. d. integrates psychological insights to better understand individual choices. ANS: C DIF: 1 REF: 22-2 NAT: Analytic LOC: The Study of economics, and definitions in economics TOP: Political economy MSC: Interpretive 14. Recent developments in political economy a. render much of the traditional field of political science obsolete. b. render much of the traditional field of economics obsolete. c. illustrate the resolute nature of democracy. d. point to the fact that government is a less-than-perfect institution. ANS: D DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 NAT: Analytic LOC: The Study of economics, and definitions in economics TOP: Political economy MSC: Interpretive 15. The Condorcet voting paradox applies to situations in which voters a. decide between exactly two possible outcomes. b. decide among more than two possible outcomes. c. as a group have transitive preferences. d. choose the inferior candidate even though the majority preferred the better candidate. ANS: B DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Condorcet paradox MSC: Interpretive 16. The Condorcet paradox a. proved that the Arrow impossibility theorem is wrong. b. was proved wrong by the Arrow impossibility theorem. c. serves as an example of the Arrow impossibility theorem. d. pertains to voting systems, whereas Arrow's Impossibility Theorem does not. ANS: C DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Condorcet paradox MSC: Interpretive 17. Normally, we expect voters' preferences to exhibit a property called a. transitivity. b. transversality. c. normality. d. universality. ANS: A DIF: 1 REF: 22-2 NAT: Analytic LOC: The Study of economics, and definitions in economics TOP: Transitivity MSC: Interpretive
  • 24. 228 Chapter 22/Frontiers of Microeconomics 18. If preferences exhibit the property of transitivity, then a. the preferences are irrational. b. individuals prefer more government involvement in private markets than do people whose preferences are not transitive. c. preferences change over time more quickly than when preferences are not transitive. d. preferences satisfy one of the properties assumed to be desireable by Kenneth Arrow in Social Choice and Individual Values. ANS: D DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 NAT: Analytic LOC: The Study of economics, and definitions in economics TOP: Transitivity MSC: Interpretive 19. Which of the following statements captures the meaning of transitivity of preferences? a. If A is preferred to B, then B is less preferred than A. b. If A is preferred to B, and B is preferred to C, then A is preferred to C. c. If A is preferred to B and B is preferred to C, then the preference for A over B is stronger than the preference for B over C. d. If A is preferred to C, then there exists B such that A is preferred to B and C is preferred to A. ANS: B DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Transitivity MSC: Definitional 20. The Condorcet voting paradox demonstrates that democratic outcomes do not always obey the property of a. narrowness of preferences. b. concavity of preferences. c. asymmetry of preferences. d. transitivity of preferences. ANS: D DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Condorcet paradox MSC: Interpretive 21. The Condorcet paradox shows that a. allocations of resources based on majority rule are always inefficient. b. problems in counting votes can negate legitimate democratic outcomes. c. the order on which things are voted can affect the result. d. transitive preferences are inconsistent with rationality. ANS: C DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Condorcet paradox MSC: Interpretive 22. Under majority rule, the order in which items are voted on is a. unimportant, and this is a lesson of the Condorcet paradox. b. unimportant, and this is a lesson of Arrow’s impossibility theorem. c. important, and this is a lesson of the Condorcet paradox. d. important, and this is a lesson of Arrow’s impossibility theorem. ANS: C DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Condorcet paradox MSC: Interpretive Table 22-2 Three longtime friends-Fred, Barney, and Wilma-are deciding how they will spend their Sunday afternoon. They all agree that they should do one of three things: go to a movie, go to the beach, or go to a museum. They also agree that they will have two pairwise votes to determine how to spend their evening, with the majority determining the outcome on each vote. The first, second, and third choices for each person are as indicated in the table below. Fred Barney Wilma First choice Museum Beach Movie Second choice Beach Movie Museum Third choice Movie Museum Beach
  • 25. Chapter 22/Frontiers of Microeconomics 229 23. Refer to Table 22-2. If (1) the first vote pits museum against movie, and (2) the second vote pits beach against the winner of the first vote, then the outcome is as follows: a. Museum wins the first vote and museum wins the second vote, so they go to a museum. b. Museum wins the first vote and beach wins the second vote, so they go to the beach. c. Movie wins the first vote and movie wins the second vote, so they go to a movie. d. Movie wins the first vote and beach wins the second vote, so they go to the beach. ANS: D DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Condorcet paradox MSC: Applicative 24. Refer to Table 22-1. If (1) the first vote pits museum against beach, and (2) the second vote pits movie against the winner of the first vote, then a. Museum wins the first vote and museum wins the second vote, so they go to a museum. b. Museum wins the first vote and movie wins the second vote, so they go to a movie. c. Beach wins the first vote and beach wins the second vote, so they go to the beach. d. Beach wins the first vote and movie wins the second vote, so they go to a movie. ANS: B DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Condorcet paradox MSC: Applicative 25. Refer to Table 22-2. Which of the following statements is correct? a. In a pairwise election, movie beats beach. b. In a pairwise election, beach beats museum. c. In a pairwise election, museum beats movie. d. None of the above is correct. ANS: D DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Condorcet paradox MSC: Applicative 26. Refer to Table 22-1. Which of the following statements is correct? a. In a pairwise election, beach beats movie. b. In a pairwise election, museum beats beach. c. In a pairwise election, movie beats museum. d. All of the above are correct. ANS: D DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Condorcet paradox MSC: Applicative 27. Refer to Table 22-2. Which of the following statements is correct regarding the Condorcet paradox and the results of pairwise voting by Fred, Barney, and Wilma? a. The paradox implies that pairwise voting never produces transitive preferences, and so the voting by Fred, Barney, and Wilma fails to produce transitive preferences. b. The paradox implies that pairwise voting sometimes (but not always) produces transitive preferences, and the voting by Fred, Barney, and Wilma does produce transitive preferences. c. The paradox implies that pairwise voting sometimes (but not always) fails to produce transitive preferences, and the voting by Fred, Barney, and Wilma fails to produce transitive preferences. d. The paradox does not apply to the case at hand, because Barney's preferences are not individually transitive. ANS: C DIF: 3 REF: 22-2 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Condorcet paradox MSC: Interpretive 28. Refer to Table 22-2. If Fred, Barney, and Wilma use a Borda count, rather than pairwise majority voting, to decide how to spend their afternoon, then they will go a. to a movie. b. to a concert. c. out to dinner. d. None of the above is correct; a Borda count fails to produce a winner in this instance.
  • 26. 230 Chapter 22/Frontiers of Microeconomics ANS: D DIF: 3 REF: 22-2 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Borda counts MSC: Applicative Table 22-3 The citizens of Paradoxopolis will decide whether to build a new school, build a new park, or build a new road. Exactly one of the three choices will prevail, and the choice will be made by way of pairwise voting, with the majority determining the outcome on each vote. The preferences of the voters are summarized in the table below. Voter Type Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Percent of Electorate 25 35 40 First choice School Park Road Second choice Park Road School Third choice Road School Park 29. Refer to Table 22-3. If (1) the first vote pits school against park, and (2) the second vote pits road against the winner of the first vote, then the outcome is as follows: a. School wins the first vote and school wins the second vote, so they build a school. b. School wins the first vote and road wins the second vote, so they build a road. c. Park wins the first vote and park wins the second vote, so they build a park. d. Park wins the first vote and road wins the second vote, so they build a road. ANS: B DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Condorcet paradox MSC: Applicative 30. Refer to Table 22-3. If (1) the first vote pits school against road, and (2) the second vote pits park against the winner of the first vote, then the outcome is as follows: a. School wins the first vote and school wins the second vote, so they build a school. b. School wins the first vote and park wins the second vote, so they build a park. c. Road wins the first vote and road wins the second vote, so they build a road. d. Road wins the first vote and park wins the second vote, so they build a park. ANS: D DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Condorcet paradox MSC: Applicative 31. Refer to Table 22-3. Which of the following statements is correct? a. In a pairwise election, school beats road. b. In a pairwise election, road beats park. c. In a pairwise election, school beats park. d. All of the above are correct. ANS: C DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 TOP: Condorcet paradox MSC: Applicative 32. Refer to Table 22-3. Which of the following statements is correct? a. In a pairwise election, road beats school. b. In a pairwise election, school beats park. c. In a pairwise election, park beats road. d. All of the above are correct. ANS: D DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Condorcet paradox MSC: Applicative
  • 27. Chapter 22/Frontiers of Microeconomics 231 33. Refer to Table 22-3. Which of the following statements is correct regarding the Condorcet paradox and the results of pairwise voting in Paradoxopolis? a. The paradox implies that pairwise voting never produces transitive preferences, and so the voting in Paradoxopolis fails to produce transitive preferences. b. The paradox implies that pairwise voting sometimes (but not always) produces transitive preferences, and the voting in Paradoxopolis does produce transitive preferences. c. The paradox implies that pairwise voting sometimes (but not always) fails to produce transitive preferences, and the voting in Paradoxopolis fails to produce transitive preferences. d. The paradox does not apply to the case at hand, because the preferences of Type 3 voters are not individually transitive. ANS: C DIF: 3 REF: 22-2 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Condorcet paradox MSC: Interpretive 34. Refer to Table 22-3. If the citizens of Paradoxopolis use a Borda count, rather than pairwise majority voting, to decide what to build, then they will build a new a. school. b. park. c. road. d. None of the above is correct; a Borda count fails to produce a winner in this instance. ANS: C DIF: 3 REF: 22-2 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Borda counts MSC: Applicative 35. As an alternative to pairwise majority voting, each voter could be asked to rank the possible outcomes, giving 1 point to her lowest choice, 2 points to her second-lowest choice, 3 points to her third-lowest choice, and so on. This voting method is called a(n) a. median vote. b. pairwise minority vote. c. Borda count. d. Arrow count. ANS: C DIF: 1 REF: 22-2 NAT: Analytic LOC: The Study of economics, and definitions in economics TOP: Borda counts MSC: Definitional 36. Economist Kenneth Arrow wrote a famous book in 1951 in which he took up the question, a. Is there a perfect voting system? b. Are preferences transitive? c. Is a dictatorship a good form of government? d. Should the president of the United States be elected to a single, six-year term? ANS: A DIF: 1 REF: 22-2 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Arrow's impossibility theorem MSC: Interpretive 37. In his 1951 book, Social Choice and Individual Values, Kenneth Arrow defined a perfect voting system. That system includes which of the following features? a. unanimity b. transitivity c. absence of a dictator d. All of the above are correct. ANS: D DIF: 1 REF: 22-2 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Arrow's impossibility theorem MSC: Definitional 38. In his 1951 book, Social Choice and Individual Values, Kenneth Arrow used the term unanimity to mean a. A beats B only if everyone prefers A to B. b. if everyone prefers A to B, then A beats B. c. if A beats B and B beats C, then A must best C. d. everyone who is eligible to vote must vote; otherwise, the outcome is invalid.
  • 28. 232 Chapter 22/Frontiers of Microeconomics ANS: B DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Arrow's impossibility theorem MSC: Definitional 39. Arrow’s impossibility theorem shows that no voting system can satisfy which of the following properties? a. unanimity and transitivity only b. transitivity and independence of irrelevant alternatives only c. no dictators and transitivity only d. unanimity, transitivity, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and no dictators ANS: D DIF: 1 REF: 22-2 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Arrow's impossibility theorem MSC: Definitional 40. One property of Kenneth Arrow's perfect voting system is that the ranking between any two outcomes A and B should not depend on whether some third outcome C is also available. Arrow called this property a. transitivity. b. pairwise perfection. c. independence of irrelevant alternatives. d. irrelevance of social choices. ANS: C DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Arrow's impossibility theorem MSC: Definitional 41. Kenneth Arrow proved that the voting system that satisfied all of the properties of his perfect voting system was a. one in which a single person (a dictator) imposes his preferences on everyone else. b. pairwise majority voting. c. majority voting that is not pairwise. d. None of the above is correct. Arrow proved that no voting system can satisfy all of the properties of his perfect system. ANS: D DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Arrow's impossibility theorem MSC: Interpretive 42. The Borda count fails to satisfy which of Kenneth Arrow's properties of a perfect voting system? a. no dictator b. unanimity c. transitivity d. independence of irrelevant alternatives ANS: D DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Arrow's impossibility theorem MSC: Interpretive 43. The Arrow impossibility theorem shows that a. democracy should be abandoned as a form of government. b. it is impossible to improve upon democratic voting methods as a mechanism for social choice. c. all voting systems are flawed as a mechanism for social choice. d. the median voter’s preferences will always win in a two-way vote. ANS: C DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Arrow's impossibility theorem MSC: Interpretive 44. Majority rule will produce the outcome most preferred by the median voter, as demonstrated by the a. Arrow impossibility theorem. b. Condorcet paradox. c. pairwise voting proposition. d. median voter theorem.
  • 29. Chapter 22/Frontiers of Microeconomics 233 ANS: D DIF: 1 REF: 22-2 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Median voter theorem MSC: Interpretive 45. When each voter has a most-preferred outcome for the expenditure on a particular government program, majority rule will produce the outcome a. preferred by the mean (average) voter. b. preferred by the median voter. c. that causes the political party in power to increase its power. d. defined by Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem. ANS: B DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Median voter theorem MSC: Interpretive 46. Assume there are nine voters in a certain small town and let x = the preferred number of dollars spent per person per month on garbage collection. For Voters 1, 2, and 3, x = $10; for Voter 4, x = $15; for Voter 5, x = $18; and for Voters 6, 7, 8 and 9, x = $20. The median voter is a. Voter 3. b. Voter 4. c. Voter 5. d. Voter 6. ANS: C DIF: 1 REF: 22-2 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Median voter theorem MSC: Interpretive 47. The median voter a. is the voter exactly in the middle of the distribution. b. is the voter whose preferred outcome beats any other proposal in a two-way race. c. always has more than half the votes on his side in a two-way race. d. All of the above are correct. ANS: D DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Median voter theorem MSC: Definitional 48. If the median voter theorem holds, a. a Borda count will violate the principle of transitivity. b. the Condorcet paradox also holds. c. minority views will not receive much consideration. d. All of the above are correct. ANS: C DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Median voter theorem MSC: Interpretive 49. The assertion that the median voter is king refers directly to the result established by the a. Arrow impossibility theorem. b. Condorcet paradox. c. median voter theorem. d. Borda mechanism. ANS: C DIF: 1 REF: 22-2 NAT: Analytic LOC: The Study of economics, and definitions in economics TOP: Median voter theorem MSC: Definitional 50. According to the median voter theorem, majority rule will a. always produce an inconclusive outcome. b. produce the outcome least preferred by the median voter. c. produce the outcome most preferred by the median voter. d. produce an outcome that is inconsistent with transitive preferences.
  • 30. 234 Chapter 22/Frontiers of Microeconomics ANS: C DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Median voter theorem MSC: Definitional 51. Arrow's impossibility theorem is disturbing in the sense that it proves that a. no voting system is perfect. b. only a dictator can produce a desirable social outcome. c. the preferences of the wealthy should be given more weight than the preferences of the poor. d. the centuries-old Condorcet paradox was not a paradox after all. ANS: A DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Arrow's impossibility theorem MSC: Interpretive 52. The median voter's preferred outcome is the same as the a. average preferred outcome. b. outcome preferred by the greatest number of voters. c. outcome produced by majority rule. d. outcome preferred by Arrow’s “perfect” voter. ANS: C DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Median voter theorem MSC: Interpretive Scenario 22-1 At issue in a particular city vote is how much to spend, per person, on road repair next year. Among the 10,000 voters, 1,500 prefer to spend $300 per person, but no more; 2,800 prefer to spend $450 per person, but no more; 3,500 prefer to spend $800 per person, but no more; and 2,200 prefer to spend $1500 per person, but no more. 53. Refer to Scenario 22-1. The median voter is one who prefers to spend a. $300. b. $450. c. $800. d. $1500. ANS: C DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Median voter theorem MSC: Applicative 54. Refer to Scenario 22-1. If there is a vote on whether to spend $600 per person or $800 per person, the median voter will vote to spend a. $600 per person and the voting outcome will be $600 per person. b. $600 per person and the voting outcome will be $800 per person. c. $800 per person and the voting outcome will be $600 per person. d. $800 per person and the voting outcome will be $800 per person. ANS: D DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Median voter theorem MSC: Applicative 55. Refer to Scenario 22-1. If there is a vote on whether to spend $800 per person or $1100 per person, the median voter will vote to spend a. $800 per person and the voting outcome will be $800 per person. b. $800 per person and the voting outcome will be $1100 per person. c. $1100 per person and the voting outcome will be $800 per person. d. $1100 per person and the voting outcome will be $1100 per person. ANS: A DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Median voter theorem MSC: Applicative
  • 31. Chapter 22/Frontiers of Microeconomics 235 56. An implication of the median voter theorem is that, in a race between Republicans and Democrats, a. if Republicans want to win, they will take a “middle-of-the-road” stance on many issues. b. if Democrats want to win, they will take an extreme stance on many issues. c. Republicans and Democrats go to extremes to differentiate themselves from one another. d. Republicans and Democrats work hard to identify the fringe voters. ANS: A DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Median voter theorem MSC: Interpretive 57. When Republicans and Democrats offer similar platforms in an election campaign, a likely explanation is the a. Arrow impossibility theorem. b. Condorcet paradox. c. median voter theorem. d. fact that politicians are more interested in the national interest than their own self-interest. ANS: C DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Median voter theorem MSC: Interpretive 58. In American politics, we often observe that during a campaign, the Democratic and Republican positions on many issues are similar, which illustrates a. Arrow’s impossibility theorem. b. the Condorcet paradox. c. a Borda count. d. the median voter theorem. ANS: D DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Median voter theorem MSC: Applicative 59. An implication of the median voter theorem is that a. minority views and majority views are given equal weight. b. platforms of the major political parties will not differ greatly. c. the logic of democracy is fundamentally flawed. d. behavioral economics plays a signficant role in voting outcomes. ANS: B DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Median voter theorem MSC: Interpretive Table 22-4 Five voters must choose from among four options: A, B, C, or D. Each voter’s preferences are summarized in the table below. Options higher in the table are more preferred by the voter. Preferences Voter 1 Voter 2 Voter 3 Voter 4 Voter 5 1st Choice D C B C A 2nd Choice A B A D D 3rd Choice B A D B C 4th Choice C D C A B 60. Refer to Table 22-4. If the vote were conducted according to a Borda count system where each person's first choice receives 4 points, second choice 3 points, third choice 2 points and fourth choice 1 point, the result would be a. that A would win. b. that B would win. c. that C would win. d. a tie between A and D. ANS: D DIF: 3 REF: 22-2 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Borda counts MSC: Applicative
  • 32. 236 Chapter 22/Frontiers of Microeconomics 61. Refer to Table 22-4. If the vote were conducted according to a modified Borda count system where each person's first choice receives 10 points, second choice 5 points, third choice 3 points and fourth choice 1 point, the result would be a. that A would win. b. that B would win. c. that C would win. d. that D would win. ANS: C DIF: 3 REF: 22-2 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Borda counts MSC: Applicative 62. Refer to Table 22-4. Which pairwise voting scheme would result in outcome B? a. First, choose between A and B. Second, voters choose between the winner of the first vote and C. Third, voters choose between the winner of the second vote and D. b. First, choose between B and C. Second, voters choose between the winner of the first vote and A. Third, voters choose between the winner of the second vote and D. c. First, choose between B and D. Second, voters choose between the winner of the first vote and C. Third, voters choose between the winner of the second vote and A. d. First, choose between C and D. Second, voters choose between the winner of the first vote and A. Third, voters choose between the winner of the second vote and B. ANS: D DIF: 3 REF: 22-2 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Pairwise voting MSC: Applicative 63. Refer to Table 22-4. Which pairwise voting scheme would result in outcome D? a. First, choose between A and B. Second, voters choose between the winner of the first vote and C. Third, voters choose between the winner of the second vote and D. b. First, choose between B and D. Second, voters choose between the winner of the first vote and C. Third, voters choose between the winner of the second vote and A. c. First, choose between C and D. Second, voters choose between the winner of the first vote and A. Third, voters choose between the winner of the second vote and B. d. First, choose between C and D. Second, voters choose between the winner of the first vote and B. Third, voters choose between the winner of the second vote and A. ANS: A DIF: 3 REF: 22-2 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Pairwise voting MSC: Applicative 64. Refer to Table 22-4. Which pairwise voting scheme would result in outcome A? a. First, choose between A and B. Second, voters choose between the winner of the first vote and C. Third, voters choose between the winner of the second vote and D. b. First, choose between A and C. Second, voters choose between the winner of the first vote and B. Third, voters choose between the winner of the second vote and D. c. First, choose between B and D. Second, voters choose between the winner of the first vote and C. Third, voters choose between the winner of the second vote and A. d. First, choose between C and D. Second, voters choose between the winner of the first vote and A. Third, voters choose between the winner of the second vote and B. ANS: C DIF: 3 REF: 22-2 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Pairwise voting MSC: Applicative
  • 33. Chapter 22/Frontiers of Microeconomics 237 Table 22-5 The 500 voters of Appleton are deciding by majority rule how much to spend on a new library. Number of voters who most prefer this amount of spending $0 65 $1 million 60 $2 million 100 $3 million 75 $4 million 200 65. Refer to Table 22-5. The median voter prefers to spend a. $2 million. b. $2.57 million. c. $3 million. d. $4 million. ANS: C DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Median voter theorem MSC: Applicative Table 22-6 Voter Type Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Percent of electorate 55 25 20 First choice X Y Z Second choice Y Z Y Third choice Z X X 66. Refer to Table 22-6. The table shows the preferences of three types of voters over three possible outcomes: X, Y, and Z. In addition, the table shows the percentage of voters of each type. Based on this information, which of the following statements is true? a. As the Condorcet Paradox predicts, majority rule fails to produce transitive preferences for society. b. As Arrow's Impossibility Theorem demonstrates, it is impossible from this information to determine which outcome the voters prefer. c. The median voter theorem allows us to conclude that in a vote between X and Y, Y will win since the Type 2 voter is the median voter. d. While the Condorcet Paradox predicts that majority rule may not produce transitive preferences for society as a whole, society's preferences in this case are transitive. ANS: D DIF: 3 REF: 22-2 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Condorcet paradox MSC: Applicative 67. Refer to Table 22-6. The table shows the preferences of three types of voters over three possible outcomes: X, Y, and Z. The table also shows the percentage of voters of each type. Based on this information, which voter type is the median voter? a. Type 1 b. Type 2 c. Type 3 d. The median voter cannot be determined without knowing the pair of outcomes from which the voters will be choosing. ANS: A DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Median voter theorem MSC: Analytical
  • 34. 238 Chapter 22/Frontiers of Microeconomics 68. Refer to Table 22-6. The table shows the preferences for three types of voters over three possible outcomes: X, Y, and Z. The table also shows the percentage of voters of each type. Based on this information, which of the following statements is true? a. In a vote between X and Y, X loses since only the Type 1 voters prefer X to Y. b. In a vote between Y and Z, Y wins getting 80% of the total vote. c. In a vote between X and Z, X loses getting only 45% of the total vote. d. Both a and b. ANS: B DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Median voter theorem MSC: Applicative Table 22-7 Number of People Preferred Budget 4 $20 7 $30 10 $ 0 13 $40 15 $10 26 $50 69. Refer to Table 22-7. The table shows the most preferred budget of 75 voters. In an election, each voter will select the budget closest to his or her most preferred budget. Using this information, what is the most preferred budget of the median voter? a. $10 b. $20 c. $30 d. $40 ANS: D DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Median voter theorem MSC: Analytical 70. Refer to Table 22-7. The table shows the most preferred budget of 75 voters. In an election, each voter will select the budget closest to his or her most preferred budget. Which of the following statements regarding this information is true? a. In an election between a $33 budget and a $37 budget, the $33 budget will win. b. Since the median voter theorem implies that the budget of the median voter will win the election, we would expect the overall best budget to be $25, the median of the available budgets. c. In an election between a $10 budget and a $40 budget, the $40 budget will win. d. Both b and c. ANS: C DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Median voter theorem MSC: Analytical Table 22-8 Voter Type Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 4 Percent of electorate 32 20 15 33 First choice W X Z Y Second choice X Z W W Third choice Y W Y Z Fourth choice Z Y X X
  • 35. Chapter 22/Frontiers of Microeconomics 239 71. Refer to Table 22-8. The table shows the preferences of four types of voters over four possible outcomes: W, X, Y, and Z. In addition, the table shows the percentage of voters of each type. Based on this information, which of the following statements is false? a. Outcome W is preferred to outcome X overall. b. Outcome X is preferred to outcome Y overall. c. Outcome Y is preferred to outcome W overall. d. Outcome W is preferred to outcome Z overall. ANS: C DIF: 3 REF: 22-2 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Condorcet paradox MSC: Analytical 72. Refer to Table 22-8. The table shows the preferences of four types of voters over four possible outcomes: W, X, Y, and Z. In addition, the table shows the percentage of voters of each type. Suppose a Borda count election is held in which each voter ranks the four outcomes, giving 1 point to last place, 2 points to second to last, 3 points to the second best, and 4 points to the best. In this case, which outcome would win? a. W b. X c. Y d. Z ANS: A DIF: 3 REF: 22-2 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Borda counts MSC: Analytical 73. Refer to Table 22-8. The table shows the preferences of four types of voters over four possible outcomes: W, X, Y, and Z. In addition, the table shows the percentage of voters of each type. Suppose that, for some reason, W is eliminated as a possible option. Using a Borda count election, with 3 points for the best choice, 2 points for the second best choice, and 1 point for the last choice, which outcome would win this election? a. X b. Y c. Z d. There would be a three-way tie. ANS: B DIF: 3 REF: 22-2 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Borda counts MSC: Analytical Table 22-9 Voter Type Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 # Voters 40 15 45 First choice C B A Second choice B A C Third choice A C B 74. Refer to Table 22-9. The table shows the preferences of 100 voters over three possible outcomes: A, B, and C. If a Borda count election were held among these voters, giving three points to each voter's first choice, two points to the second choice, and one point to the last choice, which outcome would win the election? a. Outcome A b. Outcome B c. Outcome C d. Either outcome A or outcome C since these have the same total score. ANS: C DIF: 2 REF: 22-2 NAT: Analytic LOC: Understanding and applying economic models TOP: Borda counts MSC: Analytical