Usability and security in future voting systems
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Election Center presentation August 2013 Savannah, GA
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Usability and security in future voting systems
- 1. Challenges of balancing usability and security in future voting systems Dana Chisnell @danachis @ChadButterfly
- 2. How are the votes counted?
- 3. How are the votes counted?
- 5. If it’s not usable, it’s not secure.
- 6. Now Current design demands much of voters
- 8. Cataloged 147 election websites Conducted 41 remote moderated usability tests
- 10. What happened?
- 11. Voters are ballot-centric they’re focused on that act, not conscious of the overall process
- 12. What’s on the ballot?
- 13. ? ? ?
- 14. ? ? ?
- 15. ! ?
- 16. If voters don’t know what is on the ballot they are more likely to go to third-party sources they are less likely to show up at the right polling place they’re likely to undervote down-ballot they are less likely to turn out
- 17. Website design problems are well understood sites are hard to find find other sources navigation reflects department don’t know where to go labels are jargon don’t know how to get to content dates and deadlines are vague don’t know when to act graphics are gratuitous get distracted or lost in the site, lose trust sites are not accessible disenfranchisement
- 19. San Francisco and Oakland, December 2011 EVN, March 2012
- 21. Alameda Co. demo ballot
- 22. Minneapolis 2011
- 23. New York state demo
- 24. Voter slate
- 25. How is my vote counted?
- 28. Ballot design problems are well understood split contests across columns overvoting there are responses on both sides of names overvoting arrows rather than bubbles marking incorrectly formatting is inconsistent or too consistent undervoting instructions are complicated or lacking all kinds of crazy things voters don’t know how to correct their ballots lost votes
- 29. How RCV works
- 30. n=52 Joe
- 31. What does it mean?
- 32. Mental models People make inferences about how things work based on available information and context
- 33. Mental models This is what we teach people
- 34. Mental models Sometimes it really is this simple but not in the US
- 35. Mental models Sometimes it really is this simple but not in the US
- 36. Much more like signing for a mortgage
- 37. This is the ballot we test NIST medium complexity ballot
- 39. Point / weight system
- 40. Intent is loaded Preparing to vote Knowing what to expect Interacting with the ballot
- 41. What’s on the ballot? What are my options for voting? absentee what’s the deadline to apply? what do I have to do to get one? when is it due? early voting Election Day where do I vote? where do I vote?
- 42. what’s the deadline to apply? where do I vote? what do I have to do to get one? when is it due? who is in office now? do I need ID to vote? what’s the deadline for registering? where do I vote?
- 43. 1. Voters develop faulty mental models
- 44. 2. Voters don’t understand the consequences of their actions
- 45. 3. Voters vote counter to their intentions
- 48. straight party voting + regular contests + RCV + multi-candidate + retention contests + measures 6 different models
- 49. We’re pretty sure there’s a problem
- 51. Voters bear a cognitive burden that design can relieve.
- 52. Poor design and instructions on ballots make understanding, marking, and casting difficult, time-consuming, and complicated
- 53. Poor design and instructions on ballots make counting, verifying, and audits difficult, time-consuming, and complicated
- 54. Raises questions about what is being secured.
- 55. complex ballots = lost votes
- 56. complex ballots + vote-by-mail = lost votes
- 57. complex ballots + multi-language = lost votes
- 58. RCV + VBM + multi-language = 1000s of lost votes
- 59. Lack of trust in elections Lack of trust in officials Recalls Scrambling county boards
- 60. Security may add to the cognitive burden without thoughtful design.
- 61. Security = Counted as cast
- 62. Security = Cast as intended + counted as cast
- 63. This moment
- 64. Voter ed is not the answer.
- 65. If it’s not usable, it’s not valid.
- 66. If it’s not usable, it’s not countable.
- 67. If it’s not usable, it’s not verifiable.
- 68. If it’s not usable, it’s not auditable.
- 69. If it’s not usable, it’s not secure.
- 70. Thank you Rick Bond Jared Spool Cyd Harrell David Cary Ethan Newby Rebecca Sherrill Callie Wheeler Frank Castro Chelsey Glasson Sandy Olson Sara Cambridge Nancy Frishberg Laura Paajanen Yelena Nakhimovsky Beth Lingard Whitney Quesenbery Beth Pickard
- 71. And... Andrea Moed Doug Hanke Kristen Johansen Karen McGrane Boaz Gurdin Krysta Chauncey Ashley Pearlman Karen Bachmann Donald A. Cox Rosa Moran Kamaria Campbell Josie Scott Paul Schreiber Rachel Goddard Jenn Downs Samantha LeVan Jacqui Adams Kate Aurigemma Michelle Milla Erin Liman Josh Keyes Alessandra Brophy Josh Bright Andrea Fineman
- 72. New tools.
- 73. Field Guides series Research commissioned by EAC Research commissioned by NIST Usability and Civic Life Project Research commissioned by NIST
- 74. Field Guides series Research supported by MacArthur Foundation Research supported by MacArthur Foundation Research supported by MacArthur Foundation Research commissioned by EAC
- 75. Field Guides To Ensuring Voter Intent civicdesigning.org /fieldguides
- 77. If it’s not usable, it’s not secure.
- 78. Thank you.