Evaluation of the oyster farming potential of the Cintra bay (southern Morocco)
Hastings 2014 FFI Benefit Sharing
1. Sustainable Financing and Benefit-Sharing
for the Koh Rong Archipelago Marine
Fisheries Management Area
REPORT BY:
JESSE GUITE HASTINGS, PhD
DONAL YEANG, MSc.
OCTOBER 2014
FOR THE COASTAL & MARINE CONSERVATION PROJECT, FAUNA &
FLORA INTERNATIONAL CAMBODIA PROGRAMME, IN PARTNERSHIP
WITH THE FISHERIES ADMINISTRATION, MINSTRY OF AGRICULTURE,
FORESTRY & FISHERIES, ROYAL GOVERNMENT OF CAMBODIA
2. CONTENTS
មូលន័យសង្ខេប..................................................................................................................... 1
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY............................................................................................................... 5
INTRODUCTION: THE NEED FOR SUSTAINABLE FINANCING AND FINANCIAL BENEFIT-SHARING FOR
THE KOH RONG ARCHIPELAGO MFMA ...................................................................................... 7
METHODS................................................................................................................................. 9
OPTIONS ................................................................................................................................ 10
COLLECTION OPTIONS......................................................................................................... 10
ENTRANCE FEES ............................................................................................................. 10
DIVING AND BOATING FEES.............................................................................................. 10
CONCESSION FEES.......................................................................................................... 11
VOLUNTARY DONATIONS ................................................................................................. 12
GOVERNANCE OPTIONS: ..................................................................................................... 12
VERTICAL DISTRIBUTION OPTIONS:...................................................................................... 13
HORIZONTAL (CFI) DISTRIBUTION OPTIONS.......................................................................... 13
CRITERIA................................................................................................................................ 15
ANALYSIS ............................................................................................................................... 16
COLLECTION OPTIONS......................................................................................................... 16
ENTRANCE FEES ............................................................................................................. 17
DIVING AND BOATING FEES.............................................................................................. 18
CONCESSION FEES.......................................................................................................... 20
VOLUNTARY DONATIONS ................................................................................................. 21
GOVERNANCE OPTIONS ...................................................................................................... 22
VERTICAL DISTRIBUTION OPTIONS ....................................................................................... 23
HORIZONTAL (CFI) DISTRIBUTION OPTIONS.......................................................................... 24
GLOBAL AND REGIONAL BEST PRACTICES............................................................................ 26
BELIZE ............................................................................................................................ 26
NGA TRA BAY MARINE PARK, VIETNAM ............................................................................ 27
TUBBATAHA MARINE PARK, PHILIPPINES .......................................................................... 27
ACEH, INDONESIA............................................................................................................ 28
BONAIRE MARINE PARK, BONAIRE ................................................................................... 29
BUNAKEN MARINE PARK, INDONESIA................................................................................ 30
KOMODO NATIONAL PARK, INDONESIA ............................................................................. 30
SHARK REEF MARINE RESERVE, FIJI................................................................................ 31
CAMBODIAN BEST PRACTICES ............................................................................................. 32
CHAMBOK ECO-TOURISM SITE ......................................................................................... 32
ODDAR MEANCHEY COMMUNITY FORESTRY REDD+ PROJECT......................................... 33
RECOMMENDATION: A BENEFIT-SHARING MODEL THAT IS EFFECTIVE, EQUITABLE, AND
TRANSPARENT........................................................................................................................ 35
PHASE ONE: LAYING THE GROUNDWORK (2015).................................................................. 35
PHASE TWO: ROLLING IT OUT (2016 - 2017)........................................................................ 38
PHASE THREE: SCALING IT UP (2018 - 2019)....................................................................... 44
WORKS CITED ........................................................................................................................ 47
3. Recommended Citation: Hastings, J.G. & Yeang D. (2014) Sustainable Financing and
Benefit-Sharing for the Koh Rong Archipelago Marine Fisheries Management Area. Fauna &
Flora International Cambodia Programme, Phnom Penh, Cambodia.
Acknowledgements: The authors are grateful to Fauna & Flora International, the UK
Government’s Darwin Initiative and the Prince Albert II of Monaco Foundation for providing
the funding to make this report possible. Photo credits: Jeremy Holden/FFI.
Disclaimer: Fauna & Flora International benefits from the support of the Prince Albert II of
Monaco Foundation (http//www.fpa2.com) and the UK Government’s Darwin Initiative This
report has been produced by independent consultants Dr Jesse Guite Hastings and Mr Donal
Yeang on the request of Fauna & Flora International. The contents of this document are solely
the liability of the consultants and under no circumstances may be considered as a reflection
of the Prince Albert II of Monaco Foundation's or the UK Government’s position.
8. 5
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Royal Government of Cambodia’s Fisheries Administration (FiA), together with Fauna &
Flora International (FFI) and many other local, national, and international partners, is working
to establish the Koh Rong Archipelago Marine Fisheries Management Area (KRA MFMA).
There have already been several markers of progress in regards to ensuring the effective
management of the MFMA, including gathering biophysical data for use in zoning decisions
(2012 - 2013), conducting community consultations on draft zoning maps (2013), conducting
private sector consultations on zoning, management, and financing (2013-2014), creating a
provincial management committee (PMC) (2013), creating a technical working group (TWG)
(2014), and determining the MFMA’s vision, goals, and objectives (2013 – 2014). One of the
remaining tasks to ensure the effective management of the KRA MFMA is to develop a
sustainable financing plan.
This report is designed to inform the development of that financial plan. Drawing on a literature
review of global, regional and Cambodian best practices, as well as data from consultations
with informants from the Cambodian government, the private and NGO sectors, and local
communities, it assesses the potential sustainable financing options for the KRA MFMA and
designs a financial benefit-sharing mechanism which includes the three community fisheries
(CFis) as well as relevant government levels and agencies.
Benefit-sharing, defined by the Convention on Biological Diversity as “the fair and equitable
sharing of benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources” (www.cbd.org), is needed
for several reasons. First, benefit-sharing builds support for conservation. Local stakeholders
are more likely to follow the MFMA’s regulations when they feel their voice is respected and
they see direct benefits from supporting it. Second, MFMAs have costs (such as the closure
of selected fishing grounds, time spent patrolling and in management meetings, etc.) as well
as benefits, and benefit-sharing helps compensate stakeholders for their costs. Third, concrete
and mutually-agreed upon benefit-sharing mechanisms help reduce the capture of benefits by
elites and allow them to be more fairly distributed throughout relevant communities. Finally,
benefit-sharing gives stakeholders incentives and financial flexibility to pursue activities that
may be ultimately good for the MFMA, such as fisheries management, developing diversified
livelihoods, and building community infrastructure such as hospitals, sewage treatment
facilities, and schools.
Consultations with Cambodian stakeholders in 2013 and the report by Hastings (2013)
revealed that the most preferred and feasible financing mechanisms during the start-up phase
of KRA MFMA were tourism user fees (entrance fees, diving and boating fees, and concession
fees), voluntary donations from tourists and tour operators, and the continuation of foreign
conservation assistance. In the medium term, there may be an interest in moving to a wider
portfolio which includes more complex funding mechanisms such as biodiversity offsetting and
conservation trust funds. Thus, this report focuses upon these financing mechanisms and
explores options in terms of (1) how the funds are collected, (2) how the funds are governed,
(3) how the funds are distributed vertically (i.e. between various levels of government and
CFis), and (4) how the funds are distributed horizontally (i.e. between CFis and groups within
CFis). Analysis and recommendations for this report were developed based on a desktop
literature review, consultations with Cambodian stakeholders from July 21st – 27th 2014, and
9. 6
feedback from FFI. Criteria were adapted from a previous work (Hastings 2013) and include
(1) political feasibility, (2) administrative ease, (3) funds oversight, (4) legal feasibility, and (5)
fairness and equity.
This report recommends that the KRA MFMA sustainable financing and benefit-sharing model
is brought in through a three-phased plan. The first phase (2015) focuses upon building
capacity and laying the educational, financial, and legislative groundwork for full model
implementation. The second phase (2016 - 2017) focuses upon model implementation at the
KRA MFMA scale. The third phase (2018 - 2019) focuses upon making KRA MFMA part of a
larger, regional-scale financing network. The tasks for each phase of the model are below.
The tasks from each phase build upon those in phases previous.
TABLE 1: SUSTAINABLE FINANCING AND BENEFIT-SHARING MODEL FOR KRA MFMA
PHASE ONE (2015) PHASE TWO (2016 - 2017) PHASE THREE (2018 - 2019)
Collect voluntary donations
for the MFMA’s management
costs
Create a sub-group of the
TWG and a segregated bank
account to manage and
receive funds
Crack down on illegal
activities within the MFMA
and fine perpetrators
Build financial capacity of
CFis
Determine the fee amounts
through WTP surveys and
immediately begin
negotiating distribution
options with relevant
stakeholder groups
Educate tourism operators
as to the need for and use of
fees
Prepare and lobby for the
necessary legislative
framework to allow fees for
the MFMA
Prepare tags/tickets for
distribution
Collect entrance, diving and
boating, and concession
fees, as well as continue to
collect voluntary donations
Govern the funds through a
multi-sectoral stakeholder
committee at the provincial
level, likely a sub-group of
the KRA MFMA TWG
Distribute funds to CFis,
Preah Sihanouk provincial
government departments
(including FiA), the Ministry
of Economy and Finance, as
well as for an open fund for
entrepreneurial projects.
Fund distribution
percentages (%) should be
determined through
stakeholder negotiation,
adhering to principles of
need and equity
Prepare KRA MFMA
souvenirs for sale
Join Cambodia Bay Trust
Fund (if established)and
negotiate regional-scale
benefit-sharing
Sell KRA MFMA souvenirs
Explore other financing
options, including Payment
for Ecosystem Services
(Carbon Finance and
Watershed Protection)
This analysis is part one of a longer project; part two will include a Willingness to Pay Survey
of tourists and tour operators so to enable a completed picture of funding flows and benefit-
sharing opportunities.
10. 7
INTRODUCTION: THE NEED FOR SUSTAINABLE FINANCING AND FINANCIAL
BENEFIT-SHARING FOR THE KOH RONG ARCHIPELAGO MFMA
The Royal Government of Cambodia’s Fisheries Administration (FiA), together with Fauna &
Flora International (FFI) and many other local, national, and international partners, is working
to establish the Koh Rong Archipelago Marine Fisheries Management Area (KRA MFMA). The
KRA MFMA is to be the first large-scale marine protected area (MPA) in Cambodia and will
be a model marine fisheries management area for conservation of marine biodiversity,
sustainable fishing and tourism, contributing to poverty reduction. There have already been
several markers of progress in regards to ensuring the effective management of the MFMA,
including gathering biophysical data for use in zoning decisions (2012 - 2013), conducting
community consultations on draft zoning maps (2013), conducting private sector consultations
on zoning, management, and financing (2013-2014), creating a provincial management
committee (PMC) (2013), creating a technical working group (TWG) (2014), and determining
the MFMA’s vision, goals, and objectives (2013 – 2014). One of the remaining tasks to ensure
the effective management of the KRA MFMA is to develop a sustainable financing plan.
This report is designed to inform the development of that financial plan. Drawing on a literature
review of best practices, as well as data from consultations with informants from the
Cambodian government, the private and NGO sectors, and local communities, it assesses the
potential sustainable financing sources for the KRA MFMA and designs a financial benefit-
sharing mechanism which includes the three community fisheries (CFis) as well as relevant
government agencies and management committees. This analysis is part one of a longer
project; part two will include a Willingness to Pay Survey of tourists and local businesses so
to enable a completed picture of funding flows and benefit-sharing opportunities.
Benefit-sharing, defined by the Convention on Biological Diversity as “the fair and equitable
sharing of benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources” (www.cbd.org), is needed
for several reasons. First, benefit-sharing builds support for conservation. Local stakeholders
are more likely to follow the MFMA’s regulations when they feel their voice is respected and
they see direct benefits from supporting it. Second, MFMAs have costs as well as benefits
(such as the closure of selected fishing grounds, time spent patrolling and in management
meetings, etc.), and benefit-sharing helps compensate stakeholders for their costs. Third,
concrete and mutually-agreed upon benefit-sharing mechanisms help reduce the capture of
benefits by elites and allow them to be more fairly distributed throughout relevant communities
(FFI 2014). Finally, benefit-sharing gives stakeholders incentives and financial flexibility to
pursue activities that may be ultimately good for the MFMA, such as fisheries management,
developing alternative livelihoods, and building community infrastructure such as hospitals,
sewage treatment facilities, and schools. However, care must be taken to develop benefit-
sharing mechanisms that are effective, equitable, and transparent – the influx of new funds
into a local community should not create inequality, destroy cultural practices, or contribute to
conflicts (Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity 2008).
After describing the methods used to collect data, this report lays out options for sustainable
financing and benefit-sharing across four dimensions. Criteria for analysing the options are
then presented. The analysis section analyses each option against each criterion as well as
presents global, regional, and Cambodian benefit-sharing best practices that can help inform
11. 8
the design of the KRA MFMA model. Finally, the report concludes by recommending a three-
staged model for sustainable financing and benefit-sharing to be implemented over the next
five years.
12. 9
METHODS
Analysis and recommendations in this report were developed based on a desktop literature
review, consultations with Cambodian stakeholders from July 21st – 27th 2014, and feedback
from FFI. Criteria were adapted from previous work (Hastings 2013).
A desktop literature review, conducted in July 2014, provides the foundation for the report.
Before the consultations in Cambodia began, both consultants reviewed documents providing
global, regional, and Cambodian examples of sustainable financing and benefit-sharing in
MPAs, protected areas (PAs), and around Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest
Degradation (REDD) projects. Cambodian legislation related to the country’s protected areas,
national and sub-national financing, community fisheries, and KRA MFMA was also reviewed.
This review helped structure the initial options and analysis so to ensure that the final
recommendation reflected Cambodian realities as well as best practices from around the
world.
Following the literature review, a round of consultations was held with Cambodian
stakeholders from July 21st – 27th. These consultations served to ‘ground-truth’ various options
in light of the wider Cambodian and specific KR/KRS context. Interviews and focus groups
were held in Phnom Penh, Sihanoukville, and on KR/KRS with stakeholders in government,
the private sector, the NGO sector, and local communities. Individuals interviewed included:
TABLE 2: INTERVIEWEES
NAME POSITION DATE
Mr. Berry Mulligan Project Manager, FFI-Cambodia July 21st
Mr. Ouk Vibol Director, Department of Fisheries Conservation July 21st
Mr. Seth Hoeger Managing Director, Song Saa Private Island July 21st
Mr. Ny Phaly Assistant to Minister, Ministry of Tourism July 21st
Mr. Pierre Khan General Manager, Koh Rong Dive Center July 21st
Ms. Anna-Theresa Kienitz Project Manager, Save Cambodia Marine Life July 21st
Mr. Wayne McCallum Executive Director, Song Saa Foundation July 22nd
Mrs. Claudia Chan Director, LimeTree Capital July 22nd
Mr. Kevin Treloar Vice President Business Development, Royal Group July 22nd
Mr. Sakip Catal Owner, Koh Rong Dive Center July 22nd
Mr. Seng Kha Director, Department of Tourism, Sihanoukville July 23rd
Mr. Nan Chamroeun Director, FiA Cantonment July 23rd
Mr. Hoc Laim Member, MFMA PMC and Dep. Director, FiA Cantonment July 23rd
Mr. Nout Ly Dep. Director, Department of Transport, Sihanoukville July 23rd
Mrs. Kyoko Owner, EcoSea Dive Shop July 23rd
CFi Chief and Committee Daem Thkov Community Fishery July 24th
Mr. Kylie Gavard Owner, Conservation Cambodia July 24th
Mrs. Sarah Yorke Manager, Cambodian Diving Group July 24th
Mr. Hak Seakly Village Chief, Koh Touch July 24th
CFi Patrol Team Patrol Team, Koh Touch (for KRS Community Fishery) July 25th
CFi Chief and Committee Koh Rong Sanloem Community Fishery July 25th
Mr. Dennis Funke TWG-MFMA tourist agency representative, and owner,
The Dive Shop Cambodia
July 25th
Mr. Prak Visal Dep. Director of Provincial Administration Bureau,
Sihanoukville
July 26th
13. 10
OPTIONS
Consultations with Cambodian stakeholders in 2013 and the report by Hastings (2013)
revealed that the most preferred and feasible financing mechanisms during the start-up phase
of KRA MFMA were tourism user fees (entrance fees, diving fees and boating fees, and
concession fees), voluntary donations from tourists and tour operators, and the continuation
of foreign conservation assistance. In the medium term, there may be an interest in moving to
a wider portfolio which includes more complex funding mechanisms such as biodiversity
offsetting and conservation trust funds.
Thus, this report focuses upon these financing mechanisms and explores options across four
dimensions, including (1) how the funds are collected, (2) how the funds are governed, (3)
how the funds are distributed vertically (i.e. between various levels of government and CFis),
and (4) how the funds are distributed horizontally (i.e. between CFis and groups within CFis).
Below, we focus mainly upon collection options for tourism user fees (entrance fees, diving
and boating fees, and concession fees) and donations, as fines are regulated by Cambodian
Fisheries Law, biodiversity offsets are regulated by the Ministry of Environment through the
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) process, and foreign conservation assistance often
has rules for administration mandated by donor agencies. Conservation trust funds are
discussed as one of the governance options.
COLLECTION OPTIONS
ENTRANCE FEES
Entrance fees are fees imposed upon individual tourists to gain entry to an MPA or sometimes
to an island chain surrounded by an MPA. All tourists visiting pay the fee. Entrance fees are a
very common financing mechanism for MPAs all around the world, especially those that
receive large numbers of tourists. Entrance fees can be collected by government personnel
or another group contracted to do so. The two options for the KRA MFMA include:
Direct Collection (Government): The responsibility for collecting entrance fees will lie
with the Ministry of Tourism or the Preah Sihanouk provincial police. Entrance fees will
be collected directly from tourists at centralized choke-points, such as the ferry docks
in Sihanoukville or a future KRA MFMA Visitor’s Centre.
Indirect Collection (Ferry Operators): The responsibility for collecting entrance fees will
lie with the ferry operators. Ferry operators going to KR/KRS will add an entrance fee
surcharge to all ferry tickets and then remit the funds to the relevant governmental
authority. Tourist numbers from ferry operators in regards to fee payment will be cross-
checked against tourist numbers collected by the provincial police.
DIVING AND BOATING FEES
Diving and boating fees are fees imposed upon tourists who SCUBA dive, snorkel, or do
recreational boating in an MPA. These fees, on top of entrance fees, are considered
appropriate for MPA financing because tourists engaging in these activities are especially
14. 11
benefiting from the healthy marine environment provided by the establishment of the MPA.
Like entrance fees, diving and boating fees are common in MPAs worldwide. The three options
for the KRA MFMA include:
Direct Collection (Government): The responsibility for collecting fees from SCUBA
divers, snorkelers, and boaters will lie with the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and
Fisheries (FiA). Fees will be collected at centralized choke-points (mooring buoys,
docks on KR/KRS, or a future KRA MFMA Visitor’s Centre).
Indirect Collection (Tour Operators): The responsibility for collecting fees from SCUBA
divers, snorkelers, and recreational boaters will lie with the tour operators. Tour
operators will add a fee to all bookings and remit the funds to the relevant authority.
Two methods of payment are possible – payment by operators to the relevant authority
based upon annual customer numbers or revenue, or a “tag” system. Under the tag
system, tour operators will be responsible for buying diving or boating tags from the
relevant authority, which they will then have to resell to tourists. FiA will then do spot-
checks at docks, mooring buoys, or other locations to ensure all divers, snorkelers,
and boaters are being sold and using tags.
Indirect Collection (CFis). The responsibility for collecting dive and boating fees will lie
with the CFis and their patrolling teams. CFis will send boats to collect fees directly
from boats in their CFis or collect from tour operators on docks or at operator
headquarters. CFis will then remit a portion of the funds to the FiA and other relevant
government agencies.
CONCESSION FEES
Concession fees are fees charged to operators for the right to operate within an MPA; i.e. run
visitor lodges, bring SCUBA divers and/or snorkelers into the MPA area, operate a floating
restaurant, manage aquaculture operations, etc. Unlike entrance fees and diving/boating fees,
concession fees are charged to operators and not tourists. There are two options for collecting
concession fees for KRA MFMA:
Direct Collection (Government): The responsibility for negotiating and collecting
concession fees will lie with the Ministry of Environment or the Ministry of Tourism.
Rates for concessions will be set through a system uniform across all concessionaires
that use the MFMA. Methods for setting rates may include a flat annual fee, a % of
gross revenues or profit, or a fee based on the number of tourists that used the MFMA.
Indirect Collection (Concessionaires): The responsibility for negotiating and collection
concession fees will be contracted out to large concessionaires that hold other’s
leases, i.e. Royal Group and LimeTree Capital. Rates for concessions will depend
upon negotiation or a uniform rate system as above.
15. 12
VOLUNTARY DONATIONS
Voluntary Donations are donations from tour operators and tourists that use the MPA and are
interested in supporting the MPA’s effective management. It is generally easiest to get
voluntary donations for MPA management when funds are pledged towards particular
objectives (i.e. setting mooring buoys, cleaning up a beach) so that those operators or tourists
can feel empowered about supporting that activity. Giving souvenirs (to tourists), naming and
publicity rights, or green certificates (for operators) may further incentivize donations. The two
options for collecting donations for the KRA MFMA include:
Ad-hoc Collection: KRA MFMA tourists and tour operators are encouraged to give
donations for the KRA MFMA on an ad-hoc basis.
Systematic Collection: There is a systematic effort by government agencies and
members of the TWG to collect donations from operators that use the MFMA,
especially during the early stages of financing when financing is more uncertain. There
is also an effort to have operators encourage their customers to donate to the MFMA,
i.e. putting out a donation box, putting a suggested donation on their bill with an “opt-
out”, tying a donation to receipt of some sort of souvenir (i.e. a KR/KRS-themed t-shirt),
etc.
GOVERNANCE OPTIONS:
Funds from fees and donations can be kept at the national level, provincial level, or in a trust
fund, and can be managed solely by government personnel or a mixture of government
personnel along with other stakeholder groups. Options for the KRA MFMA include:
Governance by National Government. All funds will flow to the national treasury and
be governed by the Ministry of Economy and Finance.
Governance by Provincial Government. All funds or a significant portion thereof will
flow to Preah Sihanouk provincial government and be governed by provincial
government authorities.
Governance by Committee. All funds or a significant portion thereof will be segregated
into a bank account earmarked only for the KRA MFMA. The bank account will be kept
at the provincial level and be overseen by the PMC, TWG, or some new amalgamation
(i.e., a sub-group of the TWG).
Governance by Trust Fund: All funds or a significant portion thereof will be segregated
into a conservation trust fund for the KRA MFMA or the entire Cambodian Bay. This
fund will be overseen by the fund authority.
16. 13
VERTICAL DISTRIBUTION OPTIONS:
In most benefit-sharing models, funds flow to various levels of government as well as local
communities to compensate these groups for the costs associated with MPA management.
The distribution of funds can be decided based upon political priorities and discussion or pre-
decided based upon a percentage-based formula. Options for the KRA MFMA include:
Political Distribution: Funds will be redistributed yearly to government agencies, KRA
MFMA management committees, and CFis based upon need, political priorities, and/or
discussions of the relevant body.
Percentage-based Distribution. Funds will be redistributed yearly to government
agencies, KRA MFMA management committees, and CFis based on an agreed-upon,
percentage-based formula. This formula can be discussed and revised on an adaptive
basis as needed.
HORIZONTAL (CFI) DISTRIBUTION OPTIONS
Determining early how to allocate funds between and within communities is very important as
it sets expectations and enables a benefit-sharing model which is effective, equitable, and
transparent. There are many ways to split funds between and within communities. Options for
the KRA MFMA include:
Equal Distribution. All funds for CFis would be divided between the three CFis equally,
either absolutely equally or adjusted for population within each CFi. The funds could
be distributed to individual households or kept at the community level. If funds were
kept at the community level, there would be discussions as to how the funds would be
used beyond CFi patrolling and management costs. Communities would use existing
CFi committees or newly formed committees to govern the spending of funds.
Performance-based Distribution. All funds for CFi would be divided between the three
CFi based upon the extent to which they met agreed-upon performance metrics
(adherence of community members to MFMA regulations, number of patrols done on
a monthly basis, CFi committee meetings held, etc.). Like for the equal distribution
option above, funds could be distributed back to individual households or kept at the
community level.
Input-based Distribution. All funds for CFi would be divided between the three CFi
based upon the extent to which their CFi contributed to the funding for the MFMA (effort
by communities to seek external funds, extent of SCUBA diving/snorkelling within that
CFi, extent to which communities solicited donations from operators, etc.). Like for the
equal distribution option above, funds could be distributed back to individual
households or kept at the community level.
Area-based Distribution: All funds for CFi would be divided between the three CFi
based upon the size of their CFi and their corresponding responsibility for patrolling
17. 14
and marine management. Like for the equal distribution option above, funds could be
distributed back to individual households or kept at the community level.
Needs-based Distribution. All funds for CFis would be divided between the three CFi
based upon the extent of development and/or fisheries need in that CFi (level of
households in poverty, average income level, need for assistance in patrolling, etc.).
Like for the equal distribution option above, funds could be distributed back to
individual households or kept at the community level.
In-kind Distribution. Funds would not be remitted to CFis; rather, they would receive
in-kind benefits delivered by government agencies, NGOs, or another empowered
stakeholder groups. In-kind benefits could include thing such as technical advice,
micro-credit schemes, fuel or food for patrolling, or the building of schools, clinics,
sewage treatment plants, or other necessary community infrastructure.
18. 15
CRITERIA
Criteria listed below are adapted from Hastings (2013). These criteria will be used to analyse
the options presented above across the four dimensions. Note that all criteria are not relevant
for all options.
1. Political Feasibility: How politically feasible is this option in the Cambodian and
KR/KRS context? To what extent is this option supported by the relevant stakeholders
in government, NGOs, private sector, and CFis?
2. Administrative Ease: How administratively easy is this option to implement and
maintain?
3. Funds Oversight: How transparent and accountable would finances collected through
this option be?
4. Legal Feasibility: Is this option legally permissible in the Cambodian context, or is it
easy to adapt the law through a Deika or Sub-decree so that it is permissible?
5. Fairness and Equity: Is this option viewed as fair and/or equitable from the perspective
of the KR/KRS stakeholders?
19. 16
ANALYSIS
The following section analyses each set of options (collection, governance, vertical
distribution, horizontal distribution) against the five criteria, based upon barriers and
opportunities to sustainable financing and benefit-sharing identified during stakeholder
consultations. Each sub-section has a matrix to summarize the results of the analysis, using
a scale of high, medium, low, unknown, or not applicable (N/A). In this matrix, the options are
highlighted based on their results (best results are darkest while worst results are lightest).
The section concludes with a review of global, regional, and Cambodian best practices in
sustainable financing and financial benefit-sharing. Some of this text is abstracted from an
earlier review (Hastings 2013).
COLLECTION OPTIONS
TABLE 3: ANALYSIS OF COLLECTION OPTIONS BY 5 CRITERIA
Options Political
Feasibility
Admin.
Ease
Funds
Oversight
Legal
Feasibility
Fairness &
Equity
Collection Options
Entrance Fees
(Government)
High Medium Medium Medium High
Entrance Fees (Ferry
Operators)
High High High Medium High
Diving/Boating Fees
(Government)
Medium Low Medium Medium Medium
Diving/Boating Fees
(Tour Operators)
Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium
Diving/Boating Fees
(CFis)
Low Medium Low High Medium
Concession Fees
(Government)
Low Low High Medium Medium
Concession Fees
(Concessionaires)
Medium Medium High Medium Medium
Voluntary Donations
(Ad-hoc)
High Medium Low High High
Voluntary Donations
(Systematic)
High Medium Medium High High
20. 17
ENTRANCE FEES
Political Feasibility: Nearly all stakeholders involved in consultations, including dive operators,
CFi committees, individuals at various levels of government, and members of the KRA MFMA
PMC and TWG supported some sort of entrance fee to support the management of the KRA
MFMA. The concept of entrance fees for PAs is well established internationally as well as
domestically – entrance fees are charged for several Cambodian terrestrial protected areas
and the ability of the Ministry of Environment to charge them is enshrined in Cambodian
legislation (Kingdom of Cambodia 2008, Article 33, Line 2). While the KRA MFMA is not a
protected area from the perspective of Cambodian legislation, the Cambodian experience of
entrance fees and protected areas nevertheless ensured that the concept of an entrance fee
for KRA MFMA had wide support and understanding.
Administrative Ease: Most stakeholders consulted felt that entrance fees would be
administratively easy to collect. Indirect collection by ferry operators was deemed to be the
most efficient way of collecting the entrance fee for two reasons: (1) there is only a handful of
ferry operators that bring tourists to KR/KRS, with the ferry services dominated by one big
player (Koh Rong Dive Centre), and (2) the ferry operators are required to register their tourist
numbers with the Provincial police, ensuring ease in cross-checking tourist numbers. The
easiest way to collect the fee was seen to be having the ferry operator adding it to the cost of
the ferry ticket and providing the tourist with information about what the fee supports, perhaps
supplemented by a KRA MFMA brochure or souvenir. The fee revenue would then be remitted
to the relevant authority.
While it would be possible to have the Ministry of Tourism or provincial police collect the fee
directly from tourists at ferry docks - there are only a couple of ferry docks in Sihanoukville
from which ferries leave for KR/KRS – this option was not preferred due to the ease of
collecting from ferry operators and the need to build infrastructure (i.e. an office or station).
Collecting the fee at the Visitors Centre is not possible as it is not built yet, and when built it
will be located on KRS outside the village thus requiring an extra trip for many tourists.
Funds Oversight: The transparency and accountability of the entrance fees funds, once
collected, would largely depend upon how the funds were governed. Most stakeholders
wanted the funds to stay at the provincial level as opposed to being remitted to the national
level, as there was a fear that few funds would return to the provincial level if funds were sent
nationally. From the collection standpoint, ferry operator collection was seen to minimize
leakage due to the limited number of operators and the ability to check tourist numbers against
police records.
Legal Feasibility: There is currently no provision in either national or sub-national law to allow
the collection of an entrance fee for a MFMA in Cambodia. Upon first analysis, therefore, this
would be a legislative dead-end and an entrance fee for the KRA MFMA would not be possible.
The 2008 Protected Areas Law, cited above, only allows fees to be collected in the context of
an official protected area, and the collection is to be done and overseen by the Ministry of
Environment.
21. 18
However, many stakeholders would optimistic that this gap in legislation could be filled. There
are two ways in which this could be done. If the recently-passed (June 2014) Law on Sub-
National Finance explicitly allows the collection and keeping of fees at the provincial level, the
Preah Sihanouk provincial governor could pass a Deika in which fees for KRA MFMA were
mandated. This would be the easiest option from a legislative standpoint, estimated by
governmental stakeholders to take 2-3 months to complete. If the Law on Sub-National
Finance does not allow the collection and keeping of fees at the provincial level, a Sub-decree
would be necessary. This would be more complicated as it would require consultations with
the Ministry of Economy and Finance and a signature from the Prime Minister. It was estimated
by governmental stakeholders that this could take 6 months or more to complete.
A close reading of a 2012 draft of the Law on Sub-National Finance (Kingdom of Cambodia
2012) indicates that a sub-decree may be necessary. Article 25 (Revenues from local sources
including tax and non-tax revenues) declares that the distribution and proportion of tax and
non-tax revenues between the sub-national administrations need to be determined by sub-
decree, in consultation with the Minister of Economy and Finance. More analysis and
discussion of this law is needed to fully confirm whether to proceed with a Deika or Sub-
decree.
Fairness and Equity: Since the overwhelming majority of tourists reach KR/KRS via ferry, and
the fee wouldn’t differentiate by activity, an entrance fee charged on top of ferry tickets was
seen to be both fair and equitable.
DIVING AND BOATING FEES
Political Feasibility: Many stakeholders involved in the consultations supported the idea of an
additional fee for SCUBA diving in the KRA MFMA, while several also indicated support for a
fee on snorkelers and recreational boats. While new for Cambodia, there was recognition that
fees for SCUBA diving, snorkeling, and boating in MPAs are common in other parts of the
world.
No one involved in consultations opposed this sort of fee under all circumstances. Rather,
those that did have concerns about the fee (mainly dive operators) were worried about the
impact of a fee on SCUBA diving business, and saw a difficulty in ensuring that the fee was
charged fairly and equitably across tour operators and individuals engaging in marine
activities. On the first point, dive operators were concerned that since SCUBA diving at
KR/KRS was not that spectacular (low fish density, poor visibility) a fee may make KR/KRS
uncompetitive versus regional competitors. On the second point, there was concern that the
disreputable tour operators would be able to avoid paying the fee while those larger and more
reputable would not, making for an uneven playing field. There was also reluctance to pay the
fee until there was concrete action taken on stopping illegal activities (Vietnamese trawlers,
dynamite fishing, anchoring on reefs, etc.) in the KRA MFMA.
Administrative Ease: Unfortunately, a fee on SCUBA diving and snorkelling would not be quite
as easy to collect as entrance fees. There seems to be no “ideal” method for collecting fees,
despite there being less than 10 tour operators running SCUBA/snorkelling trips around
KR/KRS. Government collection at centralised choke points (most likely docks on KR/KRS
22. 19
where boats leave on SCUBA diving/snorkelling trips) would be possible; however, due to the
irregular nature of the trips, collection staff may be idle for a large part of the day. Yearly
collection by operators based upon reported tourist numbers is also possible; however, there
is currently no legal obligation of operators to report customer numbers to any government
authority and it may be difficult to cross-check self-reported numbers. Finally, a tag-system
eliminates the need for self-reporting but then requires potentially time-consuming spot checks
by FiA personnel. Collection by CFi members was seen as unfeasible due to the lack of
capacity of CFis to manage large amounts of funds.
The administrative ease of collecting boating fees is currently unknown. At the moment,
recreational boating around KRA MFMA is low; however, general future tourism growth as well
as a planned marina by Royal Group may increase non-diving recreational boat exponentially.
However, collecting boating fees has the same potential logistical issues as collecting diving
or snorkelling fees (e.g., irregular trips, no legal obligation to report numbers, need for time-
consuming spot checks).
Funds Oversight: Like with entrance fees, the transparency and accountability of the diving
and boating fee funds largely depend upon how the funds were governed. Most stakeholders
wanted the funds to stay at the provincial level as opposed to being remitted to the national
level. There was also a strong desire from tour operators that the funds should be overseen
by a multi-sectoral committee which included both private sector and NGO representatives.
From the collection standpoint, the tag system seemed to minimize leakage due to the limited
number of operators, the lack of dependence upon self-reporting, and the ability to do spot-
checks in the field.
Legal Feasibility: Like with entrance fees, there is currently no provision in national or sub-
national law that explicitly allows the collection of SCUBA diving, snorkelling, and boating fees
in an MFMA in Cambodia.
However, there is a provision in the Sub-decree on Community Fisheries Management
(Kingdom of Cambodia 2005) which says that one of the rights of community fisheries is to
“fish, do aquaculture, harvest, sell, use, and manage all fisheries resources in accordance with
the community fishing area agreement and management plan” (Chapter 3, Article 11). This
same sub-decree empowers the Department of Fisheries to “help to seek funds from all
sources to fund and support community fisheries” (Chapter 6, Article 23).
During consultations, several governmental stakeholders (including in the FiA) were asked
about this provision and they agreed that while user fees from SCUBA/snorkelling/boating is
not explicitly mentioned in the sub-decree, the wording means it could be interpreted to mean
CFis can collect fees from these users with potential support from FiA. The interpretation
would be that divers, snorkelers, and boaters are “using” the fisheries resources and as such
can be charged. However, this interpretation would be up for debate and would need to be
affirmed by a lawyer as well as the Ministry of Economy and Finance. Most believed that even
if this interpretation stood, a stronger legal backing provided by a new Deika or Sub-decree
(as with entrance fees, discussed above) would be better.
Fairness and Equity: Tour operators felt that this fee would only be fair if it was matched with
action by CFis and FiA against illegal activity, as well as was imposed upon all operators that
23. 20
engage in SCUBA/snorkelling/boating and not just the larger, more reputable operators. They
also were concerned about the potential impact on business of a large fee. For this reason,
the fee level should be set through a Willingness to Pay survey (to be done in Phase 2).
CONCESSION FEES
Political Feasibility: Concession fees seemed to be a new idea for Cambodia as many
stakeholders consulted on this idea acted surprised to hear of it and needed further
explanation as to how it would work in the context of a MFMA. Despite this, there seemed to
be broad agreement that some sort of concession fee may be appropriate for the KRA MFMA,
with some caveats. First, there would need to be thought on what sort of activities would
require a business to pay a concession fee. Would conducting an activity (such as SCUBA
diving) inside of an MFMA be required, or would merely being adjacent to the MFMA be
enough? Second, there would need to be an agreed-upon formula by which to charge
concession fees that were fair to both small and large business. For example, a fee that was
the same amount on operators irrespective of revenue and tourist numbers was seen as
unfair.
Administrative Ease: The administrative ease of collecting a concession fee depends upon
the method of collection. Discussions with governmental stakeholders indicate that other
concession fees in the context of PAs have been set through direct negotiations between the
Ministry of Environment and the relevant concessionaire. If this model is taken for the KRA
MFMA, with a government agency negotiating each contract individually, administration would
be overly burdensome and time consuming. However, if the method of administration was
standardised and rates were set based upon an agreed-upon formula, administration could be
easy. Administration could also be relatively simply if large concessionaires with other
businesses under their purview (like Royal Group on Koh Rong) were responsible for
collecting and remitting the fees.
Funds Oversight: Like with the other types of fees, the transparency and accountability of the
concession fee funds largely depend upon how the funds were governed. From a collection
standpoint, concession fees collection would seem to have little leakage as there are a limited
number of operators and fewer opportunities for malfeasance.
Legal Feasibility: While the Ministry of Environment is empowered to collect concession fees
to fund the operation of PAs, there is no provision in Cambodian law to enable the collection
of concession fees for the funding of the KRA MFMA. A new Deika or Sub-decree could
officially allow concession fees to be collected and as well as mandate the rate-setting
mechanism.
Fairness and Equity: As mentioned in the political feasibility section, stakeholders felt that a
concession fee would be fair if there was a clear definition on activities that require payment
of the fee and equity in fee rates and fee scope.
24. 21
VOLUNTARY DONATIONS
Political Feasibility: Due to the fact that donations are voluntary, there was wide support for
this option contributing to KRA MFMA funding. In fact, several tour operators have already
begun donating to the KRA MFMA. For example, LimeTree Capital – which is developing
bungalows on KRS though Koh Rong Sanloem Island Resorts Co., Ltd. – has donated land
and over US$9000 to FiA to build the KRA MFMA’s headquarters. Dive operators said they
would be generally willing to donate, as well as encourage their customers to donate, as long
as they felt that the funds would be governed in a transparent fashion and could see that their
donations were going to stop illegal activity and clean up the KRA MFMA environment.
Administrative Ease: Donations from operators are administratively easy to collect, as is it a
direct transaction between a single operator and the recipient group (usually a government
agency). There may need to be some time spent to clarify the terms of the donation (what it
will be used for, how it will be accounted for, etc.).
Donations from tourists could be collected by operators and remitted back to the relevant
government authority. There are several options for donation collection – an “opt-in” and an
“opt-out”. Under the opt-in model, tourists would be asked by operators to donate towards the
management of the KRA MFMA (most likely after they had completed and enjoyed their tourist
activity). Under the “opt-out” model, a donation would be automatically added to the tourists’
bill and they would have the right to ask for it to be removed. Under either model, operators
would explain the importance of the MFMA and the necessity for funding. Providing a
commemorative souvenir with the donations may incentivize a greater level of giving.
Funds Oversight: The transparency and accountability of the donations largely depend upon
how the funds were governed. If solicitation of donations are ad-hoc, and donations are going
to multiple groups (FFI, FiA, Ministry of Tourism, etc) it may be more difficult to account for the
donations in entirety. Systematic collection of donations by members of the TWG and the flow
of all donations into a single bank account would enable stricter oversight.
Legal Feasibility: According to the FiA and other government agencies, it is already permitted
to collect and keep voluntary donations at the provincial level. The Law on Financial Regime
and Property Management of Sub-National Administrations and Organic Law (Article 24)
states that revenues of sub-national administration can include voluntary donations.
Therefore, there seems to be no legal barrier to this option.
Fairness and Equity: The voluntary nature of the donations means that they are, by default,
fair. Soliciting donations from all operators instead of just the most visible and profitable may
lead to greater buy-in and ownership by the KRA MFMA operator community.
25. 22
GOVERNANCE OPTIONS
TABLE 4: ANALYSIS OF GOVERNANCE OPTIONS BY 5 CRITERIA
Options Political
Feasibility
Admin.
Ease
Funds
Oversight
Legal
Feasibility
Fairness &
Equity
Governance Options
Governance by
National Government
Low High Low High Low
Governance by
Provincial Government
Medium High Medium Medium Medium
Governance by
Committee
High Medium High Medium High
Governance by Trust
Fund
High Low Unknown Unknown Unknown
Political Feasibility: There was strong support amongst all stakeholders consulted for
transparent and accountable governance of funds. Transparent and accountable governance
of funds is critically important as it impacts the ability to create buy-in into MPA fees, reduce
leakage, and enable more funds to flow to supporting MPA objectives.
Most stakeholders consulted believed that the funds should be kept as close to the KRA MFMA
as possible, ideally in a segregated bank account at the commune or the provincial level.
There was a common belief that if funds were remitted to the national level, provincial
government and the KRA MFMA would see little if any funds return.
Administrative Ease: Ease of administration would depend heavily upon which governance
option was selected. If funds were remitted to the national level, administration would be easy
as this has been the standard in Cambodia for many years. Administration at the provincial
level would also be easy, dependent upon legal backing (see ‘legal feasibility’ section for
more). The creation of a committee to oversee the funds would add some complexity but also
add transparency. Finally, governance of the funds in a trust fund is perhaps the most
administratively difficult to establish, although in the long term this method would have many
benefits (see Hastings 2013 for more).
Funds Oversight: Most stakeholders consulted agreed that the ideal body for funds oversight
would be a multi-sectoral committee drawn from the government, private sector, NGO sector,
and local communities. The structure of the committee has a direct bearing on the ability to
build trust in fund governance and collect fees from tour operators. For example, one dive
operator mentioned that they would not want to pay fees if a particular marine conservation
group was included, while other dive operators said that they would not want to pay fees if the
committee overseeing the funds was just made up of government officials. One governmental
official say that the ideal arrangement was to create a sub-group under the KRA MFMA TWG
to manage the funds.
26. 23
Legal Feasibility: Legal backing for sending the funds to the national level is clear and well
established. There is no historical precedent in Cambodia for keeping funds at the provincial
level – whether overseen by a multi-sectoral committee or not - for the management of an
MFMA. Thus, the ease of administration at the provincial level is less clear. However, the Law
on Sub-National Finance may offer an opportunity to keep the funds provincially. An
interpretation of the law could enable this; for example, Article 17 enables sub-national
administrations to “carry out their functions and responsibilities for economic and social
development within their jurisdictions.”
Creating a sub-group under the TWG to manage the funds already seems to be legally
permissible without new legislation. For example, according to the Deika on the creation of
the provincial management committee (No. 134 Sor Sor Ror/13), the PMC “has the right to
form and change the Technical Working Groups which assist it…” (Article 4) as well as “push
MFMA conservation and development…” (Article 2). The PMC creating a sub-group of the
TWG to manage funds would seem to clearly be a simple “change” and (through ensuring
effective fund governance) would help push MFMA conservation and development. However,
this interpretation would need to be verified by a legal expert. Alternatively, a Deika from the
Provincial Governor could create the sub-group under the KRA MFMA TWG to manage the
funds and order the establishment of a dedicated bank account.
Fairness and Equity: Keeping funds as close to the KRA MFMA as possible would seem to be
the fairest option, as commune and provincial stakeholders pay the greatest costs to manage
the MFMA. A multi-sectoral committee also seems the most equitable; this formulation was
seen as providing internal oversight and most accurately representing the interests of those
that interact with the KRA MFMA.
VERTICAL DISTRIBUTION OPTIONS
TABLE 5: ANALYSIS OF VERTICAL DISTRIBUTION OPTIONS BY 5 CRITERIA
Options Political
Feasibility
Admin.
Ease
Funds
Oversight
Legal
Feasibility
Fairness &
Equity
Vertical Distribution Options
Political Distribution Medium Medium N/A High Medium
Percentage-based
Distribution
High High N/A Unknown High
Political Feasibility: When asked about how funds should be distributed, most stakeholders
spoke to which government agencies, management committees, operators, and CFis should
receive the funds and for what reason, as opposed to the mechanism by which the funds
should be distributed. Therefore, it is difficult to say which mechanism for vertical distribution
is most preferred. However, three governmental officials did mention a percentage-based
distribution formula when discussing how to split up the funds. Many other MPAs (to be
discussed in the ‘best practices’ section) use percentage-based formulas to govern the
27. 24
distribution of funds and shelter distribution from year-on-year variations based upon political
priorities.
Administrative Ease: A percentage-based distribution would seem to be the administratively
easiest option to implement as the percentage going to each group would be the same each
year. On the contrary, determining funding levels each year based upon discussions may be
time consuming and acrimonious.
Legal Feasibility: Splitting funds based upon political priorities and needs is well established
in Cambodian law and historical precedent. For example, the Ministry of Environment splits
funds from fees and elsewhere based upon its determinations and grounded in in 2008
Protected Areas Law. On the contrary, there are few domestic precedents to having a
percentage-based formula distribution system. However, there are many international
precedents. The same Deika or Sub-decree mandating the fees and establishing the
governance mechanisms could also mandate the percentage-based formula for the
distribution of funds. Alternatively, any committee or group in charge of fund governance could
do so.
Fairness and Equity: In the short term, distributing funds based on needs, political priorities,
and discussion is the fairest option as it retains the greatest flexibility to account for recent
changes and short-term circumstances. However, in the long-term, a percentage-based
distribution is more fair and equitable. This is because operating from a known, agreed-upon
formula allows recipient groups to create longer term financial plans and removes the ability
of more powerful stakeholders to capture greater funds for themselves through negotiation. A
percentage-based formula can be revisited adaptively and renegotiated every couple years
based on experience from implementation and effectiveness.
HORIZONTAL (CFI) DISTRIBUTION OPTIONS
TABLE 6: ANALYSIS OF HORIZONTAL DISTRIBUTION OPTIONS BY 5 CRITERIA
Options Political
Feasibility
Admin.
Ease
Funds
Oversight
Legal
Feasibility
Fairness &
Equity
Horizontal Distribution Options
Equal Distribution Medium High Low High High
Performance-based
Distribution
Medium Low High High Medium
Input-based
Distribution
Low Low Medium High Low
Area-based
Distribution
Medium High Medium High High
Needs-based
Distribution
Medium Low Medium High High
In-Kind Distribution Medium Low High High Medium
28. 25
Political Feasibility: There was no clear agreement between stakeholders on which horizontal
distribution method would be optimal. Initial discussions with the FiA revealed that their
preference was for the area-based distribution option; that is, dividing funds between CFis
based upon the size of their CFi and the related needs for patrols, fuel, food, and time spent
in management committees. However, the two CFi committees consulted (Daem Thvov and
Koh Rong Sanloem) felt that an equal distribution between CFis would be ideal as it would be
the most fair and minimize conflicts between CFis. CFis also talked about internally distributing
money within their communities (after CFi patrolling costs were covered) to poor households,
suggesting a favourable view of a needs-based distribution. Some dive operators leaned
towards a performance-based distribution option to ensure that CFis were actually doing
patrols and spending money as laid out in the management plans. Finally, some other dive
operators believed that CFis did not have the capacity to manage large amounts of funds,
necessitating that resources were given directly as food, fuel, and capital goods (in-kind
distribution).
All stakeholders (including CFi committees) consulted believed that it would be best to have
the money kept at the community level, as distributing the money to individual households
would diminish the visibility of the funds and prevent large projects that would increase CFi
buy-in and MFMA support.
Administrative Ease: The easiest option administratively would be equal distribution, as it
would just require a calculation based upon population size or even a simple equal split
between CFis. Likewise, an area-based distribution would require a simple calculation of CFi
size. The other options require time-consuming monitoring, in-depth research, or supply
procurement. For example, the needs-based distribution option would require someone to
precisely calculate development and patrolling needs of each CFi, while performance-based
distribution would require CFi management plans and monitoring of community effort by FiA
or another government agency or NGO.
Funds Oversight: Performance-based distribution offers the best option for oversight as it
would tie funding to management plans, CFi patrolling efforts, and monitoring results. In-kind
distribution would also ensure judicious use of funds as communities would be given resources
directly. Equal distribution would offer the least opportunities for oversight, as funding would
be given regardless of performance or CFi status.
When asked, CFi committees said that they would manage any prospective funds within their
committee, under the guidance of their financial officer, CFi chief, and commune chief. The
two CFis consulted had only managed a couple of hundred USD at a time, indicating a huge
need for capacity building by FFI, FiA, or another agency before funds to CFis are released.
Legal Feasibility: The Sub-decree on Community Fisheries Management clearly gives CFis
the right to manage financial resources for their CFi. CFi funds are managed by the financial
officer of the CFi committee and/or the CFi chief. There do not seem to be any prohibitions in
Cambodian law on any of the distribution options; thus, the option selected would depend
upon discussion within the CFi committee.
Fairness and Equity: As mentioned, there was no clear agreement on which distribution option
was the most fair. CFis felt that an equal split would be fairest. FiA felt that an area-based
29. 26
distribution would be fairest. Dive operators thought that distribution based on performance or
in-kind would be fairest. Nevertheless, there was broad agreement that input-based
distribution would not be fair as some CFis have much more diving activity than others.
GLOBAL AND REGIONAL BEST PRACTICES
This section discusses eight examples of sustainable financing and benefit sharing in
Southeast Asian MPAs as well as from Belize, Bonaire, and Fiji. While there is nothing
particularly “marine” ” about sustainable financing and benefit-sharing as concepts, and
terrestrial examples abound, this emphasis on marine is to ensure maximum applicability to
the KRA MFMA. Some text below is adapted from an earlier report by this author (Hastings
2013).
BELIZE
Background: Belize is a small country in Central America with incredible marine and terrestrial
biodiversity. As of 2008, Belize had 19 marine protected areas, ranging from small no-take
MPAs managed by NGOs to large, multiple-use MPAs managed by government agencies.
Many activities take place inside Belize’s MPAs including recreational fishing, subsistence
fishing, SCUBA diving, and boating.
Sustainable Financing and Benefit Sharing Model: Belize’ Protected Area Conservation Trust
(PACT) was established in 1995 as a trust fund for Belize’s entire system of terrestrial and
marine protected areas. PACT is funded through a US$3.75 visitor conservation fee, levied
as a departure tax and included in airplane ticket prices, as well as a 20% commission on
cruise ship passenger fees. Upon paying the US$3.75 departure tax for PACT, tourists are
given a pamphlet explaining PACT’s efforts and describing the protected areas that the tax
helps to finance.
Getting funds from PACT is through an open application system - managers of PAs and MPAs
are able to apply for funds on a yearly basis. Funds can be used for community development
and environmental education as well as protected area management and conservation. The
exact distribution of funds towards these activities depends upon the specific grant application.
Having a well-developed trust fund and a national funding scheme allows consistent funding
of PAs and MPAs across the country. Having a system of open applications allows managers
to directly make the case for management needs. Like many developing countries, Belize still
struggles with illegal fishing within their MPAs and difficulty with sustainable financing; PACT
funding is often not sufficient to cover all MPA management costs.
Sources for above: www.pactbelize.org,
http://www.pactbelize.org/Programs/PriorityAreas.aspx
30. 27
NGA TRA BAY MARINE PARK, VIETNAM
Background: Nga Trang Bay MPA is near Nha Trang City, in Khanh Hoa province in South
Vietnam. Established in 2001 with the support of the Global Environmental Facility and the
IUCN Vietnam Programme, it was Vietnam’s first MPA. At 16000 hectares in size, it
encompasses 9 islands, 6 villages, and 5300 inhabitants (80% living on fishing activities),
hosting over 700,000 tourists annually (all figures as of 2007). From the time of establishment,
those involved in MPA management aimed to involve the local communities in governance as
well as ensure poverty reduction and community infrastructure development. Tourism user
fees and a benefit-sharing mechanism that included a community development fund were
seen as a means to reach this objective.
Sustainable Financing and Benefit Sharing Model: Two fees help to finance the Nga Trang
Bay MPA – the Sightseeing fee, set at US$0.30 a person and which applies to all tourists who
boat in Nga Trang Bay, and the Ho Mun Service Charge, set at US$2 for SCUBA divers and
US$0.60 for snorkelers which visit the waters near the island of Ho Mun (the core area of the
MPA). By 2007, the revenue from these fees had risen to US$200,000 a year.
A pilot study was run to see how villages would spend revenues from a potential benefit-
sharing mechanism. US$2000 was distributed to each of the 6 MPA villages; funds were used
for projects such as market restorations, waste management systems, and development of
schools and roads. Based on these results, in 2008 the people’s council (the council in charge
of the MPA) decided that the split of user fee revenues would be 55% going to the Nha Trang
Bay MPA authority and 45% remitted to the provincial treasury, of which 10% would be
earmarked for community development.
Nga Trang Bay MPAs benefits from high international visibility and associated high tourist
numbers and fee revenues, meaning that financial stability is not a major problem. However,
progress is still being made in ensuring that the funds going to communities are additional to
funds received otherwise, and that projects benefit the community as a whole instead of
preferred households. There is also the issue of scale – while user fees are providing revenue
and benefit-sharing is helping communities near the Nga Trang Bay MPA, there are 14 other
MPAs in the Vietnam MPA system which will not receive any of this revenue and need their
own financing solutions.
Sources for above: (O’Callaghan 2008)
TUBBATAHA MARINE PARK, PHILIPPINES
Background: Tubbataha Marine Park is considered by many to be the crown jewel of Philippine
MPAs. Located in the Sulu Sea 150 kilometers away from the island of Palawan, Tubbataha
Marine Park was established in 1988 to protect high levels of marine biodiversity from threats
including dynamite fishing and overfishing. Now, the Marine Park has a large no-take zone
which is popular with visitors coming from all over the world, including SCUBA divers operating
off of live-aboard dive boats. Since its establishment, illegal fishing has decreased and coral
cover and fish biomass have increased exponentially. In 2010, the Tubbataha Reefs Natural
31. 28
Park Act provided additional powers to combat illegal fishing and strengthened community
involvement (www.futurepolicy.org/5854).
Sustainable Financing and Benefit Sharing Model: In 1999, it was determined that there
needed to be a user fee system established from which revenues would cover management
costs and enable benefit-sharing between MPA stakeholders. A Willingness to Pay survey
run by WWF-Philippines help set the initial rate, and now the MPA charges an entry fee of
PHP3,000 (approximately US$75), with a 50% discount for those visiting again in the same
season. There is also a schedule of fees for vessel entry ranging from PHP3,000 to PHP6,000.
By 2006, revenue from fees covered more than 80% of park management costs.
A benefits sharing model was introduced in 2000 which split the revenues three ways: 50%
going to savings as a reserve fund for conservation finance, 43% going to the Tubbataha Park
Management Office for operations and maintenance, and 7% going to the Local Government
Unit of Cagayanicallo for community development and other local campaigns.
At this point, Tubbataha Marine Park seems like a win-win, with marine biodiversity being
protected, fisheries being enhanced, sufficient funds going to MPA management, and support
flowing to local communities. Like Nga Trang Bay MPA, Tubbataha is advantaged by having
high international visibility and associated high tourist fee revenues.
Sources for above: (TEEBcase 2011; Dygivo, Salao, and Honasan 2006)
ACEH, INDONESIA
Background: After the 2004 tsunami, FFI’s marine programme in Indonesia worked to
establish a network of locally managed marine areas around Pulau Weh. One aspect of
supporting this network included establishing a community micro-credit revolving fund for the
village of Iboih on the north coast of Pulau Weh. This village (766 people spread over 208
households) depended heavily on marine and coastal resources and had been heavily
impacted by the tsunami. The purpose of this fund was to providing a source of low-interest
loans and thus allow households to rebuild their livelihoods in a way that would support
sustainable marine management (i.e. establish local businesses, sustainable fishing
operations, etc.).
Sustainable Financing and Benefit Sharing Model: The revolving fund was initially capitalized
by FFI to the amount of US$60,000. Over the course of a year and half, FFI worked with the
community to establish a revolving fund committee, standard operating procedures and
lending criteria, and an Iboih Makmur Cooperative. After control of the fund had been
transferred over to the local community, FFI continued to support the fund through capacity
building and assisting with financial management. The community organized itself into six
borrowing groups which developed loan applications for tourism development, fishing, trade,
agriculture, livestock, and women’s livelihoods. Eventually, the revolving fund dispersed a total
of 602,977, 400 IDR (around USD$52,000), funding the expansion of existing businesses and
creation of new businesses across the six groups. As of 2012, the default rate was extremely
low (only two borrowers had defaulted on a payment).
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The vast majority of the community supported the fund because it supported the local
economy, provided access to low-interest credit, and increased community togetherness and
cohesion. FFI stayed in close contact with the community as the fund developed, providing
capacity building assistance. In addition to the economic benefits provided by the fund, it led
to a positive change in attitude or behavior towards the environment by approximately one-
third of those receiving a fund loan (the rest were no change; there were no recipients that
had a negative change in attitude or behavior towards the environment). Challenges to fund
management included delays in disbursing approved loans and some lack of transparency in
handling funding complaints.
Sources for above: (Novriyanto et al. 2012)
BONAIRE MARINE PARK, BONAIRE
Background: Marine life has been protected near Bonaire for many years. From the 1960s
and 1970s, turtle poaching and spear fishing were banned; in 1978 and 1980 mooring buoys
were placed to protect the coral reefs from impacts from anchoring of dive boats. More official
protection came when the Bonaire marine park was established in 1979 with the help of WWF;
in 1999 it was officially declared a national park. With a total size of 27 km2, it is extremely
popular for SCUBA diving, snorkelling, swimming, and boating; it possesses over 350 species
of reef fish, 50 species of hard corals, sea turtles, dolphins, and migratory birds.
Sustainable Financing and Benefit Sharing Model: In 1992, Bonaire Marine Park established
a US$10 diving fee. Since 1992 the fee has been raised to US$25 and buys the visitor diving
access for a year through the purchase of a commemorative diving tag. Diving daily tags and
yearly tags for other users (swimmers, boaters, sailors) are available for US$10. For years
revenue from sale of the tags has helped to cover all of the MPA’s operating budget.
Willingness to pay surveys indicates that the even the US$25 fee may be too low. A 1991
WTP survey indicated that visitors may be willing to pay US$27 or more (Thur 2010).
Bonaire is widely considered one of the most successful marine parks in the world, being the
first MPA to use payment for a tag as a mechanism for fee collection. Bonaire’s success with
tag implementation has made it a sustainable financing example for others; for example,
Bunaken Marine Park (below) used Bonaire as the guiding framework for its own fee
development process. Despite these successes, Bonaire struggles with issues common to
many MPAs including negotiating uses across a diversity of stakeholder groups and stopping
illegal activity. The marine park’s first management plan was written in 2006.
Sources for above: (WWF 2009; UNEP 2005; STINAPA Bonaire 2006).
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BUNAKEN MARINE PARK, INDONESIA
Background: Established in 1991, Bunaken Marine Park is an 8900 km2 MPA in Sulawesi,
Indonesia popular with SCUBA divers from around the world due to its high marine
biodiversity. The MPA covers five islands and over 20 villages with more than 30,000
individuals. In the late 1990s and the early 2000s, recognizing the need for a sustainable
financing portfolio, the MPA switched from relying more heavily on support from USAID and
the national government to a more mixed portfolio of sustainable financing options.
Sustainable Financing and Benefit Sharing Model: As of the mid-2000s, Bunaken National
Marine Park in Indonesia charged local visitors between US$0.10 and US$0.30, and foreign
visitors US$6 for a daily pass and US$17 for an annual pass. A WTP survey was conducted
to determine optimal fee levels for both domestic and international tourists. Payment of the
fee gets visitors a uniquely-numbered tag that must be displayed at all times inside the park.
Fees were introduced in a phase-fashion and their introduction was combined with an
educational effort aimed at the tourism sector. Bunaken’s fee system was modeled after the
Bonaire tag system.
In three years, this entrance fee system generated over US$400,000. Funds are split, with
80% returning to the MPA’s management advisory board and 5% to the national government,
7.5% to the provincial government, and 3.75% to each of the district and city governments.
When this distribution option was proposed, Indonesian law had said that all fee revenue
would return to the national level, but Bunakaen Marine Park supporters obtained a special
exemption for Bunaken as a pilot study. Indonesia was going through a decentralization reform
process at the time which assisted in obtaining this exemption. The exact distribution
percentages were determined through contentious and time-consuming negotiations.
The experience of Bunaken Marine Park has a lot to offer KRA MFMA. Similarities between
the two experiences abound, despite the fact that the effort behind setting up the fees are
separated by over a decade. For example, both sites (2) receive a large number of tourists
and SCUBA divers, (2) have a constituency of tourism operators who notice a decline in
biodiversity, (3) are/were the first MPA in their country to look for funds kept at the local or
provincial level, and (4) are/were in countries going through a process of decentralization.
While the introduction of the Bunaken entrance fee system was not a costless process, it now
is contributing substantially towards covering the MPA’s management costs.
Sources for above: (Erdmann et al. 2003; Erdmann 2003; UNEP 2005; WWF 2009).
KOMODO NATIONAL PARK, INDONESIA
Background: Komodo National Park is a 1,733 km2 MPA (also including terrestrial
components) located in the Lesser Sunda Islands, Indonesia. Established in 1980 and
declared a UNESCO world heritage site, it protects a wide variety of charismatic terrestrial
and marine fauna including the Komodo dragon, whales, sea turtles, dugongs, coral reefs,
and over 1000 species of fish. More than 20,000 people live in or near the MPA, including
fishermen. The MPA is popular with SCUBA divers and snorkelers due to its high biodiversity,
attracting 20,000 – 25,000 visitors yearly.
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Sustainable Financing and Benefit Sharing Model: Komodo National Marine Park in Indonesia
requires foreign visitors to make a contribution to their conservation trust fund of between
US$15 and US$45 depending up the length of stay. Fees for Indonesian visitors range from
75,000 Rp. (US$7.5) to 225,000 Rp (US$25). This fee is collected by the Komodo National
Park Authority and is in addition to a 20,000 Rp (US$2) entrance fee and a 20,000 Rp.
compensation fee (US$2). The park is also supported by concession and licensing fees on
tour operators, dive shops, and recreational boating.
Revenue is collected by the Komodo National Park authority and is split between the
government of Nusa Tenggara Timur Province (30%), the government of Manggarai Barat
District (40%), the Ministry of Forestry (15%), and the Ministry of Finances (15%). Funds go
to support conservation, community development, eco-tourism, marketing, and promotion.
There is now broad support amongst both industry and local communities for the fees. Due to
the continued popularity of the MPA, as of 2005 there was research going on to determine the
carrying-capacity for the MPA so that visitors do not overwhelm the natural environment.
Sources for above: (Gallegos, Vaahtera, and Wolfs 2005)
SHARK REEF MARINE RESERVE, FIJI
Background: Shark Reef Marine Reserve is located in Beqa lagoon, off the South coast of Vitu
Levu, Fiji. It was established in 2004 by a group of dive operators and local communities to
protect more than 8 species of sharks that frequent the area. The marine reserve had two
aims: to protect the coral reef from illegal fishing, and develop the area as a location for shark
diving. Managing the marine reserve is a joint effort: local communities provide wardens, the
Fiji Fisheries Department provides training and enforcement capabilities, dive companies train
local people as dive staff, and the Shark Foundation (http://www.shark.ch/) provided a boat
for patrolling. Shark diving and shark research in the reserve is now extremely popular,
drawing international visitors from around the globe (including the first author of this report).
Sustainable Financing and Benefit Sharing Model: There is a US$11 fee for those divers that
dive in the Shark Reserve. This income returns to the local communities of Wainiyabia and
Galoa and is managed by local committees; in return for receiving the fee revenue these
communities pledge not to fish in the reserve and provide wardens for patrolling efforts. Dive
shops, restaurants, and hotels also benefit through increased tourist visitation and revenue.
The Shark Reef Marine Reserve is a good example of how communities, the private sector,
and the government can work together to create a win-win for conservation and the local
economy. The revenue from diving fees incentivizes the community to stop fishing in the
reserve and patrol for illegal fishing. Like in many other MPAs in the world, the reserve still
struggles with illegal fishing committed by outsiders (i.e. from other villages and towns in Fiji).
Sources for above: http://www.dive-the-world.com/reefs-and-parks-fiji-viti-levu-shark-reef-
marine-reserve.php
