1. 1
Supporting Decentralization as an Entry Point for
Governance Reform in Sierra Leone
Yongmei Zhou (AFTPR)
Decentralization TG Presentation, Mar 7 2007

2. 2
Sierra Leone: a poor post-conflict country
 Civil war (1991-2002) displaced half of population, caused
20,000 death, and destroyed infrastructure and social capital
 176th
out of 177 in UN HDI ranking
 Infant mortality: 166 out of 1000; SSA average: 101; world
average 57.
 Under-5 mortality: 284 out of 1000; SSA average: 171; world
average 86.
 Life expectancy 37; SSA average: 46; world average: 67.
 Adult literacy: 36%; SSA average: 71%; world average 80%
 Weak governance and rampant corruption

3. 3
A high-stake bet
 2004, World Bank $25m for Institutional Reform and Capacity
Building Project
 2006, DfID and EU gave a $25m trust fund to the World Bank
to top up IRCBP
 2005, JSDF $2m for strengthening community collective action
& engagement with local councils
 2005, PHRD grant $900,000 for strengthening leadership of the
decentralization process
 Existing social action project (NSAP, 2003-2008, $35m) adopts a
strategy to support decentralization and strengthen local council
capacity
 2007: Accelerated Child Survival Project ($35m) to strengthen
gov health grant system and LCs capacity to deliver

4. 4
Why betting on a
decentralization-driven
governance reform program?

5. 5
Some criteria for a good entry point for
governance reform
 A good thing to do
 A good time to do it
 Some influential people lose sleep over it
 Can lead to visible and quick enough improvement in
something that people care about
 Can generate further momentum and expand constituency
for longer-term governance transformation
Q: Was devolution a good entry point in the Sierra Leone
context?

6. 6
A good thing to do, at least in theory
 Addressing a root cause of the civil war – centralization of
power and resources and resultant inequality and rampant
corruption.
 Opening space for political participation
 More transparent and equitable resource allocation across
districts
 Bringing resource closer to frontline providers and hopefully
better delivery
 Bringing the state closer to citizens and hopefully building
state legitimacy

7. 7
Bad roads and poor
communication make
a small country too
“big” to govern from
Freetown
This map is based on GIS data for
Sierra Leone. Road density is
calculated as the km of road per
square km of land in each chiefdom.
The roads that have available GIS
data are major A and B roads.

8. 8
Window of opportunity & just-in-time
support
 IRCBP preparation phase coincided with GoSL
preparation for LG legislation and elections
 Immediate engagement with newly elected LCs
 Start a virtuous cycle

9. 9
MoF counting on fiscal decentralization to improve
effectiveness of public spending
 Sustained efforts to improve effectiveness of public
spending in the past decade (see PFM reform history)
 MoF frustrated with pervasive leakages of resources
 PETS 2002: less than 10% of all essential drugs could be accounted for
by District Medical Officers; less than 5% of all essential drugs were
accounted for by periphery health units.
 PETS 2002: only 72% teaching and learning materials reached the
intended schools from District Edu Offices, arriving 170 days later
than contracted.
 PETS 2003: Receipt of seed rice: 8% before planting season; 35%
during planting season; 57% after planting season
 Establish Local Gov Finance Department to focus on
fiscal decentralization

10. 10
Citizen and business engagement
open and accountable local political
process, civil society and media oversight,
public-private partnership
Local government capacity
and governance practice
Central government enabling conditions
allowing fiscal and administrative autonomy, adequate &
predictable transfers, refrain from political interference,
domestic accountability mechanisms
Community collective
action
IRCBP and partners work on conditions for effective
local governance

11. 11
Do it in a way that expands
constituency and opens more doors

12. 12
Building constituency for decentralization
through LC Rapid Results Initiatives
 Immediately after LC elections, central government challenged
and supported each LC to identify, design, and implement one
Rapid Result Initiative that was
 Urgent and compelling
 Visible – people will notice the difference
 Can be translated into real impact in 100 days
 MLGCD Decentralization Secretariat provided coaches
 MoF disbursed Local Government Development Grant four
months after elections

13. 13
LCs did not disappoint
 LCs RRIs tackled diverse development issues: water,
sanitation, feeder roads, bridges, traffic, rice production,
post-harvest loss. Examples of results:
 Travel time between Sewafe and Peya of Nimiyama Chiefdom of Kono
District reduced from 1hr to 15 minutes and transportation cost reduced
from Le 5,000 ($1.75) to Le 2,000 (70 cents).
 Increase the availability of high-yield quick-harvest Inner Valley Swamp
Rice seeds in Pujehun District by 4,000 bushels within 90 days
 Ensure the availability of safe and portable drinking water in the mains
and laterals and 25 public taps in the Moyamba township within 90 days.
 Total volume of Garbage in two lorry parks and two markets in Kenema
Township reduced by 90% within 95 days.
 Cheaper and faster than MDA projects

14. 14
LCs RRIs to generate a virtuous cycle
Central Government
and donors
willing to transfer
resources to LGs with
good track record.
Progressive LGs given
opportunity to learn-
by-doing, establish track record,
develop capacity and
motivate other LGs to catch up.
LGs exercise authority and
accumulate capacity. LGs adopt
inclusive accountable practices.
Citizens and firms perceive relevance of
LGs and engage in collective action
(express demand for public service,
participate in co-production,
hold LGs accountable,
pay taxes).

15. 15
And preventing a vicious cycle of
deteriorating local governance
Inadequate and/or
unpredictable
transfers; limited
autonomy & authority;
Weak monitoring
LGs:
capacity low,
Some corrupt
Citizens and firms discount
LGs relevance and
do not participate in
LGs decision process
and do not pressure for
performance.
Low impact of
LG spending

16. 16
Sector RRIs to give credibility to
sector devolution
 Sector staff performing functions related to primary
health, crops/livestock, DEC schools received
orientation of the Rapid Results Approach.
 RRIs developed by sector teams
 Local council sector committees would monitor the
progress of the sector RRIs: accountability and
partnership between politicians and professionals.
 Each RRI team would include members from
beneficiary communities

17. 17
Central Government
and donors
willing to transfer
resources to LGs with
good track record.
Weak LGs given
opportunity to learn-
by-doing, establish
track record and
develop capacity.
LGs exercise authority and
accumulate capacity. LGs adopt
inclusive accountable practices.
Citizens perceive relevance of
LGs and engage in collective action
(express demand for public service,
participate in co-production,
hold LGs accountable,
pay taxes).
Are purse-
holders aware
of LG
achievement
and willing to
further
empower
progressive
LGs?

18. 18
MoF now treats grants to LCs as high-
priority spending
Actual grants transfer to local councils 2004-2006
-
5,000,000,000
10,000,000,000
15,000,000,000
20,000,000,000
25,000,000,000
Administrative
Grant
Other Grants Solid Waste
Management
Health Care
Services
Agriculture and
Food Security
Rural Water
Services
Local Govt Dev
Grant(WB+
GoSL
Counterpart)1
TOTAL
FY04 disbursement FY05 disbursement FY06 disbursement

19. 19
Although timing of transfers remain to be
improved
Timing of disbursement for grants to Local Councils (2006)
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Administrative Grant Other Grants2 Solid Waste
Management
Health Care Services Agriculture and Food
Security
Rural Water Services TOTAL
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4

20. 20
Lobbying Accountant General to simplify
transfer process
 Cumbersome bureaucracy needed urgent reform: for
every quarterly payment of every grant to 19 councils,
237 are required before a payment can be made. 237
signatures per grant per quarter * 14 grants * 4
quarterly payments/grant = 13,272 signatures!
 Recently consolidated grants and forms

21. 21
Some donors considering using GoSL
grants system for resource transfer
 World Bank and DfID health sector support to top
up financing GoSL LC grants system, improving
M&E, supporting district health management teams
to implement their sector plans and budget
 DfID water sector support to follow similar
approach
 World Bank and DfID/EC co-financing the block
grant for LCs (Local Gov Dev Grant): allow LCs
discretions and build in incentive in grant allocation
formula.

22. 22
Need to continue expanding constituency for
decentralization
Perception ofagency commitment todecentralization by 110 participants in the 2nd NationalDecentralization
Dialogue (Dec 2006)
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
World Bank
IRCBP team
Min Health and Sanitation
Min Food and Agric
MoF
MLGCD
National Commission for Social Action
Sierra Leone Water Company
Min Education
Sierra Leone Road Authority

23. 23
Did it turn out to be a good thing to do?
 Is devolution bringing the state closer to people?
 Are LGs responsive and accountable?
 Does devolution improve access to and quality of services?
 Does improvement in public services increase citizens’ trust
in government?
 Does improvement in public services lead to improvement
in tax compliance?
 Will high-performing councilors have more promising
political career?
 Will more competent and committed people stand for LG
elections in 2008?

24. 24
Building LCs capacity is not
the hardest part

25. 25
LCs meeting some min standards for
governance practice
Source: Comprehensive Local Government Performance Assessment (Nov 2006)
Legend
5 minimum conditions
4 minimum conditions
3 minimum conditions
2 minimum conditions
0-1 minimum conditions
7 Minimum conditions
1. Financial management
2. Development planning
3. Budgeting and accounting
4. Procurement
5. Transparency and accountability
6. Project implementation
7. Functional capacity of LG

26. 26
LCs adopting good governance practices,
many not yet adopted by ministries
Source: Comprehensive Local Government Performance Assessment (Nov 2006)
Legend
70 - 88 points
60 - 69 points
50 - 59 points
30 - 49 points
Performance measures
1. Management, organization and institutional
structures
2. Transparency, openness, participation and
accountability
3. Planning systems and project implementation, M&E
4. Human resource management
5. Financial management, budgeting and accounting
6. Fiscal capacity and local revenue mobilization
7. Procurement and contract management

27. 27
District Medical Officers embraced
decentralization
 Primary health service delivery responsibilities devolved to
LCs in 2005, along with tried grants
 DMO is part of LC Management Team and a co-signatory of
LC health grant account
 DMO enjoys operational autonomy
“Decentralization has stopped the tide of brain drain among medical
professionals because we now have interesting work to do.”
“Decentralization allows us to quickly respond to disease outbreaks. We
don’t have to wait for the ministry.”
“Decentralization means if I have a problem I can knock on the doors of
our council rather than sitting on a long bench in Youyi Building for a
week and waiting for an audience with a ministry official.”

28. 28
Health Care Services at PHUs did not deteriorate
after devolution in 2005
Source: IRCBP Health Clinics Surveys 2005-2006
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
with a latrine
with a working fridge
with an improved water source
in a good-quality building
with patients present
open at arrival
fraction of clinics...
2005 2006

29. 29
Health Care Services at PHUs did not deteriorate
after devolution in 2005 (continued)
Source: IRCBP Health Clinics Surveys 2005-2006
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
important supplies in stock
important drugs in-stock
required staff posted
average fraction of...
2005 2006

30. 30
Stimulating citizen demand
for good governance is easier
said than done

31. 31
Performance comparison, peer learning,
and political competition
 Hypothesis: with a good communication program,
comparative performance data can serve as
 Stimulant for peer learning and performance
improvement
 Trigger for political competition and civic activism
 Whether disseminating comparative performance
information among electorates will affect political
fortune of councilors remain to be seen.

32. 32
Good-practice LCs get award from MLGCd and bonus
grants from MoF, but are people asking their laggard
LCs tough questions?
Legend
70 - 88 points
60 - 69 points
50 - 59 points
30 - 49 points
Performance measures
1. Management, organization and institutional
structures
2. Transparency, openness, participation and
accountability
3. Planning systems and project implementation, M&E
4. Human resource management
5. Financial management, budgeting and accounting
6. Fiscal capacity and local revenue mobilization
7. Procurement and contract management

33. 33
Are people wondering why councils are paying such
different prices for similar furniture?
Cost of an average set of office furniture (56 conference chairs, 4 computer workstations, 7 office desks, 2 small conference tables, 1 large
conference table, 4 executive desks), using actual unit prices paid by LCs
0
5,000,000
10,000,000
15,000,000
20,000,000
25,000,000
30,000,000
35,000,000
M
oyambaDistKoinadugu
DistTonkoliliDist
BontheTownBontheDistrict
KailahunDist
M
akeniTown
KambiaDistPortLokoDist
BombaliDist
PujehunDist
W
ARD-C
Kenem
aDist
KoiduNew
S
Town
Bo
TownKenem
aTown
Bo
Dist
KonoDist

34. 34
Rural people start knowing their councilors but
they are far more familiar with their chiefs
Knowing the authorities
Source: GoBifo/IRCBP/ENCISS Joint Household Survey in Bonthe and Bombali Districts (Dec 2005)
0.00%
10.00%
20.00%
30.00%
40.00%
50.00%
60.00%
70.00%
80.00%
90.00%
Bombali District Bonthe District
Percent of respondents able to correctly name the Chairperson of their Local Council
Percent of respondents able to correctly name the Local Councillor from their ward
Percent of respondents able to correctly name their Section Chief
Percent of respondents able to correctly name their Paramount Chief

35. 35
Gender and age gaps in political awareness,
activism and confidence
Source: GoBifo/IRCBP/ENCISS joint household survey in Bombali District and Bonthe District (Dec 2005)
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
% who attended a meeting in
the last year and spoke at the
last meeting they attended
% able to correctly name Local
Councillor or Local Council
Chairperson
% reported voting in last
general election (2002)
% reported voting in last local
government election (2004)
% believing they have some or
little chance (rather than no
chance) in changing unjust
chiefdom law
% believing they have some or
little chance (rather than no
chance) in changing unjust
local council law
Female (8-24) Female (25-35) Female (>=36) Male (8-24) Male (25-35) Male (>=36)

36. 36
Whether devolution can sustain itself and lead to
wider governance reform remains to be seen
 Will local politicians fight against recentralization
attempts?
 Will competition among local governments give
pressure for performance improvement?
 Will local political markets allow for more credible
alternatives to emerge for future national elections?
 Can culture of inclusion and accountability be built
from below?

37. 37
What next?
Four tough nuts to crack

38. 38
1. Need the missing leg of the stool
Decentralization
Human Resource
Management
Reform
Public Financial
Management Reform

39. 39
Lack of HRM reform progress in central gov
poses binding constraints on decentralization
 Lack of applicants for LC jobs, despite more attractive
monetary offers than central gov equivalent positions
 Main concerns: career prospect, job security
 Recommend
 Allow mobility between civil service and LG service
 Work with tertiary institutions and professional organizations to
establish curriculum, certificate, diploma and “flood” the market
with talents central and local gov need
 Same constraint as 2003: leadership?

40. 40
2. Will LCs ever be self-sustainable?
LC own revenue performance 2005 and first 3 quarters of 2006
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
Kam
bia
DistrictTonkoliliDistrict
KailahunDistrictBom
baliDistrict
PortLokoDistrict
KoinaduguDistrictPujehun
District
W
esterArea
RuralDistrict
Bo
District
Moyamba
DistrictKenema
DistrictBontheDistrictKono
DistrictFreetownCity
MakeniTownKenem
a
Town
Bo
TownBontheTown
KoiduNew
Sem
behun
Town
(Leonepercapita)
FY05 FY06 Q1-3

41. 41
3. Traditional authorities & elected
local councils
 Lack of policy clarity on roles and responsibilities
indicates a deeper ambivalence among political
elites

42. 42
4. PIU & government bureaucracy
 IRCBP project team is entirely contract staff (all
Sierra Leone national)
 Performance and incentive far exceeds that of
parent ministries (MoF, MLGCD)
 Tension & policy and operational bottleneck
 Will integration be possible?